
ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS

PART 9

**TACTICS FOR
STABILITY OPERATIONS**

This publication replaces AC 71658
(AFM Vol 1 Part 9 - *Tactics for Stabilizing Operations*)

2007

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'A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.'

Aldo Leopold

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WARNING

This document is based on the TTPs taught at OPTAG. It was updated in early 07. As threats and technology change so will the TTPs and this publication will become outdated. The most current version will always be published on the Army's Electronic Battle Box. Units must check the web based version, and with OPTAG, to ensure they have the most up to date information. Suggestions for changes should be sent to LWC, Warfare Development (WARDEV), Tactical Doctrine Branch.

INTRODUCTION

STABILITY OPERATIONS

1. The three principal land tactical activities are offensive, defensive and stability operations. All three may be conducted concurrently. Stability operations are defined as:

'Military operations which contribute to order, security and control to set the conditions to allow the primacy of non-military and indigenous organisations to develop accountable institutions and mechanisms of government.'

2. Stability operations have only recently been recognised as having parity with offensive and defensive operations as a land tactical activity. Because all three land tactical activities may occur concurrently, and because they are likely to be conducted with the same resources and by the same commander, a knowledge of AFM Vol 1, Part 1, *Formation Tactics* is a prerequisite for understanding the broader context of which stability operations are a constituent part.

3. The purpose of this publication is to provide the latest detailed guidance for conducting stability operations. Part A sets the strategic/operational scene. Part B provides the TTPs and advice on the training necessary to acquire proficiency in them. These TTPs have been developed by capturing best practice from both past experience and contemporary operations. They provide first principles and the start point from which to plan and conduct Pre Deployment Training (PDT) activity and to develop TTPs specific to a particular environment or situation encountered on operations.

THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (COE)¹

4. The current operating environment is determined by a blend of interrelated, complex and dynamic factors. The consequent realities for the military are best described by General Krulack's three block war concept which sees military forces handing out humanitarian supplies on one city block, separating warring factions or maintaining stability in an adjacent block and fighting adversaries in a third.² And all of these activities are

¹ The variables that determine the precise nature of the COE are described in detail in Information Note 06/04, *The COE*.

² Gen C C Krulak, *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War*, Marines magazine, Vol 28, No.1, Jan 99.

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carried out within a framework of information and influence operations that battle for the hearts and minds of indigenous populations and a range of global audiences.

5. In addition to delivering the kinetic effect traditionally associated with military activity there is a requirement to influence the perceptions and attitudes of a range of audiences through influence, or non-kinetic, activity. Every action taken by the military will have an effect on the perceptions and attitudes of the indigenous population, the adversary and wider audiences. Presence, posture and profile, the use of force or restraint and how troops interact with locals will have an influencing effect and should be targeted accordingly. Doctrine concerning Info Ops and influence activity is being developed and can be found on the LWC web site or the Army Electronic Battlebox.

6. Ambiguity and uncertainty are constants of the COE³ and all soldiers, regardless of capbadge, must be trained to deal with this. There is a need to develop all of our soldiers' physical and mental robustness, ensure that they are capable of applying the basics in order to be able to fight for their lives in close combat and to develop their powers of judgment – knowing when and how to act is essential to mission success at all levels.

COIN

7. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are essentially COIN operations that are being conducted in an expeditionary manner within a multinational context. The principles of COIN, developed primarily from extensive UK experience, hold true. British military COIN doctrine (AFM Vol 1 Part 10) is in the process of being updated to reflect contemporary conditions. The web based version of the COIN AFM reflects the most current iteration and should thus be used as a key reference document when preparing for and conducting operations.

APPLICATION THROUGH LEADERSHIP

8. Although doctrine and TTPs provide practical guidance on the conduct of operations, their publication alone will not sufficiently add to operational success. Unless soldiers understand doctrine, are well trained in TTPs and are sufficiently motivated to carry out their tasks to the best of their ability their effectiveness on the battlefield, as individuals or as part of a team, will be limited. It is leadership which ensures that training is effective and that drills are learned and followed correctly. It is leadership which drives effective action and motivates soldiers to give their utmost to achieve the common purpose. It is leadership which turns the bald statements of fact in this publication into life saving or battle winning action. And moreover, it is strong leaders who recognise that doctrine writers do not have a monopoly on wisdom and adapt and develop this guidance to win in the Contemporary Operating Environment.

³ Lt Col SJC Tootal OBE, 3 PARA BG – Op HERRICK 4 – An overview of All Arms combined battle in Afghanistan, *The Infantryman 2006*.

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STABILITY OPERATIONS

PART A

CONTEXT

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“The effects based approach...has required us to think afresh about how we intervene in, and subsequently exit from, conflict situations. In particular it requires us to view stabilisation and restoration not as the final act at the end of a conflict, but rather to see the conflict as the first, sometimes unavoidable opening act that precedes the main task of restoration and stabilisation....”¹

1. Stability operations are planned continuously and conducted concurrently with offensive and defensive operations. They are defined as:

‘Military operations which contribute to order, security and control to set the conditions to allow the primacy of non military and indigenous organisations to develop accountable institutions and mechanisms of government.’

2. Military intervention in a state will be undertaken in concert with the other elements of national power (diplomatic and economic) as part of a comprehensive approach in order to achieve national political and strategic objectives.² Stability operations conducted by military forces will be central to achieving wider national aims. They are, at least in part, conducted concurrently with offensive and defensive operations and are likely to be an enduring theme on all operations. The timely creation of conditions for international and host nation (HN) organisations to operate will be a primary concern and, particularly in a post conflict situation, military activity will provide the foundations for longer term development, stability and wider reform.

3. The Contemporary Operating Environment³ will require stability operations to be planned and coordinated with a range of civil actors⁴, in the face of a variety of threats, in complex terrain and amongst the local population. The need for military involvement could range from conflict prevention measures in failed or failing states to providing early support to nation building. The existing security situation will affect the ability of certain actors to engage until their security is guaranteed. In such a case the military may have to take rapid initial responsibility for the provision of the rule of law, basic utilities and governance until a handover of responsibility can be achieved. In asymmetric operations the military will need to be able to take back the lead in these areas if the security situation deteriorates so that relevant other actors cannot complete their role.

4. There are four interrelated groups of tactical activities associated with stability operations. They are conducted in a framework of information operations:

¹ Col G Baldwin. How recent conflicts have altered the concept of crisis management and restoration. *The Infantryman 2005*.

² JDN 4/05 *The Comprehensive Approach*.

³ Described in Information Note 06/04.

⁴ Civil actors is a collective term for the range of civil agencies, bodies and organisations that may be involved in addressing the circumstances and conditions of a conflict or crisis situation. These include: OGDs, International Organisations (IOs); international donors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU); security forces such as the Civil Police; Non Government Organisations (NGOs); the corporate sector; local authorities; and local populations.

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- a. Security and control.
- b. Initial restoration of essential services and facilities.
- c. Interim governance tasks.
- d. Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR).

These are considered in Chapters 3 to 6.

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CHAPTER 2

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

BACKGROUND

1. **The Comprehensive Approach¹.** The Comprehensive Approach (CA) is the UK Government's approach to cross department, comprehensive planning. The greater coherence in planning resulting from the CA and participation of Other Governmental Departments (OGD) and Inter-Agencies (IA) at strategic, operational and tactical levels offers a number of advantages. These include a thorough, effective analysis and shared understanding of a situation, access to a broad range of intelligence and analytical assets and expertise, and a better focussed use of military resources to achieve long term national objectives. Significant operational and tactical effect can result from the judicious use of OGD and IA during Stability Operations. In semi-permissive and permissive environments HQ elements should be expanded to include cross governmental and IA personnel. The CA is best demonstrated at the tactical level by Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT). It should, however, be understood that where OGD and IA are either unavailable or insufficiently experienced, it may be necessary for their functions to be performed by the military.

2. **Supported and Supporting Departments.** Depending on the nature of a crisis, the military may not constitute the main effort and may be required to conduct supporting activity to create the conditions for OGD or other organisations to deliver the required outcome. The relationship between supported and supporting departments may change with time according to the agreed main effort or the situation. Command and control, responsibilities and funding will need to be clarified and the necessary means of communications between departments and agencies established.

3. **The Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU).** The PCRU is accountable to a board drawn from the MOD, DfID and FCO. It comprises personnel from the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department for International Development (DfID) and also has seconded staff from the Police Service of Northern Ireland, GCHQ and HM Treasury. It has been established to provide a framework for the coordination of the UK Government's response to a crisis. It provides the technical expertise to assist with strategic planning, in the form of an 'Integrated and Common Assessment', and has limited deployable elements that can provide planning advice to a commander and his staff at the operational level. Critically it provides the military with advice on a wider, complementary set of competences covering government, security and justice, public services, infrastructure and economic issues.

UNDERSTANDING AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

4. In order to achieve success military activity has to be based on a thorough understanding of the operating environment. It is essential to develop a good understanding of the constituent parts of the relevant society², its history and culture, the origins of conflict, demographics, political dynamics, influential power structures, regional

¹ Reference JDN 4/05 *The Comprehensive Approach*.

² Rule of law, education, commercial, humanitarian and health, information, military/security, economic and diplomacy and governance. JWP 3-50 *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*.

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influences and the complex of actors (civil, military, criminal etc) involved. Such understanding then forms the basis for:

- a. Determining the nature of the threat.
- b. Determining the perceptions and intentions of the various actors involved in a crisis.
- c. Determining and assessing how military activity affects the dynamics of the situation.
- d. Planning.
- e. Executing operations.

5. Maintaining Situational Awareness (SA) is also essential. Knowing when and how to act to achieve the desired effect is critical. To enable comprehensive planning and coordinated activities with OGD and IA requires intelligence. Within stability operations the ISTAR effort is subtly different from other operations. There is a greater need to develop trend and link analysis, with a focus on a wider range of actors. Whilst the need for in depth understanding of each actor is obvious, the reality is that this is unachievable except over a long period of time, and thus commanders should expect the intelligence picture that they need will develop slowly. Formation commanders should expect to have to provide much more focussed ISTAR support to units that will have a broader range of responsibilities than in a warfighting operation. It is often incorrectly assumed that HUMINT is the key requirement in stability operations. The prevailing circumstances and the environment rather than the type of operation determine the most effective collection method. As with any type of operation, a detailed ISTAR estimate, regularly updated, will form the basis of determining what ISTAR assets³ are required.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

6. A military force will usually operate under a politically brokered mandate (UN or regional for example) or some form of agreement brokered with a HN (Military Technical Agreement, Memorandum of Understanding etc). This will provide the force with international legitimacy and define how it may conduct operations. In addition to UK law, other international law such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the Geneva Convention will apply as a matter of principle. Each situation must, therefore, be considered with appropriate legal advice.

COALITION DYNAMICS

7. Operations conducted as part of a coalition will be subject to additional frictions. Each contributing nation is likely to have strategic objectives that are not necessarily aligned with the UK's, and their forces may operate under different remits. ROE and chains of command may be complex. National agenda and their implications for the employment of their troops must be understood and considered when planning. Decision making is likely to be slower, more complicated and perhaps more frustrating than when a single

³ Including assessment staff.

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nation is involved. This will in part be due to the problems with language and not having a common understanding of terminology. National reporting chains should not be allowed to sideline the coalition chain of command. The coalition view of events should always be considered.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

8. Info Ops seek to influence the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, allies and the uncommitted. It is an essential activity when conducting stability operations. The Info Ops campaign will need to be consistent with the HMG Information Strategy. Planning should be fully integrated, conducted by specialist staff and used to produce targeted effect in support of operational and tactical activity. The use of Info Ops in stability operations is covered below.

HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE

9. The requirement to conduct stability operations concurrently with war fighting will see military HQs expand from their war fighting framework to accommodate specialist cells (Info Ops, G9/CIMIC, SSR, LEGAD, POLAD, OA, Ops Sp and a Stabilisation Advisor (STABAD) from PCRU), enhance existing capabilities (eg intelligence architecture) and incorporate OGD, IA and military multinational elements. The inclusion of civilian personnel will be restricted by the permissiveness of the operational environment. Elements of the HQ may need to take on additional roles to enable the HQ to plan and execute some of the tactical activities, in particular support to SSR, interim governance tasks and the restoration of essential services. Pre deployment preparation should include role specific training for staff and collective training (including civilian and multinational staff) for the whole HQ⁴.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

10. Operational Analysis (OA) teams produce Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) to give an objective assessment of the overall situation and the effectiveness of military operations. Ultimately MOE assist in determining mission success and can be used to inform decision making. MOE should be considered and integrated throughout all phases of an operation and a combination of methods should be used. Data collection can be carried out by troops or by third parties (HN contractors, other civil actors etc). Armed with objective advice from the staff and OA Cell the commander can use these objective assessments and make a qualitative judgement on the MOE. Examples of likely MOE and means of data collection include:

- a. **Normality Indicators.** Analysis of normality indicators provides a systematic measure of the progress towards normality by assessing key economic indicators.
- b. **Patrol Reports.** Observations and interviews carried out by routine dismounted patrols can be used to indicate trends in tension.
- c. **Opinion Polling.** The use of professional pollsters can provide statistical analysis of public opinion on key issues.

⁴ All augmentees should arrive with the formation HQ with the correct staff skills and prior to the HQ's MRX.

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d. **Contacts Analysis.** Records of incidents and attacks can be used to assess enemy/insurgent/criminal activity and trends.

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CHAPTER 3

SECURITY AND CONTROL

INTRODUCTION

1. Security and control is the first of the four tactical activities in stability operations and is likely to be the activity which requires most military effort. Success in achieving security and control enables all the other lines of operations to flourish. The early establishment of a secure environment and a degree of law and order, following military intervention, achieves the following:

- a. Provides a permissive environment for external, civil actors to operate.
- b. Promotes campaign authority.
- c. Provides the opportunity for the development or resumption of normal security, social, political and economic activity.
- d. Provides the opportunity for dialogue between opposing factions leading to political activity.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

2. **Variables.** Success in establishing a secure environment depends upon a number of variables, some of which are outside the control of an external military force. All these factors should have been considered by the strategic comprehensive estimate:

- a. **Social, Ethnic and Political Factors.** The social and ethnic mix of a society and its propensity to violence as a result of its history, political divisions or criminality will impact on the security environment.
- a. **The Nature of the Political Settlement.** A comprehensive peace settlement reduces the scope for further violence.
- c. **The Nature and Extent of the Demobilisation of Combatants.** Failure to conduct a comprehensive and timely Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme can perpetuate violence and lawlessness and make arms available to militias etc.¹ Equally an overly ambitious DDR programme can also lead to a security vacuum that can be exploited by protagonists.
- d. **Regional Stability.** The influence of neighbouring states can exacerbate or improve a situation.
- e. **The Size, Posture, Command and Skills of the Military Force.** The military force providing security and control must be configured, trained and resourced to conduct the mission. For example, large numbers of combat ready soldiers who remain in barracks will be of little use in promoting stability.

¹ DDR is covered in Military Support to Security Sector Reform in Annex C.

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f. **The Extent of Organised Crime.** In a transitional phase organised crime can emerge as an ally of spoilers and rejectionists. Criminals will benefit from a lack of law and order and will exploit any security vacuum. It is therefore essential that credible and impartial criminal justice systems and the civil police service (PS) are developed early.

g. **Condition of Security Sector.** The capacity and capability of the HN security sector will influence the security situation.

h. **History.** Analysis of the history of conflict (including key events such as uprisings, assassinations and peace agreements) and associated changes in governance, security and socio-economic development will provide an insight into local attitudes towards violence and proposed solutions.

3. **Threats.** Threats to security in failed or failing states are diverse, will vary over time and space and are often interrelated. The challenges to establishing a secure environment can be grouped into four categories:

a. **Expressive Violence.** Perpetrators of expressive violence are unlikely to have realistic political aims but their violence goes beyond that of criminality. Such violence is conducted by two broad groups: former regime diehards and score settlers.

b. **Instrumental Violence.** Instrumental violence is used by groups within a state or by neighbouring states to promote their political, territorial or strategic interests. Violence between religious or ethnic groups can fall into this category if orchestrated for political ends.

c. **Threats to Coalition Forces and New Regimes.** Where threats to coalition forces and new regimes exist, they should be rapidly countered.

d. **Disorder.** Social chaos results in disorder (looting, revenge killings, vigilantism etc) and a failure to curb this rapidly will undermine campaign authority and the credibility of a coalition to provide security. In addition banditry, conducted by former members of ISF or armed factions, and 'normal' criminal activity will also need to be countered.

4. **Intelligence.** Intelligence, HUMINT in particular, will prove essential in the conduct of security and control tasks to permit both the precise targeting of individuals and organisations and informing wider SA. Integral assets (field HUMINT Teams, SIGINT teams etc) may be augmented by ISF assets, where appropriate, and other international intelligence organisations (eg INTERPOL).² The sharing of intelligence will help to develop a climate of cooperation between MNF, ISF and other organisations. Commanders will require guidance from PJHQ as to what can be shared and this guidance should be kept under review.

5. **Use of Force.** Force must be applied within the ROE for a particular operation. Legal advice should be sought at all levels when planning its use. Consideration must also

² AFM Vol 1 Part 3 *ISTAR* contains more detail on Intelligence activities.

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be given to the effect that the use of proportional force will have on a broad audience (such as the general population, other factions etc) and other campaign lines of operation, not just the intended target. Short term tactical gains through the use of proportional force may obstruct long term objectives, for example by alienating elements of a local population who may view the collateral damage and casualties caused by, say, the use of indirect fire weapons to engage targets in some areas as unacceptable or excessive despite the fact that the use of such weapons may be entirely within the bounds of the ROE.

6. **Establishing Rule of Law.** Successful implementation of the rule of law requires an effective criminal justice system consisting of police, judiciary and penal elements. Early establishment of the rule of law will increase the chances of mission success. Delivering personal security for the population should be a high priority and will set the conditions for the resumption of normal economic and social activity. Experience has shown, however, that it can take over a year to build and deploy a foreign CIVPOL force.³ Military forces can consequently come under pressure to maintain internal security and fill the vacuum. Where this is necessary, they should be complemented by civil law enforcement capabilities and replaced entirely by an appropriate civilian organisation as soon as practicable. Policing needs to be linked to judicial and penal processes and will form part of a wider SSR process as the operation progresses. Specialist predeployment training (PDT) may be required for elements of a force. Legal guidance and clarification must be sought concerning powers of arrest, detention etc. Detail on a possible mechanism for establishing rule of law is given at paragraph 522.

7. **Information Operations.** Info Ops will be required to influence local, national and regional attitudes and perceptions in order to support the establishment of a secure environment and the development of law and order. They will also provide the means by which the military communicates with the local population. Any information vacuum will be exploited by adversaries and the MNF must consider the best medium for communicating with the local population. Some examples of how Info Ops activity may be used are given below:

- a. Promote the authority of and generate popular support for legitimate HN institutions and ISF.
- b. Marginalise violent factions, criminals and other spoilers from the majority of public support.
- c. Develop and protect consent (or tolerance) towards the MNF by the local population.
- d. Explain the reason for operations and the use of force by the military.
- e. Communicate instructions, provisions and rules to the population.
- f. Shape conditions prior to military activity in order to pre-empt negative effects.
- g. Reinforce and strengthen the will and resolve of ISF and allies.

³ Dobbins et al. *America's role in Nation Building From Germany to Iraq*. RAND Corporation. 2003.

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EXECUTION

8. **Establishing Temporary Rule of Law.** Establishing and maintaining the rule of law is essential when conducting stability operations. In some situations, such as the immediate aftermath of conflict, HN law and order institutions may not be capable of performing this function and it is unlikely that a significant number of international police will be immediately available to replace them. Responsibility for enforcing law and order will therefore initially fall to the military. The steps outlined in Table 3.1 are intended to provide a framework which can be used to develop solutions to the problem of establishing law and order where no other capacity exists.

Step	Execution/Activity	Resources
1. Understand legal authority.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand the means available to the military to enforce the rule of law. This includes the use of force, powers to stop, search, detain and intern civilians. • Ensure that actions taken in order to establish the rule of law are legal. • Understand HN criminal laws and powers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LEGAD. • PCRU rep. • Dfid in-country advisor.
2. Communicate. Expected behaviour, restrictions and consequences must be clearly articulated to the civil population.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage prominent local figures within the civil community. • Use local media. • Use Info Ops activities to inform and influence behaviour. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tac Psyops Teams. • LEGAD. • Interpreters. • Military personnel • Civpol advisors. • Info Ops & Media.
3. Enforce rule of law.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider use of curfews. • Conduct patrolling activity (if possible with local PS and or Indigenous Armed Forces (IAF)). • Stop/search/detain persons as necessary. • Establish and run temporary detention facility. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Include inspections by IOs (eg ICRC) and prominent local figures. - Provide opportunity for enquiries & visits by family members (through ICRC). - Publish lists of detainees and their location. • Establish interim assessment system to determine the need for internment. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A panel of military and prominent civilian figures may provide an appropriate means of doing this. - Efforts should be made to reduce numbers held in detention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interpreters. • Civpol advisors. • LEGAD/ALS. • RMP. • Med. • RE. • MPS. • Prison Service advisors. • Log & Med sp. • Clerical support. • Interpreters. • Info ops. • PCRU rep. • Dfid in-country advisor. • Interpreters. • ALS. • Clerical support. • Info ops. • PCRU rep. • Dfid in-country advisor.

<p>4. Transfer responsibility to appropriate organisation. These could include international or HN Police and Prison Services and judicial systems.</p>	<p>facilities for minor offences. - An independent oversight mechanism should be established (eg a committee of prominent local figures, appropriate IOs). - Processes and findings should be publicised.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agree conditions for transfer of authority early. • Assist with the development of police, judicial and penal systems. • Address as part of broader Security Sector Reform (SSR) (see Section 6). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCRU rep. • DfID in-country advisor. • Interpreters. • Civpol advisors. • LEGAD/ALS. • RMP. • Med • RE. • MPS. • Prison Service advisors. • Log & Med sp. • Clerical support. • Interpreters. • Info ops. • Interpreters. • ALS. • Clerical support. Info ops.
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Table 3.1 – Establishing Temporary Rule of Law

9. **Military Tasks.** *ADP Land Operations* lists a number of tactical tasks associated with security and control. These are listed below and reference made to detail contained in other publications where appropriate:

- a. **Patrolling.** Patrolling enables the military force to dominate ground in order to deny its use to hostile forces, and gain information. Detail on patrolling activity is contained in Chapter 17 of this AFM.
- b. **Convoy Protection.** Detail on convoy operations and the employment of electronic counter measures is contained in the Chapter 18 of this AFM.
- c. **Public Order Operations.** The military may need to conduct public order operations to maintain law and order where the civilian police are unable to deal with the situation. Chapter 18 of this AFM provides detail on public order operations.
- d. **Cordon and Search.** Cordon and search operations may be required in order to detain individuals, obtain evidence or deny weapons and equipment to hostile elements within an area. Chapter 16 of this AFM contains detail on cordon operations, patrol search and search operations.

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e. **Route Protection.** The protection of routes may be required as a force protection measure or to deny freedom of movement to hostile elements. Route Search and the use of vehicle check points (VCP) provide the means by which this is achieved. Both activities are covered in detail in Chapter 15 of this AFM which covers movement control measures, the checking and search of routes, the use of ECM and IED counter measures.

f. **Separation of Hostile Forces.** Interposition or the separation of hostile forces may be required. Detail on interposition tactics, negotiation and mediation, delineation procedures and observation and monitoring is given in JWP 3-50 *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*.

g. **Enforcement of Out of Bounds Areas.** Key infrastructure, vulnerable communities, food storage depots, weapons cantonments etc may need to be kept out of bounds or protected. IPB should highlight such areas. Means of enforcing out of bounds areas include:

- (1) Communicating the location of out of bound areas and the consequences of entering them.
- (2) Dominating approaches.
- (3) Conducting patrols and searches.
- (4) Securing the area (fencing, standing patrols, checkpoints, sentry positions etc).

h. **Curfews.** Curfews provide a means by which the movement of personnel can be controlled during specific periods of time. The following points should be considered:

- (1) **Design of Curfew Timings.** Curfew timings should support the establishment of a secure and stable environment but not prevent the civil community from going about its legitimate business (religious activity, obtaining food, fuel etc).
- (2) **Communication.** Curfew restrictions, the reason for them and the consequences of breaking them must be clearly communicated.
- (3) **Enforcement.** Framework patrolling, VCPs, quick reaction forces (QRF) triggered by observation posts and standing patrols provide the means by which the curfew may be enforced.

i. **Prisoner and Detainee Handling.**⁴ The mandate under which the force is operating will articulate the specific powers of arrest and detention available to members of the force and theatre specific Standard Operating Instructions must

⁴ JDP 1-10 *PW, Detainees and Internees* provides guidance on the rules concerning the handling of prisoners and detainees.

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detail the precise processes involved with the detention and internment of persons. These should include:

- (1) Detail on the powers of the force to stop and search persons and the procedures to be followed.
- (2) Details on the procedures to be followed when conducting the search of vehicles or property.
- (3) Details concerning the detention and internment of persons. These should cover: the circumstances under which persons should be detained; the actions to be taken; details on the detention of women and children; the nomination and responsibilities of unit personnel needed for the processing of detainees; the medical examination of detainees; tactical questioning; the decision making process and procedures to be followed with regard to internment, release or transfer to HN PS; the procedures to be followed when an individual is interned, including documentation, review committees, independent inspections (eg by ICRC), informing families and releasing or transferring internees to HN penal and judicial systems.

In general the procedures adopted should ensure that human rights are not infringed and that any evidence relevant to a potential prosecution is gathered, preserved and recorded correctly.

j. **Movement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP).** Every effort should be made to prevent the local population becoming refugees through measures such as ensuring their security and the provision of essential services. Support to IDP and refugees is usually conducted by specialist agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN High Commissioner's Office for Refugees (UNHCR). Depending on the scale and location of the problem the military may be required to provide assistance with the movement of refugees. The following factors should be considered when planning and conducting this sort of activity:

- (1) The return of IDP and refugees is a voluntary process.
- (2) IDP and refugees should be involved in the planning and management of their return and resettlement as far as is practicable.
- (3) IDP and refugees should be protected.
- (4) The conditions established in the destination must at the very least meet essential food and water, shelter and housing, medical and sanitary and security requirements.

Where the military is involved with IDP and refugees, advice should be sought from subject matter experts (eg UNHCR) and activities coordinated with other civil humanitarian agencies as far as is practicable.

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CHAPTER 4

INITIAL RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND FACILITIES

INTRODUCTION

1. The initial restoration of essential services and facilities is the second tactical activity associated with stability operations. Military effort may be required in the early stages of an operation, and subsequently in periods or areas where the security situation deteriorates, to restore essential services and facilities¹ for the following reasons:

- a. Civil agencies are incapable of delivering the required effect due to the security situation, but military restoration must compliment the longer term plans of OGDs and avoid creating dependence on military support.
- b. In order to improve security:
 - (1) Directly, by fixing populations (for example by the provision of clean water in a given area), improving routes (permitting, armoured vehicles/QRF access), improving street lighting etc.
 - (2) Indirectly, by removing cause for discontent amongst the civil population and denying a shadow government the opportunity to occupy a vacuum.
- c. To promote campaign authority.
- d. To support the logistic and infrastructure requirements of a military force.
- e. To act as a catalyst for governance, economic and social activity (for example by repairing strategic infrastructure and improving transport links).
- f. Legal obligations placed upon occupying powers by international law to provide and care for civilian populations.

2. The restoration of essential services and facilities for a civilian population, linked to an Info Ops campaign and other lines of activity, is an early measure that can be taken to increase the chances of mission success. Restoration work must be linked to the IO messages in order to capitalise on the good will from the local population and deny criminal groupings from taking unwarranted credit. Restoration activity is likely to be conducted primarily by military engineers or contractors with CIMIC staff playing a coordinating role. The military medical services may also be involved where there is a requirement to restore medical facilities for the civilian population and to provide advice on environmental health issues.

3. The nature and size of the military contribution will vary. In some circumstances it may be appropriate to focus military engineer effort on the restoration of services for the population at the expense of the provision of facilities to the force.

¹ Water and electricity supplies, sewage systems, waste disposal services, roads, bridges etc.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR INITIAL RESTORATION

4. **Restoration Planning.** Restoration planning should to be undertaken early, as part of the comprehensive planning process in the absence of appropriate civilian agencies. An overall assessment of the HN's infrastructure should be made and used to focus military and civil resources to best effect in support of the campaign plan. Short term, quick-win solutions should be aligned with long term objectives and resources identified and allocated to conduct both. Provision should also be made for the military to hand over responsibility for restoration tasks to appropriate civil actors or HN institutions as soon as is practicable while having contingency plans to retake the lead in periods or in areas where the security situation deteriorates and prevents other actors from carrying out their role. The HN should be involved as early as possible in the planning of work and the allocation of priorities with HN personnel employed wherever possible.

5. **Targeting.** The restoration of essential services can contribute directly to improvements in the security situation. Restoration and restoration activity should be treated as a non-kinetic effect and fully integrated into the targeting process. During conflict phases, expert advice from military engineers must contribute to the targeting process in order to lessen the impact of kinetic operations on critical infrastructure in order to:

- a. Avoid, where possible, targeting infrastructure that will be required to restore the nation in the post combat phase.
- b. Minimise the long term damage to any infrastructure that must be targeted in order to achieve a required effect during combat operations.
- c. Protect infrastructure that will be required to restore the nation in the post combat phase that might be vulnerable to other threats during combat operations.

Short term gains will need to be balanced against long term objectives and the impact on the perceptions of local populations should be considered. Restoration activity should be conducted in support of and exploited by Info Ops (failure to do so may leave a vacuum that is exploited by opposition groups). Info Ops activity may also be required to produce a remedial effect where critical infrastructure has been damaged as a result of military action or to manage expectations when quick repairs are not achievable.

6. **Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE).** Basic services and infrastructure should be examined as part of the IPE process. Correctly targeting restoration effort can achieve significant results.²

7. **Coordination of Activity.** Military restoration activity must be coordinated with the efforts of civil actors and in line with long term strategic objectives. The process of comprehensive planning and coordination should continue at the operational and tactical level. CIMIC staff will play a role in this process, conducting liaison with civil actors and, where the situation permits, establishing a Civil Military Operations Centre (CMOC) as a

² Maj Gen PW Chiarelli, US Army. *Winning the Peace – The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations*. Military Review Jul-Aug 05.

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mechanism for coordination.³ Military engineer staff will be involved in this process along with other subject matter experts, such as the military medical services.

8. **Funding.** Ideally funds for restoration activity should be made available from a single source at the national level and channelled to HN institutions as they develop their capability and capacity. Restoration activity must be adequately resourced. The mechanism for obtaining funds for restoration activity (from the MOD's, own OGD such as DfID or other civil or International Organisations such as the World Bank) must be understood. Financial authority must be delegated to the appropriate level⁴ to ensure that sufficient funds can be used in a timely manner to achieve desired effects. Restoration work with a direct impact on the military mission, such as repair of street lighting in an urban area to reduce the requirement for patrolling, should be funded through the military.

9. **Employment of Military Engineers.** Military engineer resources will be limited, reinforcing the need for the appropriate targeting of assets and effective liaison and coordination of effort with other actors. They may be employed in the following ways:

- a. Conducting the technical assessment of existing infrastructure (both before and after deployment).
- b. Preparation of an emergency infrastructure plan in conjunction with other actors.
- c. Advising on targeting and effects.
- d. Securing key infrastructure assets.
- e. Managing contracting processes.
- f. Programme and project management.
- g. Repair, maintenance and operation of infrastructure.
- h. Reestablishment, training and mentoring HN service institutions.

In some circumstances it may be necessary to surge additional engineer resources to a theatre in order to cope with the infrastructure demands of the civilian population and the military concurrently.⁵

10. **Use of Local Expertise and Labour.** A challenging but essential task is to make the best use of available local expertise as soon as possible. In order to set the conditions for long term success and the eventual transfer of responsibility to HN facilities institutions indigenous personnel should be involved in problem solving and decision making from the outset. Institutional capacity should be developed alongside technical ability and planning processes (prioritisation of tasks, securing of funds etc) linked to governance activities.

³ See IJWP 3-90 *Joint Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)* for more detail on CIMIC activity.

⁴ Some funding could be made available to ground holding unit commanders, but funded projects must contribute to the overall effect that is trying to be achieved.

⁵ A paper by HQ EinC(A) *Stabilisation and Restoration – The Military Engineer's Role*, gives more detail on the employment of Military Engineers in the restoration of essential services and facilities.

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Wherever possible local labour should be used on reconstruction projects in order to boost local economies and provide legitimate means of income to the local population. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes (see below) may be linked to reconstruction projects to provide employment opportunities for ex-combatants.

11. **Transition Management.** Where the military has been obliged to undertake activity normally carried out by civil actors there will be a requirement to hand over responsibility, either by province or nationwide, to HN institutions or other appropriate civil actors (IO or NGO). Depending upon the situation (capability and capacity of HN institutions, security etc) the time required for the transition process will vary. It should be a conditions-based activity and decisions to conduct a transfer of responsibility should be linked to other relevant lines of operation (for example Governance). Info Ops should exploit opportunities to highlight progress and the effectiveness of legitimate HN institutions.

EXECUTION

12. Normally, the lead will be taken by the Engr Branch, in line with the overall J3/J5 plan and effort should be coordinated with all staff branches and it should be understood that the initial restoration of essential services and facilities by military engineers is likely to be of a temporary and improvised nature. Longer term solutions are likely to be required to generate lasting effect and early activity should seek to complement longer term repair and development plans. The following headings are intended to give a feel for the type of activity that may be required when conducting the restoration of essential services. The list is neither exhaustive nor necessarily sequential. Activities should be linked to Info Ops and other influence activity:

a. **Existing Infrastructure Assessment.** This should be conducted pre and post deployment by the relevant subject matter experts. Other civil actors may be involved in this process. Typical tasks include:

- (1) The repair of roads, railways and waterways.
- (2) The restoration of airfields, harbours and ports.
- (3) The provision of essential services (SWET (sewers, water, electricity, trash)).
- (4) The restoration of essential health and public buildings and services, including sewerage and waste disposal.

b. **Establish Links with HN Essential Service Providers.** Maximum use should be made of HN expertise at all stages. Other civil actors should be included in this process where appropriate.

c. **Plan and Resource Restoration Activity.** Activity should be prioritised in accordance with operational and humanitarian needs. Detailed planning will be required by military experts in conjunction with available HN experts and other civil actors. As a general rule military involvement should occur where no other organisation has the capacity relative to the situation to act. Resources must be identified early and made available in a timely manner in order to take advantages of

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windows of opportunity (for example a temporary improvement in the security situation). Short term projects should complement long term aims.

d. **Conduct Restoration.** As far as reasonably practicable, efforts must be made to include HN expertise, labour and resources in restoration and restoration projects. Opportunities for providing local employment and developing HN capacity should be exploited and, ideally, linked to longer term economic development plans, SSR activity etc.

e. **Develop HN Institutional Capacity and Capability.** The initial restoration process should set the foundation for continued and sustainable HN responsibility for the delivery of utilities. Subject Matter Experts (SME) may be required to conduct training, mentoring and monitoring to develop technical, and management skills. The provision of essential services and utilities should be linked to initiatives to develop local governance.

f. **Conduct a Transition of Responsibility for Essential Services Provision.** The transition of responsibility should be planned early, as a conditions-based activity and linked to other lines of operation.

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CHAPTER 5

INTERIM GOVERNANCE TASKS

Govern verb. *Conduct the policy and affairs of (a state, organisation or people). Control or influence.*

The Concise Oxford English Dictionary.

INTRODUCTION

1. It is accepted that the provision of governance is not generally a military responsibility and if the military do get involved it is most likely to be in a supporting role. In some circumstances, however, the military may be the only organisation able to take responsibility for governing an area. JWP 3-50 *The Military Contribution to PSO*, identifies that the military may be required to undertake a range of civil administration tasks in support of a weak HN government or in the absence of a working indigenous or international administration. Such tasks may range from CIMIC liaison to the establishment of an interim military government and are likely to include some degree of responsibility for the provision of essential services. The military should seek to hand responsibility for governance tasks to an appropriate indigenous or international civil organisation at the earliest appropriate opportunity. Its primary role will be in establishing the environment in which civil actors can operate.

GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

2. **Responsibility.** Comprehensive and detailed planning will be required with input (and ideally the lead) from OGDs, the HN government and other IOs and NGOs as appropriate. Considerations include:

a. **Mandate.** The mandate under which the force is operating will articulate responsibilities and structures for government.

b. **Understanding.** Existing structures and legislation need to be clearly understood and their existence and ability to function effectively assessed. The subtleties of the local environment should be understood. To understand fully the local situation an analysis of existing power bases and the interrelationships between them should be conducted.

3. **A Possible Approach.** Although there is no template for best practice in governance, the following functions are likely to be required:

a. **Rule of Law.** Some form of rule of law should be established. Military forces may be required to perform the role of a police force, or assist local PS; protect and assist existing, or establish, some form of judiciary; and support or establish some form of penal system.

b. **Civil Authority.** A mechanism for meeting the immediate needs of the civil population¹ (shelter, food, water, medical provision, sanitation, fuel, power etc) must be established. Committees comprising prominent local citizens may provide a

¹ Maslow's *Hierarchy of Needs*.

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suitable means for determining needs and establishing priorities. An understanding of the local politics will be essential in negotiation and communications in general.

c. **Communications.** Communication is critical to the establishment of civil authority and the rule of law. Info Ops and P Info resources will be required to support of governance activity, to provide information on the civil authority being established, the role of the military etc. An information vacuum risks exploitation by elements hostile to the military force or the supported civil authority.

In all cases best use should be made of local expertise, structures and capabilities. Adequate resources should, ideally, be provided to allow local officials to resolve their own issues. Strict standards of accountability should be enforced to lessen the effects of corruption. More detail on achieving these functions is given below.

4. **Protection of Existing Facilities.** Early effort must be made to protect existing government infrastructure. Failure to do so is likely to increase the resources and time required to establish even basic HN governance facilities and capability/capacity.

5. **Use of Existing Institutions.** Experience has shown that using existing government institutions produces quicker results than building new ones from scratch. In order to provide an initial degree of governance there may be a requirement to permit former, undesirable regime elements to remain in post (under close supervision) until they can be replaced by a suitable alternative.

6. **Elections.** The military may also support an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in organising elections. The temptation to hold early elections in order to meet deadlines and exit strategies should be avoided to prevent the legitimisation of spoilers and disruption of the long term democratic process. Studies suggest that it is desirable to hold local elections in the first instance to provide the opportunity for local leaders to emerge and gain experience and for political parties to build a support base. Extended preparation periods also facilitate the establishment of other aspects of civil society, such as a free press.²

7. **Coordination and Consistency.** The activities of all agencies involved in the provision and development of governance and capacity must be coordinated. A consistent approach should, ideally, be adopted by all actors.

8. **Control of ISF.** SSR activity must include the development of the means by which ISF are controlled by a legitimate government. Attempts should be made to include this principle from the outset of any governance activity.

CONDUCT

9. **Establishing Civil Authority.** It is essential that an administrative vacuum is not allowed to develop in order to deny the opportunity for spoilers (criminals, extremist groups etc) to establish their own shadow government in opposition to legitimate government institutions. A means by which a military force may begin to establish a civil authority is suggested in Table 5.1. Wherever possible expert advice from OGD and a deployed

² Dobbins et al. *America's role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*. RAND Corporation. 2003.

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POLAD should be used and efforts made to coordinate initial activities with any longer term development programmes.

Activity	Execution	Resources
<p>1. Communication. Establish a dialogue with key community figures to increase awareness and manage local expectation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hold meetings with civil society representatives (use J2 assessments etc to ensure appropriate personalities are involved). • Use media/Info Ops to inform local opinions, perceptions and expectations. • Publicise activities. • Protect civil representatives as necessary. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safe, neutral venue for meetings. • Interpreters. • CIMIC staff. • Tac Psyops teams. • Media teams. • Clerical support to record proceedings. • PCRU team. • DfID in-country advisor. • FCO representatives.
<p>2. Identify and prioritise local requirements. Establish committees of local representatives to represent and prioritise the needs of the civil population.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hold regular meetings to establish priorities and update on progress. • Identify and include local expertise (eg facilities managers). • Encourage local ownership of issues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safe, neutral venue for meetings. • Interpreters. • CIMIC staff. • Clerical support to record proceedings. • PCRU team. • DfID in-country advisor. • Meeting venues.
<p>3. Provide administration and essential services. Meet the needs of the civilian population and encourage local ownership.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish sector working groups (eg water, power, law and order) comprising local and military experts. • Develop working group capability with military elms increasingly performing a mentoring role. • Establish a mechanism to allocate funds/resources and monitor effectiveness (the committee(s) established in step 2 may form the basis of this). • Publicise activities and responsibilities to enhance legitimacy of organisations. • Manage expectations. • Audit accounts and expenditure. • Link to national structures as soon as practicable. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interpreters. • Subject matter experts (eg ALS, RE, AMS) and technical support. • Clerical support. • Source(s) of funding. • Financial support. • Info Ops. • Media Ops. • CIMIC staff.
<p>4. Set conditions for and handover of responsibility. Responsibility for governance should be handed over to the HN authorities or an appropriate international civil organisation at the earliest practicable opportunity.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify and agree conditions to be met for transfer to occur early. • Identify suitable organisations to accept responsibility (HN institutions, IOs, NGOs, OGD etc). • Develop capacity of local organisations. • Publicise achievements. • Manage expectations (local population, local administrators, NGOs, own forces etc). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIMIC staff. • Info Ops. • Media Ops. • Interpreters. • PCRU team. • DfID in-country advisor.

Table 5.1 – Establishing Civil Authority

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10. **Rapid Deployment of Civil Expertise.** In cases where an external administration is required, able civil administrators **may** be deployed to conduct administrative tasks. Military support, in the form of protection and life support, might be required in order to enable them to function effectively.

11. **Elections.** Military forces may be required to provide support to elections, probably by providing security for voter registration centres, polling stations and the movement of ballot boxes as well as assisting in the education of the electorate. It is desirable to have ISF involved in this process (according to their capability) and they should be involved in the planning and conduct of support to elections. Police primacy should be essential. In many cases such activity may provide a catalyst for improving cooperation between elements of the ISF and between the ISF and emerging government. This and the associated Info Ops opportunities should be exploited.

a. **Independent Electoral Commissions.** IECs are usually appointed to run an election process. They usually comprise representatives of the HN and a Chairman appointed by the UN. Independent from political influence, they are charged with the organisation, oversight, implementation and conduct of elections in order to deliver impartial, effectively delivered and credible elections. Early liaison with the IEC, ISF and military is essential in order to facilitate the planning for the security of the elections. Care must be taken not to jeopardise the neutrality of the IEC.

b. **Private Companies.** Private companies may be employed to provide logistic and administrative support (voter registration, election kits of booths, ballot boxes, paperwork etc and the transport of ballots) to elections in order to maintain the independent nature of the process. It is necessary to draw clear boundaries of responsibilities between the military and the PMCs. Close liaison is needed to prevent misunderstanding.

12. **Provincial Reconstruction Teams.** Experience based primarily from Afghanistan has shown that the PRT can be useful to initiate local planning and coordination of stability operations. Due to its multidisciplinary (including expertise from OGD) make up it is ideally placed to review priorities across the spectrum of development. Detail is given in Annex A.

13. **Humanitarian Assistance.** The military is only likely to provide humanitarian assistance when the security conditions in an area preclude the operation of NGOs and other civil agencies. Generally military involvement in humanitarian aid should be as a last resort and should be as a result of a request for assistance. Coordination with aid agencies is essential and expert planning advice should be sought from appropriate civil agencies (UNHCR, competent NGOs etc). When it comes to actually delivering aid, the military may find itself much better equipped than NGOs/IOs in the area: some NGOs simply cannot mobilise aid on the same scale as the military³. Poorly planned and executed humanitarian assistance can lead to a deterioration in the security situation (such as rioting at distribution points and in refugee camps) and sour civil-military relations, potentially causing problems at a later stage when the military wishes to hand over other responsibilities to them. Comprehensive planning with the use of multidisciplinary teams (eg PRT) is essential. All military forces engaged in humanitarian activity should do so in uniform, not civilian clothing, in order to assist in maintaining the independent status of the aid agencies.

³ Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments, Workshop reports, Jan 13-14 2005, Centre for Stabilisation & Restoration Studies p18.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

INTRODUCTION

1. The PRT concept employs a series of capabilities to enable the delivery of stability. By drawing on the UK¹ experiences from Afghanistan and elsewhere, this chapter seeks to identify the underlying principles that should be considered when undertaking similar activity in the future.

2. The term PRT came from guidance given by the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai when presented with a Joint Regional Team concept. They were termed 'Provincial' to be associated with the National Government and not with the warlords who dominate regions, and 'Reconstruction' because this is the majority of the Afghan people. The term is unfortunate in specifying both a province and reconstruction, neither of which necessarily apply to the teams' activities and implies that the team will deliver the reconstruction the local population want.

3. A PRT typically involves three UK government departments; MOD, FCO² and DfID³. An indigenous government representative is also essential. Depending on the situation, the civil police or military may also have a role. Coalition nations may also contribute staff to PRTs. The PRT is aimed at enabling enduring stability and extending the government's influence through local institutions, and providing support to reconstruction⁴. PRTs are specific to their environment, evolve through the campaign, and need ongoing capability adjustments.

AIM

4. The aim of this annex is to provide tactical level guidance and information to assist potential PRT commanders, staff, members and their trainers in preparing for, planning and conducting PRT operations.

PRINCIPLES

5. **Consent.** Consent of the central government is essential, and an element of consent (not to be confused with a benign environment) is required in the proposed area of operation. The maintenance of consent for PRT activity through the delivery of stability is the operational centre of gravity. Consent is linked to campaign authority⁵. Threats to instability may include:

- a. Weak central government and feudal structure.

¹ This Annex does not consider lessons from PRTs of other nations.

² The US Department of State (DOS) where US interests are also involved.

³ The US Agency for International Development (US AID) where US interests are also involved.

⁴ The UK PRT commander's mission from Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) is currently "to set the conditions for the achievement of stability within the PRT Area of Operations (AO) in order to further UK and coalition interests in Afghanistan and the region".

⁵ See JWP 3-50 *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*.

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- b. Ineffective provincial institutions.
- c. Ethnic division.
- d. External influences.
- e. Poorly performing economy.
- f. Past experiences.

6. **Unity of Command.**

a. Unity of command must exist within the military C2 structure and the political structure. When supported by the information campaign it ensures a coherent national strategy at every level and coherence of security structures and processes developed within PRT AOs. It requires much work and is very difficult to achieve given potential competing agendas.

b. The PRT has an integrated civilian and military structure with equal input into decision making, so a consensus seeking approach is required. The military may lead initially, but the emphasis will change as the campaign progresses.

7. **Unity of Purpose.** PRT and other military operations in theatre should have a unified purpose. As other forces, agencies and organisations are likely to be operating in the PRT's area, liaison and coordination is essential to ensure that such activity is coherent with the purpose of the overarching campaign.

8. **Situational Awareness.** Situational awareness of the environment, people, local and national politics and tensions, together with the international influences that exist is essential. To some extent this should be filtered down all the way to soldier level. Effective cultural awareness training for all ranks is a key contributor to situational awareness. Maintaining situational awareness is a key component of success in fluid situations where alliances change frequently.

9. **Force Profile.** The non-threatening, understated profile of PRTs is fundamental to the way in which they operate and promote consent. It is closely allied to the need for situational awareness. This must be balanced however with FP requirements. The PRT and its elements must ensure that potential aggressors are fully aware that PRTs can defend themselves if attacked and can call in additional support.

10. **Coherence with Wider Peace Support Operation Principles.**^{6 7}

a. By enabling indigenous capacity PRTs must avoid creating dependency. This will be a long process needing patience which may be incompatible with political pressures.

b. PRTs should adhere to the three fundamentals detailed in Joint Warfare Publications:

⁶ JWP 3-90 *Civil-Military Co-operation.*

⁷ JWP 3-50 *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations.*

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- (1) Campaign authority.
- (2) The use of force.
- (3) Perseverance.

...and the five guiding principles:

- (4) Comprehensive and complementary campaigning.
- (5) Preventative action.
- (6) Sensitised action.
- (7) Security.
- (8) Transparency.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

11. **Operational Environment.** Understanding the operational environment is central to the success of PRT activity. This extends from physical factors and seasonal variations to the complex of actors operating in the country, many of whom are civilian and drive the need to a CIMIC capability.

- a. The relationship with other organisations within the PRT must be developed to ensure a coherent PRT planning process.
- b. Planning should take account of NGOs, OGDs and Other Government Agencies (OGA) as well as commercial operations and private security companies which may operate in these regions.
- c. Although multinationality within and between PRTs presents challenges, it also offers the opportunity for exchange of ideas, information and capability.
- d. The relationship with indigenous security forces must be established and clear command relationships defined when they operate in the same areas as the PRT.

12. **Lines of Operation.** The lines of operation will be derived from the planning process.⁸ As the campaign progresses the emphasis will change, particularly during election periods. The complexities and interrelationships must not be underestimated. For example, the introduction of central government into an area can have an immediate detrimental impact on security. These complexities can be mitigated by CIMIC.

13. **Leadership Engagement Plan.** A mechanism to engage successfully with the local leadership must be found. In the early stages, identification and verification of those who genuinely hold power and influence can be a challenge. Thereafter situational awareness is vital to ensure that an understanding of the dynamics of power is maintained. The plan should identify how to achieve, maintain and resource such engagement.

⁸ The current PRT lines of operation in Afghanistan are security, institutions, economic and external influences.

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14. **Force Protection.** A risk analysis should take account of the following:
- a. Opposing forces, local conditions (driving, medical etc).
 - b. The utility, capability and responsiveness of any QRF.
 - c. The requirement for ECM should be continually assessed.
 - d. Appropriate contingency plans must be developed, (reinforcement, extraction).
15. **Equipment.** Specialised equipment and Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) will need to be considered, particularly communication systems. PRT vehicles must be visually distinct from UN/NGO vehicles.
16. **Force Composition.** Several factors determine the composition and structure of a PRT. It will be a balance of military and civilian elements tailored to the requirements of each region and taking account of the local threat and tactical risks. In the early stages, the size and nature of the civilian element will be a matter primarily for the Lead Nation (LN) providing the core of the PRT, in coordination with contributing nations and organisations. In the latter stages the requirement for the military element should decline until it is no longer required. Factors such as the security situation, the status of reconstruction and governance and the presence of other International Organisations (IO) and agencies will play a role in defining the specific objectives and functional expertise requirements of each PRT. The following is a guide to the core elements:
- a. **Command Group.** In a multinational environment the command group will consist of a LN designated commander and staff responsible for all the military assets and mission of the PRT.
 - b. **HQ Staff.** To include functional areas as required.
 - c. **Liaison Element.** Liaison will be required with local police, local leaders and local military HQs.
 - d. **Security Element.** To include:
 - (1) Compound security element.
 - (2) Mobile security teams.
 - (3) Tactical reserve. QRF.
 - e. **Patrolling/Military Observer Teams (MOT).**
 - f. **Support Elements.**
 - (1) HUMINT collection capability.
 - (2) Counter intelligence capability.
 - (3) Info Ops/PSYOPS capabilities.

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- (4) Linguists.
- (5) Real life support including cargo handling.
- (6) Medical support Role 1 and 2.
- (7) CIS support.
- (8) A Forward Air Controller Tactical Air Control Party (FAC TACP) is essential when air support provides an element of force protection.
- (9) Engineer support capability.
- (10) Finance capability.
- (11) Civil-Military Cooperation Element.

17. **Additional Skills Required.** A PRT should also include the following specialist/additional skills:

- a. **Language.** Trained personnel.
- b. **EOD.**
- c. **Legal.** Legal expertise may be achievable though reach back.
- d. **CIMIC.**
- e. **Military Observation Team Commanders.** MOT personnel should be selected with care. Experience has shown that mature officers tend to be the most successful MOT commanders.

18. **Logistics.**

- a. **Forward Support Base (FSB).** Logistic support can be achieved by a FSB supporting a number of PRTs and a QRF. Such a FSB, which might be multinational, should retain a small footprint to assist FP.
- b. **Host Nation Support (HNS).** In order to overcome the limitations of logistic support the local economy should be used to its maximum extent.
- c. **Medical.** Consideration must be given to the nearest available and suitable hospital facilities. A properly resourced MEDEVAC plan is essential.
- d. **Infrastructure.** The national chain of command will provide infrastructure support.
- e. **Op Welfare.** The Op Welfare package available will be detailed in the Mounting Instruction; it may be constrained by the environment.

19. **Funding.** A directive will define the PRT commander's role. It will include a letter of financial delegation. The following principles generally apply:

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- a. Costs incurred outside the theatre rest with the TLB where they fall.
- b. Manpower costs of deployed personnel will rest with their parent commands.
- c. In theatre expenditure should be controlled by the PRT commander. Normally costs will be charged to PJHQ TLB, except for costs which fall to other TLBs.

20. **Cost Sharing.** When other nations contribute to a UK led PRT, PJHQ will sign a MOU prior to deployment. The PRT Commander should ensure that the requirements and sensitivities of cost sharing partners are taken into account before any major commitment of funds.

21. **CIMIC Funding.** Sources of funding may include DfID, other donor countries, Commanders' Emergency Response Programme (CERP) and the Office of Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA).⁹

- a. Humanitarian aid, disaster relief, development and civil reconstruction are generally DfID's responsibility. If DfID deploys a representative to the PRT, the PRT's role is as a facilitator to the DfID representative's work.
- b. The PRT should carry out CIMIC work in line with the commander's directive. Every effort is to be made to safeguard DfID's policy lead by seeking written agreement from DfID to provide funding prior to any financial commitment being entered into.

EXECUTION

22. **Lines of Operation.** Lines of operation that form a baseline are shown below.

Assess →		Influence and support →			Drawdown
SSR	Assess situation and establish dialogue and liaison	Spt regional orgs Monitor and verify	Support DDR	Reduce unauthorised military capabilities	Endstate
		Support development of civpol, judiciary and border guards	Establish institutions	Reduce lawlessness and criminality	
Institution Building	Assess Provincial government priorities and plans	Spt the estb of effective provincial and district government Spt the constitutional process		Reduce feudal/patronage basis for govt/admin	
Economic	Map economic infrastructure	Ensure coord with central government priorities and plans	Engage with providers	Support to the regeneration of the economy	
External Influences	Assess external influences		Encourage positive and discourage negative influences		

Figure 5.A.1 - Lines of Operation

⁹ Under strict US regulation.

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23. **Monitoring.** Monitoring is achieved by Military Observation Teams (MOT) observing and engaging locally. Monitoring is a term unique to the UK, but other nations engage in similar activity. MOTs can play a major role as follows:

- a. Patrol AO and carry out specific PRT tasks as ordered.
- b. Mentor all police forces - national, highway regional and border.
- c. Monitor and negotiate with indigenous military forces; assist with DDR and heavy weapons handover.
- d. Support governors and local ministries; participate in security meetings.
- e. Identify aid projects to DfID officer through the PRT Comd.

24. **Counter Narcotics (CN).** CN is a specific issue in Afghanistan, but the principles may be valid elsewhere. ISAF support to CN is based on the fundamental principle of enabling and facilitating the Government of Afghanistan's long term national CN strategy and specifies that actions by ISAF should be limited to support roles, and should exclude direct military action except for self defence and force protection.

25. **Force Protection.** Although the need for FP will be balanced against the force profile of a PRT, it will also incorporate an element of Info Ops to demonstrate a credible deterrent. Factors to consider include:

- a. Contingency plans including full or partial extraction of the force or elements thereof. SH availability and capability.
- b. Time and space, the effect of climate and terrain and their impact on tactical mobility.
- c. Application of lost drills and lost communications procedures.
- d. Reinforcement and capability of QRF for all operations.
- e. CASEVAC and medical posture for all operations.
- f. Continued viability of FP plans, CASEVAC, reinforcement, evacuation etc through the four seasons.
- g. The balance of physical FP engineering measures for the PRT estate versus the need for easy access for local people.

26. **Liaison.** Liaison is a key PRT activity but the footprint constraints mean that it has to be an essential function undertaken by all members, who will require training and education down to soldier level. Liaison should be established with:

- a. **Government.** Liaison with local and central governments should be achieved. In Afghanistan HM Ambassador directly advises President Karzai in Kabul. A recommendation to the Ambassador by the PRT FCO representative is therefore one of the key means of achieving local action by national government in a PRT's AO.

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b. **Non Governmental Organisations.** A PRT will not generally have direct initial contact with NGOs and IOs, but operates through UN or other agencies. Nevertheless mechanisms need to be established for PRTs to be aware of NGO activities and intents, and for NGOs to be kept informed.

c. **International Organisations.** UN, NATO, EU, OSCE, World Bank, International funding organisations.

d. **Multinational PRTs.** Liaison with PRTs from other nations is essential in order to gain broader situational awareness and benefit from the sharing of ideas and resources. A periodic PRT conference chaired by the chain of command should be encouraged, if not already in place, to enhance understanding of the overall campaign and ensure coherence.

e. **Interpreters.** Interpreter capability will generally be delivered through locally employed civilians (LEC). Security cleared interpreters are likely to be in extremely short supply and must therefore be used cautiously. In areas where there is a multitude of dialects interpreters will rarely speak all of them.

27. **Communications.** Tactical communications are a key capability which present significant challenges in operations with a reduced military footprint. Mobile communications to MOTs require specific planning. The following systems are likely to be available:

- a. NATO Friendly Force Tracker.
- b. Satphone – Iridium.
- c. Tacsat.
- d. Commercial radios.
- e. Joint Operational Command System (JOCS). All staff officers require JOCS training prior to deployment.
- f. Crisis Response On NATO Open System (CRONOS). NATO Secret WAN.
- g. Mobile telephones.

28. **Legal.**

a. Enforcement of local law is unlikely to be a PRT task. For planned operations local authorities should undertake the functions of arrest or detention.

b. PRTs should be familiar with the legal mechanisms in place. Examples include ceasefires, ROE, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), MOU and other Military Technical Arrangements (MTA).

c. UK armed forces are usually covered by technical arrangements which give them immunity from prosecution under local law. These arrangements will not necessarily apply to LECs, eg interpreters and security guards.

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d. Not every nation will have the same ROE. Coherence (under multinational or NATO ROE), sensitivity and mutual understanding of any constraints this may impose will be required for combined operations.

e. The PRT is unlikely to be responsible for the protection or security of other UK nationals who may be in the area. Such people should be referred to the British Embassy who hold a list of those personnel formally entitled to UK military protection. It should be noted that due to the vulnerability of some NGO and international aid agency personnel located in isolated areas, immediate sanctuary could be offered in extremis.

29. **Information Campaign.** Information operations are an overarching activity and not a separate line of operation. The campaign must include the population, the protagonists, and the NGOs, all of whom will have their own views on the military campaign. Media Ops and CIMIC, together with Info Ops, constitute the military contribution to the Information Campaign¹⁰.

a. **Media Ops.** Media Ops aim to promote widespread understanding and support for operations by providing public information and implementing public relations policy to external and internal audiences. They are related to Info Ops in their presentation of information and communication of understanding and intent. While their activities must be coordinated and deconflicted, Media Ops must remain separate from Info Ops in order to avoid charges of manipulation or mendacity from the media. Local media, especially local radio and newspapers (if they exist) must be listened to and read, in order to ascertain which issues are being discussed locally, and to ascertain the general 'mood music' in the locality.

b. **CIMIC.** CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the commander, the civil population and institutions. One of the objectives of CIMIC is to influence the perceptions of the civil population and institutions toward PRT objectives; it is therefore imperative that there is coordination between the influence activities of CIMIC and Info Ops. While functionally an integrated activity within military planning in a similar manner to that of Media Ops, CIMIC may need to be seen to remain separate in order to maintain the trust of the bodies with which it works.

30. **Mission Creep.** There is a danger of using troops to undertake activity simply because they are there. The PRT is likely to be one of the few organised, influential and capable organisations in a chaotic environment. Therefore it can become a natural focus for a whole range of problems, many of which are well outside its remit. Everything that is undertaken must be mission driven, not activity led. Due to the unique nature of PRTs there is a need to revisit the mission statement on a regular basis.

31. **Measurement of Effect.** PJHQ is continuing to develop the criteria in order to measure PRT effectiveness. Commanders must be aware that continual demands for MOE can be very resource intensive and take up considerable staff effort.

¹⁰ DTIO_IO_Pol dated 14 Oct 04 *Information Operations Concepts and Policy Update*.

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TRAINING

32. Personnel selected for a PRT will receive three broad areas of training:
- a. **Generic.** Skills required by all.
 - (1) **Environment.** Effect of climate, geography etc.
 - (2) **Culture.** Religion, ethnicity, history etc. Training should give regional understanding and focus on specifics related to where the unit will be located.
 - (3) **Intelligence.** Threat, power bases, personality briefs.
 - (4) **Other Actors.** FCO, DfID, other nationalities, NGOs. Modus operandi and aims. What NGOs contribute and how PRTs and NGOs can work together.
 - (5) **CIMIC.** Successful CIMIC is largely the result of a state of mind. Every soldier must understand the issues and principles. CIMIC predeployment training can be made available from the Joint CIMIC Group.
 - (6) **Civil Police and Judiciary.** In scenarios where the creation or development of civil institutions is involved, a basic understanding of civil police and judicial processes, whilst not immediately transferable to an AO without a democratic foundation, would be useful.
 - (7) **Medical.** Consideration should be given to enhanced medical training for all personnel in environments where the delivery of Role 2 support and evacuation may be involve increased risk.
 - (8) **Dismounted Military Skills.** In some theatres all personnel will require dismounted military skills training in order to reduce FP risk.
 - (9) **Languages.**
 - (10) **Map Reading.**
 - (11) **Media Handling.**
 - (12) **Mines/EOD.** Theatre specific.
 - (13) **Use of Interpreters.**
 - (14) **Negotiation and Mediation Skills.**
 - b. **Command and Staff.** Relevant staff and commanders should receive a briefing package comprising:
 - (1) Strategic context.
 - (2) Higher level pol/mil issues.
 - (3) Cultural issues to a detailed level to include governance.

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- (4) Social, political and economic issues specific to the district in which personnel will be operating.
- (5) Enhanced media package.
- (6) Finance training.
- (7) JOCS and other IT package training.
- (8) Operations in a multinational environment.

c. **Specific Training.**

(9) **Medical.** Extra CMTs and additional Battlefield Advanced Trauma Life Support (BARTS) training will be required where operating over extended areas. The BARTS course is run by the Defence Medical Education and Training Agency (DMETA). Once obtained, the qualification is valid for four years.

(10) **Driver Training.** A PRT needs good driving skills. There are three aspects to driver training:

- (a) Ensuring sufficient personnel have a driving licence.
- (b) Off road driving skills.
- (c) Vehicle Mechanics to support the fleet. Additional vehicle specific courses may be available in theatre.

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CHAPTER 6

MILITARY SUPPORT TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM¹

'.. the risk of conflict is heightened when security forces are not subject to proper discipline or civilian control ... properly constituted and reformed security forces can act as a force for good ... helping to reduce instability and contributing to a reduction in human suffering.'

DfID, FCO and MOD Security Sector Reform Policy Brief November 2003

INTRODUCTION

1. **Definition.** SSR describes the overall (and largely political) process by which effective security structures are developed in order to allow the citizens of a state to live in safety.² SSR is likely to be a core task in countries emerging from conflict but may also make a significant contribution to conflict prevention in fragile or failing states. In all cases it is seen as a critical activity that provides the basis for longer term stability and will address two broad areas; the quality of governance in the state (in terms of the relationships between security sector institutions, wider government apparatus and the general public) and the technical competence and professionalism of those in the security sector.³

2 **The Security Sector.** The composition of the security sector differs from country to country so there is no universally applicable definition of it. However there are four generally accepted categories that comprise the security sector:

a. **Security Actors.** Armed forces; police and gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, government backed militias) and veterans groups.

b. **Security Management Oversight Bodies.** The executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial planning and audit units); civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

c. **Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions.** Judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.

d. **Non-Statutory Security Forces.** Liberation armies, private military companies (PMC) armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguard units and political party militias.

¹ HQ 52 Inf Bde is the Army's lead proponent for SSR.

² GFN-SSR Compendium of Good Practices on SSR.

³ Joint Doctrine Note *The Military Contribution to SSR* provides the strategic level doctrine on SSR and covers the comprehensive cross government approach.

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3. **The Comprehensive Approach.** To be successful SSR requires all elements of national power to be applied in a coherent fashion (as part of the UK Government's Comprehensive Approach⁴) and in coordination with other donors and the recipient or Host Nation (HN). In order to achieve a coherent cross Whitehall approach, the UK Government has established two interdepartmental Conflict Prevention Pools. These fund activities, including SSR, bringing together the diplomatic, defence and development interests of the FCO, MOD, and DfID.

SECURITY CONCEPTS⁵

4. International consensus supports the idea that the foundation of state security action should be the protection of the people. This idea is based on two principles:

a. The security interests of the state should not conflict with the security interests of its citizens.

b. The state is ultimately responsible for providing the security conditions for the well being of its population. In developing countries that security is not provided exclusively by western style statutory bodies but also comes from traditional and non-statutory systems. The conditions are not limited to law and order issues but include all political, economic and social issues that ensure life is as free from risk as possible.

c. Ideally the security sector will be controlled and guided by a National Security Strategy. If one does not exist its development could be an early element of the SSR programme.

SSR PRINCIPLES

5. The following generic principles apply to the military's involvement in the reform of ISF:⁶

a. **Local Ownership.** Overcoming the tendency to use an outsider's frame of reference is important and therefore the initiative must rest with the indigenous leaders selected during any capacity building phase. For lasting reform to work it must be home grown.

b. **Application of a Strategic Reform Plan.** The military contribution will be part of a wider strategic reform plan which will dictate priorities and the sequencing of reform. Important aspects will be:

(1) A vision for the security sector as part of a strategy document that lays out the funding of sustainable and long term reform.

(2) Roles and division of responsibilities between security services are defined and relationships strengthened.

⁴ Joint Discussion Note 4/05.

⁵ GFN-SSR *Compendium of Good Practices on SSR*.

⁶ JDN/Tbc *The Military Contribution to SSR*.

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- (3) Development objectives are agreed.
- (1) Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) are established and agreed.
- (5) The transfer of responsibility for security from the international community to host nation is planned.

c. **Legitimacy.** Moral authority for SSR stems from the host nation government and forces acting within the rule of law. All processes must reflect high standards of governance and be supported by information operations to manage, inform and influence internal and external perceptions.

d. **Optimum Delivery.** Delivering effective reform of a host nation's armed forces requires adequately resourced levels of training and mentoring. To deliver indigenous forces requires trainers who will also act as force developers, monitoring and facilitating the progress across functional lines including logistics, infrastructure and personnel. Continuity of effort is necessary in terms of personnel and the approach to development. Reform should start and finish as soon as possible.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

6. **Understanding.** How societies define and approach security will be shaped by a wide range of factors including their history, cultural and political traditions, and national needs, priorities and circumstances. These, and the causes of any conflict with their implications for an SSR programme should be understood along with the values, aims, intentions, responses, views and interrelations of local populations, factions, adversaries, criminals etc.⁷ Understanding the motives and remits of other coalition members and civil actors is also required. This aspect is key to all SSR involvement from the strategic to the tactical level.

7. **Stakeholders.** Successful SSR programmes require comprehensive planning and execution. Coordination and information sharing between the major stakeholders at all levels is essential. These include:

- a. HN government and ministries.
- b. ISF.
- c. UN agencies.
- d. NGOs and the representatives of all groups in the civil society.
- e. Bilateral governments.
- f. Coalition military forces.
- g. PMCs.

⁷ HIV/AIDS may also impact on the effectiveness of a nation's security sector.

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8. **Obstacles to Change.** Several factors which could obstruct SSR programmes should be identified and countered. They include:

- a. The persistence of an authoritarian, militarist approach to security.
- b. Weakness of national vision and lack of institutional capacity to formulate and execute reform programmes.
- c. Factions and individuals (possibly including organised criminals, members of the government and ISF, local warlords etc) who view SSR as a threat and take active measures to disrupt the process (known as spoilers).
- d. Corruption.
- e. Resource constraints.
- f. Conflicting donor policies.
- g. Political instability and tension with neighbouring states.
- h. Suspicion between ISF and the civilian population and concerns over retribution.
- i. Insecurity resulting from insurgency, public disorder etc.

9. **Time.** In failed or failing states the reforms required of the security sector to ensure long term stability will take significant time to implement. Indeed some elements of reform may require cultural changes that could take generations. Realistic goals and aspirations are therefore required. Despite the likelihood that military involvement in an SSR programme is relatively short term, planning should be for the long term. The temptation to adopt short term, quick win solutions that do not contribute to longer term goals should be avoided.

10. **Risk.** Risk will need to be taken in a SSR programme, particularly when it is conducted in an unstable security environment and there is pressure to generate ISF capable of dealing with the short term security issues. For example, it may be necessary to conduct recruitment without a full screening process, or to rely on militias etc to provide security in some geographical areas until the SSR programme can be resourced to deal with them. Consideration must be given to where risk lies, what long term effect it may have and how it is minimised and managed. The acceptance of a short term risk and its cause must be identified for removal in the long term country strategy.

THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

11. **Comprehensive Assessment.** The SSR assessment process will be a cross-department activity. Depending upon the situation input will come from the Security Sector Defence Advisory Team (SSDAT) and the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU). The assessment process is the stage at which other resources will be secured to continue reform (or not). It will vary according to the operational environment:

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a. **Permissive.** In a permissive environment SSR activity is likely to be at the request of the HN Government. The SSR assessment process will be a comprehensive cross-government affair in concert with the HN government that produces clear lines of development, key tasks and milestones.

b. **Non Permissive.** In a post conflict or peace enforcement environment initial intervention planning should see a SSR preassessment conducted at the strategic and operational level. This should produce a plan to ensure that initial, military led SSR activity is focussed towards the potential required end state. In the initial stages military effort will be concentrated on the establishment of a secure environment and is likely to include the following activity:

- (1) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) (Annex C).
- (2) Capacity building of key security actors (armed forces, police, judiciary, penal and border services) (Annex B).

As soon as practicable after conflict a full assessment should be conducted in conjunction with the HN at the strategic and operational level. Subsequent planning will develop tactical level activity to generate the coordinated development of the security sector, the long term goal, in the case of the Indigenous Armed Forces (IAF), being the production of a sustainable, professional organisation with clear responsibilities and sound governance.

12. **Security Sector Defence Advisory Team (SSDAT)**⁸. The SSDAT is a small, multi-disciplinary team of SSR practitioners drawn from MOD and DfID with military, former military, governance, police and justice and security and intelligence advisors. It provides tailored in-country advice on SSR programmes in support of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) and Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) country and regional strategies. SSDAT does employ serving military officers so it may be a source of advice through reach back.

MILITARY SUPPORT TO SSR

13. **Military Involvement in SSR.** The precise scope and nature of military support to SSR will vary according to the level of reform required in the HN security sector and the security environment (which may limit the ability of other civil actors to operate). Entry points for SSR activity will span the spectrum of conflict. In an unstable environment it is likely that the military will be required to initiate capacity building of the security sector. This will be conducted in line with probable reform criteria developed during the SSR pre-assessment. The priority, however, will be establishing a secure environment preferably using indigenous forces. Military activity is likely to be based on the following areas:

- a. Professional military training at appropriate levels.
- b. Education of the role of armed forces in a democratic society.
- c. The conduct of national defence reviews.

⁸ SSDAT can be contacted on: Tel +44(0)1793 314852 or Fax +44(0)1793 785160.

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- d. The development of defence policies.
- e. The provision of technical assistance.
- f. Strengthening defence resource management.
- g. Increasing accountability in defence procurement.
- h. Strengthening military personnel management systems.
- i. The development of infrastructure and specialist training facilities.
- j. Support to the initial stages of DDR programmes.
- k. Provision of essential enabling functions such as CASEVAC.

A list of possible activities that might involve a military force in support of a SSR programme showing possible leads and level of national involvement is at Annex A. Figure 6.1 illustrates how the relative contributions of different organisations involved in a SSR programme may vary according to the situation.




Figure 6.1 – Relative Contributions to SSR Programme by Organisations according to the Security Situation

PLANNING THE MILITARY INPUT TO SSR

14. Comprehensive campaign planning⁹ should address the need to regenerate or reform elements of a HN security sector. This process must include an assessment of the threat to security and regional issues, the existing security sector structures and capabilities, the likely responsibilities and tasks of the security sector and produce SSR strategies and programmes that describe the characteristics of the reformed security sector (role, primacy, size, structure, equipment etc) and how change is to be implemented (including roles and tasks for the military eg support to a DDR process, assistance with restructuring of armed forces, control and issue of equipment and infrastructure and training responsibilities). Throughout this process effort should be made to involve the HN as much as is practicable. Once tasks are identified the ISF and other elements of the security sector should be designed or reformed accordingly and in conjunction with the HN. Form should follow function. This will enable the following planning activity at the operational level:

- a. Identification and definition of existing structures/institutions that should remain and/or be improved. This could mean, for example, that barracks and personnel record offices are left untouched.
- b. Identification of existing security structures that should be removed or drawn down and any resulting requirement for a DDR programme.
- c. The identification of capability shortfalls in existing structures/institutions.
- d. The allocation of appropriate resources (equipment, infrastructure, training teams etc) and sequencing of actions to achieve the desired end state.
- e. Sequencing of actions, allocation of troops to task plus the identification of additional assets/capabilities required for success.

This process will involve close liaison between SSR planning staff and intelligence and plans cells.

15. Likely SSR planning activities are illustrated in Figure 6.2. All activity should contribute to achieving the required end state and, if appropriate, the conditions for a Transfer of Security Responsibility (TSR) to the ISF. SSR activity will also need to be linked to and coordinated with the other lines of operation conducted by the HQ. ISF involvement should be sought throughout the planning process.

⁹ See JWP 3-50 Chapter 4 and JDN *The Military Contribution to SSR*.

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


Figure 6.2 – SSR Planning Activities

COMMAND AND CONTROL

16. **HQ Function and SSR Cell Structure.** A HQ may be required to execute command and control over the reform of all, or part of a HN's security force. Military involvement is likely to focus mainly on the development of IAF. However, where OGD and other agencies are not able to operate and the military is given broader responsibility (including the development of a police service for example) it should receive specialist support (for example from the PCRU and civil police advisors), both in terms of advice and the delivery of appropriate training. The HQ must be fully aware of the plan for the development of the whole security sector and the sequencing and priority afforded to its various elements. The HQ will require a structure that is capable of performing some or all of the following SSR related functions:

- a. Coordination with and support to OGDs, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), IO and other donors and actors.
- b. Ensuring coherence with the national plan for developing the elements of the ISF for which it is responsible.
- c. Coordination with ISF and coalition headquarters.
- d. Receiving intelligence support from the appropriate formation HQ.
- e. SSR specific planning.
- f. Delivery of training, equipment and infrastructure to ISF.
- g. Monitoring and assessing progress.
- h. Transferring responsibility for security to ISF.¹⁰

¹⁰ See Annex D.

- i. Running contracts and accounts related to SSR activity.




Figure 6.3 – Possible SSR Cell Structure

17. **C2.** Command and control relationships between organisations (UN, MNF etc), within the organisations delivering the SSR programme and the ISF, need to be clearly expressed, understood and resourced with adequate communications equipment.

18. **Supported v Supporting Roles.** The military should not assume that it has the lead in SSR tasks. It is likely to be in a supporting role to OGD and should be prepared to assist them, particularly with regard to enabling them to deliver their effect more rapidly in a post conflict or hostile situation.¹¹ In an immediate post conflict environment the military is likely to be the only organisation capable of conducting SSR related activities. Support from other actors will be limited until the security conditions are created to permit them to function.

RESOURCES

19. **Funding.** SSR requires significant expenditure and resource constraints can pose a threat to a successful programme. Funding is likely to come from a range of donors (OGDs, IOs, coalition partners etc) and should be identified in the SSR assessment process. There is a requirement for a clear understanding of financial authority, the rules which apply and the ability to manage and account for funds.

20. **Manning.** Staff with the relevant expertise (particularly in the log/infra, finance and non armed forces areas) should be selected for the SSR function. The staff is likely to comprise a high proportion of officers and SNCOs. In most situations the ability of the ISF to cope with the security situation in the HN will be a key factor in the decision to reduce the presence of the military.

¹¹ This could include the provision of security, basic infrastructure and life support, mobility (SH), construction of prisons to assist penal reform programmes etc.

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21. **Training Teams and Supporting Staff.** Training Teams (TTs) and other personnel involved in the delivery of support to a SSR programme should be from a dedicated organisation. As ISF capability develops ground holding units (where employed), may become responsible for mentoring and monitoring tasks. Military forces are well placed to conduct training, mentoring and monitoring of IAF. Specialist staff should be involved in training other elements of the ISF, particularly where specialist capabilities (eg police forensic capability) are required. Where no such expertise is available, military forces should receive specialist Pre Deployment Training (PDT) to allow them to conduct such tasks.

22. **Equipment.** ISF will require sufficient quantities of appropriate and reliable equipment to build their capability within the SSR programme. Equipment may be reissued from HN sources or provided by external donors. The risk of loss of equipment from ISF is likely and robust accounting procedures are required. In addition a plan to sustain all equipment that meets the immediate requirement and also ensures longer term ISF self-sufficiency should be developed.

23. **Infrastructure.** The ISF may require new infrastructure (office and HQ buildings, barracks, accommodation for families, workshops, training facilities, ranges etc). The delivery of new infrastructure needs to be adequately resourced and fully integrated into the SSR programme. The resources required to provide PRT infrastructure are likely to be the same as are required for infrastructure restoration and/or the provision of infrastructure for the force; they will need to be prioritised through the Joint Force Engr, who is the Commander's advisor on all infrastructure matters.

RESTRUCTURING AND DEVELOPING ISF

24. The military contribution to a SSR programme is likely to focus on developing the technical competence and capability of a HN's armed forces through the process of training, mentoring and monitoring from individual and section to MOD level. It may also involve the creation of a security architecture, the development of relationships between elements of the ISF etc. Sometimes this role could expand to include other elements of the ISF, such as the police and prison services, intelligence services, border and coast guards etc. In these circumstances guidance should be sought from OGDs and from PCRU. Wider institutional reform may also be required. The Lessons Database held at the Land Warfare Centre should be consulted early in the planning process. Details on the restructuring and development of ISF are given in Annex B.

25. Reform of the ISF will only form part of the overall SSR programme. Other actors will be involved in developing the capacity of the relevant HN institutions of the security and justice systems. Military support to SSR must be coordinated with this activity. In reality a HN may not agree or recognise the need for reform in all aspects of its security sector. When this is the case, reform in one area may provide the opportunity to promote demand for change in other areas of the security sector.¹² Known as '**entry points**' these should be exploited efficiently but sympathetically.

¹² For example the need to provide a HN's armed forces with ROE may act as a catalyst for the establishment of government oversight mechanisms and judicial reform.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION

26. DDR should be considered as one of the pillars of SSR. The process follows a ceasefire agreement and is a mechanism to remove weapons, reduce the number of combatants in an area of former conflict and contribute to the conditions for longer term stability by reintegrating former combatants into society in a productive manner.

27. DDR will not be the sole preserve of the military and should not be seen as a quick fix solution to a conflict. As with other SSR activity there is no templated solution to a DDR programme. Annex C provides more detail on a generic DDR process, principles and risks. Although it must be recognised that the military can contribute and possibly lead on disarmament and demobilisation, reintegration really should not be a solely military task as it relies on broader regional economic development agendas which in the UK's case will be overseen by DfID.

TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

28. In the latter stages of its support to SSR, and in response to improving indigenous self-reliance, a military force will conduct the Transfer of Security Responsibility (TSR) to the Civil Authorities. This process will include the transfer of responsibility for security to the HN ISF¹³ and will be part of an ongoing operational transition process. The need for TSR to occur will have been stated in the campaign plan and the conditions required to achieve it will need to be developed as an operation progresses. These will not solely be concerned with the issue of security but will cover the whole range of security sector issues including governance capacity, rule of law and economic reform. Reform in these areas is usually the domain of OGD, IO etc and there will be a requirement to conduct comprehensive planning¹⁴ to coordinate military activities with them. Annex E provides much more detail on the business of transferring security responsibility to the ISF.

¹³ The term ISF refers to the whole range of military, police, border guards, coastguards and key installation security forces.

¹⁴ See JDN 4/05 *The Comprehensive Approach*.

POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES FOR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
SSR PROGRAMME

Ser	Activity	Likely Lead Dept	Involvement				Remarks
			In Sp	Possible Mil Lead and/or level of Mil Activity			
				Strategic (Ind Staff Offr /Adviser)	Operational (Unit /Subunit)	Tactical (MiTT /Spec TT)	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
1.	HN Governance	FCO	DfID,MOD	X			
2.	HN Economic Reconstruction	DfID	FCO,MOD	X			
3.	Core Sy Sector						
	Develop MOD	MOD	FCO,DfID	X			
	Develop NSS	MOD		X			
	SDR (or part of)	MOD		X			
	IAF Fmn/Unit/HQ design and structure	MOD		X		X	
	HRM	MOD		X			
	C4I procedures and skills	MOD		X		X	
	Procurement	MOD		X			
	Mil skills	MOD			X	X	
	PO skills	MOD			X	X	
	Bomb Disposal and IEDD	MOD				X	
	De-mining	MOD				X	
	Sy and Gd Force for SSR programme and activities	MOD		X	X		Poss with trg activities
	Life Support for SSR programme and activities	MOD		X	X		Poss with trg activities
4.	SSAJ¹						
	Judicial	FCO	DfID,MOD				
	Int and security services	SIS	DfID,FCO, MOD	X		X	
	Policing	FCO	DfID,MOD	X		X	IPU CIG
	Prison: construction, manning and management	FCO	MOD	X		X	HO & HMP
	Border control and customs	HMRC FCO	MOD	X		X	
	Maritime coastal protection and port management	HMRC MOD	MOD	X		X	RLC Maritime & RN
	Private military/security (granting authority)	FCO	MOD				

¹ Security Sector and Justice.

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Ser	Activity	Likely Lead Dept	Involvement				Remarks
			In Sp	Possible Mil Lead and/or level of Mil Activity			
				Strategic (Ind Staff Offr /Adviser)	Operational (Unit /Subunit)	Tactical (MiTT /Spec TT)	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
	Private military/security (operations)	MOD	FCO				
5.	Sy Management and Oversight						
	Ceasefire monitoring	FCO	MOD	X			
	Peace negotiations	FCO	MOD	X			
	DDR: cantonment, wpn destruction and trg for ex-combatants.	DFID MOD	MOD		X		
	Airport control, maintenance and ATC	CAA	MOD	X		X	RAF
	Engr activities include roads, airstrips and all utilities	DFID	MOD	X		X	STRE
	Civil Workforce recruitment & management	DFID	MOD			X	G5 CIMIC
	Medical	FCO	MOD	X		X	DMS
	Media	FCO	MOD	X		X	

RESTRUCTURING AND DEVELOPING INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES (ISF)

INTRODUCTION

1. Military support to a SSR programme is likely to involve the restructuring of an ISF and the development of its capability. The requirement may vary from improving existing structures within the HN to the complete reformation of a nation's security forces. This work may take place in parallel with a DDR programme² and wider political, legal and economic reform and as such forms part of a wider, comprehensive approach. The development of ISF is the responsibility of the whole force and not the sole preserve of Military Training Teams (MiTT). Throughout, the needs are to produce Indigenous Security Forces (ISF) that are integrated into the political system and that act in accord with the direction of a legitimate government; and are sustainable beyond the point where our own forces and advisors withdraw. The aim of such reform is to produce robust, self-sustaining ISF that serve the interests of the state and its people.

AIM

2. The aim of this Annex is to provide an outline of the planning considerations and factors involved in restructuring and developing ISF.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

3. Campaign planning for SSR should identify the required structure and capabilities required of the new ISF. The results should guide the detailed planning of restructuring, training and, if required, the Transfer of Security Responsibility (TSR) process to achieve the desired end state.³

GOVERNANCE

4. ISF should be part of a security sector governed according to democratic norms and high standards of conscientious professionalism if further conflict is to be avoided. They should not become a threat to central government and therefore need to be integrated into the political system and undergo necessary changes in parallel with it. The issues listed below should be considered at the strategic and operational level. It is essential that these points are fully understood and accepted ('bought into') by the HN authorities who ideally should have shared in their development. They should take responsibility and exercise control as early as possible. Some of the points below will be contentious and slow to develop. Forcing the pace artificially, however tempting for a commander wanting to make a difference in his 6 or 12 months in theatre, will lead to long term difficulties.

- a. The division of authority between civil authorities and the armed forces.

² See Annex C.

³ Detail on the TSR process is given in Doctrine Note 06/02.

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- b. The respective roles of various security actors in defining, implementing, monitoring and regulating security policy.
- c. The body of law and legislation used to govern the security sector.
- d. The method for making decisions about key issues, such as the level of security spending or a decision to go to war.
- e. How to strike an appropriate balance between transparency and preserving information that is vital to national security.

5. In addition the ISF will need the following:

- a. Strategic guidance on the role of the military in Internal Security (IS) and clear lines of police – military demarcation.
- b. Clear articulation of how the police-military interface is to be managed.

RESOURCES

6. Competition for resources between the elements of ISF will exist within a SSR programme. As far as possible all elements should be adequately equipped for role. New equipment should be introduced with the appropriate training, train the trainer (T3) packages and ES structures. The infrastructure requirements of the new forces will also be a significant factor. The appropriate technical advice should be sought from the relevant staff branches (J4, JF Engr, J6 etc) to inform planning.

7. Where the military is likely to be required to assist the police with IS operations it should be able to provide an additional level of capability (such as armoured vehicles) rather than simply more of the same. This assists in the demarcation of roles between police and military. The campaign planning activity should indicate the resources (equipment, infrastructure and training manpower) required to achieve the desired end state, so helping to differentiate between military and police roles.

TIME

8. The time required to restructure and develop the capability of ISF to the required level of competence will vary. Wherever possible a realistic timescale within which to execute substantial change should be adhered to. The following factors will influence the time required to achieve the desired end state:

- a. The scale of structural, political and cultural change.⁴
- b. The security situation within the HN.
- c. The degree of reequipping required.

⁴ The more significant the change to the force, the greater the time required - not only to generate but to create a self-sustaining force that, critically, sees control by civil institutions within the HN as the acceptable norm.

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- d. The time needed to train training teams, individuals and units.
- a. The need to develop new infrastructure to house to force.⁵
- f. Availability of funding and personnel.

EXECUTION

THE DESIRED END STATE AND TRANSITION

9. The desired end state of change to the ISF will usually be that of an accountable, self-sustaining, capable and credible force, able to meet the security challenges faced by the state and with police primacy for matters of internal security. Achieving this may take decades, but all restructuring and training activities should seek to promote these aims from the outset. All parties must clearly understand and agree exactly how the reformed ISF will be structured and what it is capable of achieving.

10. In situations where a MNF has been assisting the HN with security a transition of responsibility for security will occur between them and ISF. This will be a gradual process that is complete when all elements of the ISF (armed forces, police etc) and other related sector activities have achieved their respective end states.

RESTRUCTURING AND CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

11. **Coordination.** Restructuring and development programmes for each element of the ISF should be:

- a. Developed at the national level. In countries with a strong regional or federal constitution it may be appropriate to organise ISF elements along regional lines.
- b. Developed in conjunction with key HN security sector stakeholders.
- c. Implemented through a single, national level organisation for each element of the ISF.

12. **Training Teams.** Training Teams (TT) comprising staff from MNF and other agencies (international police forces, customs services etc) employed in close support of the ISF provide the means to implement restructuring and capability development within an SSR programme. Where TT comprise more than one agency a lead must be designated from the outset. The TT structure provides the capacity to mentor, monitor and train (M2T) the force elements and undertake open, objective assessment and reporting throughout the process of restructuring, development and transition. TT should be appropriately resourced and manned by a dedicated staff with the relevant experience and expertise to achieve their function. An example structure, taken from recent UK experience with 10 Iraqi Army Division, is given in Appendix 1. TT are most effective when fully embedded with their respective element of the ISF.

⁵ Force generation may be delayed by the prior requirement to construct suitable accommodation for personnel, C3I and equipment.

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13. **Leader Engagement.** Engagement between the appropriate MNF and ISF commanders provides the opportunity to conduct mentoring, operational linkage between the two organisations and the subjective assessment of ISF capabilities.

14. **Parallel Reporting and Staffing.** In some circumstances, particularly during the early stages of M2T, TT may be required to run a parallel reporting and staffing process to ensure that the correct staff and command processes within and between ISF headquarters are carried out. As the force becomes more proficient the TT will primarily conduct the monitoring function and activity with the MNF will be coordinated through the use of a conventional system of liaison officers.

15. **Lines of Operation.** The restructuring and development of ISF occurs along three main lines of operation: physical development; developing operational capability; and perception management. Each will be examined in more detail below. Throughout this process TT and Short Term Training Team (STTT) staff will be required to adapt to local circumstances and improvise adopting a developmental approach. Best results will be obtained when the local force has been involved in problem solving. The key is to produce a workable solution that will continue to work after the departure of the MNF.⁶ Experience in Iraq has shown that strong leadership, sound administration and good training all play an equal part in the development of a force.

16. **Physical Development.** The physical aspect of the force restructuring and development process involves the following:

a. **Manning and Recruitment.** The restructured force may be manned by members of the existing ISF, other former combatants and new recruits:

(1) All personnel should be subject to a selection and screening process to ensure that they are suitable for role and are not from undesirable elements of former regimes.⁷

(2) Where possible the ethnic balance within the force should reflect that of the HN as a whole.

b. **Training.** The provision of training ranging from Basic Training Centres (BTC), through specialist training (such as developing forensic capabilities within Police Services (PS) and ISR capabilities for armed forces), to provincial and regional planning and CPX could be required to produce an ISF that meets the required endstate. The following points should be noted:

(1) A thorough Training Needs Analysis (TNA) must be conducted at the outset. Training programmes should be developed accordingly and with ISF involvement to ensure that they meet requirements in a realistic manner, make the most appropriate use of resources and continue after the withdrawal of MNF support.

⁶ Security forces in other nations in the region may provide appropriate models.

⁷ Some personnel may require additional training and others (potential war criminals and key former regime personnel) may need to be removed.

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- (2) The time and resources available should be used to achieve the best standards possible.
- (3) Training centres should become centres of excellence with instructors from ISF playing an increasingly prominent role in their running.
- (4) Where new units are being formed there will be a requirement to select and train officers, SNCOs and soldiers individually and then to conduct training as formed units. Surge STTT may be required to assist in the latter stages of this process.
- (5) Special to arm training should make best use of opportunities to provide support to the force (eg engrs providing FP for military facilities).
- (6) Joint training and operations (with other elements of the ISF) and combined training and operations with MNF should be introduced as soon as ISF capability and the situation permit.
- (7) METLs, developed to meet the requirements of the force, are an aid to refining training programmes, providing coherence and assessing performance.
- (8) Training to develop administrative and logistic capability to reflect the design of the structures required by the SSR strategy should be included from the outset.

c. **Equipment.** The following points apply:

- (1) Equipment appropriate for the role of the force must be provided. It must be affordable, supportable and within Indigenous Police Services (IPS) capabilities.
- (2) New equipment should be introduced in a timely manner.
- (3) Train the trainer packages should be run.
- (4) ES training should also be provided. Equipment should be procured in a holistic manner to reduce the ES burden.
- (5) Advice on equipment requirements must be based on what the ISF requires and not what a donor has to offer.

d. **Sustainability.** It is critical that the ability of the force to sustain and administer itself is **developed concurrently to other capabilities**. CSS and ES units should be formed and equipped appropriately, administrative staff trained and administrative and accounting procedures put in place.

17. **Developing Operational Capability.** Operational capability will depend upon the ability of the ISF HQ to plan and conduct unilateral, joint and combined operations. A progressive training programme to develop HQ and staff to the required level of

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competence should be developed.⁸ A similar programme should be developed for the conduct of joint and combined exercises. Operational requirements (such as the need to provide security for elections) may provide a suitable opportunity and catalyst for such activity. Appropriate C2 structures and facilities, such as Provincial Joint Operations Centres (PJOCs), need to be established, resourced and linked to the appropriate governance structures. To aid leader engagement, continuity and the development of professional relationships, MNF AOs should mirror those of the ISF that they are supporting.

18. **Perception Management.** It is important to manage and monitor the force's image and how the force sees itself. This process should be considered at all levels and included in the overall, comprehensive Info Ops strategy.

a. **Internal.** The moral component of a restructured force, its confidence, self belief and cohesion are critical elements that need to be developed. In societies where family, tribal, religious and cultural influences are important, good leadership will be essential.

b. **External.** The perceptions of other organisations (the civilian population, HN, OGD, MNF, other elements of the ISF, NGOs, donors, and the international community) will need to be influenced.

19. **Measures of Effectiveness.** Measuring the effectiveness of the ISF will require subjective and objective judgement. Subjective judgement can be provided by partnering commanders and embedded MiTT. Measuring fighting power (command, personnel, logistics, equipment and training) provides a more objective assessment of overall capability. Means to collect and collate identified data requirements should be developed at the outset of an SSR programme. The level of sophistication should be set by the HN requirement and ISF capability, and not by UK or other developed nations' best practice.

DEVELOPING SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF ISF

20. More detail on developing armed forces and police services is given in Appendices 1 and 2.

⁸ LWC Collective Training Group should be approached to assist with the running of CPX.

DEVELOPING INDIGENOUS ARMED FORCES (IAF)

INTRODUCTION

1. The reform of IAF is an area of SSR which is likely to involve military forces. Although improving the capability and capacity of IAF is an intuitive business to the military, it is an activity that must be conducted in a comprehensive and coordinated manner and in parallel with other reforms to the security sector.

AIM

2. The aim of this Appendix is to summarise the key factors concerning the reform of IAF as part of a SSR programme.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

THE FUNCTION OF ARMED FORCES

3. Armed forces fulfil three functions for a government. The capacity to achieve them should be included in development plans. Functions are:

- a. Operational: planning, command and execution of operations.
- b. Administrative: recruiting, training and administration.
- c. Ministerial: the provision of technical advice through a Ministry of Defence (MOD).

PRINCIPLES CONCERNING ARMED FORCES IN A DEMOCRACY

4. The following principles apply to armed forces in a democracy:

- a. They should be at the disposal of the legitimate government.
- b. They are required to abide by the law and respect the constitution.
- c. They must respect the will of national elected bodies and the judgement of any court responsible for the interpretation of the constitution.
- d. They should serve the nation by contributing to its security and enabling it better to achieve its legitimate objectives.

5. SSR can only be achieved where the political culture is democratic in substance as well as name. Changes in the IAF and their relationship with the political system should be accompanied by any necessary changes in the system itself, including revised legislation.

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DESIGN OF THE ARMED FORCES

6. A number of factors should be considered when formulating a national plan to develop the IAF:

- a. The IAF should be designed in close consultation with the HN. Their role should be based on realistic and clearly expressed national threat assessments.
- b. The reputation of the IAF under any previous regime.
- c. The relationship between police and military functions, roles and activities.
- d. Spoilers (those with something to lose as a result of reform).
- e. The military may need to be persuaded or coerced into accepting fundamental change.
- f. The HN institutional capacity to assess, formalise and manage change.
- g. An appropriate legal framework that serves as the basis for military action.
- h. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
- i. Realistic timelines.
- j. MOE and progress indicators.

7. The resulting strategic plan must be developed in substantive and detailed consultation with HN political, financial and civil representatives. It should be based on a detailed assessment of current and future security needs. The resulting force structures should be designed to meet agreed tasks, must be affordable to the HN in the long term and funding allocations decided in consultation with it.⁹

RISK

8. Risk can be reduced by:

- a. Avoiding the politicisation of decision making (this will be difficult).
- b. Avoiding short term cost saving at the expense of longer term goals.
- c. Thorough analysis of requirements involving a range of civil actors and public discussion.
- d. Wide and timely consultation and transparency of the process.

⁹ Armed Forces in neighbouring or regional states may provide a suitable model.

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EXECUTION

PRINCIPLES

9. The following principles apply to the conduct of reform:
 - a. Realistic aspirations and timescales for reform.
 - b. The process should be locally owned with military personnel only conducting training, mentoring and monitoring.
 - c. Close coordination with other elements of the SSR programme.
 - d. Changes in function should be mirrored elsewhere by other elements of the ISF (eg removing responsibility for riot control from the army and handing it to the police service which must then be adequately trained and equipped to perform the task).
 - e. Military Training Teams (MiTT) should adopt a consistent approach and maintain continuity when handovers are conducted.
 - f. Supporting skills, such as budgeting, administration, recruiting, supervision, management and logistics, must be developed.
 - g. IAF should be adequately paid in order to counter corruption, deter a return to violence and make service an attractive career.
 - h. Steps should be taken to build public confidence in and appreciation for the IAF. The role and ethos should be published and leaders, civil society and the media engaged to promote understanding.
 - i. A culture of service to the state and its people should be engendered. The IAF should be seen as a career of first choice.

CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Military Training Teams and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams

10. **Function.** MiTT and OMLT provide the practical means for implementing change and improving the competence and professionalism of IAF. Their role is to conduct Mentoring, Monitoring and Training (M2T) and liaison with support from the remainder of the force. The MiTT/OMLT organisation must have a clear command relationship with the SSR cells within the respective HQs and other force elements supporting the SSR process.
11. **Structures.** Until the IAF are capable of independent operation, MiTT/OMLT should be embedded at all levels of command in the IAF. As the capability of the IAF improves MiTT activity will progress from training and mentoring activity to monitoring performance. Figure 5.B.1.1 illustrates the MiTT structure adopted for 10 Iraqi Army Division.

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


Figure 6.B1.1 – Op TELIC MiTT structure for 10 Iraqi Army Division

12. **Preparation.** The following issues should be addressed in the preparation of MiTT/OMLT:

- a. Selection of teams by rank, skills and cap badge.
- b. Selection of non-military personnel within teams.
- c. Specific predeployment training.
- d. Security of training teams.

13. **PRT.** If the situation permits, MiTT/OMLT may work directly to PRT, either throughout the entire operation (depending on the scale of reform required and the security situation) or as the MiTT/OMLT organisation changes during the operational transition process.¹⁰

14. **Additional Support.** Short Term Training Teams (STTT) may be surged to provide additional training capacity at key points in the process (for example conducting the collective training of new battalions once recruits have finished basic training). LWC Collective Training Group may provide assistance in the conduct of CPXs.

15. **Specialist Training.** MiTT/OMLT conducting specialist training (eg ISR, EOD and logistics) must contain the appropriate level of expertise and be selected and trained prior to deployment. Liaison officers should receive role specific and cultural training.

¹⁰ See Annexes D, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and E, Transfer of Security Responsibility.

ENGENDERING CHANGE

16. MiTT/OMLT should work intimately with IAF and draw on their own expertise to produce appropriate, practical solutions that will endure and continue to develop once support is withdrawn. Key factors in the success of reform are:

- a. Local ownership.
- b. Strong leadership.
- c. Sound administration.
- d. Good training.

17. The MiTT/OMLT is responsible for training the people, establishing the structures and connections, and driving the processes until they become intuitive to the IAF.

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

18. Infrastructure will be required for personnel (and families), headquarters, training and equipment. Realistic timelines and funding which are linked to recruitment, training and equipment programmes should be established for their delivery.

DEVELOPING INDIGENOUS POLICE SERVICES

INTRODUCTION

1. One of the most significant and potentially controversial elements of many SSR programmes is the reform of the Police Service (PS) and ensuring police primacy within the security sector. In many situations this task is carried out by a specific organisation (such as the UNMIK Police teams who trained the Kosovo Police Service) and is not usually the responsibility of a MNF. In some circumstances, however, the military may be required to take the lead in restructuring a PS. Policing is not an activity intuitive to the military and even military policing activities differ from the capabilities, procedures and processes of a civil force.

2. Development of the PS should occur in parallel with legislative reform, reform in the penal and judicial systems within which the police operate and in other related civil service and government branches. It should also be supported by the appropriate expertise, which must include a comprehensive understanding of such parallel reform.

AIM

3. The aim of this Appendix is to summarise the key factors surrounding the reform of PS and provide more detailed information on restructuring and capability development in order to inform the planning for and process of police reform.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

THE SEPARATION OF POLICE AND MILITARY POWERS

4. **Principles.** Civil and military spheres of activity often overlap in states where an SSR programme is required. There are marked differences in understanding the function, role and organisational structures of various units which straddle the police-military boundary. Even in some democracies there is a trend towards paramilitary police units. The general consensus is that police and military powers should be clearly distinguished and separated. The following principles apply:

- a. The PS should be regarded as civilian rather than military.
- b. Military personnel should not conduct policing activity.
- c. Systematic and conceptual separation from the military is required. The PS should have its own, distinct and specialised education and training programmes.
- d. Police and military powers should complement each other.

5. **Strategic Planning.** A number of factors should be considered:

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- a. The boundaries, points of interface and responsibilities between police and military functions, roles and activities need to be identified.
- b. Routine policing needs to be understood in relation to the activities of paramilitary units, special guards etc.
- c. Spoilers (those with something to lose as a result of reform) should be identified along with any threats that they may present.
- d. If the military has held policing powers, it may need to be persuaded or coerced into accepting fundamental change, especially if these powers have in the past been lucrative and used to supplement meagre wages.
- e. The HN institutional capacity to assess, formalise and manage separation needs to be developed.
- f. The strategy chosen should ensure that formal or institutional relations are the determining factor in change - not personal relationships and allegiances.
- g. An appropriate legal framework that serves as the basis for police action needs to be developed. It will help to delineate police and military responsibilities and make police duties and responsibilities transparent.
- h. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats should be analysed.
- i. Realistic timelines should be developed.
- j. MOE and progress indicators should be chosen and adhered to.

EXECUTION

BUILDING A NEW POLICE SERVICE

6. **Introduction.** Building a new PS and developing the necessary appropriate legislative and judicial system within which it can operate is a difficult and complex process, particularly where reform tries to condense a package of diverse training into a shorter than desirable timeframe. The process is further complicated by a negative public opinion of the PS, a mismatch of funding and aspirations, and a far too frequent lack of strategic planning and coordinated execution. Building a new PS has four main challenges:

- a. Ensuring the PS operates within a wider system of governance.
- b. Establishing adequate managerial structures and systems.
- c. Establishing an accountable organisation that respects human rights.
- d. Equipping and training individual officers.

7. **Principles.** The following principles generally apply:

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a. Aspirations and timescales for reform must be realistic. The force must be affordable to the HN in the long term and funding allocations decided in consultation with it.¹¹

b. The PS should be designed to meet the requirements of its role and equipped with the necessary range of specialist policing skills (see below).

c. The process should be locally owned with International/MNF personnel only conducting M2T.

8. **Planning.** There are a number of planning factors to be considered:

a. There needs to be a strategic plan developed with detailed consultation with HN political, financial and civil representatives.

b. The strategic plan should have a framework for recruiting and certification, complaints procedures, accountability mechanisms and civilian oversight organisations.

c. TTs should adopt a consistent approach using nationally agreed TOs, TTPs, structures etc.

d. Planning should be based on a detailed assessment of current and future policing needs.

e. Supporting skills such as budgeting, administration, recruiting, supervision and management, need to be developed.

f. Priorities and roles reflecting financial realities and capabilities should be made clear.

g. Practical steps:

(1) Ensure that the PS is adequately paid in order to counter corruption and make service an attractive career (pay scales should be set in line with the rest of the criminal justice system).

(2) Create an institutional framework of internal and external accountability. Inappropriate behaviour should be punished and good practice rewarded.

(3) Steps should be taken to build public confidence in the PS. The role and ethos should be published and leaders, civil society and the media engaged to promote understanding.

(4) The criminal justice and penal systems must be developed in parallel.

h. MNF AO boundaries should mirror those of the PS they are supporting.

¹¹ Police Services in neighbouring or regional states may provide a suitable model.

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RECRUITMENT

9. **Introduction.** For a PS reform programme to succeed, the new force, where possible, should not resemble its predecessor in either image or practice. A thorough vetting process is essential to ensure the capability and loyalty of current and aspirant officers and the removal or retraining of those found to be unsatisfactory. Officers found responsible for past abuse and poor practice should also be removed. The process is often hampered by a lack of trustworthy records¹² and there is often a perception that the process is influenced by favouritism and political or ethnic affiliation.

10. **Principles.** The following principles apply to the recruitment process:

- a. The aim is to produce an effective, capable institution. The process therefore needs to be open and grounded in national laws.
- b. An objective assessment of competency and performance should be the criteria for promotion and reward. The long term goal is to produce a culture that punishes abuse and corruption.
- c. A continual process of performance assessment should be established to remove or retrain officers who fail to meet the required standards and to identify individuals for further training and promotion.
- d. Remedial training should be offered to make up for shortfalls in skills.
- e. The PS should reflect the demographic balance of the society it serves. This should be achieved without diminishing the standards required of officers and may mirror regional differences in the population.

CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

11. **Principles.** The basic principles of restructuring, development and transition as outlined in Annex B apply across whole of the ISF. The strategic SSR plan for the state should give guidance on the allocation of resources to achieve the desired endstate and define the responsibilities of each element of the ISF. M2T tasks include station visits, joint patrols and procedural checks.

12. **Developing Specialist Capability.** It is highly undesirable for MNF military forces to train HN PS as it undermines the need to separate police and military responsibilities. Whilst the military are able to deliver some elements of basic training (drill, weapon handling, basic incident management) specialist policing capabilities will need to be developed by experts. Where it is charged with responsibility for reform of the PS, a MNF must either be provided with the requisite expertise or must train its own troops to the necessary standard prior to deployment. Specialist areas which will need to be developed include:

¹² A combination of methods can be used to assist verification: community consultation, publishing recruiting lists for comment (security issues will need to be considered here) and consultation with human rights organisations. Consultation with stakeholders will assist, and engender more public support for the force.

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- a. **Intelligence.** The capability to collect, collate, analyse and disseminate intelligence is required to counter criminal, terrorist and insurgency activity.
- b. **Specialist Support.** Specialist teams (SWAT, TSU, EOD, search, public disorder).
- c. **Criminal Investigation.** A full investigative capability involving basic crime scene management, investigative procedures, interviewing skills, file preparation and a forensic capability will be required.

ESTABLISHING POLICE PRIMACY

13. **Introduction.** The transition to police primacy within the ISF will need to be part of a coordinated strategy across the whole SSR process. The end state of police primacy must be clearly defined at the outset. Expectation management, particularly amongst the military who may traditionally have been the main providers of security, must be started early. Where the police are taking on new responsibilities previously provided by other elements of the ISF they should be appropriately trained and equipped to fulfil them.

14. **Practical Steps.** The following practical measures may be adopted:

- a. Improve the status of the PS, including the use of Info Ops to raise the status of the police in the eyes of the public.
- b. Lessen corruption.
- c. Improve training.
- d. Adequately train and resource the PS to operate in dangerous situations in order to lessen the reliance on military support.
- e. Introduce measures to ensure the PS operates in accordance with the rule of law and is accountable (through internal and external organisations).
- f. Emphasise the service element of policing.
- g. Avoid the politicisation of the ISF.
- h. Security organisations having both a police and military function (border guards for example) should, where possible, be designated as special police and subordinated to the ministry of interior.
- i. Quick win solutions include the introduction of distinct police uniforms; targeted international study trips; the abolition of military ranks and titles.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR)

INTRODUCTION

1. DDR aims to take former combatants through the process of becoming ex-combatants and transform them into productive members of society. Whilst DDR usually forms part of a peace agreement and is conducted as part of the post conflict restoration process, it should not be assumed that DDR is appropriate to every operation. DDR is aimed at securing the immediate post conflict situation by collecting weapons, disarming former combatants and providing them with at least a minimal transition package so they do not feel the need to take up arms again. The process itself concentrates on the ex-combatants, but the benefits of a successful DDR programme will be felt by the wider community.

2. The process requires a comprehensive approach to planning and execution and will involve a host of IO, OGDs, coalition partners, NGOs etc. Military involvement is likely to be as part of a coalition with the multinational force (MNF) acting in a supporting role, providing security, monitors and logistic and administrative support in the early stages of what is a complex and time consuming process.

AIM

3. The aim of this Annex is to inform military involvement by presenting the planning considerations and a generic framework for the conduct of the DDR process.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

PRINCIPLES OF DDR

4. Five common principles underpin successful DDR programmes:

a. **Political Will.** Political will to pursue a lasting peace is required from principal stakeholders, particularly parties to the conflict, IO and donors. Success also requires a solid international framework, a political mandate, sufficient financial support and the forces to provide the necessary security.

b. **HN Government Ownership.** The HN Government must own the DDR process from peace talks to the reintegration of former combatants into civil society. External support may be necessary but the national government must lead on policy decisions and demonstrate a commitment to the process by presiding over some form of National Committee for DDR (NCDDR).

c. **Tailor DDR to Prevailing Circumstances.** The start point for a DDR programme is to ensure that those involved in peace talks understand the broad principles of DDR. Suitable conditions can then be set as part of a peace process.

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d. **Realistic Planning.** Agreement on realistic timelines and processes must be included as part of a cease fire or peace plan. Plans should take account of the difficulties involved in developing the political framework, providing a secure environment, generating the necessary international support and actually conducting the programme.

e. **Resources.** DDR is a resource intensive activity. It requires the long term commitment of skilled personnel, finance and materiel.

5. DDR also requires:

a. A strategically driven campaign plan defining the theme, clear end state, objectives, measures of success and dedicated resources:

- (1) Political will and tangible economic support for reintegration.
- (2) Information operations to encourage voluntary compliance.
- (3) Means or incentive for disarmament and reintegration.
- (4) Credible levels of participation.
- (5) Perseverance through the resolute and persistent pursuit of clearly defined objectives (which may be of a longer term social, economic and political nature).

b. Unity of purpose and coherence of action between military, political and civilian agencies:

- (1) The MNF will probably take the lead role in the early stages of the DDR process.
- (2) Supporting plans (eg economic, SSR) must be realistic, progressive and achievable, with clear delineation of responsibilities.
- (3) Reintegration is the desired end state and therefore must be planned from the outset.
- (4) Initial reintegration may include basic work in support of restoration projects to assist the re-establishment of economic and social activity.

c. **Legitimacy.** It is vital that the DDR process has the full support of the HN government and respected members of civil society.

d. **Security.** A robust posture will help to deter threats to stability. If they do arise, they should be countered swiftly and appropriately.

- (1) Supporting agency personnel and equipment must be protected.

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(2) The population must understand and support the DDR process and feel that it will give them better security.

e. **Effective Integration of ISF and Infrastructure:**

(1) Since DDR is part of SSR, elements of the existing ISF are required in the future and should be identified and transferred or integrated with the ISF.

(2) Transforming former combatants into policemen is likely to be less successful than integrating them into new IAF.

(3) Deliberate but carefully managed mixing of former combatants from opposing factions in new, integrated units may be necessary to remove any residual factional loyalties in the new armed forces.

f. **Effective Synchronisation with Other Stability Operations Tasks.**

HN ANALYSIS

6. An assessment of the risk of reversion to conflict should be considered in the early stages of planning. Factors include:

- a. The history of conflicts and underlying causes.
- b. Current and projected per capita Gross National Income (GNI).
- c. Current and future political stability, including an analysis of state structures and history of the breakdown of law and order.
- d. The country's dependency on few primary export commodities.
- e. The status of civil and political rights.
- f. The history and status of the military.
- g. Population demographics, in particular any ethnic dominance.
- h. Active regional conflicts, particularly those that might pose a threat to the HN.
- i. Previous involvement of any coalition partners with the HN.

EXECUTION

GENERIC PROCESS

7. Figure 6.C.1 illustrates a generic DDR process and lists some of the activities which could be undertaken by the MNF and donors at each stage. No two programmes will be alike and the exact division of responsibility between military and civil actors will vary. The disarmament and demobilisation stages have on previous occasions taken from three to 18 months whilst reintegration will normally be a longer process.




Figure 6.C.1 – Generic DDR Process.

DISARMAMENT

8. **Definition.** Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons in the possession of former combatants. Disarmament is often linked to voluntary weapons surrender programmes within the civilian population and the introduction of responsible weapons management programmes.

9. **Planning.** The separation and disarmament of warring parties requires a clear mandate for the MNF to execute it. A disarmament plan must be developed to include the appropriate element of FP for all involved in the process, the inclusion of amnesty and incentive programmes and robust verification measures. Security and protection will need to be provided for those who have disarmed, in at least the short term. If the process is to succeed former combatants should not perceive the need to retain their weapons for their own protection.

10. **Factors.** Planning considerations for developing disarmament include:

a. **Security.** The provision of a secure environment is central to the success of the DDR programme. In addition to meeting FP needs the MNF should provide a force to separate and protect warring parties, provide security for the movement of belligerents and fill any security vacuum that develops as a result of the process.

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b. **Eligibility Criteria.** The eligibility criteria for disarmament and registration into the remainder of the process should be clearly defined. Collective disarmament has proved to be the most efficient option although individual disarmament (to entice individuals away from belligerent groups) or a combination of the two may be appropriate.

c. **Priority for Disarmament.** In conjunction with the MNF Comd the lead agency must establish a priority for disarmament and consider the following:

- (1) FP.
- (2) Parity of disarmament between combatant parties to ensure impartiality.
- (3) The need to reduce the likelihood of conflict re-escalation by removing specific high profile weapons first, (eg heavy weapons or machine guns).
- (4) Disarmament or weapons collection points in relation to major cities and potential flashpoints.

d. **Timing.** It will never be possible or appropriate to disarm all personnel immediately. The security situation may not permit it or it may be preferable to leave groups of belligerents under their existing chains of command until disarming them is appropriate/possible.

e. **Weapon Management.** Throughout every phase of the disarmament process a plan for the verification and control of weapons systems is essential. The range of weapon types and systems to be dealt with needs to be considered and a sound plan developed and resources allocated (eg ATO and EOD teams) to register, remove, securely store, and, if necessary, destroy weapons and ammunition, mines etc. Some options for verification and identification include;

- (1) Cantonment (see below).
- (2) Electronic tagging systems.
- (3) Safe storage areas.
- (4) Weapon registration and/or licensing.
- (5) Controlled access systems.

11. **Cantonment.** The overriding requirement in supporting a ceasefire is to separate the combatants. In certain situations this may require HN government forces to return to their barracks and the movement of opposing forces to cantonments and the establishment of zones of separation between them. Whether this is required or not, a security vacuum must not be allowed to develop. The process of cantonment may be progressive, involving heavy weapons at first, and may help to set the conditions for further talks and subsequent

disarmament by reducing the capacity of the belligerents and providing breathing space. Figure 6.C.2 illustrates a generic cantonment process within the DDR programme.




Figure 6.C.2 – Generic Cantonment Process

12. **Verification.** Verification is essential to dispel suspicion between sides. A Joint Monitoring Mission (JMM) of military and civilian observers should be established to oversee the process. A Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) chaired by a senior MNF officer and comprising representatives from the warring parties and the protection force should be established to arbitrate disputes. Including tribal elders or other prominent figures from civil society in this process may help to promote a return to normal governance of society by increasing their standing in relation to warlords.

13. **Logistics and Administration.** In addition to weapon management the MNF may be required to provide transport, clothing, shelter, medical facilities and food to former combatants. Administrative support to register and process the former combatants will also be required. The DDR process should not falter due to poor administrative or logistic planning. Coordination to meet the requirements of the programme between all participants is essential.

14. **Risk Management.** The risk of a return to conflict in the early stages of a ceasefire and DDR programme is high. Opposition may come from warlords and politicians who see their power bases being removed, and others who see their livelihoods as being under threat. An appropriate approach to disarmament is required as well as strong security. A slow process balancing the development of new ISF and the disarmament of militias (whilst keeping heavy weapons under dual key arrangements) may be more successful than a rapid, wholesale disarmament that leaves a security vacuum.

15. **Security.** One of the main tasks of the MNF will be to provide security until the new ISF is capable of fulfilling that function. This security must be seen by all, including belligerents and their supporters, as being impartial, fair and capable of responding to likely

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threats. Depending on what remains of the local police force, it might have to take on policing duties and its composition and training will need to reflect this. The MNF must be seen as a temporary measure and not be perceived as an occupation force.

DEMOBILISATION

16. **Definition.** Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from the armed forces or other armed groups. The principal purpose of this stage is formally to change the status of an individual from that of combatant to ex-combatant.

17. **Planning.** The provision of a secure environment and coordination of activity with other actors and a SSR programme will continue to be MNF responsibilities. Planning for the demobilisation phase also needs to account for the following activities:

a. **Registration and Identification.** If not conducted at the disarmament stage personnel will need to be identified and registered into the DDR programme. Military records (if available), personal information and photographs will need to be obtained and ID cards and papers issued. There may be tension between the need to record data in order to inform the process and the suspicion that information may be used for subsequent prosecution or passed to the 'opposition' thus putting their lives at risk.

b. **Medical Screening.** Medical screening will be required to identify injuries and disabilities sustained as a result of conflict, HIV/AIDS, drug dependency, mental instability in order to inform the planning of appropriate medical support.

c. **War Crimes Screening.** The announcement of war crimes screening before the DDR process might stop some belligerents from participating in the process. In certain circumstances it might be more appropriate to consider a truth and reconciliation process.

d. **Information and Advice.** Former combatants should receive information and advice about their options for the future and what support is available to them. Expectation management will be required and a coherent message is necessary.

e. **Post Conflict Orientation.** Psychiatric support will be required to assist those who have been traumatised by conflict in order to prepare for their return to civil society.

f. **Formal Discharge and Transport to Home Region.** A mechanism for formal recognition of soldiers discharged from military service should be established and transport provided to return the ex-combatants to their home region.

18. **Factors.** A number of factors affect the demobilisation stage:

a. **Economic and Security Situation.** Immediate demobilisation of a nation's military forces may not be the most appropriate action. Based upon the economic and security situation, it may be prudent to keep some elements of the ISF and other factions intact and mobilised. Apart from the practical difficulties of simultaneously

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demobilising all warring factions care should be taken to avoid a security vacuum and provide the basis for the new national security force (in accordance with the SSR programme), or to provide a workforce for national support programmes such as infrastructure improvement and/or public works programmes.

b. **Categories of Combatants for Separation.** Different categories of combatants will require to be separated according to different needs. A start point for categorisation is given below:

(1) **Military Personnel with Less Than 18 Months Service.** These people require well planned but not extensive support and reintegration actions.

(2) **Military Personnel with More than 18 Months Service.** Such people will require full demobilisation and subsequent support to ensure reintegration.

(3) **Special Status Combatants.** Political or religious troops, secret police etc whose association with a previous regime make them harder to demobilise and reintegrate. This category could also be at risk of reprisals if not positioned correctly.

(4) **Female Combatants.** Female combatants should be treated according existing UN guidelines. The status of females (combatants, support personnel, wives) should be established.

(5) **Child Combatants.** Child combatants are particularly vulnerable to psychological trauma. They should be treated in accordance with UN guidelines which include:

- (a) Immediate separation from adult combatants.
- (b) Counselling.
- (c) Educational and vocational training.
- (d) Family reunion.

(6) **Disabled Combatants.** Support will be based on immediate medical attention to save life and planning the transfer of responsibility for longer term rehabilitation to appropriate social services.

(7) **Irregular Combatants.** Irregular combatants will require a similar level of support for reintegration. Training and re-education are central activities to ensure successful reintegration.

19. **Re-insertion.** Re-insertion is a form of short term, transitional assistance covering the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families as they return home. It occurs in the latter stages of demobilisation and prior to the longer term process of reintegration.

RE-INTEGRATION

20. **Definition.** Re-integration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility that often requires long-term external assistance.

21. **Planning.** Re-integration is a long term process that will take years. Military involvement is likely to be limited in both scope and time scale, and will be in support of a civilian lead agency. Re-integration planning for ex-combatants will involve establishing future livelihoods and reconciliation with communities and former enemies. As before, long term commitment (financial and expertise) will be required along with coordination of all actors. The return of former combatants to their communities will often need to be supported by parallel regeneration programmes and investment.

22. **Training.** Ex-combatants will need to be given new skills to enable them to settle back into civilian life and support their families and communities. Where there has been persistent conflict many of the skills required in a normal civilised society will have been lost. By equipping ex-combatants with these skills the chance of them reengaging in future conflict will reduce. The training programme will be long term and conducted mainly by OGDs and NGOs. Appropriate military skills (demining, engineering works) may be needed in the early stages.

23. **Military Re-integration.** A military re-integration programme may be run for some former combatants as part of the wider SSR programme. The MNF is likely to be involved in this process. Figure 6.C.3 shows a generic military re-integration process. Either all combatants can be demobilised prior to absorption into a new force, new structures formed from existing groupings or smaller forces integrated into the dominant force. The following factors will need to be considered:

- a. The standard required (medical, educational, criminal/war crime record etc).
- b. Ethnic/racial issues.
- c. Pension and legal rights.
- d. The division of ranks and positions of authority between former opposing factions.




Figure 6.C.3 - Generic Military Re-integration Process

TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

INTRODUCTION

1. In the latter stages of its support to SSR and in response to improving indigenous self-reliance, MNF will conduct the Transfer of Security Responsibility (TSR) to the civil authorities. This process will include the transfer of responsibility for security to the HN. The need for TSR to occur will have been stated in the campaign plan and the conditions required to achieve this should be developed as an operation progresses. Reform in these areas is usually the domain of OGD, IOs etc and comprehensive planning¹ to coordinate military activities with them should be conducted. The conditions should be designed and owned by the HN Government with advice from the MNF and lead nation states. The decision to conduct TSR should be made by the HN Government with support from international partners (military and civilian).²

2. The ability to conduct TSR depends on the collective capacity of HN institutions to take responsibility for their own areas of authority with diminishing external advice and assistance. The precise way in which the process is handled will be significantly influenced by the security situation in the HN. An effective means to assess the conditions, both subjective and objective, should be established from the outset of the campaign.

AIM

3. The aim of this Annex is to provide operational and tactical level guidance and information to assist those involved to prepare for, plan and conduct the process of transferring responsibility for security responsibility to a HN and its security forces.³

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

BACKGROUND

4. The operational transition process allows a MNF to underwrite ISF self reliance as the former disengages. A significant degree of risk is attached to this process. If the MNF withdraws too quickly, the ISF may fail in its role and suffer a loss of self esteem and public confidence. Conversely, too slow a withdrawal could lead to dependency and a loss of public consent (or tolerance) for the presence of the MNF. The lines of operation for the campaign are interlinked and military planning cannot be conducted in isolation. Throughout, planning must consider the need to keep coalition partners involved and engaged in the process and to coordinate the planning and execution of activity with the host of other civilian actors (OGD, IO etc) involved in an SSR programme.

¹ See JDN 4/05 *The Comprehensive Approach*.

² The dynamics of coalition strategic interests, HN agendas and the need to shape local and international perceptions to set the conditions for TSR will make this an extremely complicated process. This issue is discussed further in the Stability Operations Chapter of this AFM.

³ A similar process may need to be adopted for the handover of other key responsibilities, such as the handover of responsibility for the provision of essential services, to HN or international civil organisations.

5. Figure 6.D.1 illustrates generic MNF activity and force levels through a transition process. During the first stage of Tactical Overwatch (TOW), the lead (but not responsibility) for security provision switches to the ISF. MNF routine activity and support to ISF should gradually reduce with time. Reductions in force levels may occur as ISF capability improves. As the ISF and HN authorities continue to build their capability the conditions for a provincial TSR will be reached. The HN authorities and ISF then assume responsibility for the provision of security at provincial level. The resulting MNF force posture in Operational Overwatch (OOW) should be designed to support provincial control. Activity is likely to be reduced, although an agile reserve force, comprising MNF and ISF elements, is maintained. Training Teams (TTs) are likely to continue to provide support to an SSR programme and planned surge activity by the reserve may occur at periods of heightened tension in support of a province. The MNF retains the option to return to a province should the ISF be unable to deal with a deterioration in the security situation. Detail on the preconditions for and activity in each stage is given below. A number of subjects need to be considered before concentrating on the detail of the military activities.




Figure 6.D.1 – MNF Activity and Force Levels Through Operational Transition

SETTING CONDITIONS AND DECISION MAKING

6. Generic conditions for TSR should be set and agreed by the HN government with advice from MNF and troop contribution nations as part of a comprehensive planning process. These conditions must always be based on the clearly expressed premise that the HN and its ISF will operate within the rule of law and that they will be linked to the campaign lines of operation. It is critical that the HN government is fully involved with the design of the conditions and feels that it has ownership of them. Conditions for the return of MNF should also be agreed.

7. The rate at which the necessary conditions are achieved will vary within the HN. They will depend not only on the security situation itself but also on the capacity and capability of HN institutions and ISF at provincial and national levels. The timing of TSR will

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be determined as much by the ability of national institutions to support the provinces as by the conditions that exist in one province.

8. At the tactical level conditions should be assessed and constantly reviewed at local and provincial levels. Provincial Joint Operations Centres (PJOCs), comprising HN government and ISF representatives and MNF liaison officers, provide the forum to monitor and inform the process. Transparent qualitative (professional judgment from MNF commanders working with their equivalents in the ISF, TT etc) and operational analysis (OA) should inform the PJOCs and the national level decision making body of progress.

SUPPORT TO INDIGENOUS FORCES

9. The development, and possibly restructuring, of the ISF will be one of the MNF contributions to the SSR process. In order for TSR and operational transition to occur the ISF must be a capable, credible force whose capacity is judged in relation to the security challenge faced and the degree of political control and economic opportunity around it. Establishing police primacy will be a key task. In the initial stages of TOW it is likely that ISF, whilst having the lead for security operations, will still require intimate support and training from the MNF. As the process continues and the capability of ISF improves, this level of support will diminish to be replaced by joint operations involving the ISF and MNF. The ISF are likely to achieve a high degree of proficiency in tactical level tasks before achieving the required degree of command and control, CSS, coordination between ISF elements and their respective HN Government agencies. In the early stages, therefore, there should be a continual reduction in the numbers of MNF troops conducting independent patrolling activity. The need to provide planning support will extend further into the process⁴ and it is likely that MiTTs, and possibly teams operating in support of other elements of the ISF, will continue to conduct monitoring, mentoring and training (M2T), although their focus will change with time.

SUPPORT TO OTHER INSTITUTIONS

10. The ability to conduct successful operational transition and TSR depends as much upon the ability and capacity of HN government institutions to operate without support from the MNF and other international government departments as it does on capable and credible ISF. Self reliance in these areas is central to the withdrawal of MNF and to the maintenance of longer term security within the HN. It may therefore be necessary to focus on supporting and facilitating fledgling elected bodies and governance while developing cross-ministry cooperation. This should be conducted as a comprehensive approach in conjunction with civil actors (such as the FCO, DfID and the UN) who in turn should be supported to improve their effectiveness in order to replace military assistance.

11. At provincial level the capacity for governance should complement national initiatives and take place concurrently. It may be appropriate to use PRT in this role.⁵ Where specific military teams operate in support of HN government departments at the local/provincial level, plans should be made to hand over remaining functions to, ideally, HN governing bodies or other donors at an appropriate stage in accordance with the lines of operation.

⁴ This could include the provision of specific MNF capabilities, such as ISTAR feeds, to assist the ISF with the prosecution of security operations.

⁵ See Annex 8-D – Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

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CIMIC, Info Ops and Public Information (P Info) activity will be required in support of these activities.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

12. Maintaining situational awareness (SA) throughout the transition process is necessary to ensure that the ISF and civil institutions continue to function effectively. SA is required to inform the decision making process and to trigger activity by MNF and other international donors to deal with situations that threaten the transition process or the state. As the transition process continues, measures to maintain SA will need to be unobtrusive and discreet to avoid undermining ISF confidence and mutual trust. In the early stages a combination of professional judgment and objective assessment will be used to inform the decision making process. However, as the process continues and MNF profiles reduce, maintaining SA and obtaining data for MOE will become more difficult. The ability to maintain SA will be heavily reliant on ISTAR capability, as well as OGD, civil actors, TT and the media.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

13. SA is supported by OA teams producing MOE to give an objective assessment of the overall situation and the effectiveness of ISF. Ultimately MOE assist in determining mission success and, in this instance, are used to inform decision making on the reallocation and withdrawal of assets. MOE should be considered and integrated throughout all phases of an operation. When the operational transition process begins OA teams should have a comprehensive set of baseline data against which to measure future change as ISF and HN institutions develop. Specific MOE that target key ISF performance characteristics should be developed to inform the process and the decision to conduct TSR. These and the means of data collection should be included in the planning process. As MNF levels reduce, data collection will become increasingly difficult and lead to an increase in reliance on third parties (HN contractors, other civil actors etc). The ISF should be encouraged to conduct their own OA and routinely produce statistics (such as crime figures, numbers held in detention etc) in line with the conventions of an open, accountable government. These could, in turn, be used by UK OA teams to run independent analysis and inform the latter stages of the transition process.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

14. Info Ops will provide commanders with the means to affect target audiences throughout the transition process. Planning should be conducted in a timely manner, be fully integrated and resourced. Coordination with P Info and CIMIC activities will be required. In addition to ongoing activity to promote campaign authority⁶ additional effort will be required in all phases in the following areas:

⁶ 'Campaign authority describes: the perceived legitimacy, by the various actors within the complex ,of the international mandate that establishes a PSO; the perceived legitimacy of the freedoms and constraints placed on those executing a PSO; the degree to which factions, the local population and other actors subjugate themselves to the authority of those conducting the PSO; and the degree to which the activities of those executing the PSO meet the expectations of the factions, local population and others.' JWP 3-50 *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*.

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- a. Maintaining consent (or tolerance) towards MNF by the general population.⁷
- b. Enhancing the credibility of ISF and highlighting their primacy.⁸
- c. Reinforcing and strengthening the will and protecting the resolve of ISF and allies.
- d. Undermining the will, resolve, capability and credibility of opponents to international involvement and seeking to divide them from the general population.

CIVIL MILITARY COOPERATION

15. CIMIC input to the planning process and its associated activity will prove essential to the transition process. Coordination with P Info and Info Ops activity will remain critical. Throughout, the imperative of CIMIC activity, in conjunction with other civil actors, will be to restore the responsibility for civil administration to legitimate, competent civil authorities if it has not already done so. Similarly, projects in direct support of the civil community conducted by the military should be by exception and CIMIC effort should involve finding suitable donors or sponsors for such work. The following CIMIC activities may be undertaken throughout the TSR process:

- a. Contributing to SA and planning by:
 - (1) Monitoring the capability and capacity of HN institutions.
 - (2) Monitoring the capacity and capability of civil actors.⁹
 - (3) Obtaining comment from civil actors and HN institutions regarding the security situation, quality of life etc to inform OA.
- b. Continuing to assist in creating self reliance in HN institutions (as part of a comprehensive approach) in order to create self reliance and hand over responsibility to them (or a suitable sponsor).
- c. Ensuring that there is a forum through which the ISF can continue to engage with civil actors.

CONDUCT

16. As operational transition progresses the MNF force posture will evolve. Changes in force posture should be driven by improvements in ISF and HN institutional capability and designed to promote and support responsibility for security at the provincial and, eventually, national levels. The stages are:

⁷ Consent will be required for the presence of MNF and, as TOSR progresses, for their withdrawal.

⁸ This may need to be extended to include other institutions.

⁹ Civil actors is a collective term for the range of civil agencies, bodies and organisations that may be involved in addressing the circumstances and conditions of a conflict or crisis situation. These include: OGDs, International Organisations (IOs); international donors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU); security forces such as the Civil Police; Non Government Organisations (NGOs); the corporate sector; local authorities; and local populations.

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- a. Tactical Overwatch (TOW).
- b. Operational Overwatch (OOW).
- c. Strategic Overwatch (SOW).

17. For progress to the next stage to be made a predetermined set of functional and environmental circumstances should be assessed. OA, MOE and subjective judgment will be required to inform this process. Conditions will be generic and judgment will be required to apply them in different areas. **It is unlikely that every condition will be satisfied concurrently and judgment will be required to assess when they are right to move to the next phase.** Risk should be identified and understood throughout.

TACTICAL OVERWATCH

18. **Conditions.** The key determinant for this phase is the ability of ISF to take the lead for the provision of security at provincial level with close support from the MNF. The likely conditions are as follows:

- a. Representative government at provincial level is bureaucratically capable and able to exercise political control over ISF activity and further capacity building, with advice from the MNF.
- b. Essential services are acceptable, or improving, and provide a reasonably sustained level of service to preclude widespread civil unrest.
- c. Economic opportunities are assessed to be acceptable with a reasonable expectation of improvement.
- d. Effective ISF operating with advice and assistance from MNF. Depending on the security situation ISF is able at provincial level to:
 - (1) Take the lead, with advice, for joint counter insurgency, anti crime and stability operations without the need for independent MNF framework security operations.
 - (2) Assert general territorial control and maintain law and order with close support from MNF.
 - (3) Operate under direction from and in consultation with provincial authorities.
 - (4) Enjoy a reasonable level of independent tactical mobility.
 - (5) React to and control individual incidents.
 - (6) Coordinate activities between police, army, border security services etc.

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- (7) Provide effective point policing of formal border access points and some disruption to cross-border activity.
- (8) Provide reasonable protection of strategic economic infrastructure.
- (9) Provide first and second line support to static locations and first line support to deployed operations, with some assistance.
- (10) Operate from secure operating bases.
- (11) Develop integrated security plans at provincial level.
- (12) Successfully complete training exercises or operations at the required level.
- (13) Provide reasonable security, with close support for elections.

19. **Military Activity.** In the initial stages of TOW activity levels for the MNF are likely to appear similar. The change is therefore more in mindset. The ISF lead in security matters must be increasingly fostered throughout TOW to improve capability and reduce any dependence on the MNF. Intimate support to ISF is likely to be provided in the early stages but it should be gradually reduced with a view to creating the conditions for transfer to OOW and the conduct of the formal TSR. Combined operations (involving MNF and ISF) should be conducted and used as a means for developing ISF confidence and capability. Training activity, conducted by TT, should continue in line with the SSR programme. Info Ops and CIMIC activity should be focussed to support the process. MNF levels should reduce and base closures are likely. Annex A lists the likely conditions for ISF to achieve in order to set the conditions for TOW. The following is a summary of likely MNF activity:

- a. Act in support of ISF as and when required.
- b. Conduct incremental base closure whilst maintaining a degree of colocation with ISF.¹⁰
- c. Continue SSR activity through combined operations and TT.¹¹
- d. Reduce visible presence of MNF to improve ISF and public confidence in them.
- e. Continue own FP activity and remain postured for increased support to ISF as required.¹²

¹⁰ Forces must be seen to withdraw at the request of the HN, not as a response to a perceived threat. If the latter is the case it will fuel any ongoing or future conflict within the state or region. Base closure also releases the combat power committed to sustaining and protecting them.

¹¹ Embedded TT and partnering arrangements at BG level and below should continue to provide intimate advice and support and SA in the initial phases. Reconfiguration of the TT will be required as transition progresses to achieve balance and, perhaps, to focus on training specific capabilities.

¹² There will be a requirement to differentiate between threats to international troops in response to their very presence and enduring threats to the HN state. Conditions for additional support should ideally be agreed in advance.

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- f. Routine, independent security and stability operations should decrease to be replaced by combined operations with ISF.
- g. Info Ops activity should ensure that a cohesive message (from national policy to tactical level) is presented in order to:
 - (1) Support the establishment of a credible ISF.
 - (2) Separate public opinion from any opposing insurgent groups.
 - (3) Enhance ISF credibility.
 - (4) Promote the message that international troops remain at the HN government's request to guarantee the security situation.
 - (5) Emphasise that the transition is based on ISF and HN institutional capability rather than the situation.
- h. CIMIC activity should focus on supporting the development of governance and self-reliance with increasing support from civil actors.

OPERATIONAL OVERWATCH AND TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

20. **Conditions.** The following conditions should ideally apply before a formal TSR to the provincial civil authorities is conducted and the MNF transfer to OOW is undertaken:
- a. Provincial government is bureaucratically capable, linked to the appropriate national institutional structures and able to exercise political control over ISF operations and further capacity building with very limited advice from international actors or the MNF.
 - b. Provincial governments reflect the outcome of democratic elections and officials act mostly in accordance with HN law.
 - c. The majority of ethnic/religious groupings are not assessed to be opposing the government and the leaders advocate engagement with it.
 - d. Opposition groups (including unofficial paramilitary groupings) have memberships involved in politics as the chosen method for civil engagement.
 - e. Corruption levels are within existing norms and measures are in place to reduce them.
 - f. Assessed popular opinion indicates a reasonable degree of confidence in the sustained delivery of essential services and there is widespread belief that economic opportunities are sufficient or continuing to grow.
 - g. Reconstruction, economic development and inward investment are led by the HN.

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h. ISF:

- (1) Are capable of conducting counter insurgency, anti-crime and stability operations at provincial level, under the control of provincial authorities without the need for close support.
- (2) Continue to exert territorial control and maintain law and order with support only *in extremis*.
- (3) Are viewed as capable and the preferred providers of security by the public.
- (4) Are developing robust links to national C2 structures and intelligence systems.
- (5) Coordinate effective operations supported by intelligence.
- (6) Have an understanding of how to develop police primacy. Police forces have a record of conducting operations as an accountable, procedure based force.
- (7) Provide a level of point security for economic infrastructure and can deliver wider security with minimal support.
- (8) Have developed provincial level intelligence structures which are capable of fusing and effectively employing information within forces and with a developing ability to do so between forces.
- (9) Enjoy an increasing degree of independent tactical mobility within provinces and, to a lesser extent, pan-province.
- (10) Have logistic structures that can support deployed operations without MNF support.
- (11) Can exert a measure of control over key border areas and continue to dominate formal access points.
- (12) Have developed integrated security plans at provincial level.
- (13) Provide reactive and environmental protection for international governmental effort engaging in HN-led reconstruction and governance activity at first line with second line MNF support.

21. **Military Activity.** Following TSR the MNF transfer to OOW will see a further reduction in the profile and a reduction in basing that, in the latter stages, will see troops based in a single location, probably in reduced numbers. A capable and agile force will need to be maintained to conduct combined operations with ISF, provide reinforcement to HN authorities on request and to protect national or coalition interests and vulnerabilities. The force will need to be physically and mentally agile and adopt an expeditionary approach. SA will need to be maintained through continued attendance at PJOC, support

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to ISF, through the civil actor community, intelligence activity, OA etc. A loss of SA will add significantly to the risk involved in the transition process. Carefully considered re-intervention will require contingency planning and should only occur when a satisfactory ISF solution is not available or when vital interests are threatened. Operational support to the HN should be strictly controlled. Requests for assistance from the HN must be scrutinised to ensure that sufficient time and space has been given for self-reliance to work. Annex B lists the likely conditions for ISF to achieve in order to set the conditions for transfer to OOW. Likely activity is as follows:

- a. The provision of a capable and agile reserve, in conjunction with ISF, to conduct combined operations and re-engagement if required.¹³
- b. Maintain SA (including that of OGD and relevant civil actors).
- c. Training support to develop normalised bilateral defence activity.¹⁴
- d. Cooperative reassurance to ISF.
- e. Further base closure.
- f. Continued military tasks in support of SSR.¹⁵
- g. Continued political-military liaison.
- h. CIMIC effort shifts the responsibility for the generation and running of donor or centrally funded government projects to HN government control.
- i. Info Ops set the conditions for transfer to SOW by exploiting beneficial publicity. Effort will be required to gain consent for the withdrawal of MNF. Planning should be conducted to reduce the negative impact of re-intervention and senior HN figures should be encouraged to highlight the achievements of HN institutions.
- j. Activity to promote coalition cohesion, such as contributing to elements of the agile reserve, is required.

STRATEGIC OVERWATCH

22. **Conditions.** The conditions for SOW will be met when ISF have assumed security and stabilisation tasks from MNF and HN institutions have sufficient national capacity to control their security forces and provide adequate municipal services to their population. In effect normal bilateral military relations exist. The following conditions will need to be met:

- a. Provincial and national government is able to exercise political control over ISF operations and capacity building with very limited advice at the national level.

¹³ Reinforcement to a province would be on request or when deemed appropriate.

¹⁴ Adequate Force Protection (FP) will be required for MiTT and PRT. Depending on the threat and geography the need to provide FP may hinder significant reductions in force levels. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for ISF to provide FP.

¹⁵ It may be appropriate to use PRT at this stage.

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- b. An accountable system of national government has been established with opposition groups being represented by political parties in the first instance.
- c. Assessed popular opinion indicates satisfaction with the degree of delivery of essential services and there is widespread belief that economic opportunities and growth exist.¹⁶
- d. There is a national lead for economic development and inward investment.
- e. National government conducts bilateral relationships.
- f. ISF:
 - (1) Accept the authority of civil institutions and are capable of maintaining law and order at the national level with minimal advice.
 - (2) Exert territorial control without assistance.
 - (3) Are seen as the only providers of security by the public.
 - (4) Have developed robust national C2 structures and intelligence systems. Capable of fusing and effectively employing information within and between forces at a national level with minimum advice.
 - (5) Can coordinate effective intelligence-supported operations at national level.
 - (6) Have developed police primacy with an accountable, procedure based police force trusted by the population.
 - (7) Have secured strategic economic infrastructure.
 - (8) Enjoy nationwide independent tactical mobility.
 - (9) Control key border areas and formal access points.
 - (10) Have developed integrated plans at national level.
 - (11) Provide protection and a secure working environment for international government and corporate personnel.¹⁷

23. **Military Activity.** SOW will see the withdrawal of the residual, formed land-based force. The UK will contribute to a further coalition or national posture that will continue to support HN self reliance and start to finalise the conditions required to normalise bilateral relations. IO activity will again be central to shaping the conditions for the move to SOW. Activity is likely to include:

¹⁶ Measurements or estimates of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and growth would add empirical evidence.

¹⁷ There may be a requirement for national assets to provide protection for personnel from UK OGD that remain in the HN following the withdrawal of the main MNF.

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- a. Withdrawal of the formed land force and final base closure.
- b. Maintain SA.
- c. Training support to ISF and programmed joint exercises.
- d. Exercises in other regional states.
- e. The provision of an Over the Horizon Force.¹⁸
- f. Military liaison and mentoring at national level.

¹⁸ For example the SLE commitment to provide a strategic reserve for the Balkans.

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STABILITY OPERATIONS

PART B

TRAINING, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

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CHAPTER 7

PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

INTRODUCTION

1. The LAND Mounting Instruction is the authority for Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) and must be adhered to if the theatre specific training requirements are to be met. PDT is a concentrated period of training specific to a theatre of operations. It is undertaken by individuals either as individual reinforcements (IR) or as formed organisations from sub-unit to formation. In order to get the most from it, all those undergoing PDT must be fit to train and have the underlying military competencies on which to draw to avoid prejudicing the progress of PDT.

2. This chapter does not attempt to cover training of IRs as guidance on their preparation for PDT is given in the LAND Mounting Instruction. PDT for IRs is conducted on an IR course by OPTAG, normally on an IR course at Lydd or Sennelager.

AIM

3. The aim of this chapter is to outline the basic preparation necessary by both individuals and units/formations before undertaking pre-deployment training for PSO/COIN.

PDT OUTLINE

4. Unit PDT is conducted in the following sequence:

a. **Planning and Course Loading.** Planning and course loading is conducted at the earliest opportunity to ensure that the block programme works (done in conjunction with the collective training organisation) and that individuals on specialist courses are sent away as early as possible. Early liaison between the formation, HQ LAND, HQ LWC and OPTAG is crucial to success.

b. **All Ranks Briefing.** OPTAG will run an all ranks briefing (normally two days) covering theatre briefs, G2, G3, force protection and other mandatory skills. It should be the aim to brief the whole unit or battlegroup (and attachments) simultaneously. It is mandatory for all ranks.

c. **Train the Trainer.** A Train the Trainer (T3) package (normally 3 – 4 days) will be run by OPTAG to prepare the training staff from units undergoing PDT. It will provide the material necessary to conduct cascade training with their own unit. High quality instructors (normally SNCOs) are essential.

d. **Cascade or In Barracks Training (IBT).** Cascade or In Barracks Training (IBT) is the period of training carried out by a unit using the instructors trained on the T3 package by OPTAG. It is recommended that at least 10 clear working days are given to this period which is aimed at individual, team and multiple skills. Appropriate real estate and ranges are necessary.

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e. **Range Package.** A theatre-specific range package must be conducted (in addition to 10 days cascade training). This should achieve advanced levels of field firing and ideally, firing of UOR weapons systems and firing from vehicles. Units should seek to start the PDT Range package having already completed the transition to tactical live firing if they are to maximise the potential of this training event.

f. **Confirmatory Training.** Confirmatory training will be conducted by OPTAG (in consultation with commanders) and confirms skills taught during cascade training. Sub-units will normally undergo a 6-7 day programme. OPTAG will usually seek to make this a thorough combined arms exercise for all elements of the unit, including G4 elements and, where possible, will tailor it to the specific needs of the arm or service.

g. **Mission Rehearsal Exercise.** Formations will usually seek to conduct a mission rehearsal exercise for all units towards the end of the PDT period.

INDIVIDUAL SKILLS

5. **General.** It is vital that all soldiers are capable of carrying out the full range of military skills. In addition to achieving at least the minimum standards laid down in Individual Training Directives (ITDs) for their arm or service, emphasis should be placed on the subjects outlined below.

6. **Fitness.** Fitness training should concentrate on developing upper body strength and stamina. This not only will allow weapons and equipment to be carried for longer periods more easily but will also benefit public order, arrest and pursuit activities. Robust battle PT should be incorporated into training programmes.

7. **Weapon Handling.** Soldiers must be more than just familiar with their own weapons and with those which they are likely to come into contact. Negligent discharges and accidents are often the result of lack of confidence with weapons, especially in 'non-range' conditions.

8. **Shooting.** The nature of the current operational environment is such that all force elements could be involved in a contact battle and need to be able to fight for their lives. A high standard of marksmanship and fieldcraft is required of all those who deploy on operations. PDT must include comprehensive rangework and field firing.

9. **First Aid.** While the number of specialist trained medics will be increased for theatre, every soldier must be capable of delivering effective first aid by executing his ITD skills with confidence. It is not enough to hope that the team medic will arrive to do the job as he may be the casualty.

10. **Navigation.** Individuals must be able to navigate on foot and in vehicles in both rural and urban terrain. This skill must be mastered at all levels.

11. **Voice Procedure.** All soldiers must have mastered the basics of voice procedure to the extent that prior to attending PDT they can all send a contact report.

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12. **Theatre Background Study.** Study of the theatre, its history, background and culture will be required by all. Different levels of study will be required by different soldiers and officers depending upon their appointment. Study can be done either individually or in periods organised by units and formations. OPTAG will deliver a theatre orientation brief during PDT which will be augmented by an operational orientation pack that LWC/Warfare Development (WARDEV) will send to units six months prior to deployment.

BATTLEGROUP PREPARATION

13. **General.** Early engagement with OPTAG and clear direction to the Formation/Unit Training Adviser (FUTA) is essential. It is not simply enough to expect the collective training establishments to take over all aspects of PDT; they can only advise and provide subject matter expertise.

14. **Collective Training.** PDT is aimed at sub-unit level and below and does not include extensive training of unit and higher level headquarters elements. Formations and battlegroups (BGs) must carry out sufficient training (to a minimum of CT3 and ideally to CT4) during the adaptive foundation. This will ensure that they have the basic capability to operate as an efficient and effective BG HQ before facing the more complex, multi-agency challenges presented during COIN/PSO operations. OPTAG will reinforce preparatory training through MAPEXs and TEWTs but is not able to run a CAST.

15. **Course Preparation.** A plethora of specialist courses will need to be undertaken by BG personnel at all levels. Such courses must be planned well in advance to avoid clashes with PDT. Courses required will include search, interpreters, languages, intelligence, media, PSYOPS, CIMIC and tactical questioning. Details of the requirement are available from OPTAG and HQ Land.

16. **Driver Training.** Driver training causes the greatest demands on course loading and driving related incidents tend to result in the majority of casualties sustained on operations. Most units will have to increase the number of trained drivers and should pay particular attention to licence categories and specific skills required for in-theatre vehicles. Due to limited availability early loading of courses is vital.

17. **Role Preparation.** BGs may have to prepare for specialist roles to be undertaken in theatre. For example, those involved in SSR will need to conduct all the basic skills taught on PDT and acquire expertise in the training and mentoring of local security forces. Similarly those involved with G2 will need to fully understand the capabilities of the unfamiliar agencies available in theatre. Training for specialist capabilities such as static covert surveillance will also need detailed forward planning.

18. **Administration.** The administration of the BG is crucial to its successful conduct of PDT and subsequent deployment, and will include the families and rear party. The BG must ensure that all elements are equally well prepared to conduct and support in-theatre operations. Particular attention should be paid to force protection for convoys and bases. It will require early planning if the G1/4 element, which will always be busy immediately prior to any deployment, is not to have its PDT compromised.

19. **Post Operational Reports and Interviews.** BGs should make use of available Post Operational Reports (POR) and Post Operational Interviews (POI) to assist in their

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preparation for operations. They should also designate an officer to begin the collation of their own POR, which should reflect the totality of their preparation, training, execution and recovery from an operation, in order to improve all aspects for the future (LANDSO 1118 refers).

20. **Points of Contact.** The OPTAG telephone contact list is at Annex A and the LWC Warfare Development (WARDEV) list is at Annex B.

OPTAG CONTACT LIST

Appt	Tel No	E-Mail Address
Comd	94281 2284 01303 225284	LWC-OPTAG-HQ-Comd (R) LWC OPTAG HQ – Comd (S)
SO1 Trg	94281 2511 01303 222011	LWC-OPTAG-HQ-SO1Trg (R) LWC OPTAG HQ – G3 Trg SO1 (S)
OC OPTAT 1	94281 2068 01303 225068	LWC-OPTAG-OPTAT1OC (R) LWC OPTAG HQ – PSO OC (S)
OC OPTAT 2	94281 2264 01303 225264	LWC-OPTAG-OPTAT2OC (R) LWC OPTAG HQ – OPTAT 1 OC (S)
OC COTAT	94287 8561 01303 225561	LWC-OPTAG-LYDD-COTATOC (R) LWC OPTAG Lydd – COTAT OC (S)
OC STAT	94281 2225 01303 225225	LWC-OPTAG-STAT-OC (R) LWC OPTAG HQ – STAT OC (S)
QM	94287 8547 01303 225547	LWC-OPTAG-LYDD-QM
Prog Cell	94281 2192 01303 225192	LWC-OPTAG-HQ-ProgsWO1 (R) LWC OPTAG HQ – Progs WO1 (S)
Duty Officer	07771 835140	
Group Mailbox		LWC-OPTAG-HQ(Mailbox)

Operational Training Advisory Group
 Risborough Barracks
 Shorncliffe
 FOLKESTONE
 Kent CT20 3HW

RESTRICTED**ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 7****WARFARE DEVELOPMENT (WARDEV) TELEPHONE LIST**

Rank	Initials	Name	Regt/Corps	Position	Tel No
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Col	A (Alex)	Alderson MBE	Late HLDRS	Col WARDEV	2967
LtCol	AJ (Andy)	Docherty	LANCS	SO1	8760
Lt Col	MR (Marcus)	Good	LD	SO1 Tac Doc Dev	8832
Lt Col	RA (Crash)	Charrington	9/12 L	SO1 Lsns	8831
Lt Col	JDS (Julian)	Moir	KRH	SO1 Experimentation	8722
Brig (Retd)	I A (Iain)	Johnstone	Late R SCOTS	SO1 Post Op Int	2904
Lt Col (Retd)	R A (Bob)	Hamilton	Late RA	SO1 Tac Doc Pubs	8764
Maj (Retd)	PJA (Percy)	D'Souza	RLC	SO2 Co-ord	2073
Maj	S (Simon)	Canning	RA	SO2 Arty	2946
Maj	RGJ (Justin)	Stein	AAC	SO2 Avn	2626
Maj	RG (Richard)	Strangways	INT CORPS	SO2 Int	2622
Maj	SP (Stuart)	Houghton	PWRR	SO2 Experimentation	8720
Maj	M (Matt)	Palmer	R WELSH	SO2 Lsns	2047
Maj	JJ (Justin)	Sampson	REME	SO2 ES & Med	8744
Maj	AC (Andy)	Clee	RE	SO2 Engr	2619
Maj	RSB (Rupert)	Whitelegge	A and SH	SO2 Inf/Plans	2031
Maj	N (Neil)	Griffiths	R SIGNALS	SO2 CIS	2229
Mrs	A (Alison)	Stephenson		E1	2390
Mrs	D (Diane)	Sawyer		E2	2390

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CHAPTER 8

PATROLLING IN OTHER OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. This Chapter provides guidance on patrolling in 'Other Operations' (formally known as Operations Other Than War). The main body of the chapter covers the aims and principles of patrolling. Annex A provides guidance on patrol preparations prior to deployment from the security force base. Annex B provides guidance on the conduct of patrols including foot and mobile patrols. Annex C provides guidance on the activities conducted by the patrol on return to the security force base. Annex D provides the format for patrol related reports. The guidance is not prescriptive and should be supplemented by individual experience and unit SOPs.

AIMS OF PATROLLING

2. The aims of patrolling in other operations are:
- a. Gathering information.
 - b. Reassuring/gaining the trust of the population.
 - c. Prevent public disorder.
 - d. Dominating the ground by:
 - (1) Deterring and disrupting enemy activity.
 - (2) Protecting security force bases.
 - (3) Protecting key infrastructure and civilian authorities.
 - e. Support other operations in the area.
 - f. Providing security to deployed troops.

3. **Patrol Structure.** The concept of employing multiples of three 4-man teams is a common feature in other operations. The decision to adopt multiple patrolling as opposed to maintaining platoon structures will depend upon the situation and the threat. In some circumstances, framework patrols may even be up to sub-unit strength. A flexible, effects-driven TASKORG is critical.

PRINCIPLES OF PATROLLING

4. **Mutual Support.** Mutual support during patrolling is achieved by co-ordinating the movement and actions of teams, whilst taking into account weapon/ECM/communication capabilities and ranges. The loose triangle formation allows at least two teams to react to an incident involving the third team. Mutual support during a contact is generally provided by the out of contact teams attempting to move 100-150 metres into depth of the firing

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position. The team in contact must provide sufficient information to allow positions of mutual support to be adopted by the other teams.

5. **All Round Defence.** All round defence can be achieved within each team by allocating arcs of responsibility to each team member. Within a patrol, teams can be allocated arcs of responsibility to provide all round defence.

6. **Depth.** Maintenance of depth is vital; it gives troops the ability to react to incidents and also keeps the enemy guessing as to the location of all teams. Within a team depth is achieved by adopting a loose box formation within the ECM umbrella. At multiple level depth is achieved by adopting a loose triangular formation. Depth is also achieved by using other deployed or static security forces, including police, sangar sentries, vehicles (such as WR, Snatch, WMIK etc) and air support (rotary, fixed wing and UAVs). The distance between each team on patrol should be influenced by the extent of the patrol's ECM cover and the nature of the terrain. Consideration should be given to increasing the size of patrols to achieve greater depth.

7. **Deception.** Deception should be employed to introduce doubt into the mind of the enemy as to the purpose, route and actions of the patrol. The enemy will look to predict the actions of the patrol in order that it can be targeted or to limit the effectiveness of the patrol. The enemy will look to establish patrol patterns in order that they can mount an attack at a time and place of their own choosing. They will be deterred from mounting an attack if the actions of the patrol are unpredictable as there is a higher risk of capture or discovery. Some methods of achieving deception on patrol are as follows:

- a. Change exit and entry drills, including utilising mobile pick up and drop off.
- b. Change patrol formations and numbers, including changing the structure of a multiple. For example, varying multiples between two teams of six soldiers and three teams of four soldiers or by deploying additional multiples
- c. Varying patrol routes (honesty traces must be completed and their information managed by ops rooms).
- d. Avoidance of pattern setting (doubling back, hard targeting, mobile lift and drop).

8. **Communication.** The communications plan must be robust and communications maintained throughout the patrol. Every patrol member must understand the lost communications procedure. Without communications a patrol or a team within it becomes extremely vulnerable. Communications enable the ops room and commanders to keep the patrol informed of threats and intentions. Every patrol member has a responsibility to keep the remainder of the patrol informed of anything noteworthy including observed changes in normal behaviour amongst civilians, suspicious activity or even a lack of activity.

COUNTERING ENEMY TACTICS

9. Patrol members must remain vigilant and suspicious. Enemy activity has to be planned and prepared and the signs are there to be seen. Patrol members should be encouraged to question whether what is seen is what it appears to be. They should be

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inquisitive and reluctant to accept things at face value. Reporting suspicious activity, lack of activity and the out of place contribute to the development of a low level intelligence picture, help achieve mission success and can save lives. Soldiers must be aware of the 'absence of the normal and the presence of the abnormal'.

10. The enemy will amend his tactics in response to ours. Troops must observe and record these and be prepared to develop their own TTPs in response.

11. Patrols must not set patterns. To do so is to invite attack. Vehicles must not stop at the same locations, soldiers must vary their fire positions and the cover they use when static. Patrol activity must be unpredictable, routes and timings must be varied. In essence, good low-level soldiering skills must be employed.

PATROL PREPARATIONS

1. Thorough preparation is critical to success. It is a legal requirement for patrols to be briefed and given orders before being deployed. Patrol members should depart on a patrol understanding its mission, confident of the capabilities of the patrol, understanding the threats that may be encountered during the patrol and with good situational awareness.
2. **Briefings and Orders.** Pre-patrol briefings and patrol orders should cover the following subjects:
 - a. **Environment and Threats.** The intelligence brief will cover the operating environment, friendly forces, general and specific threats and suspect persons, vehicles and locations.
 - b. **Mine Threat.** Commanders must make a mine threat risk assessment for every patrol. The subsequent direction will affect off-road movement, 5 and 20m checks, rummage policy etc. All patrols must be informed of the mine threat and the consequent restrictions and SOPs.
 - c. **Operations Update.** The update should be given by the watchkeeper or patrol commander. Amendments to Out of Bounds (OOB) areas should be briefed.
 - d. **Mission and Tasks.** Each patrol should have a specific mission and each patrol member must be aware of their responsibilities. Where possible, patrols should have both a G2 and a G3 task.
 - e. **DOP, Routes, PUP, Alternative DUP/PUP, Patrol RVs.** These points must be covered in detail.
 - f. **Multiple and Team Arcs.** This detail must be known by all patrol members.
 - g. **Posture.** Soft or hard dependant on the task, situation and environment. The patrol posture may have to change several times during a patrol.
 - h. **Actions On.** These are likely to be SOPs but should be covered especially if there are local variations or new members in the patrol.
 - i. **ROE.** ROE cards must be carried and understood.
 - j. **Comms Plan.** The comms plan must be briefed in detail and not stated as "as per SOPs". It must include alternate frequencies, TACSAT procedures, mobile telephone numbers, the lost comms plan and must cover all the area through which the patrol is travelling, including neighbouring AOs.
 - k. **ECM Plan.** The ECM plan should be fully briefed.

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l. **Equipment Distribution.** Equipment should be distributed as required by the situation and the patrol's mission.

m. **Medical.** Each soldier must carry his own FFD and morphine and every team should have a team medic pack. All patrol members must know who is carrying the pack and know how to use its contents. A common SOP must be established for location in which FFDs and morphine are carried.

n. **Atts and Dets.** The following may be attached or detached and should be introduced at the start of the brief:

- (1) Interpreters.
- (2) Police (RMP or local).
- (3) Specialist search teams.
- (4) Females.
- (5) Dogs and dog handlers.
- (6) EOD teams.

3. **Dress.** SOPs should be developed to stipulate what dress is to be worn for the various types of patrol. The dress state will be linked to threats to, and posture of, the patrol and should be briefed to patrol members in sufficient time to enable proper preparations to be made. All patrols must have a day and night capability regardless of the expected duration of the patrol.

4. **Equipment.** Equipment carried by the patrol will be environment and task specific.

a. **Radios and ECM Equipment.** Radios and ECM equipment should be checked at the point of issue prior to every patrol to ensure that the equipment and ancillaries are serviceable and operate correctly. Sufficient batteries must be taken for the duration of the patrol. Patrol members must be competent in the operation of all ECM and radio equipment. It is the commander's responsibility to ensure that radios and ECM equipment are switched on and working and communication checks are conducted prior to leaving the base location.

b. **Weapons.** All weapons must be prepared for firing (including baton guns) prior to deployment. Slings must be used to ensure weapons do not become separated from their bearer and to allow the weapon to be slung when required. Baton gunners should rehearse deploying the baton gun at short notice under the direction of the team commander. Baton guns must be carried ready for use and not stowed in day sacks.

c. **Ammunition.** Sufficient ammunition and pyrotechnics must be carried to enable the patrol to conduct its mission.

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- d. **Bergens.** Patrol members should pack their bergens with sufficient team and personal equipment to enable them to be retasked (eg manning a cordon, change to standing patrol) without returning to the security force base location. An SOP should be developed to detail the bergen contents (eg 48 hour rations, sleeping bag, radio batteries etc). Bergens should be held by the CQMS, or equivalent, if not carried by the patrol to facilitate delivery to the deployed patrol.
 - e. **Documentation.** Team commanders are responsible to the patrol commander for ensuring that appropriate documentation is carried by individuals for the conduct of the mission. Soldiers must carry their ID Card, ID discs and F Med Card as an SOP together with any appropriate theatre specific documentation (orders for opening fire, ROE, and evidence, arrest and search records etc). ID discs must be kept on their issued chains around the neck, rather than being attached to clothing.
5. A number of equipment checks should be conducted prior to deployment:
- a. **Individual Equipment Check.** It is the responsibility of every patrol member to check his/her individual equipment. Soldiers should ensure any loose items of equipment carried are secured to the body or kit, including notebooks, torches etc.
 - b. **Team Commander's Equipment Check.** Commanders must ensure that individual team members limit what they carry to that which is required for the patrol. Team equipment must be checked for serviceability.
 - c. **Patrol Commander's Equipment Check.** Patrol commanders should check random items of individual and team equipment from each team prior to deploying, taking particular interest in the serviceability of mission specific equipment.
6. **Rehearsals.** Patrols should rehearse actions on drills, and drills for exiting and entering the security force base location. Also, any patrol specific actions which are not normally carried out must be rehearsed.
7. **Communications Check.** Communication checks should be conducted with the ops room before every patrol. Patrols should not leave the security force base until all communication systems have been proven. All patrols must have at least two forms of working comms.
8. **Flap Sheets.** Patrols should complete 'Flap Sheets' and hand them to the Ops Room prior to departing the security force base. This can be done when booking the patrol out of the security force base. An example flap sheet format is at Appendix 1 to Annex A.
9. **Booking out.** Patrols should book out with the ops room before exiting the base location. When booking out the patrol comd should fully brief the watchkeeper on his plan to assist in directing support to the patrol.
10. **Loading Bay Drills.** There should only be one team at the loading bay at any one time. The remainder of the patrol should be behind some form of cover. No team should leave the base until every member of the patrol is loaded.

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- a. Weapon loading and unloading must always be supervised
- b. Only one type of weapon should be loaded or unloaded at each loading bay at any one time.
- c. White light should be used at night to ensure that loading and unloading is completed properly.

Appendix:

- 1. Example Flap Sheet Format.

CONDUCT OF PATROLS

DRILLS FOR EXITING AND ENTERING SECURITY FORCE BASE LOCATIONS

1. Exiting and entering a security force base is a high risk activity due to the way troops are channelled through a limited number of entry or exit points. The enemy is known to monitor patrols leaving and entering base locations in order to identify patterns and areas of weakness that they can exploit. Patrols leaving and entering a security force base can reduce the risks of attack by conducting the following drills:

- a. Vary the points used to exit and enter the base and the routes used to transit the immediate area around the base.
- b. Vary the method of deployment. When on foot always hard target when in the vicinity of the base location and vary the distance that hard targeting is conducted over in order to avoid pattern setting. Distances at which top cover sentries are established should be varied when entering and leaving base locations in vehicles. Vehicles may be used to drop-off and pick-up foot patrols. The QRF may be used to provide depth to deploying and returning patrols.
- c. Minimise the use of patrol holding areas close to the base. If the patrol is within hard targeting distance of the base it should move into the base location. If holding areas are to be utilised during the patrol they should be included in the patrol brief.
- d. Exit and entry drills should be rehearsed and should be conducted at speed.

AVOIDANCE OF UNINHABITED BUILDINGS

2. Derelict, partially destroyed and uninhabited buildings are the ideal killing ground for the enemy as they allow devices to be hidden easily and with minimum risk of discovery. Patrols should pass uninhabited and derelict buildings quickly and should not stop, loiter, take up fire positions or conduct patrol tasks in the immediate vicinity of such buildings. Some partially destroyed buildings may be inhabited by people and livestock but should be treated with caution and avoided.

INCIDENTS OF MINOR AGGRESSION

3. Incidents of minor aggression arise anywhere, anytime, for any number of reasons and can develop rapidly into violent public disorder. Patrols must always be on the look out for the tell-tale signs of discontent that may give rise to such incidents. Patrol and team commanders must constantly evaluate the options open to them during such incidents. Patrols may wish to consider the following:

- a. **Anticipation.** Anticipation of aggression commences with the start of the patrol. All patrol members should look out for hostile attitudes, crowd build-up, threatening behaviour etc. Where such behaviour is detected a SITREP and

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LOCSTAT should be sent to all teams. The patrol commander must be informed and the team should extract out of the area. Where the team becomes involved, it should immediately identify if anyone has been assaulted and extract from the area with any casualty using the minimum force required.

b. **Face Up.** Facing the threat will enable the team to see any missiles that may be thrown and may enable evasive action to be taken. The commander should extract the team from the area of the threat. It should be noted that the threat is often multi-directional, thereby making it difficult to face up to the threat.

c. **Bunching.** Teams should avoid bunching when reacting to an incident of minor aggression but may need to close in to ease control. The team commander should direct his baton gunner as required whilst extracting the team from the area of the incident.

d. **Controlled Move Back.** To achieve a controlled move back, the team commander should attempt to gain a buffer zone of about 20 metres between the team and the aggressors. This area of separation should be maintained to provide the team the space in which to manoeuvre away from the area of the incident

e. **Use Of The Baton Gun And Non-Lethal Weapons.** The baton gun is an ideal weapon for achieving a buffer zone between the crowd and the team and for initiating a break clean. The baton gunner must be controlled by the commander and operate within the ROE. Other non-lethal weapons may have been issued (such as 'stingball' grenades) which could be used to achieve a buffer zone.

f. **Mutual Support.** The patrol teams that are not directly involved in the incident should monitor the radio, and move parallel with the crowd, maintaining a position from which they can move in and assist the extraction of the team involved in the incident if required. Closing in on the team involved in the incident will present a larger target for the aggressors and can complicate command and control.

g. **Use of Vehicles.** Using vehicle-borne QRFs and mobile patrols at the scene of a minor aggression situation can present problems in command and control. This is especially the case when drivers have not been practiced in manoeuvring their vehicles at speed in confined spaces. Vehicle commanders should have communications with the patrol before leaving the base location in order to gain situational awareness, a route in and out and the intended pick up point or stand off position. Teams should not mount vehicles until the all teams have broken clean of the crowd.

h. **Situational Awareness.** It is critical that teams do not become solely focussed on the crowd. Crowds may be used to channel the team into an ambush. At all times teams must remain vigilant to the threat of enemy activity.

4. Quick thinking and quick reactions are required along with self-discipline when dealing with this form of incident. Time should not be wasted and an extraction should be executed as soon as possible.

Appendices:

1. Foot Patrols.
2. Mobile Patrols.

FOOT PATROLS

1. Foot patrols normally consist of a minimum of three 4-man teams, normally led by an officer or SNCO. Patrols of less than three teams compromise the principle of depth and should be avoided. The size of teams and the number of teams in a patrol can vary according to the mission and threat but should not be so large as to become unwieldy as they become difficult to command and control. Patrols can be augmented by specialist personnel as required.

2. Team members must assist their commander by applying basic patrolling techniques. This gives the team commander more scope and time to concentrate on assisting the commander in the conduct of the patrol. Team members should concentrate on maintaining spacing, formation, alertness, conducting 5m and 20m checks and taking up effective fire positions without supervision.

5 AND 20 METRE CHECKS

3. Five metre checks must be conducted every time a patrol member stops. Twenty metre checks must be conducted when a patrol goes firm (static) for more than 5 minutes.

5m and 20m Checks	
5m	20m¹
Identify a position in which to go firm. Carry out a visual check using SUSAT/optics, checking for bricks missing from walls, new string/wire, mounds of fresh soil/dirt or other suspicious signs. Check the area at ground level through to above head height.	All team members carry out a visual check using SUSAT etc out to 20m. The Team Commander then directs 2 personnel to conduct an isolation of the area to at least 20 m radius around all personnel/ vehicles.
Before occupying the position carry out a thorough visual and physical check for a radius of 5m. Be systematic, take a little time and show curiosity. Use touch and, at night, white light.	The pair, with ECM Equipment, move forward in single file to carry out an isolation circle of 20m radius from all personnel/ vehicles. Both observe and physically check the ground by zig-zagging across the circle. Remaining pair provide cover until the circle is cleared for occupancy.
Any obstacles must be physically checked for command wires. Fences, walls, wires, posts and the ground immediately underneath must be carefully felt by hand (without gloves).	

Table B1-1: 5m and 20m Checks

¹ Note that OPTAG used to teach teams to ‘stop short’ prior to conducting 20m checks. This is deemed to be no longer operationally relevant since it still leaves the team vulnerable in their ‘stop short’ location.

MOBILE PATROLLING

1. Mobile patrols are frequently used in the urban and rural environments as they provide a platform from which to mount operations. This appendix covers the advantages, disadvantages and specific considerations relating to mobile patrols.

ADVANTAGES

2. The advantages that can be gained by conducting mobile patrols are as follows:
- a. **Speed.** The speed with which a mobile patrol can react reduces response times during and after incidents.
 - b. **Protection.** Whilst limited, the armour of the vehicle affords some protection to the patrol against small arms fire, RPG and IED attacks (depending on type of vehicle and armour protection).
 - c. **Mobility.** Use of vehicles allows greater distances to be covered during a patrol and enables a greater range and quantity of equipment to be carried. Vehicles enable foot patrols to be moved around the patrol area thereby assisting the deception plan. Mobile patrols working in support of foot patrols provide greater depth and additional mutual support.
 - d. **Depth.** Use of vehicles in support of dismounted troops enables greater depth to be achieved.
 - e. **Firepower.** Some vehicles are fitted with crew-served weapons systems that provide the patrol with greater firepower.

DISADVANTAGES

3. There are a number of disadvantages when conducting mobile patrols that must be considered during the planning of the patrol matrix:
- a. **Target Size.** Vehicles present larger targets with potentially greater casualties if an enemy attack is successful. Mobile patrols present an easy target for stone throwing youths as there are less options available with which to respond to such incidents.
 - b. **HUMINT.** Mobile patrols are less able to interact with the local population than foot patrols.
 - c. **Route Restrictions.** Mobile patrols are restricted to roads and tracks and set patterns more rapidly than effective foot patrols.

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- d. **Breakdowns.** Mechanical failures and break downs present recovery and protection problems.

COMPOSITION

4. A mobile patrol will normally consist of two or more vehicles, crewed as follows:
 - a. Commander.
 - b. Driver.
 - c. Two soldiers as top cover sentries.

EQUIPMENT

5. The nature of the patrol task will determine the equipment carried by the mobile patrol. Vehicles should always be equipped as follows however, vehicles must not exceed their designed weight carrying capacity and all equipment must be securely stowed so that it remains in place should the vehicle roll over:
 - a. Vehicle Check Point equipment (stinger/caltrops/lazy tongs, cones, signs, lights).
 - b. Fire extinguishers.
 - c. Brooks blanket.
 - d. Jerry cans of water.
 - e. Vehicle 1st aid kit.
 - f. Torch.
 - g. Radios.
 - h. ECM equipment.
 - i. Maps.
 - j. Mine tape.
 - k. Pyrotechnics.
 - l. Riot equipment.
 - m. Any additional equipment directed by local SOPs.

TASKING

6. Mobile patrols are generally employed in the following roles:

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- a. Mobile support to foot patrols.
- b. Vehicle check point operations.
- c. Quick reaction force.
- d. Escort duties for administrative tasks (convoys).
- e. Military escorts (normally a minimum of two military vehicles working in conjunction with the local police force/escorted vehicle).
- f. Commanding officer's rover groups.

SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS

7. **Limitations.** Mobile patrols are constrained, both physically when inside the vehicles and in their ability to react to some minor aggression situations. This can be exploited by sections of the local population who understand that reactions of the patrol are restricted by ROE and the Laws of Armed Conflict.

8. **Situational Awareness.** The vehicle commander may find it difficult to achieve good situational awareness due to the constraints to all round vision. Top cover sentries provide information essential to the patrol and vehicle commander maintaining situational awareness and must update the commander on activity to the flanks, rear and above the vehicle.

9. **Halts.** Static or halted mobile patrols become vulnerable and unplanned halts should be avoided. Where halts are required they should be pre-planned and should take place well outside built up areas. Vehicle crews and transported soldiers should dismount and carry out 5m and 20m checks during halts. At least 1/3 of the patrol should adopt fire positions to cover the remainder whilst 20m checks or other patrol tasks are conducted. All vehicle doors should be closed and vehicles left out of gear with the hand break off (unless parked on a slope). Some soldiers may remain mounted during halts including:

- a. Driver of "B" vehicles during short halts.
- b. Drivers of "A" vehicles.
- c. Soldiers operating crew served weapons.

10. **Breakdowns.** When a vehicle on a mobile patrol breaks down, the patrol should de-bus and secure the immediate area (including a 20m check) in order to provide security to the driver whilst an attempt is made to repair the vehicle. The commander must consider the risks and implications associated with self-recovery by another patrol vehicle, waiting for recovery and destroying the vehicle in situ to deny its use to the enemy. If the decision is taken to self recover or await recovery consideration should be given to tasking other patrols to satellite the broken down vehicle. A deception operation should be considered to conceal the breakdown (eg VCP).

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11. **High Risk Areas/ Choke Point.** Consideration should be given to dismounting and clearing high risk areas and choke points on foot prior to moving vehicles through the area.²

12. **Safety.** The driver is responsible for the vehicle load and must ensure that all equipment is stowed securely and correctly and that the weight of the load does not exceed the vehicle's prescribed design limits. The vehicle commander is responsible for his crew. He is to ensure that, when fitted, the crew wear seatbelts and wear the appropriate protective clothing appropriate to the threat and task. Additionally, the commander is to ensure that he has reliable communications with any top cover sentries and that there is sufficient internal space for the top cover sentries to get inside the vehicle quickly should there be a need to do so.

13. **'Dynamic' Top Cover Sentries.** Top Cover Sentries (TCS) must be deployed tactically. They must be given specific arcs. They should be trained in the 'jack in the box' technique, only being in use when they are likely to be effective. For example, at high speeds, they are unable to observe effectively and are at greater risk of injury from roll-over in a RTA. When entering and exiting SF bases they should not be deployed since the vehicles are being covered by the sangar sentries.

² ECM considerations when entering high risk areas or moving through choke points can be found in Chapter 8, Electronic Counter Measures.

POST PATROL ACTIVITIES

1. **Account for Patrol Members.** Immediately on re-entering the security base a check should be made to ensure all members of the patrol are accounted for.
2. **Loading Bay Drills.** No member of the patrol should unload before the entire patrol has entered the base location. Teams should unload one at a time with the remainder of the patrol positioned behind hard cover.
 - a. Weapon unloading must always be supervised.
 - b. Only one type of weapon should be unloaded at each loading bay at one time.
 - c. White light should be used at night to ensure that loading and unloading is completed properly.
3. **Booking In.** Patrols should book in with the ops room as soon as possible after entering the base location.
4. **Equipment Checks.** Lost equipment must be reported so the patrol can return to the area where it was lost (if it is assessed safe to do so) and the information forwarded to the ops room for further action and information distribution as necessary.
5. **Hot Debrief.** Patrols must conduct hot debriefs as soon as possible after entering the base location in order to capture low level information whilst memories are fresh and the information relevant. **Every** member of the patrol should participate in the de-brief. The interpreter should also be de-briefed to allow them to pass on any information they obtained during the patrol, such as low level HUMINT.
6. **Patrol Report.** The patrol commander is responsible for the production of the patrol report assisted by a minimum of the team commanders and any specialist personnel attached to the patrol.
7. **Honesty Trace.** The actual route taken by the patrol (as opposed to the planned route) including any halt locations must be plotted on the operations room trace. This will inform future patrol route planning. Enemy “dicking” operations will identify pattern setting, including the locations of halts, which may result in attack against locations regularly used by security forces. The honesty trace is essential in ensuring that inadvertent pattern setting does not arise from deviations from patrol routes.

PATROLS – REPORT FORMATS

PATROL SITREP

To:		Report No: 014
From:		
Title:	PATROL SITREP	
As at/DTG:	All timings Charlie	
A	Time of SITREP	
B	Current location of C/S (Grid/Name)	
GENERAL		
C	Description of activity in AO and sightings.	
FRIENDLY FORCES (Only specify details that have changed)		
D	Description of current plan	
E	Description of future intentions	
F	General comments/additional info	

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PATROL INCREP

To:		Report No: 015
From:		
Title:	PATROL INCREP	
As at/DTG:	All timings Charlie	
A	Time of incident	
B	Location of incident (Grid/Name)	
C	Type/Description of incident	
D	C/S, persons involved	
E	Number and types of casualties	
F	Location of casualties	
G	Location of nearest HLS	
H	Location of ICP/Name of ICP Comd, C/S and frequency or other contact details	
I	Loc of IRV and safe direction of approach	
J	Actions taken	
K	Support required	
L	Details of hostile persons/terrorists	
M	General comments/additional info	

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PATROL SUMMARY
(Only sent on secure means)

To:		Report No: 024
From:		
Title:	PATROL SUMMARY	
As at/DTG:	All timings Charlie	
A	Subunit	
B	DTG of patrols deploying	
C	Number of Patrols Deploying	
D	(Repeat for each patrol)	
	1	Patrol C/S
	2	Time out
	3	Time in
	4	Number of Teams
	5	Type of Patrol/Method of Insertion (1) Foot (2) Mobile (3) Veh Drop Off-Foot Ptl (4) Heli Drop Off
	6	Outline of Route (by Spot Number)
	7	Any Other Information

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CHAPTER 9

GUARDING AND BASE SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

1. Implicit in the Army's mission on operations is the fundamental importance of securing our operational bases. Protection of our own assets is an essential requirement in enabling us to carry out our duties. Guard is a generic name for soldiers engaged in any form of base security duties, either static or as a local patrol. Guards vary in size depending on the tasks to be conducted but will be based on the standard team/multiple format with the requisite command structure. There should always be a designated guard commander and 2IC, the latter doubling as the NCO in charge of posting sentries. Guards should always contain a deployable reserve, normally at very short notice to move, to augment the on-duty personnel – usually known as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF).

2. Any soldier in theatre will be expected to conduct guard duties at any time of day or night in any environment, especially in response to an increased threat or in reaction to an incident. Larger bases (such as Logistic Bases) may employ specialist guard forces, augmented by troops normally based in the camp. Guard duties are necessarily continuous, 24 hours a day, to counter the unpredictable threat and to control access to a base. Duties should be divided into shifts (stags) and rotated to prevent staleness. In dark hours personnel numbers may be doubled up to add to alertness.

OBJECTIVES OF GUARDING

3. Guarding is an effective means of:
 - a. Dominating a designated area in order to:
 - (1) Deter attack (both defensive and offensive postures).
 - (2) Protect non-combatant functions.
 - (3) Gather information.
 - (4) Control access.
 - b. Ensuring the security of troops deployed on this task by:
 - (1) Adopting the principles of defence.
 - (a) Depth.
 - (b) Mutual support.
 - (c) All round defence.
 - (d) Deception.

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- (e) Concealment.
 - (f) Reserve.
 - (g) Offensive action.
- (2) Reacting to combat indicators:
- (a) Absence of the normal.
 - (b) Presence of the abnormal.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

4. **Alert States.** Operational theatres will normally use the JUPITER system of alert states. The JUPITER alert states are based on the UK BIKINI and the US THREATCON levels and measures. BRITFOR J3 Ops will control the level of the JUPITER Alert State in conjunction with the threat assessment briefed by J2 staff. Local commanders can lower and raise the alert state at their discretion, but are to inform the chain of command immediately. Details of alert states are shown at Annex A.

5. **Weapon, Dress and Vehicle Movement States.** Details of weapon, dress and vehicle movement states are shown at Annex B.

6. **Operations Room.** Regardless of the size of the base, there must be an operations/communications centre which co-ordinates all activity from sangars, gate sentries and GDA patrols and controls any incidents. It should be separate from the guard room, which is more usually associated with administration of the guard. An alternative operations control centre must also be identified and provisioned for use when the main centre becomes untenable. In smaller bases, this alternative may be as simple as a clearly designated, pre-packed bergan containing maps, communications information, flap sheets and aide-memoires.

7. **Battle Procedure.** As guarding tends to be a constant and cyclic activity, a set battle procedure can be followed in slower time to enable all members of the guard to understand and prepare adequately for their roles in achieving the mission.

8. **Orders.** Guard orders must be written, properly issued and acted upon in order to ensure that no gaps or weaknesses exist in base security. They must be reviewed and updated to take account of improved insurgent capability or changes in the base infrastructure. The sequence should begin with an intelligence briefing to include:

- a. Recent incidents.
- b. Latest threats and capabilities.
- c. Information gathering tasks (sangar sentries, CCTV monitors and GDA patrols).
- d. Description of local suspects.

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- e. Descriptions of vehicles of interest (including stolen/hijacked vehicles).

Sample orders for the guard commander and sentries are at Annex C.

9. **Equipment.** Equipment available to guard personnel varies enormously from standard patrol items to specialist equipment for surveillance and traffic control. Immediately prior to taking over guard duties all equipment must be checked to ensure that it is serviceable and readily accessible.

10. **Deception.** Deception tactics should be implemented where possible to introduce an element of doubt in the mind of the enemy and his dicking system. Deception depends on the imagination of the individual, but due to the static nature of most guard tasks alertness and the ability to react are key. Guard personnel should constantly imagine themselves in the enemy's position and then attempt to introduce factors which are unfavourable from his viewpoint, in short "think enemy". An example would be changing the changeover times for sangar sentries in order to avoid setting patterns.

11. **Loading Bay Drills.** There should only be one team at the loading bay at any time. The remainder of the multiple should be behind some form of cover. Do not mix weapon systems and use white light at night. All drills at the loading bay are supervised no matter what the rank of the loader. No team should leave the base until every man is loaded and no one should unload until the last man is in.

BASE SECURITY TASKS

12. **Sangar Duties.**

a. **Characteristics.** Sangars are uniformly constructed as armoured cubes forming either part of the perimeter defences of a base or raised on a tower to provide an observation platform. They are usually sited to dominate an entrance to a base. Sangars can be both defensive and offensive in nature and usually accommodate a single sentry. Access to the sangar is normally covered from view, although the sangar itself tends not to be camouflaged. Above observation windows may be panoramic photographs, gridded and marked with reference points and/or a rangecard.

b. **Sangar Equipment.** Most sangars have ECM equipment and radio or intercom communications with the operations room. Each should also have a logbook, written orders and an 'actions-on' aide-memoire. Not all contain attack alarm buttons.

c. **Duties.** Sangar sentries are the eyes and ears of a base, whose alertness is paramount to the safety of all within the base. Their primary task is to react quickly and correctly in raising the alarm and reporting/challenging suspicious activity. It is essential that they are given proper orders (specifying arcs of observation, secondary tasks such as logging and reporting, orders for opening fire and other actions-on) and are rehearsed in their duties. All sangar sentries should be posted by an NCO who controls length of stags and is responsible for monitoring alertness, co-ordination of reports and investigation of alarms.

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13. Gate Duties.

a. **Characteristics.** Gates to bases are **areas of weakness** within the perimeter, necessary to allow access to the base either to pedestrians or, more usually, vehicles up to HGV in size. Access to the gate is usually controlled by traffic measures such as large concrete bollards (UCB) to form a chicane, ramps and barriers. There may be waiting bays and search areas adjacent to the main access point. The whole area should be covered by observation from a sangar and, if necessary, well lit.

b. **Duties.** Gate sentries are vital components of base security as they control approaches to and, ultimately, access to the base. They are often the first point of contact with the base's occupants and therefore have an important image to portray – both alertness to deter the 'dicker' and professionalism to reassure the visitor. The gate sentry's primary task is to control access by identifying and, if necessary, challenging anyone approaching. He is responsible for quick assessment of a visitor's credentials and for facilitating the visitor in gaining access to the base if entitled. All the while he must observe approaches to the base to protect both himself and visitors from attack. In the event of a proxy device being delivered the gate sentry will be the first to grasp the situation, raise the alarm and conduct immediate action drills to release the driver. He is the first line of defence at the perimeter's weakest point and as such bears significant responsibility. He should be thoroughly conversant with his orders and well-rehearsed in reaction drills.

c. **Searching of Vehicles and Personnel.** All bases require a specific search capability at their main access points in order to check people and vehicles before entering. Details on the conduct of personnel and vehicle searches can be found in Chapter 4.

REACTION TO INCIDENTS

14. **General.** Any reaction to an incident must be conducted within the bounds of the extant Rules of Engagement (ROE).

a. **Combat Indicators.** Most incidents are preceded or accompanied by signs or 'combat indicators' which, if spotted, can indicate an impending attack. Guards can then take immediate action by raising the alarm, implementing reaction drills and attempting to seize the initiative from the insurgent.

b. **Patterns.** Bases are static and subject to routine patterns of activity, both within and around them. The enemy will rely on a predictable reaction to any circumstance and will repeat successful attacks. He will use hoax devices to study our reaction and then set secondary attacks against areas of perceived weakness or predictability.

c. **Incident Reaction.** All reaction must be couched within legal constraints as outlined in the ROE. There are three elements able to react to a base attack incident:

- (1) Sanger and gate sentries.

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- (2) Operations room staff.
- (3) The quick reaction force (QRF).
- d. **The Sangar and/or Gate Sentries.** Sentries should:
 - (1) Raise the alarm.
 - (2) Report the incident.
 - (3) Engage the enemy.
- e. **The Operations Room Staff.** The operations room staff should:
 - (1) Extend the alarm.
 - (2) Plan and execute follow up action in conjunction with other agencies.
 - (3) “Big picture” evaluation – why has the incident occurred?
 - (a) A hoax to test reactions?
 - (b) A come-on for subsequent attack?
 - (c) To tie up our forces in one particular area?
 - (d) To provoke over-reaction?
 - (4) Report the incident up the chain of command.
 - (5) Ensure that supporting troops (such as the QRF) and other agencies are fully briefed on the situation before deploying.
- f. **The QRF.** The QRF should deploy once given a set task by the ops room. This may include cordoning the scene of an incident, cutting-off enemy escape routes or providing additional combat power to deal with the incident.

15. **Detailed Drills for Reaction to Incidents.** Detailed drills for the reactions to specific incidents are contained in the following Annexes:

- a. Annex D – Detailed drills for mortar or rocket attack.
- b. Annex E - Detailed drills for proxy VBIED attack.
- c. Annex F – Detailed drills for other base security events including UXO hand-in, walk-in and celebratory fire.

ALERT STATES – DEFINITIONS

1. **JUPITER Alert States.** The four levels of JUPITER Alert States are:
 - a. **JUPITER Alert State One.** There is a general threat of anti-coalition targeting but no target is defined.
 - b. **JUPITER Alert State Two.** A warning of an increased likelihood of insurgent activity has been received without any particular target or time of attack being defined. It will be used when the assessment indicates an increased threat that does not justify adopting JUPITER State 3. It may also be imposed during periods of activity likely to stimulate violent reaction.
 - c. **JUPITER Alert State Three.** Specific information has been received which indicates that a substantial threat exists against a military target within the div AO in the near future. It could be issued as a general or a local warning and would normally be applied for a limited period only.
 - d. **JUPITER Alert State Four.** A warning issued when specific information indicates that an imminent attack against a particular target or in a particular area can be expected; or an object, suspected to be a bomb has been found. This state would normally only be issued as a local warning and for a very limited period. Local commanders may impose this state; the chain of command must be informed immediately.
2. **Security Classification of Alert States and Measures.** Alert state codewords are not protectively marked. They may be passed by telephone provided they are not clarified in any way. However, notices displaying current alert states (black on red background) are to be sited so as to minimise the likelihood of the general public seeing them. The definitions of the alert states and the associated measures are RESTRICTED.

WEAPON, DRESS AND VEHICLE MOVEMENT STATES

1. Weapons States.

State	Description	Remarks.
1.	Unarmed	Weapons and ammo readily aval but not issued.
2.	Armed	Weapons carried unloaded, loaded magazines aval.
3.	Armed Prepared	Weapons loaded but not made ready.
4.	Ready	Weapons loaded and made ready.

2. Dress States.

Code	Uniform/Equipment
A	Full combats, helmets, CBA, PLCE and pers wpn with ammo to be worn at all times.
B	Outside SF bases: Full combats, helmets, CBA, PLCE and pers wpn with ammo to be worn. Inside SF bases: above equipment to be close at hand.
C	Outside SF bases: Full combats, regimental headdress or desert hat, CBA, PLCE and pers wpn with ammo to be worn. Inside SF bases: Full combats to be worn, pers wpn may be secured at base installation.
D	Full combats with head dress to be worn.
E	Outside SF bases: Full combats, headdress, (CBA, PLCE and pers wpn with ammo to be at hand in veh).

3. Vehicle Movement States.

Code	Movement Restrictions	
1.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only msn essential move permitted • No move without armoured escort • Move with min two vehs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Min of 2 person per crew • All pers to be armed (min one rifle per veh) • Comms required in all vehs
2.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimise move • No move without armed escort • Move with min two vehs • Min of two people per crew (escorts four per crew) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comms required in at least one veh • All pers to be armed • Outside SF bases vehs to be guarded • Top cover deployed
3.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Move not restricted. • Single veh move authorised with min two people per crew 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outside SF bases vehs to be guarded • All pers to be armed • No comms required

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4.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Move not restricted.• Single veh move permitted with single person crew	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Wpns on orders of local comd• No comms required
5.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Move not restricted. Single veh move permitted with single person crew	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Wpn not required• No comms required

GUIDANCE FOR GUARD COMMANDERS AND SENTRIES

DUTIES/ORDERS	
GUARD COMMANDER	SENTRY
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A detailed description of the location to be guarded (any special features). 2. Tasks, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific entrances etc to be guarded. • Specific vulnerable points inside and outside the area which have to be protected at all costs. 3. Contingency Plans such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action to be taken against unauthorised persons or a hostile crowd. • Action to be taken if there is a danger of damage, looting or arson. • Reaction to Mortar attack. • Reaction to IED attack. 4. Instructions on his legal powers, which should include the use of minimum necessary force, the circumstances when special riot control weapons may be used, when small arms fire may be opened, and how such fire is to be controlled. 5. Guidance on replies to be given to any persons who ask the reason for the guard. 6. Liaison with police including instructions regarding searching of vehicles and persons entering or leaving the installation. 7. List of employees and authorised visitors, together with specimen passes and photographs. 8. Reinforcement plan. 9. Communications, and the times at which reports must be made by radio and telephone. 10. Action against people taking photographs. 11. Method of raising alarm. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The scale of ammunition to be carried, charging of magazines, loading, position of safety catch or change lever. 2. Checking of passes, specimens of which should be issued. 3. The use of specialist equipment, eg surveillance devices. 4. Searching persons and vehicles. 5. The use of minimum necessary force. 6. Opening fire/ROE. 7. The method of calling for assistance/raising alarm. 8. Actions on people observing/taking photographs. 9. Reaction to all forms of attack.

DETAILED DRILLS FOR MORTAR OR ROCKET ATTACK

1. **Sangar Sentries.** Once you become aware an attack is imminent sound the mortar attack alarm and get under hard cover. At the first opportunity report the following information to the ops room.
 - a. Location of possible firing point.
 - b. Number of launches heard followed by number of impacts heard (thus giving an indication of the presence of blinds or otherwise).
 - c. Casualties.

Remain in hard cover until given the all clear. Then observe your arcs.

2. **Troops.** On hearing the alarm, all troops should seek immediate cover and don CBA and helmet. Commanders should turn on their radios and listen to what is going on briefing their soldiers accordingly. SOPs should state what frequency to listen in on. Camps may use a set PRR channel to assist in this. Remain in place until the soak period is over and you are told what to do next. Once the all clear is given, multiple commanders should move into the ops room to receive orders or to a safe location which will be given by the ops room. Team commanders should conduct a head check, account for their soldiers the move together as a multiple to await the multiple commander orders.
3. **QRF.** Once the soak period is over, QRF commanders should move at best speed into the ops room. The following are possible QRF tasks:
 - a. Search for casualties.
 - b. Search for detonations and blinds.
 - c. The movement of any civilians within the SF base to the safe area.
 - d. Possible deployment to control or freeze movement around the area of the base plate or blinds.
4. **Ops Room.** The ops room staff should send a contact report to higher command and task the following agencies:
 - a. Joint Force EOD Gp to deal with remaining mortar shells and the base plate.
 - b. Aviation assets to locate the base plate and search area.
 - c. Possibly police to assist if civilians are involved.
 - d. Warn all inbound callsigns and aviation of the attack.

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5. **Follow Up Action.** When sufficient information has been gained a clearance and cordoning plan should be made. Commanders should then be briefed and tasked to secure the following areas.

- a. The target area or any blinds are to be cleared with a minimum safe distance of 100m (200m for large mortar or rocket).
- b. The flight path. If known clear to 100m each side of the flight path.
- c. The base plate location - always assume a self-destruct, and treat as a VBIED and clear to 200m.
- d. EOD agencies will require a manned ICP to deal with any devices. He will work from the base plate, flight path and then the camp location.

6. **Soak Periods.** It is vital that a soak period is instigated following a mortar attack, since blinds may still function for a period of time after landing. There is to be no movement until after the soak period is concluded. EOD staff will advise on the length of the soak period.

7. **Action on Blinds.** The action to be taken in the event of blinds will be dictated by camp SOPs and the threat. There may be an operational imperative to clear blinds immediately, or the decision may be taken to delay dealing with blinds until daylight (if the attack has taken place at night. If this is the case, blinds must be marked (such as by using cyalume light sticks) and movement prevented in the area of the blind.

8. **Camp Clearance Plan.** Ops rooms must ensure that there is an efficient SOP for the clearance of camp to identify the location of casualties and blinds. This may include splitting the camp into sectors, use of gridded air photographs or the use of aviation assets. It must be rehearsed.

DETAILED DRILLS FOR PROXY VBIED ATTACK

1. **Insurgent Considerations.** The enemy may coerce an innocent civilian to deliver a device, usually a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED), to a security base and follow at a distance to ensure compliance. This normally requires personnel to conduct abduction/hostage-taking preliminary op. The enemy will normally conduct a thorough recce before implementing their plan, looking for weaknesses including routine and predictable behaviour.

2. **Security Force Considerations.** To deter delivery of a VBIED all traffic passing or approaching the main base entrance(s) should be tightly controlled, covered by observation and, when necessary, by fire. Defences range from simple chicanes, stand-off blast walls and speed ramps to fully automated traffic control systems including hydraulic rising barriers. The system must be *seen* to deter attack and make it a difficult option for the enemy. The system should be able to cope with the maximum perceived threat, for example the multiple vehicle suicide attack where one echelon is used to destroy the defences in order to allow penetration of the base by follow up vehicles. All vehicles allowed to enter the base must be subjected to strict checking within a stand-off area which provides some element of cover from view and screening from blast.

3. **Sentry Actions.**

a. **VBIED Delivered to Gate.**

- (1) Engage with lethal force if identified as suicide bomb attempt.
- (2) Challenge driver and immediately ascertain if PROXY.

b. **Confirmation of Proxy.**

- (1) Sound attack alarm.
- (2) Report into intercom "Proxy at ** gate. Dealing with hostage.".....or,
- (3) "Proxy at ** gate. Evacuating now."

c. **Assisting the Proxy Driver.**

- (1) Act as soon as possible.
- (2) Try to get driver to take vehicle to a predetermined blast reducing area (15 seconds only).
 - **DO NOT** - use physical force.
 - **DO NOT** - get in the vehicle or try to drive it.
 - **DO NOT** - open doors.

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(3) Give warning, smash window and attempt to free driver (15 seconds only).

- Close gate.
- Evacuate with driver to ops room.

d. **Evacuation.** Use a covered route to ops room or designated evacuation point.

DETAILED DRILLS FOR OTHER BASE SECURITY EVENTS

1. **UXO Hand-In.** Often locals hand in weapons, ammunition and UXO; they will often receive a payment for the item in question. Most security locations have a purpose built UXO pit either in base or outside under the watchful eye of the sangar sentry. All bases have their own rules regarding the dealing of UXO, however as a guideline the following rules should apply:

- a. Stop the local as soon as the UXO is identified.
- b. By using an interpreter get the individual to place the item within the pit.
- c. The individual should be detained and questioned thoroughly by all relevant agencies; this may include the guard command and most definitely the intelligence officer. Prior to entry into camp the local must show himself that he is clear. If you are not happy as the sentry then you should tell the local to leave your location.
- d. These drills should also be applied where weapons are handed in; soldiers should only make the weapon safe if they are competent with the drills applicable to the weapon system being handed in.

2. **Walk-In.** A walk-in is when a civilian approaches the base offering information which may be of value. These individuals need to be searched thoroughly before being escorted to a sterile location then debriefed thoroughly (ideally by a HUMINT specialist if available or a member of the intelligence cell accompanied by an interpreter if no specialist is available).

3. **Celebratory Fire.** Celebratory fire is a common occurrence and local inhabitants often discharge their weapons into the air. This is not directed at anyone in particular and should be treated as such. Unit SOPs will determine what course of action sangar sentries and patrols on the ground should take.

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CHAPTER 10

PATROL SEARCH

BACKGROUND

1. **Introduction.** Search is a key operational capability that has wide utility across the spectrum of operations in combating both conventional and non-conventional threats. All three services maintain some form of search capability (as do other government departments and the civil police) which is utilised in a wide variety of situations.

2. **Definition.** Search is the capability to locate specific targets using intelligence assessments, systematic procedures and appropriate detection techniques.

3. **Levels of Search Response.**

a. Search is conducted at three levels; basic, intermediate and advanced. The type of response is determined by taking into account the assessment of risk and sophistication of equipment technology required for the task (see Figure 1.1 below).

(1) **Basic Search.** Basic search is the lowest level of capability. It is provided by search aware soldiers and Patrol Search Soldiers (PSS), is for overall force protection and requires an understanding of the threat, methods of attack and a general knowledge of person, vehicle and simple rummage search procedures. All personnel should be search aware.

(2) **Intermediate Search.** Intermediate search is the capability to conduct operations in a situation where there is a low threat from Explosive Ordnance (EO), a relatively low level of assurance is acceptable, or there is minimal threat from a hazardous environment. It is normally used for deliberate, pre-planned offensive search operations aimed at denying resources, gaining intelligence and evidence for prosecution within the low threat environment and invariably require a cordon to provide security.

(3) **Advanced Search.** Advanced search is the capability to conduct operations in a situation where there is a high threat from EO, only the highest level of assurance is acceptable, or a hazardous environment exists. It is used for all deliberate and rapid pre-planned search operations within the high threat environment or where the risk of failure is considered unacceptable. It will, invariably require a cordon to provide security.




Figure 10.1 - Diagrammatic Representation of Levels of Risk, Training and Technology

INTRODUCTION

1. **Definition.** Basic search is subdivided into two levels of capability; search aware and Patrol Search (PS). All deployed troops should be at least search aware, and where the threat necessitates, PS trained. PS is carried out by PS Soldiers (PSS) who can conduct planned or unplanned search tasks in support of their overall patrol task.
2. **Search Procedures.** The search procedures that PSS undertake are as follows:
 - a. Personnel searches.
 - b. Vehicle searches.
 - c. Route and Vulnerable Point (VP) checks.
 - d. Area (rummage) searches.

Details on the conduct of each are given in annexes A to D respectively, although exact TTPs may differ between theatres.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3. The following factors should be considered when planning PS activity:
 - a. Anticipate hostile action. Know how the enemy operates and consider the reaction of the local population to your activity.

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- b. Isolate the target area. This may involve a cordon being put in place.
- c. Minimise risk.
- d. Maintain records. Patrol Search Records (PSR) must be used and, as a minimum, collected by the Unit Search Advisor (USA) to assist in the G2 function.
- e. Electronic Counter Measures (ECM). Ensure that the correct ECM to counter the known threat is employed. Know the constraints of the equipment and plan its use to give greatest effect. Details on the employment of ECM are given in Chapter 9.
- f. Urban operations. Additional information on planning search in urban environments is given in Annex E.

EQUIPMENT

- 4. The suggested minimum equipment for a four man patrol is given at Annex F.

FORENSIC AWARENESS

- 5. **General.** The aftermath of any incident reveals a mass of evidence useful to a forensic scientist in recreating a scene and identifying who was involved. This may provide vital intelligence and may help to secure convictions. Such evidence varies in its nature from microscopic fibres to a complete vehicle and much can be destroyed or dislodged if care is not taken to preserve it.
- 6. **Evidence Preservation.** Forensic evidence may be scattered over a wide area and may not be immediately obvious. Preservation should be on as wide a scale as possible with the following points being adhered to:
 - a. Use evidence protection kits: gloves, find bags and find labels. **Do not touch anything** or enter the scene (except to save life). Do not permit anyone else to enter except those qualified to do so (eg ATO/EOD teams).
 - b. Cordon off and preserve the scene intact. Ensure witnesses are identified and either held nearby or have their details taken for subsequent inquiries.
 - c. Keep suspects separated and away from the scene.
 - d. Avoid cross contamination. No soldier who has returned fire should be involved in searching or bagging suspects.
 - f. A detailed log of the incident including sketch maps, timings and movement details must be kept.
- 7. **Evidence Handling (General Rules).** On the following occasions it may be necessary for a soldier to handle items of evidence:

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- a. Where the local tactical situation makes it unrealistic to cordon an area for any length of time (in some areas locals will deliberately seek to destroy and mask forensic evidence, knowing its value to the prosecution system).
 - b. Where a minor find has been made.
 - c. Where a person has been found in possession of an illegal item.
 - d. Where appropriate agencies are unable to attend.
8. The following points will promote the requirement to provide an auditable trail of evidence handling:
- a. Appoint one person only as the evidence handler. This person must be able to prove that any article subsequently produced in evidence is the same as that found at the scene.
 - b. Appoint one person to keep a written record of events. Before any item is disturbed or removed it must be logged, sketched and, if possible, photographed in situ with any arrestee or detainee suspected to be connected with it.
 - c. Avoid cross-contamination. A soldier handling evidence at the scene should not subsequently come into contact with any suspect arrested, nor should the soldier attend a different scene and risk transporting evidence.
 - d. Wear appropriate protective clothing, especially gloves.
9. **The Threat.** During all evidence recovery, steps must be taken to ensure the safety of the person recovering the find and that no potentially unsafe items are introduced into the evidence chain. Types of threat could include victim operated devices on constructed hides or weapons/explosives that have not been rendered safe.
10. **Evidence.** Evidence is anything that has been legally obtained and may be used to prove or disprove a case.

TYPES OF EVIDENCE

11. **Visible Evidence.** The following are examples of visible evidence:
- a. Weapons.
 - b. Munitions.
 - c. Tape.
 - d. Tools.
 - e. Documents.

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12. **Real Evidence.** Real evidence is attributed to a suspect by means of forensics, which analyses 'invisible evidence'. The following are types of invisible evidence:

- a. Fingerprints (found on smooth surfaces).
- b. Explosives residues.
- c. Fibres.
- d. Impressions (tools, footwear, etc).
- e. DNA.
 - (1) Skin.
 - (2) Bodily fluids.
 - (3) Hair.
 - (4) Sweat (Low Count Number DNA – LCNDNA).

13. **Contamination.** This is the addition, destruction or removal of evidence and it can be either deliberate, accidental, caused by ignorance or failure to follow procedures.

- a. **Deliberate** - Unlikely within the British Armed Forces.
- b. **Accidental** - Only an issue if the searcher tries to hide the problem. Document the issue.
- c. **Ignorance** - All search personnel should now receive evidence training.
- d. **Procedures** - Following procedures is an individual responsibility.

14. **Evidence Handling (Specific Rules).** The following actions should be taken to maximise the preservation of physical evidence:

- a. **Firearms.** The weapon state should be recorded eg magazine fitted, rounds chambered etc.
- b. **Safety Procedures.** If an available soldier is trained on the weapon it should be cleared, attempting not to obliterate fingerprints on the hand grips (in some areas the threat may dictate that weapons are x-rayed by an ATO prior to handling). Magazines and ejected rounds should be sealed in separate plastic bags and appropriately labelled.
- c. **Pistols.** Pick up pistols carefully with two fingers on the butt. Avoid the trigger area as the weapon may discharge. **Never** insert a pencil etc in the barrel to lift the pistol as vital forensic evidence there may be destroyed. Place pistols and any associated rounds/magazines in separate, marked plastic bags.

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- d. **Long-Barrelled Weapons.** Once cleared, place long-barrelled weapons and any associated rounds/magazines in separate, marked plastic bags. The bags must be suitably marked to make it obvious which rounds/magazines came from which weapon.
- e. **Ammunition.** Loose rounds should be handled by the rim and placed in marked plastic bags. Avoid using metal objects to pick them up as these can destroy evidence.
- f. **Radio Equipment.** Radio equipment should be moved intact and placed in a marked plastic bag. The exact position of the antenna and any frequency settings should be noted and left undisturbed.
- g. **Clothing.** Clothing will contain useful fibres so should be disturbed as little as possible. Place clothing into a clean paper or plastic bag which should then be sealed and labelled.
- h. **Other Items.** Miscellaneous items should be picked up carefully by a corner. Touching smooth flat surfaces which may hold fingerprints should be avoided.

TASKS

- 15. Other specific appointment responsibilities are:
 - a. **Team Commander.**
 - (1) Ensure that the correct evidence recovery procedures are followed.
 - (2) Ensure that all evidence is handed over on completion of the Search.
 - b. **Scribe.**
 - (1) Ensure that all timings and evidence details are recorded in the PSR.
 - (2) Ensure that photographs and/or sketches are acceptable.
 - (3) Ensure that all handover details are recorded in the PSR
 - c. **Search Pairs.**
 - (1) Ensure you follow all evidence handling procedures.

ACTIONS ON A FIND

- 16. The following steps should be taken on making a find:
 - a. **Finder.**
 - (1) DO NOT TOUCH.

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- (2) Make a mental note.
 - (3) Mark and withdraw.
 - (4) Inform team commander.
 - b. **Team Commander.**
 - (1) Confirm (If required).
 - (2) Inform patrol commander.
 - (3) Clear the area (If required).
 - c. **Patrol commander.**
 - (1) Refer up the chain of command.
17. **Life Threatening.**
- a. All searching must STOP.
 - b. Clear and cordon the area, (4Cs).
 - c. Inform agencies and prepare for their arrival.
 - d. Ensure a sketch has been made on return to ICP for the follow up agencies.
 - e. Control the incident until handed over.
18. **Non Life Threatening.**
- a. Searching may continue.
 - b. Photograph the hide location.
 - c. Photograph the find.
 - d. Carefully bag the item and seal, (remember to wear gloves).
 - e. Document ALL evidence activity.
 - f. Ensure correct handover to the follow up agencies.
19. **Photography.** Where possible, take the following (digital) photographs:
- a. Close up of the article (with a scale if possible).
 - b. The article in situ in its immediate surroundings.

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- c. The article together with any suspect thought to be connected with it.
- d. The general surroundings.

ACTIONS ON MATRIX

Appointment	Action	Detail
Searcher	Confirm	What is it? Inform Team Commander Stop searching Mark Mental note/digital photograph
	Clear	Withdraw (Yes/No) Inform Patrol Commander
Team Commander	Cordon	Control Access
Patrol Commander	Control	Inform Chain of Command Task Agencies Prepare for arrival Brief arriving agencies Support further operations (if req'd)

Table 10.1

PERSON SEARCH PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION

1. Terrorist/criminals will generally attempt to hide items out of view of casual observers. It is therefore necessary for personnel employed on search/guard duties to use systematic search procedures to detect such items.

2. The main objective of a person search is to detect improvised explosive devices (IED) or their components, weapons, ammunition, offensive weapons (knives etc), or any other weapon, intelligence (documents, mobile phones etc) which terrorist/criminals may attempt to conceal. Person searches are a very sensitive issue and are to be performed strictly in accordance with JSP 440 and local Standard Operating Instructions (SOI). Guidelines covering the authority to search are also outlined earlier in this document and should be read before implementing the search of persons.

TYPES OF SEARCH

3. This document deals with two types of basic person search which are:
- a. **Initial Check:** - lasting approximately 2 minutes.
 - b. **Initial Search:** - lasting approximately 10 minutes.

INITIAL CHECK

4. Initial checks are a very important tool in assisting MOD personnel employed on guard duties, or when involved in other duties such as Op WIDEAWAKE. An initial check of persons can reveal a great deal about a person's reason for being on MOD property; the response can assist in making a decision on the requirement for further investigation, or if an initial search should be performed. The following points should be used as a guideline to performing an initial check of a person:

- a. Stop the person and identify yourself.
- b. Check the person's ID Documents.
- c. Check reason for entry.
- d. Observe the person, looking for any signs of unusual behaviour which may raise your suspicions.
- e. If in doubt **DO NOT** allow access and report upwards.
- f. Perform an initial search if deemed appropriate.

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INITIAL SEARCH

5. Initial searches are a superficial examination of the outer clothing, jackets, hats and gloves may be removed voluntarily. The initial search may also incorporate bags, rucksacks or other property carried. Initial searches may be performed in response to an initial check or as part of a unit's counter terrorism measures. (ie percentage searches of persons on or entering MOD property).

GUIDE TO PRIMARY PERSON SEARCH

6. Search is a science, it therefore follows that person search should be carried out using systematic procedures. In order to search a person effectively, the searcher should divide the person into five distinct areas. These areas should be searched in sequence as follows:

- a. Head.
- b. Left side upper torso.
- c. Right side upper torso.
- d. Left leg.
- e. Right leg.

GUIDE TO SEARCH USING HOODLUM METAL DETECTOR



7. The Hoodlum Metal Detector is a very useful tool which can be utilised to assist in performing initial searches of persons. The Hoodlum detects all materials which contain ferrous metals, materials which are generally contained within IEDs, arms and ammunition, lethal weapons (knives etc). In addition the Hoodlum can also be used by a male to search a female, although this procedure should only be adopted when no female searchers are available. When performing a person search using the Hoodlum the following guidelines should be adhered to:

- a. Check that the person is not fitted with a heart pacemaker.
- b. Do not touch the person's body.

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- c. Do not contour the body.
- d. You may ask the person to remove outer clothing only.
- e. Where possible always ask the person to remove any metal objects which are detected.
- f. Where metal is detected and the person cannot explain its presence to the searcher's satisfaction, it will be necessary to perform a hands on initial search. Remember rules concerning sex of the searcher.

8. Electronic medical equipment can be effected by HOODLUM. It is essential that you ask the person if they are fitted with life sustaining electronic medical aids, such as pace makers. The Hoodlum Metal Detector should not be used to search persons who are fitted with such devices.

9. The Hoodlum detects all materials containing ferrous metals; this includes jewellery and body piercing. If such jewellery is detected the person should be asked to declare where they may have such items about their bodies. If the body piercing is within an intimate area, the searcher is NOT permitted to physically touch these areas to confirm.

KEY POINTS

10. As person search is a very controversial subject searchers are advised of the following key points when performing a consensual search:

- a. There must be a minimum of two soldiers present, one to search and one to provide protection to the searcher and act as a witness.
- b. An oral warning, through an interpreter if necessary, must be issued. A generic phrase is given below but theatre specific phrases must be learnt and used:

"I AM A MEMBER OF AND I AM NOW GOING TO SEARCH YOU FOR ANY ILLEGALLY HELD ARMS, AMMUNITION OR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. DO YOU UNDERSTAND?"

- c. Be polite.
- d. State reason for conducting the search.
- e. When performing hands on search the searchers must be of the same sex.
- f. Children of 14 years and under must be searched by a female in the company of the child's parent or legal guardian.
- g. The searcher should ensure that searches are witnessed.

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- h. When carrying out a 'Hands on Search', slide hands over the person being searched. Do not pat.
- i. All person searches should be recorded.
- j. Place all items from the occupant in to a clear plastic bag in an area so you and the occupant can see them at all times.
- k. If using the Hoodlum makes sure you ask if a pace maker is fitted.
- l. The searcher is legally allowed to remove hats and jackets if required. Remember to search items thoroughly.
- m. Slide hands slowly over the person. Do not pat.
- n. **DO NOT** touch the person in intimate areas.
- o. **DO NOT** touch the person intimately.
- p. Before searching the groin area, inform the person that you are now going to search that area.
- q. Once completed, search all items in the bag, getting the person to turn on his mobile phone. If nothing is found, the person is free to go. If there is a find, arrest the person.
- r. Use the PSR to record the search.

REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO SEARCH

- 11. Should a person refuse to be searched as a condition of entry then he/she should be politely refused entry to the establishment - **Report it!**
- 12. Should a person refuse to be searched as a condition of Service - they should be refused entry and be dealt with by their appropriate authority – **Report it immediately.**

VEHICLE SEARCH PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION

1. Terrorist/criminals will generally attempt to hide items out of view of casual observers; therefore it is necessary for MOD personnel employed on search/guard duties, to use systematic search procedures to detect such items.

2. The main objective of a vehicle search is to detect improvised explosive devices (IED) or their components, weapons, ammunition, offence weapons (knives etc), or any other weapon which terrorist/criminals may attempt to conceal. Vehicle searches are to be performed in accordance with JSP 440 and local Standard Operating Instructions (SOI). Guidelines covering the authority to search are also outlined earlier this document.

BASIC RULES

3. Where possible searches should search in pairs. Vehicles are generally manufactured symmetrically, with the bodywork, fixtures and fittings the same on both sides of the vehicle. Searchers should therefore pay particular attention to any abnormalities on the vehicle. The basic rules for searching a vehicle are as follows:

- a. Most concealment areas are easily and quickly accessible to the terrorist. Use your senses at all times: sight, touch, smell.
- b. Establish what you look at on one side the back of what you see on the other; eg car floor to underside; bulkhead to engine bay; engine bay and interior to wings; back of boot to back of rear seat.
- c. As any part of the vehicle been tampered with, or has it been moved recently.
- d. Use correct tool for the job eg do not use pliers on nuts and bolts.
- e. Every part of a car has a function - ensure that it carries out that function.
- f. Be quick, thorough, efficient. Know exactly what you have to do. This will reduce the possibility of complaint.
- g. If in doubt seek advice.

TYPES OF SEARCH

4. There are two types of basic vehicle search these are:

- a. **Initial Check:** Lasting approximately 2 minutes.
- b. **Initial Search:** Lasting approximately 10 minutes.

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INITIAL CHECK

5. An initial check is a very important tool in assisting MOD personnel employed on guard duties, or when involved in other duties such as Op WIDEAWAKE. An initial check of persons can reveal a great deal about a persons reason for being on MOD property; the response can assist in making a decision on if further investigation is required, or if an initial search should be performed. The following points should be used as a guideline to performing an initial check of a person:

- a. Stop the person and identify yourself.
- b. Check the person's ID documents.
- c. Check reason for entry.
- d. Observe the person, looking for any signs of unusual behaviour which may raise your suspicions.
- e. Have a quick look inside the vehicle. Is there anything suspicious?
- f. Smell inside the vehicle. Are there any suspicious smells?
- g. A quick look inside the boot or load space of vehicle can reveal a great deal.
- h. If in doubt **DO NOT** allow access and report.
- i. Perform a Primary Vehicle Search if it is deemed appropriate.

6. **Sequence.** The sequence of the check is as follows:

- a. **Commander.**
 - (1) Commands and controls the search.
 - (2) Runs a plate check on the vehicle if such a system exists in theatre.
 - (3) Decides if a primary search is required.
- b. **Chat Up Man.** Speaks to the driver and passengers, through an interpreter, to obtain the following information:

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- (1) The identities of vehicle occupants.
 - (2) Confirm the ownership of the vehicle (ask mileage etc).
 - (3) Any other specific information required by G2 and covered in the patrol brief.
- b. **Searcher.** The searcher looks for known combat indicators (eg new tyres on old vehicles, overloading of rear of vehicle and damaged locks) and observes the reaction of the occupants. The following checks are then made:
- (1) The outside of the vehicle is inspected.
 - (2) By looking through the windows the inside of the vehicle is inspected.
 - (3) The underside of the vehicle is inspected.
 - (4) The engine and boot compartment are both inspected.
- c. **Cover Man.** The cover man:
- (1) Provides protection.
 - (2) Witnesses the operation.
- d. **Documentation.** A PSR is only required if:
- (1) Anything more than a visual check has been made (eg an item in the car is moved by the searcher).
 - (2) Damage has been caused in the initial check.
 - (3) Documents have been examined or removed.

GUIDE TO INITIAL VEHICLE SEARCH

7. Search is a science. It therefore follows that vehicle search should be carried out using systematic procedures. In order to search a vehicle effectively, the searcher should divide the vehicle into five distinct areas.

8. **Sequence.** The sequence for the initial search is as follows:

- a. The occupants are asked to get out of the car and are searched.
- b. The searchers, depending on the situation and existing SOPs, remove helmets and weapons and give them to the cover man who provides security.
- c. The vehicle is searched systematically concentrating on the five main areas:
 - (1) Exterior.

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- (2) Underside.
- (3) Interior.
- (4) Luggage compartment.
- (5) Engine compartment.

Search techniques for the search of saloon vehicles, commercial vehicles and coaches are shown in Appendices 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

BOOT OR LOAD SPACE



9. Before searching stand back and look at contents. Do they match the story offered? Is everything there, spare wheel, jack, tool bag; are there extra items such as filler paste, or tubes of glue and aerosol spray cans? If there is a spare can of fuel, is it as innocent as suggested or has the fuel tank been tampered with?

10. Remove the mats or carpets, examine in the same way as for the floor space. Pay particular attention to the space between boot and rear seat - it is a deceptive area often used for double bulkheads, especially if there is a large parcel shelf above.

11. The basic guideline is that you are looking for recent disturbance of the paint, underseal, or mechanical fittings. Any new welding, mastic or added fitments have to be checked.

SPARE WHEEL

12. The spare wheel is often stored within a compartment in the boot space. Examine the spare wheel, compare with running wheels for size and design. Roll the wheel across level ground, watch for an irregular motion.

PETROL TANK

13. Several vehicle designs include the fuel tank in the boot area, sometimes part of it, ie the top, others the whole tank. Examine the tank carefully for any signs of recent disturbance of the retaining bolt and straps, especially jubilee clips on inlet and outlet

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hoses. Look for fresh paint or sealer. Tap it for reasonable sound, ie hollow or resounding ring, not a dull thud, unless it is of plastic manufacture. Soda Bread maybe used for internal examinations.

LPG TANK

14. If an LPG tank is fitted, first check the vehicle's capability to use gas. Then examine externally as with the petrol tank. LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) is used in some cars as cheap alternative fuel to petrol. In order to use LPG a conversion and the following components would be required:

- a. A pressure vessel ie tank usually in the boot and consisting of a cylinder with domed ends. The connections to the tank would be a filler, supply to engine, safety valve, bleed valve to atmosphere (used during filling to expel gaseous element of fuel as vessel is filled with liquefied fuel) and a gauge to indicate fuel level.
- b. From the tank the fuel goes to a heater unit under the bonnet. The unit is heated from the engine cooling system to ensure that the fuel enters the carburettor in a gaseous and not a liquid state.
- c. There would also be two electrical valves to shut off the petrol supply and open up the gas supply and vice versa.
- d. All this is controlled by a switch on the dashboard area.

15. To recap, you need a tank with connections, a heater unit, two electrical valves and a switch. If these are not all fitted something is wrong. You cannot use LPG on a fuel injected car or on a diesel engine car, so if one is fitted to such a vehicle it may indicate use for illegal means.

CHECKING AN LPG TANK

16. In order to check an LPG Tank:

- a. Ask the driver to make the car run on gas (the exhaust has a sweet smell).
- b. Tap the tank. It should give a good ring even if full of LPG.
- c. Ask how much is in it. Confirm from gauge.
- d. Rock the car to make the fuel slop about.

INTERIOR



DOOR PANELS

17. There is no requirement to remove door panels. The searcher should first operate window mechanism to ensure that it operates and that the window opens and closes fully. A search of any door trays should be carried out and finally a hands on search of the inner door covering.

DASHBOARD AND CENTRAL CONSOLE

18. Dashboard and central consoles are cosmetic fittings used to cover the majority of the vehicle's electrical wiring. They are also used to house the various switches, air vents and dials. Because the dashboard is used to conceal these, there is a great deal of empty space behind the dashboard where items could be concealed. It is relatively easy to search these areas without removing the dashboards or central consoles. The following procedures should be adapted to search these areas:

- a. Are you able to see behind, usually from floor level with a torch, without removing panels?
- b. Is it possible to remove the glove box compartment for access?
- c. Is there a radio? If not, will the plastic cover where the radio should be, come off, allowing access?
- d. Use a logical and systematic approach. Ensure that the space in the heater/ventilation tubes is eliminated.
- e. Don't forget your sense of smell. You could detect explosives or perfumes. Do not forget the tailgate.
- f. The reverse of the dashboard conceals many nooks and crannies, goes out of your line of sight so would be easy to overlook in your search.

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- g. Behind the dashboard and workings you will come to the bulkhead between the interior and engine compartment. You may employ Soda Bread to assist.

SEATS

19. Vehicle seats are generally moulded by the manufacture with leather or other material covering bonded to the seat. When searching seats the following procedures should be adopted:

- a. Feel the exterior of the seat, pushing into the padding and checking for suspicious undulations, which may indicate objects concealed.
- b. Check that the seat moves backwards and forward on its adjuster and that it tilts correctly.
- c. Sit on them. Are they comfortable? Do they adjust? Do they bounce?
- d. Look under the seat and feel.
- e. Do the seats have pockets attached? (Usually on the rear)
- f. Do not forget some vehicles have seats which fold into the boot (MPVs).

ROOF LININGS

20. Modern vehicles generally have a fibre material either bonded or screwed to the roof. Feel across the area with your hands checking for unusual lumps and undulations.

SUNROOF

21. Examine sunroof housing constructed in car roof. Does the sunroof move freely? Check inside recesses.

FLOOR

22. A basic vehicle floor is not flat in cross section but consists of many undulations. From behind the driver's seat there would be a dip for the rear passenger's feet, then a rise to a possible box space behind the rear under the rear seat and possibly over the back axle. Vehicle floors generally have carpets or other material bonded or pinned to them.

23. The following procedure applies to searching the floor area:

- a. There should be no need to lift the carpet.
- b. Check to see if the carpets have been previously lifted, breaking the bond. If so investigate.
- c. Feel the floor area, checking for suspicious undulations.
- d. Remember vehicles are generally manufactured asymmetrically.

EXTERIOR BODY WORK AND TRIM



24. Stand back and take a sighting of the body contours for signs of adaptation or repair. Ensure there are no components slung extra low to the body line ie fuel tanks or spare wheel cages that may have been adapted.

LIGHTS

25. Examine headlights, sidelights, rear lights and indicators; ensure they are all working, and light clusters match on both sides of vehicle.

WHEELS

26. Examine wheel trims and hub caps, compare wheels for similar condition.

BODYWORK

27. Search the exterior of the vehicle as follows:

- a. Inspect underside of wheel arches, pay close attention to inner wing inserts and bolt and mud deflectors.
- b. Compare the shape of the wing inside to outside.
- c. Check the exterior of the vehicle's bodywork.
- d. Examine front and rear spoilers, air dams, body side moulding.
- e. Examine air intake grills.
- f. Examine bumpers.

ENGINE COMPARTMENT



28. Potential concealment sites are encountered in the body surrounding the engine where access to double skin wings is often found. Double skin bulkheads in the form of heat shields are particularly prevalent, especially when the engine is in the rear of the vehicle. Heating and ventilating equipment is often found on the bulkhead between engine and passenger compartment. Look for any extra items fitted around the engine and check to see if they work or are in fact necessary. Sound proofing material could be hiding access holes to adaptations or double skin areas. Space in the engine compartment is usually restricted but there are many nooks and crannies and other potential hiding places. The latter include:

- a. Air filter.
- b. Heating and ventilation system pipes and ducts.
- c. Windscreen washer reservoir.
- d. Cooling system reservoir and header tank.
- e. Oil filter.
- f. Battery.
- g. Examine the inboard sides of the running wheels; ensure they are uniform in condition.

UNDERNEATH



29. The underside should be the last area checked. In order to search the vehicle effectively it will be necessary for the searcher to lie down and look under the vehicle. (The use of a running board may be considered). Mirrors are an aid, but are no substitute to the naked eye and hands on search. They may, however, be used to gain a view of awkward areas such as exhaust systems and axles. When searching under the vehicle the following should be checked:

- a. Does the contour of the floor match what was seen from above?
- b. Are there any suspicious objects attached to the exhaust system?
- c. Check behind axle and gear box area.
- d. Check under front and rear bumpers. (Good concealment area).
- e. Is the spare tyre stored under the vehicle? If so, you may consider removing and checking it.

CARAVANS AND CARAVANETTES

30. With this type of vehicle concealment areas exist in the coachwork, where individual styles and designs, including those achieved through DIY, are numerous. Careful attention must be applied to how and why a unit is constructed for the spaces to become apparent. Close observation and measurement of inner compared to outer shapes is important.

31. Check cupboards, bunk spaces, wardrobes and the like. Remember that comfort and space are what manufacturers try to achieve in these types of vehicle. They normally use every available space. Unused spaces can be regarded as unusual or suspect. The searcher should approach this type of vehicle search in the same way as a car, with the following additional requirements:

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- a. Check the functions of water systems, plumbing for toilets and showers etc. Remember water is often stored in compartments outside/inside of the caravan/caravanette.
- b. Check gas systems, both cooking and heating.

TRAILERS

32. Items on trailers, such as racing teams' equipment and vehicles, or other commercial goods should be carefully assessed in determining whether the purpose of the journey is genuine. After learning the purpose of the journey and how long the trailer has been in use, examine the condition to see if it compares with the story. In previous seizures, the so-called 'used-vehicle' appeared perfect with not a mark or scratch evident in the load space, ie recently adapted and freshly painted.

33. With trailers the most regular space discovered is in the floor/chassis frame area. With a colleague helping from on top, inspect and measure the structure to check any possible space. Camper trailer tents offer scope, and because of their size and complexity to open up, the traveller will often try to dissuade you from an examination.

VEHICLE SEARCH SAFETY GUIDELINES

34. All matters concerning Health and Safety can be found in JSP 375 – MoD Health and Safety Handbook. Before all search tasks, a complete and comprehensive risk assessment of all activities is to be conducted.

DURING SEARCH

35. Take care to avoid accidents or damage to:
 - a. Yourself.
 - b. Persons in your charge - ie driver, passengers.
 - c. Searchers with whom you are working.
 - d. Any goods or evidence found. Remember that the persons who examine a vehicle are responsible for the roadworthiness if it continues its journey. If there is any doubt as to its condition, the owner or driver must be informed before he proceeds.

USE OF CAR JACKS

36. Never work under a car with a jack as the only support - use axle stands. Always chock wheels. Ensure that you are using a suitable jacking point ie do not jack up on the sump or the petrol tank. If in doubt seek advice.

37. **Documentation.** A PSR must be completed for a primary search.

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38. **Action on Finds.** If the primary search reveals illegal items the following action should be taken:

- a. The team commander is to send a FINDREP (Report No. 018) through the chain of command.
- b. Care should be taken to preserve forensic evidence and avoid cross contamination.

SECONDARY SEARCH

39. If illegal items are found or further suspicion is aroused during the initial search the vehicle may be sent for a secondary search. This a more detailed search conducted by an IST or an AAST in a secure area or base location. The way the vehicle is moved will depend upon its location, the nature of the find resources available and current SOPs.

SYSTEMATIC SEARCH IS
ESSENTIAL
TREAT VEHICLES AS FIVE AREAS

INSIDE BOOT

INTERIOR

ENGINE COMPARTMENT

OUTSIDE

UNDERNEATH

Check any large box sections or
double skin area to which
access can be obtained with
minimum modification.




Figure 10.B1.1 - Search of Saloon Vehicles




Figure 10.B2.1 - Search of Commercial Vehicles




Figure 10.B3.1 - Search of Buses and Coaches

ROUTE AND VULNERABLE POINT CHECKS

INTRODUCTION

1. Enemy groupings have become technically sophisticated and have a range of attacks at their disposal refined to incorporate new technology and counter our own TTPs. In many theatres, the key threat while transiting from one location to another is the IED. The enemy will exploit our pattern setting and use vulnerable points and areas to his advantage.

AIM

2. The aim of this Annex is to outline the procedures to be taken when transiting through vulnerable areas and vulnerable points in order to counter the IED threat.

THEATRES

3. Exact drills may change between operations (currently Ops HERRICK and TELIC) due to different technical equipment carried by patrols, different vehicles and different threats. In all cases, patrol commanders are to ensure that they are employing the most up to date practices as laid out by the area SOI's.

4. **Key Definitions.**

a. **Vulnerable Points.** Vulnerable Points (VP) are those **points** on the route where it is particularly advantageous for the adversary to position an ambush, using either IEDs or SAF, or both. Likely places are:

- (1) Culverts.
- (2) Bridges.
- (3) High banked stretches of road.
- (4) Routes dominated by high ground (possible firing points).
- (5) Junctions.
- (6) Buildings and walls near route.
- (7) Parked vehicles.
- (8) Prominent markers on the route (telegraph poles, burns, road signs).
- (9) Location of previous attack.
- (10) Places where vehicles slow down (bends, potholes, debris, traffic calming areas).

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(11) Places where you are channelled or a water feature/road narrows.

b. **Vulnerable Areas.** Vulnerable Areas (VA) are those **areas** on the route suitable for an IED attack. A VA is defined when a combination of the following is present:

- (1) Long open stretches of road.
- (2) Areas where the enemy could have a good field of view of the target.
- (3) Good possible escape routes.
- (4) Lack of civilian infrastructure.
- (5) Urban/Rural interface areas are particularly at risk.

c. **VP Check.** Completed by patrol search trained personnel¹ as a protective measure during the conduct of routine patrolling.

d. **VA Check.** Completed by patrol search trained personnel as a protective measure during the conduct of routine patrolling.

e. **Route Check.** Completed by patrol search trained personnel. It features a systematic movement along a route in the safest manner possible, with focus placed on VA/VPs, as identified by the Unit Search Adviser (USA) prior to the patrol.

f. **Route Search.** Can only be undertaken by advanced or intermediate search teams, ie REST² or AAST³, and follows specific search party configuration with specialist equipment where required. The entire route is searched rather than specific points.

g. **Higher Assurance VP Check.** This check can only be undertaken by intermediate search teams. The higher assurance VP check is conducted by an AAST trained multiple who deploy tactically (without the requirement for cordon troops), using specialist equipment to conduct a thorough VP check of specific High Use/Must Transit VPs where there is a greater assessed threat of attack by IEDs.

5. **Aim of Route Check.** Route checks are conducted to ensure that no IEDs lie along a route, allowing it to be safely used. It is one of the most frequently used techniques within current C-IED operations and is carried out to check significant lengths of route with relative speed.

6. **Principles of Route Check.** Vulnerable Points (VP) and/or Vulnerable Areas (VA) will be identified by USA/RESA or the patrol commander as part of the patrol planning process and briefed in the pre-patrol brief. Additionally, the patrol commander may identify a VA/VP on the ground during the conduct of his patrol. The VPs or VAs are then

¹ All Pax deploying to theatre will have completed the mandatory Patrol Search Training (ie 5 and 20m checks) conducted by OPTAG.

² REST – Royal Engineer Search Teams.

³ AAST – All Arms Search Teams.

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subjected to checking by dismounted patrol search trained personnel. The callsigns conducting the check are to stop short of the VP/VA and to reconfigure the patrol. During the conduct of the route check it is important that continuous ECM protection is maintained by patrol vehicles (shown in Figure 10C.1 - below).




Figure 10C.1 – All vehicles must remain within the ECM protection

7. **Conduct of a Route Check.** See Figure 10C.2 (below). It is critical that none of the searchers walk down the road (ie into the potential detection zone of a VOPIR/EFP device).




Figure 10C.2 – Conduct of the Route Check

- a. Tactical decisions such as the number and location of flank protection and the number of top cover must be made by the patrol commander (in line with direction from the chain of command).
- b. The patrol commander's position will be influenced by:
 - (1) The maximum amount of cover that can be provided by the lead vehicle.
 - (2) His ability to control lead vehicle speed. The commander must regulate the speed of the vehicles, halting them when necessary. It is critical that the speed of the patrol is dictated by the searchers – they must not be placed under pressure to move forward more quickly than they are able to search effectively.
 - (3) His ability to keep eyes on the searchers.
- c. **Searchers.** The following technique should be used:
 - (1) The two searchers move to the side of the road, carry out their 5 metre checks and then search forward to a position 10 metres ahead of the commander/lead vehicles. They must **visually** check the verge to a distance of 5 metres from the edge of the road/track surface; it is important that the searchers remain a minimum of 5 metres from the edge of the road/track.
 - (2) When the searchers reach a position of 10 metres ahead of the commander and he considers the patrol ready, he should order the searchers to start moving forward through the VP. The searchers should remain parallel to the road.

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(3) If additional manpower is available or the ground dictates it, the patrol commander can deploy a further pair of searchers to act as cover men for the primary searchers. These searchers provide security in depth for the primary searchers and must concentrate on searching the ground to the immediate front of the primary searchers for VOIEDs. They must protect themselves at all times through their own 5 metre checks (they may additionally act as relief for the primary searchers during periods of prolonged searching).

(4) If the ground is complex the patrol commander could push his primary searchers out beyond 5 metres from the road. In this instance the primary check for PIR devices is completed by the rear searchers. Searchers must ensure that they remain within the vehicle ECM bubble at all times. It is the commander's responsibility to ensure that this is done.




Figure 10C.3 – Search Zone Priorities

8. **Conduct of Searchers.** For all checks, day and night, make **maximum use of white light**. Searchers must utilise all visual aids available (eg SUSAT or binos). It is critical that none of the searchers walk down the road (ie into the potential detection zone of a VOPIR/EFP device). The patrol commander is to control the vehicle movement to mirror the 3-5 metre bounds of the searchers. **The speed of the patrol must be dictated by the searchers.** The following techniques must be used by checkers as shown in Figure 10C.3 (above):

- a. **Technique One.** Visual search of the area out to 5 metres.
- b. **Technique Two.** Visual search further ahead for suspicious objects.

c. **Technique Three.** Visual search of the area in front of the other searchers.

It is important that primary searchers also pay attention to the road/track over which the road party will travel. Figure 10C.4 (below) provides a diagrammatic view of the arcs for four searchers.




Figure 10C.4 – Arcs when using 4 Searchers

9. **VP/VA Checks in Order to combat the Command Wire IED Threat.** Where possible it is advisable to conduct an isolation of a VP/VA to alleviate the command wire threat if time and the situation allow. Flanking teams can be deployed in addition to the road team drills outlined above. Flanking teams should carry where possible Man Pack ECM and deploy a minimum of 50-75m from the edge of the road with 10m spacing between soldiers and conduct isolation (6400mil visual check) of the VP/VA. This isolation may be performed by one team conducting a full circle of the VP/VA (as shown in Figure 10C.5) or two teams each completing half the VP check (as shown in Figure 10C.6). **Prior to this drill being conducted, the local commander must conduct a risk assessment in order to identify possible threats, as well as the time and distance implications of moving away from the vehicles and thus the reduced effect of ECM protection.**

a. **Sequence of Events for an Open Area VP Check.**

- (1) Identification of a VP/VA.

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- (2) Stop short with Micawber turned on.
- (3) Turn Micawber off and dismount Searchers and conduct initial 5 & 20m checks.
- (4) Flanking party out.
- (5) Flanking party cross over road and complete isolation.
- (6) Road party conducts drills through VP/VA.
- (7) Patrol remounts vehicles and continues on task.

b. **Flanking Team Route Selection.** Flanking teams are to select the route for the isolation to provide the maximum view of the target area and minimising the risk to flanking team personnel. Searchers should avoid piles of sand, areas of debris or any other location that could conceal a device. Flanking Teams should move tactically with 10m spacing between soldiers. They should be aware of threats in depth.

c. **Flanking Team/Road Crossover.** It is important that if two flanking teams are used that they perform 'crossover' to negate the chances of a linear (beside the road) CWIED. When the flanking team(s) perform the 'crossover' phase on the road, they **must be aware of the PIR threat** and conduct their search drills to locate and mitigate against walking into the arc of a PIR. The lead searchers must choose their route carefully and avoid areas where a device could be located. Once the first searcher of the flanking team is secure on the road, the remaining team members must cross the road through the same location in order to minimise the risk to personnel in an area that has not been cleared by Micawber. At all times searchers must apply the rule of **STOP – LOOK – PLAN**.




Figure 10C.5 – Rural VP/VA check using one Flanking Team




Figure 10C.6 – Rural VP/VA check using two Flanking Teams

10. **Higher Assurance VP/VA Checks.** Higher assurance VPs checks are carried out to deter the terrorist from conducting deliberate IED attacks at VP/VA locations of high use/high threat. These include large buried IEDs, deliberate CWIEDs or any type of IED

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that can remain '*in place*' for a significant length of time and will be significantly more difficult to locate by patrol search trained personnel with no specialist equipment. There could be a number of these VPs/VAs within the AO that are transited regularly due to their location and the tactical needs of patrols. Such VPs are termed 'High Use VPs' and as such present an ideal target for the enemy. There have been several incidents in the past where the enemy knew that vehicles or foot patrols must transit these 'high use VPs' and has targeted them. The higher assurance VP/VA check provides the additional assurance to subsequent patrols passing through the VP/VA that routine patrol search VP drills will suffice and that the location has a reduced probability of containing deliberate IEDs.

a. **Selection.** Targets for higher assurance VP checks should be identified from existing VPs/VAs that pose a higher threat to troops during normal patrol action in conjunction with the following factors:

- (1) A VP/VA where an enemy attack has occurred in the past.
- (2) A VP/VA where callsigns must transit to conduct patrol action.
- (3) A threat warning has been issued for or suspicious activity/hotspots have been identified at the VP/VA.

b. **Method.** The sequence of events/conduct is:

- (1) The selection of the higher assurance VP is performed by planning staff in conjunction with USAs⁴.
- (2) AASTs under the direction/command of a USA will then coordinate deliberate operations to target known VP/VA's within the AO to provide a higher level of assurance than checks conducted by patrol search trained soldiers.
- (3) It is recommended that one high use/high threat VP be targeted per patrol due to the rigorous nature of the patrol action.
- (4) It is recommended that these higher assurance VP checks are conducted during early hours of daylight to mitigate against any IEDs emplaced overnight and maximise the effective period of assurance.
- (5) A minimum of one Multiple should deploy with the AAST trained personnel held within it (eight AAST personnel and four Patrol Search personnel, making one three team multiple). The multiple is to be commanded by a qualified and in-date USA.
- (6) A mutually supporting multiple is recommended during the actual conduct of the higher assurance VP check due to the length of time on target required.

⁴ USA – Unit Search Advisor.

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(7) The AAST Multiple deploys tactically and conducts the VP/VA check. Search equipment such as GRUDGE and DRIFTWAY, and if available an AES dog are to be employed.

(8) All areas of the VP/VA are thoroughly checked including possible friendly force stop short locations and self protection lanes.

(9) A full patrol report is completed on return to base and its findings briefed to subsequent patrols.

c. **Subsequent Patrols.** Subsequent patrols should treat high use/high threat VPs/VAs as an obstacle and have considered their actions as part of pre deployment orders and rehearsals. Route selection through the VP/VA must be considered to remove the patrol from possible areas of a deliberate IED action.

10. **Actions on Suspicious Object or Device Functioning.** Stop all forward movement and launch a 4Cs operation if the operational environment and tactical situation permits; every effort must be made to engage or capture the enemy during the initial stage. If the device functions and casualties are sustained they must take **priority**.

a. **Extraction.** If the device is located by the road party, they should withdraw away. If it is possible, the searcher discovering the IED is to provide an accurate sketch map of its location for ATO, RESA and REST. The commander may take a tactical decision to move away past the device. It is advised that the callsigns extracts keeping eyes on the device.

b. **Confirm.**

(1) Confirmation should be done visually from a safe area (ie where the searcher has been before), if necessary using white light. Maximum use should be made of available viewing aids.

(2) **Searchers should not at any time move between the suspicious object and the road.**

(3) If a device is confirmed or the searcher has any suspicion of a device, then ATO assistance must be requested and the remainder of the 4Cs operation carried out.

(4) Members of the confirmation party and/or the cordon should never be tempted to photograph the object.

c. **Clear.**

d. **Cordon.**

e. **Control.**

RUMMAGE/AREA SEARCH

THE THREAT

1. Rummage/area search is classed as an offensive operation and it is unlikely that the search team would be specifically targeted as part of a planned attack. An opportunist may well be prepared to attack the search team by the means of a shoot, or try to distract the search team away from the area by initiating an incident in another location. If working in an urban area there is always the risk from public disorder.

2. It is possible that a long term hide could be protected by a victim operated device that is either within the hide itself or at the access point. If this is suspected then advice from G2 should be sought prior to the search starting. As always a threat remains when transiting to and from the search location. Method of transport and alternative routes should always be considered when planning any search tasks.

VULNERABLE POINTS

3. The access areas to long term hides and the area within the hide itself are classed as Vulnerable Points (VPs).

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4. **Preliminaries.** Preliminary considerations are as follows:
- a. Address of target (8 figure grid reference to centre of target area).
 - b. Radius from centre of the target out to the extent of the search.
 - c. Ground characteristics in detail.
 - d. Team areas.
 - e. Boundaries in detail (including overlap).
 - f. Traced persons in the area.
 - g. Landowner.
 - h. Priorities and use of AES dog, if available.
 - i. Initial and team ICP locations.
 - j. Documentation, PSR.
 - k. Transport.

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- l. Dress.
- m. Agencies.
- n. Location of nearest military/police base, medical and emergency services.
- o. Timings for:
 - (1) Orders.
 - (2) Planned start.
 - (3) Planned end.
 - (4) First and last light.

5. **On Task.** On task considerations are as follows:

- a. Consider the threat assessment at all times - What if?
- b. Update cordon/incident commander.
- c. ECM coverage (as applicable).

6. **Post Task.** Post task considerations are as follows:

- a. PSR completed.
- b. Equipment cleaned.
- c. Debrief team.

HIDE ATTRIBUTES

7. A hide must be:
- a. Available for immediate use.
 - b. Accessible.
 - c. Concealed.
 - d. Non attributable.
 - e. Locatable by day and night.

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WINTHROP THEORY

8. Winthrop Theory uses the basic requirements of hides, especially the need for reference points, to identify possible hide locations. Once a search area has been identified, viewing the ground from the enemy's viewpoint, selecting likely reference points and associated potential hide sites helps to focus the efforts of the search teams. Typical reference points include:

- a. Telegraph poles, gates, barriers and pylons.
- b. Trees and bushes.
- c. Ends, corners or gaps in fences, walls and hedges.
- d. Road signs and street furniture.
- e. Distinctive objects such as large rocks or abandoned cars etc.

TYPES OF HIDE

9. The following are examples of how a terrorist may store and move resources:

- a. **Long Term.** Long term hides are likely to be well sited, waterproof constructions that are used for the long term storage of resources. Such hides vary from specially constructed pits or buildings containing large amounts of resources, to plastic barrels containing one or two items.
- b. **Transit.** Transit hides may be in, or on route to the target area. They may not be designed for long term storage, though they may be purpose built. These may be static or mobile. The transit hide may be the point at which the quartermaster transfers resources to activists to collect, or they may be used solely by the activist. Although not stocked for long periods, individual transit hides may be used on more than one occasion.
- c. **Short Term.** Short term hides are close to the scene of the incident and are used by activists to conceal weapons immediately before and after an incident, enabling him to leave the area clean. In some cases convenience and accessibility outweighs concealment, hence these hides are vulnerable to search operations.

ACTIONS ON A FIND

10. The following steps should be taken on making a find:

- a. **Finder.**
 - (1) **DO NOT TOUCH.**
 - (2) Make mental note/digital photography.
 - (3) Mark and withdraw.

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- (4) Inform team commander.
- b. **Team Commander.** Confirm (If required).
 - (1) Inform patrol commander.
 - (2) Clear the area (If required).
- c. **Patrol Commander.** Decide if life threatening or non life threatening - if unsure then must go with the former:
 - (1) **Non Life Threatening.**
 - (a) If the find is to be recovered by the police/RMP secure the area and proceed with the Search.
 - (b) If the find is to be recovered, remember gloves and mask.
 - (c) Photograph the hide location.
 - (d) Photograph the find.
 - (e) Carefully bag the item and seal.
 - (f) Complete evidence label.
 - (g) Document ALL evidence activity.
 - (h) Ensure correct handover.
 - (2) **Life Threatening.**
 - (a) **All searching must stop.**
 - (b) Clear and cordon the area.
 - (c) Inform agencies and prepare for their arrival.
 - (d) Ensure a sketch has been made on return to ICP.
 - (e) Control the incident until handed over.

ARRIVAL AT STOP SHORT POINT (SSP)

11. On arrival at the SSP, the search commander should liaise with the cordon commander and must ask the following questions:

- a. Is the cordon in place?

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- b. Are there any changes to the plan?
- c. Has there been any suspicious activity in the area?

12. The search teams should immediately carry out 5m and 20m checks prior to carrying out SSP to ICP procedures.

PHASE 1 – ESTABLISH SEARCH ICP

13. The following should be used as a guide when selecting the ICP location (see Figure 10D.1):

- a. The ICP should ideally be within the search area (threat assessment dependant).
- b. The ICP should be away from any obvious reference points.
- c. Use a good vantage point.




Figure 10D.1 – Establish ICP

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PHASE 2 – SELECT REFERENCE POINTS FROM ICP

14. The whole team should participate in reference point selection (see Figure 10D.2).



Figure 10D.2 – Select Reference Points from ICP

PHASE 3 – WALK THE BOUNDARY

15. The whole team should walk the boundary in order to achieve the following (see Figure 10D.3):

- a. To look for more reference points.
- b. To look for markers or secondary markers.
- c. To confirm the boundary to the whole team.
- d. To look for any other access into the area.
- e. On return to ICP collate reference points and dog indications (where applicable). These are then prioritised.




Figure 10D.3 – Walk the Boundary

PHASE 4 – SEARCH THE REFERENCE POINTS

16. Each reference point should be rummaged searched to a radius of 15m (see Figure 10D.4) starting from the centre then working out. The search pairs should carry the following equipment:

- a. ECM – theatre dependent.
- b. Digging implement.
- c. MMC and pin markers.
- d. Notebook and pen.
- e. Air photography (if possible).




Figure 10D.4 – Search the Reference Points

PHASE 5 – SEARCH THE BOUNDARY

17. The boundary should now be searched by pairs operating in different directions to ensure maximum search coverage (see Figure 10D.5) with each pair completing a full circuit of the boundary (including an overlap). In addition, searchers must ensure an overlap of 1m within their areas of responsibility (see Figure 10D.6).




Figure 10D.5 – Deployment of Search Pairs (Boundary Search)




Figure 10D.6 – Search Pairs Areas of Responsibility (Boundary Search)

PHASE 6 – OPEN AREA SEARCH

18. The open area within the search boundaries should now be searched. Search pairs should be deployed as shown in Figure 10D.7, with alternate digging implements across the line. Pin markers should be used to delineate searched areas.




Figure 10D.7 – Open Area Search Formation

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URBAN ENVIRONMENT AREA SEARCH CONSIDERATIONS

19. The following considerations should be made in the urban environment:
 - a. Team areas are normally split into 'tarmac islands'.
 - b. Command and tasking of search pairs must be tightly controlled.
 - c. Any find must be watched over from hard cover.
 - b. Consider the use of close protection for searchers.

URBAN SEARCH PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION

1. The nature of the urban environment dictates that team and multiple commanders must be prepared to operate with a great deal of flexibility when tasked to carry out searches.

AIM

2. The aim of this annex is to provide a planning guide for commanders employed in search tasks in the urban environment. It is not intended to be a comprehensive document on urban search procedures.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

3. The threat assessment is critical. Search teams must be familiar with the TTPs used by the enemy. An appreciation of the current situation is essential before planning can start. The following factors should be considered:

- a. The enemy method of operation:
 - (1) Attacks on vehicle patrols.
 - (2) Attacks on foot patrols.
 - (3) Attacks on cordon positions.
 - (4) Disruption of normal life.
- b. The type of device and means of initiation likely to be used:
 - (1) Command Wire IED (CWIED).
 - (2) Remote Control IED (RCIED).
 - (3) Victim Operated IED (VOIED).
 - (4) Timed IED (TIED).
- c. Likely locations of a device:
 - (1) Road junctions.
 - (2) Choke points - alleyways, cul-de-sacs etc.

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- (3) Patrol routes. Honesty traces should be checked to avoid pattern setting.
- (4) Obvious ICP locations and cordon positions.

4. Once the threat assessment is complete search efforts can be targeted at the most likely sites.

PLANNING

5. **Planning Conference.** Due to the tempo of operations there may not always be time to conduct a full planning conference. When possible the following expertise should be used to assist in the planning process:

- a. **Royal Engineers Search Advisor (RESA).** If the search is to be high risk or in support of an IED clearance operation a RESA will be required. ASTs are scarce assets and will not be tasked until the RESA has agreed that the search is high risk or high assurance. Early warning and tasking of the RESA is essential.
- b. **Unit Search Advisor (USA).** The USA commands the All Arms Search Team (AAST) on operations and plans all Intermediate Searches.
- c. **EOD.** In the event of an IED clearance EOD assets will have primacy so should be involved in the planning of deliberate operations.

6. **Planning factors.** There are a number of factors to be considered:

- a. **Location.** The start and finish points of the search must be determined.
- b. **Manpower Requirement.** A minimum of three PSS trained teams is required for route checks or rummages. A full AAST is needed for route and area searches and a REST should be employed for HRS.
- c. **Police.** Local police and RMP are required to deal with traffic and complaints.
- d. **Protection.** Search teams should be protected whilst on task. A cordon or satellite patrols will be required.
- e. **Working Dogs.** The use of dogs should be carefully planned to optimise their effect and avoid hazards specific to the urban environment, such as heavy traffic.
- f. **Equipment Requirement.** The requirement for specialist search equipment (eg ECM, wire detectors and metal detectors) should be confirmed and the equipment must be checked.
- g. **Area of Responsibility.** Search teams need to be fully briefed on their areas of responsibility (see para 7).

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OUT OF BOUNDS CLASSIFICATION

7. Once planning is complete the search area can be broken down into areas of responsibility. These areas are termed red, amber and green.

- a. **Red.** Red areas are those where the highest degree of confidence is required. If the threat is high then the area will always be searched by RESA and a REST with EOD assets in support.
- b. **Amber.** Amber areas are those where it is less likely that there will be a device. This area is usually searched by the USA and AAST although a RESA and an REST may search this area.
- c. **Green.** Green areas are on the peripheries of the search area and are normally searched by PSS.

PROCEDURE

8. The procedure for the conduct of the search takes the following stages:

- a. **Stage 1.** The outer cordon troops move into the borders of the green area. The ground is dominated to prevent attacks on the search teams.
- b. **Stage 2.** The Inner cordon deploys and the search teams move to the appropriate ICP.
- c. **Stage 3.** The search teams conduct the search.
- d. **Stage 4.** Once the task is complete the search teams extract and the Inner and outer cordons collapse in turn.

ACTIONS ON

9. On a high risk search EOD assets will generally be present to deal directly with finds. Depending on the nature of the find it may be necessary to relocate the ICP and cordon positions. Actions on a find are as follows:

- a. The teams should stop searching.
- b. The team commander should assess the situation and consider the threat to his team and the requirement to preserve evidence.
- c. A find report should be sent and appropriate assets tasked to deal with the find.
- d. Specialist assets (RESA, SOCO, EOD etc) should be fully briefed on arrival at the ICP.

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INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

10. The following principles apply to any incident:
 - a. **Confirm** the find (record a description, its location and produce a sketch).
 - b. **Clear** the area (100m for a briefcase size device, 200m for a car and 400m for a large vehicle – keep out of line of sight).
 - c. **Cordon** the area. Remember 5 and 20m checks!
 - d. **Control** the cordon (including the movement of specialist assets).
 - e. **Check** for secondary hazards.

PATROL EQUIPMENT

The suggested minimum search equipment for a 4-man patrol is as follows:

Ser	Item	Qty	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Search documentation	5	PSR
2	Hand held metal detector	2	
3	Digging tool	1/ man	Trowel
4	Shovel	1	
5	Patrol wire detector	1	
6	Working gloves	4 pairs	
7	Notebook and pencil	1/ man	Patrol notebook
8	Mine tape	20m/man	
9	Camera	1	Digital
10	Evidence bag	1/ man	Evidence collection / preservation
11	Latex gloves	1/ man	As 10(d)
12	Evidence awareness kits	1/ man	As issued in theatre
13	Search bag	1/ man	
14	Pin markers	20/ man	
15	Mine marker cone	2/ man	

Table 4.F.1 - 4-man Patrol Search Equipment

PATROL SEARCH RECORD

1. **Completion.** The patrol search record is intended to complete to record the act of a search and a copy should be given to the owner/occupier/driver that has been searched as a receipt of search. The record should be completed in line with the guidance notes below:
 - a. **1 - Type of Search.** To be completed depending on the search carried out.
 - b. **2 - Justification for Search.** To be completed prior to the search and depending on the search.
 - c. **3 - Date and time of the Search.** The date and time the search started and the search ended.
 - d. **4 - Location.** Enter an address or a description of the location with an eight figure grid or vehicle details with the VRN, colour and make.
 - e. **5 - Searched/Issued To.** All the details of the person getting searched are to be recorded here. If there is any additional information or occupants then their details need to be recorded on the continuation sheet. If the person searched will not give his details a description needs to be entered.
 - f. **6 - Items Removed.** Any items removed during the search need to be recorded here with a clear description of the item, an evidence serial number and the quantity.
 - g. **7 - Damage Caused.** Any damage caused during the search the details need to be recorded here.
 - h. **8 - Searchers' Details.** The searchers' ID details will be their military numbers.
 - i. **9 - Certification.** To be signed by the person being searched.
 - j. **10 - Witness to Search.** To be signed by two witnesses if the owner/occupier/driver is not present. The witnesses' ID will be their military number.
 - k. **11 - Point of Contact.** This must include a name, location and if possible a phone number.
 - l. **12 - Summary.** To be completed at the end of the search and the relevant information recorded in the correct boxes.
 - m. **Continuation Sheet.** Any additional information must be recorded here.

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**United Kingdom Ministry of Defence
PATROL SEARCH RECORD**

of

Serial Number

To be completed in *BLOCK CAPITALS*. Tick appropriate boxes. Read notes on cover before completion.

Only to be used in conjunction with the relevant Theatre Search Guidance Card.

Edtn 1 Sep 04

PSRC	SDRF	DOCREMREP	RECEIPT OF SEARCH		
1. Type of Search	Person:	Vehicle:	Area:	Building:	Route:
2. Justification for Search	Auth by Comd:	Follow up under ROE:	Sp to Civ Auth:	Annex to SRM Ser No:	
3. This certifies that the following was entered for the purpose of searching on:	Date: _____ From: _____ hrs to: _____ hrs				
4. Location Address or description with grid or vehicle details -VRN, colour, make:	Grid: _____ Description: _____				
5. Searched/Issued to (Receipt)/Owned/Driven by: (additional occupants on continuation sheet)	Name: _____		ID Details: _____		
	Address: _____		Date & Place of Birth: _____		
	Ethnicity/sect: _____		Descriptors: _____		
6. Items Removed. The items below were removed at:	Date: _____ Time: _____ hrs				
Item Description		Evidence Ser	Qty	Remarks	
7. Damage Caused:					
8. Searchers Details	Name: _____	ID: _____	Unit: _____	Signature: _____	
9. Certificate - Translations are in Theatre Guidance Cards				Signature: _____	
"I certify that the contents of this form have been explained to me in a language I understand and that this is an accurate record"					
10. Witnesses to Search	Name: _____	ID: _____	Unit: _____	Signature: _____	
	Name: _____	ID: _____	Unit: _____	Signature: _____	
11. Point of Contact:					
12. Summary	Productive: <input type="checkbox"/>	Force Used: <input type="checkbox"/>	Damage Caused: <input type="checkbox"/>	Arrest Made: <input type="checkbox"/>	
Target area: _____	Area Code: _____	C/S: _____	Unit: _____		

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CHAPTER 11

REACTION TO INCIDENTS

INTRODUCTION

1. **General.** The timely and effective reaction to incidents such as IEDs (both explosions and finds) and contacts with the enemy such as shootings is vital to the success of operations. The actions outlined below provide a template for the response to most incidents. In particular the use of either the four Cs (Confirm, Clear, Cordon and Control) or the five Ds (Discover, Delay, Discuss, Dominate and Dispose) during the reaction to IED incidents are highlighted. During a shooting incident, the use of rapid and aggressive action in the immediate reaction to the contact will greatly increase the possibility of capturing the firer. Thereafter the considered follow up will take the form of a four Cs operation. Soldiers must always seek to mount a robust response to any form of attack, although specific reactions will often be dictated by the ROE, presence of civilians, the terrain and many other factors.

2. **Contents.** This Chapter contains the following:

a. **IEDD Operations.**

(1) Immediate Response IEDD – The four Cs. See Annex A.

(2) Delayed Response IEDD – The five Ds. See Annex B.

b. **Reaction to a Shoot.** See Annex C.

c. **Other Agencies Available.** See Annex D.

d. **Sample Contact Reports.** See Annex E.

(1) Contact Sighting Report.

(2) IRT/CASEVAC Request

(3) EOD/ATO Request

(4) Serious Incident Report

(5) Shot Report

(6) METHANE Report

IED DISPOSAL (IEDD) OPERATIONS

3. **Types of Incident.** Patrols may be are required to respond following types of potential incidents:

a. An explosion.

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- b. The discovery of any type of IED.
 - c. The suspicion of an IED.
 - d. An accredited warning of an IED.
 - e. A find.
4. **Response.** The response can either be:
- a. **Immediate.** Where danger to life and property is imminent, or
 - b. **Delayed.** Where danger to life and property is less imminent.
5. **Types of Operation.** In all instances the ATO has the option to instigate either a direct task or a planned operation, in EOD terminology. An operation in support of ATO can be complex but the aim is to get him and his supporting agencies into a position to neutralise the device. It may entail involvement of many other agencies such as RESA/REST clearing an approach and will be conducted within the security of a cordon.
6. **Responsibilities.** The division of responsibilities are:
- a. **Incident Commander.** Commands the entire operation and coordinates planning with advice from agencies.
 - b. **ATO.** Responsible for the control and safety of all agencies working within the designated danger area (normally the area within the cordon) and will coordinate all their activities. Clearance of a suspect device, explosion or find. Coordinates and designates the danger area into which no-one is allowed to enter.
 - c. **RESA.** When tasked, RESA controls the physical search up to a point where a suspect IED or seat of an explosion is identified. ATO dictates how close search teams can approach the suspect area, normally not closer than 50m.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE IEDD

7. **Four Cs Operation.** The Immediate Response to an IED will usually follow the form of a four Cs operation which is explained in detail at Annex A:
- a. Confirm and Consider.
 - b. Clear.
 - c. Cordon.
 - d. Control.

DELAYED RESPONSE IEDD

8. **Five Ds Operation.** The Delayed Response to an IEDD will follow the form of a five Ds operation which is explained in detail at Annex B:

- a. Discover.
- b. Delay.
- c. Discuss.
- d. Dominate.
- e. Dispose.

REACTION TO A SHOOT

9. See Annex C for a detailed description of the reaction to a Shoot.

OTHER AGENCIES AVAILABLE

10. See Annex D for details of working with the other agencies available in theatre.

REPORTS AND RETURNS

11. Examples of the key reports and returns in use can be found at Annex E to this Chapter.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE IEDD – THE FOUR Cs

1. **The Four Cs Operation.** The immediate response to an IEDD will follow the form of a four Cs operation:
 - a. Confirm and consider.
 - b. Clear.
 - c. Cordon.
 - d. Control.

2. **Confirm and Consider.**
 - a. **Sources of Confirmation.** The presence of a suspect device is confirmed by a reputable source such as a military callsign (the preferred option), the police or a reliable witness. The initial discovery may have been made by a member of the public or may be as a result of insurgents calling in warnings – the latter could always be hoaxes to test our reactions or a come-on to ambush reacting troops. Confirmation should be:
 - (1) At long range where possible, using optics (SUSAT, binoculars, CWS).
 - (2) Made while remaining in cover where possible.
 - (3) Using locals of authority (eg: tribal elders, clerics) or owners/managers of commercial property whose detailed knowledge of their area or premises will be useful in spotting the unusual.
 - (4) **NEVER** permit soldiers to take photographs of suspicious objects.
 - b. **Consider.** At this stage the commander must consider the tactical options available to him. Troops should always seek to give ATO/ EOD assets the opportunity to exploit devices. However, the tactical situation may preclude this, and the decision may have to be taken to extract away from the area. In **extreme** cases only, callsigns may have to destroy the device in situ, although this will prevent any forensic evidence from being collected.
 - c. **ATO Requirements.** ATO, who will have been put on stand-by as soon as a potential task is identified, will require as much information on the exact location and make-up of the device or carrying vehicle as possible. Any potential witnesses should be held for him to interview. There may be suitable imagery which he can view prior to deployment. A decision will then be made on whether to conduct an immediate or delayed response. In outline, ATO will require the following information, known as the **five Ws**:

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- (1) **What** is it?
- (2) **Where** is it?
- (3) **When** it was discovered?
- (4) **Who** found it/ reported it? Note that the soldier who found it should make a sketch map and be available for questioning by ATO once he has deployed to the ICP.
- (5) **Why** was it found?

3. **Clear.**

a. **General.** The immediate role of the security forces is to clear people out of the danger area of a potential device as quickly as possible, while minimising risk to themselves. This can be done by verbal warnings (use of a loudhailer is helpful), by neighbours relaying the message or by soldiers physically entering buildings and telling the occupants:

- (1) Why the area is to be evacuated.
- (2) Where the suspect device is located.
- (3) Where to go (gathering point).
- (4) How to get there (safe route).

b. **Clearance.** Clearance must be systematic and orderly, starting nearest to the suspect device and working away from it. All personnel should attempt to remain out of line of sight of the suspect device and avoid the danger of broken glass from glassed areas should the device function. The following minimum safety distances are applicable:

- (1) Hand-held device - 100m and out of line of sight.
- (2) Vehicle-borne device (car) - 200m and in hard cover.
- (3) Vehicle-borne device(van) - 400m and in hard cover.

c. **Selection of the ICP Location.** At this stage ATO will have been tasked once a suspect device is confirmed and will be en route to the proposed ICP location. This should be:

- (1) Sited in an unobvious place.
- (2) Checked with the operations room for previous use.
- (3) Out of line of sight of the suspect device and outside the danger radius.

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(4) Accessible to vehicles. Note that ATO will deploy with up to two large box bodied vehicles. He may also be accompanied by WIS and a REST. Thus ICPs must have the space in which to park a large number of vehicles.

4. Cordon.

a. **General.** An urban cordon will be a hastily assembled perimeter around a suspect IED, designed to prevent accidental or deliberate ingress into the cordoned area and to protect agencies working within it. In larger towns and cities such cordons may be designed to facilitate traffic control and will commonly be a mix of military and police sub-units. There is neither the time nor means to construct defensive locations (although vehicles provide a degree of cover) therefore priority is on soldiers conducting sound 5m and 20m checks and being alert to secondary attack.

b. **ATO Requirements.** ATO may arrive at the ICP before the cordon integrity has been confirmed as speed is of the essence in disrupting timed IEDs. He will, however, require a full brief on the following:

- (1) The 5 Ws (see above).
- (2) Location of cordon positions.
- (3) The integrity of the cordon.
- (4) The location of any civilians who have refused to leave their location (known as 'stay behinds').
- (5) A detailed brief from whoever found/ identified the device.

5. Control.

a. **General.** The incident commander controls the operation from the ICP. The cordon is fully established and ATO commences his IEDD operations. Additional agencies are tasked as required. All troops remain alert to the danger of external attack.

b. **ATO Requirements.** ATO will require the cordon to be briefed on some of his activity:

- (1) Controlled explosions, shots and other significant actions.
- (2) No details of ATO's methods or procedures are to be passed over the air. Transmissions should be minimised to the following:
- (3) Time of arrival of ATO at ICP.
- (4) Timed warning of controlled explosions.

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(5) ATO declaration of device (IED, HOAX, FALSE, INCENDIARY, EXPLOSION or FORENSIC CLEARANCE).

(6) Departure of ATO.

c. **Post Incident Control.** Once the operation has finished completely, including the forensic investigation, re-entry may be allowed in the following order:

(1) Key-holders.

(2) House owners.

(3) General public.

AIDE MEMOIRE - IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO IEDS – THE FOUR Cs

<p>Safety distances from the IED location:</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>Handheld</td> <td>100 m</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Briefcase/Holdall</td> <td>200 m</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Suitcase/Car</td> <td>400 m</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Truck</td> <td>500 m</td> </tr> </table>	Handheld	100 m	Briefcase/Holdall	200 m	Suitcase/Car	400 m	Truck	500 m	<p>5 W's – Info Required by ATO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -What is it -Where is it -When it was discovered/secured -Who found it/Reported it -Why was it found
Handheld	100 m								
Briefcase/Holdall	200 m								
Suitcase/Car	400 m								
Truck	500 m								
<p>Confirm:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ If a device has exploded, been seen by your C/S or reported by a civilian – it is confirmed. Do not go near it. ▪ Remove cas from further danger and administer first aid. 	<p>P3-I Pause Plot  SKETCH MAP Plan Issue – face to face brief with Team Comds</p>								
<p>Clear:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Of C/S and civilians from “line of sight” of devices or seat of explosion. ▪ Task agencies (ATO, WIS etc). 	<p>Clear houses from device outwards and out of “line of sight”</p> <p>Task early and give ICP and Safe Route</p>								
<p>Cordon:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Site troops to meet agencies on arrival. ▪ Ensure all at safe distance. ▪ Ensure clearance is sustainable. ▪ Use white mine tape to seal area. 	<p>Ensure 5 and 20 m checks are conducted for secondary devices</p>								
<p>Control:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Face to face briefing of senior commander on arrival at the scene. ▪ Maintain control of access. 									

DELAYED IMMEDIATE RESPONSE IEDD – THE FIVE Ds

1. **The 5 Ds Operation.** The delayed response to an IEDD will follow the form of a 5Ds Operation:

- a. Discover.
- b. Delay.
- c. Discuss.
- d. Dominate.
- e. Dispose.

2. **Discover.** A suspect device will be detected either by visual or electronic means, by search or as a result of a tip off. Information reported should consist of:

- a. DTG.
- b. Unit/means of discovery.
- c. 8 figure GR.
- d. Brief description of device (if known).
- e. Direction, type and colour of wire (if any).
- f. Distances to nearest occupied and unoccupied buildings.¹
- g. Sketch maps/photographs of the area.

3. **Delay.** Duration of this stage varies with the availability of agencies, cordon troops and other assets and the time taken to formulate and implement a detailed plan.

- a. Countless hours are spent by soldiers searching for explosive devices. The enemy not be allowed to regain control of them once found. Consider overwatch OPs or major VCP operations to prevent insurgent freedom of action.
- b. Consider capitalising on the discovery by adopting an offensive approach which will catch the enemy red-handed.

4. **Discuss.** Concurrently with the delay stage should be both formal and informal consideration of the problem involving all specialists. The aim is to pool advice and information, study previous incidents for lessons learned and come up with an outline plan.

¹ ATO will determine all VPs after a detailed analysis of the ground.

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a. A formal planning conference will consider all the information available, attended by principal agencies and co-ordinated by the incident commander.

b. The incident commander then produces a detailed OpO including:

(1) Movement plan.

(2) Comprehensive 'Actions On.'²

(3) Aviation plan.

5. **Dominate.** The area of the device and surrounding ground (potential FPs) must then be dominated by troops to prevent the enemy initiating a device or interfering with the disposal operation. This takes the form of a full-scale cordon operation.

6. **Dispose.** Once the cordon is firm, specialist agencies will be brought forward through the ICP to enable ATO to neutralise the suspect device.

a. **ATO's Actions.** ATO will establish and clear a forward EOD ICP and annotate a danger area into which no other troops are allowed to enter. He is then responsible for neutralising any IED and making a declaration of his findings. His other responsibilities include control and safety within the designated danger area and the preservation of forensic evidence.

b. **Heli Insertion.** A designated HLS within the cordon is cleared and secured for use by specialist agencies. ATO and REST will clear a path forward for their equipment. Note that the EOD ICP is the start of the designated danger area. The insertion plan will be entirely dependant on the types and quantities of heli available. As a general rule ATO will deploy first.

7. **Debrief.** There could be added a sixth 'D' which is debrief. It is important that the cordon is informed of the results of the operation and that they report on any suspicious activity observed whilst in position.

² ATO input is vital here in ensuring that cordon troops are familiar with actions to be carried out.

REACTION TO A SHOOT

1. Characteristics of a Shooting Contact.

a. **Types of Shoot.** Shoots vary significantly in their execution. There are two basic forms of contact:

- (1) Multi weapon shoot.
- (2) Single round snipe.

b. **Firing Points.** Either form of shoot can be established at short notice using recced firing points such as:

- (1) An occupied house (involving house takeover – hostages).
- (2) Unoccupied/derelict buildings.
- (3) Vehicles.
- (4) Open/rural terrain.

c. **Other Factors.** The enemy will primarily consider his escape route either on foot or vehicle based on the risk of capture. The timescale of attack will often be quite short in duration and may be part of a secondary attack, or may be designed to lure troops into other areas.

2. **Phases.** There are two distinct phases when reacting to a contact shoot. These are:

- a. The contact period.
- b. The reorganisation and consideration of courses of action.

3. **The Contact Period.** The contact period lasts from the initial contact until the enemy has either been killed/captured or has extracted. All actions in the contact period are aimed at capturing or killing the enemy. The success of this phase will depend on rapid and aggressive action by all members of the patrol in order to seize the initiative from the insurgent. Initial reactions can be summed up using the **FEAR** acronym:

a. **Find and Fire.** Locate the enemy and engage within the ROE. Troops must be prepared to use their own initiative and be well practised in target indication. Use of force must always be proportional and mindful of both civilian casualties and the risk of fratricide.

b. **Extract.** Extract from the killing area. This should include the extraction of any casualties into cover for immediate first aid.

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c. **Assess and Act.** The commander must make a rapid plan to task flanking callsigns into depth of the firing point, and send an initial contact report. The aim remains to kill or capture the enemy.

d. **Report and React.** The commander should then send a more detailed contact report, requesting any additional support that he requires such as aviation, indirect fire etc. He is then in a position to react to any changes in the situation, the movement of the enemy etc. Contact reports should contain the following information:

- (1) What happened?
- (2) Where did it happen?
- (3) When did it happen?
- (4) What are you doing about it?
- (5) What agencies do you require?
- (6) Where do you want them to arrive?

4. **Reorganisation and Consideration of Courses of Action.** In the contact period all actions were aimed at killing or capturing the enemy and preventing further loss of life. The whole tempo of your reaction now changes and becomes more deliberate and methodical.

a. **Reorganisation.** Always be aware of the risk of secondary attacks in all their forms. The following points should serve as a guide:

- (1) All troops to conduct thorough 5m and 20m checks.
- (2) Conduct first aid of casualties whilst awaiting CASEVAC.
- (3) Account for all troops.
- (4) Check ammo states.
- (5) Deal with any detainees.
- (6) Prevent access to the scene by civilians. This may require a cordon to be established whilst the commander considers his future course of action.

b. **Consideration of Courses of Action.** There will be three predominant courses of action:

- (1) **Cordon.** If the tactical situation permits, a cordon may be established to enable agencies such as ATO/ WIS/ RESA to exploit any forensic evidence available. Troops must be forensically aware and take care to prevent contamination of the scene.

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(2) **Continue on Original Task.** There may be no further benefit to remaining in the area and if casualties have not been sustained, there may be the opportunity to continue with the original patrol task.

(3) **Extract to Base Location.** Particularly if casualties have been sustained it may be necessary to extract back to the patrol's base location, or to another nearby SF location.

5. **METHANE Report.** A METHANE report should be used in the event of a call sign requiring a response from other agencies eg QRF, IRT etc

6. **Deterrence.** As the insurgent's main concern is making an unhindered escape he will target patrols which he considers to provide him the best opportunity to escape with the risk of being killed or captured reduced. Therefore, from individual to command level, every effort must be taken to apply sound tactical decisions and appear confident and professional when patrolling. By applying the basic principles of patrolling we can minimise the threat to ourselves, and create uncertainty in the mind of the insurgent.

7. **Combat Indicators.** If you identify combat Indicators which indicate a shoot may be about to take place, then have the confidence to react. Do not continue on a patrol in order to confirm what you might already suspect is about to take place.

WORKING WITH OTHER AGENCIES

1. **Dogs**³. There is a cultural aversion to dogs in Islamic cultures, in particular where they are required to enter homes. All commanders are to be aware of this and ensure they have considered this factor before their use. Commanders should also be aware that the performance of dogs in the heat may be affected and they will require regular breaks. Dogs available are:

a. **Ammunition Explosive Search (AES) Dogs.** AES dogs can search for arms, explosives, hides and ancillary eqpt. They can search anything from buildings to boats but require light to do so. They are of limited use in searching for people and are not trained to detect UXO or mines. AES dogs can be used in buildings at high risk.

b. **Tracker Dogs.** Tracker dogs follow a track made by suspects fleeing on foot. Remember to task the dog immediately, restrict movement in the area to protect the likely trail from scent disruption, brief the handler and check the track for discarded weapons.

c. **Vehicle Search Dogs.** Vehicle search dogs perform the some functions as AES dogs but are trained specifically for vehicle search.

d. **Force Protection Dogs.** Force protection dogs are extremely effective on cordons.

2. **Media Ops.** Bde Media Ops will be tasked by BG Info/Media Ops Offr in the event of media involvement and will assist in dealings with the media in delicate or contentious situations. BG Info/Media Ops will produce a media line to take (MLTT) during and after the incident and will brief it to all personnel through the chain of command.

3 **Explosive Ordinance Device (EOD) Teams.** Theatre specific EOD policy will determine the tasks that may be carried out by the range of EOD assets. In general UK mine clearance policy states that general clearance of mines is not permitted except where there is an immediate threat to life or where it is necessary for the completion of an assigned mission. The local EOD Team Commander will advise once tasked.

4. **Incident Response Team (IRT).** The IRT, consisting of a MO, EOD assets, RMP, and other agencies is on permanent standby. The IRT is generally on 30 mins NTM. Response times will vary according to the range of agencies tasked and the distance to the incident.

5. **RMP.** All police are to be tasked through the ops room. Sub units will often have a RMP section attached to them, although they may be held at BG level.

6. **ATO.** ATO is to be called to all IED incidents through the BG ops room. ATOs will require the following info on arrival:

³ The use of dogs in operations is covered in detail in Chapter 17.

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- a. What has been done/cleared?
- b. Are there witnesses/diagrams?
- c. Has the ICP been used before?
- d. What is it believed to be and where is it?
- e. When was it found?

7. **RESA and REST.** RESA and REST assets must be used for all high risk search operations and in support of ATO. RESA should be incorporated into the planning process from the outset to ensure best effect.

8. **Weapon/ Mortar Locating Radar.** COBRA and/ or ASP may be deployed. They give the ability to identify the firing point for indirect fire attacks, which may enable more accurate tasking of interdiction forces.

9. **MX15.** MX15 is a thermal imagery camera mounted on a SEA KING and has provision for continuous live feed. This feed may be into a BG ops room, or directly onto the ground if a mobile ground station has been deployed. Has the range to allow the heli to stand off at sufficient distance not to be heard. It is used in conjunction with an LO as a night surveillance platform.

10. **MR2.** A NIMROD mounted surveillance asset with ability record its footage. Stills can also be produced. In addition it has a thermal imagery capability.

11. **UAVs.** A number of types of UAVs may be available, which generally provide a full motion video capability, with a ground link facility. The tasking chain will depend upon the type of UAV and the location at which it is held.

EXAMPLE REPORTS AND RETURNS

The following Appendices contain copies of the frequently used reports and returns:

Appendix 1 – Contact/Sighting Report.

Appendix 2 – IRT / CASEVAC Request.

Appendix 3 – EOD / ATO Request.

Appendix 4 – Serious Incident Report.

Appendix 5 – Shot Report.

Appendix 6 – METHANE Report.

CONTACT/SIGHTING REPORT

To:			Report No: 003
From:			
Title:	CONTACT/SIGHTINGREP		
As at/DTG:	<i>All timings Charlie</i>		
A	Time of contact/sighting (DTG)	(WHEN)	
B	Location of contact (Grid) or Location of observer (Grid) Bearing from observer (mils)	(WHERE)	
C	Target description	(WHAT)	
D	Action by target	(WHAT)	
E	Action by own forces	(WHAT)	
F	Future Intentions	(WHAT)	
Z	General comments/Additional info		

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**APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX E TO
CHAPTER 11**

IRT / CASEVAC REQUEST

To:		Report No: 002
From:		
Title:	IRT/CASEVACREQ	
As at/DTG:	<i>All timings Charlie</i>	
A	Time of incident <i>(DTG)</i>	
B	Number of casualties <i>(Triaged by use of T1/2/3 etc)</i>	
C	Nature of casualties <i>(Injuries, Nationality)</i>	
D	Location of casualties	
E	Is Doctor required <i>(Y(1) / N(2))</i>	
F	Is EOD required <i>(Y(1) / N(2))</i>	
G	Nearest suitable HLS <i>(Location / Grid)</i>	
H	Frequency & C/S at PUP	
I	Tactical details	
J	General comments/Additional info <i>Time & type of incident Hazards in area Approaches for vehicles</i>	

EOD / ATO REQUEST

To:		Report No: 004
From:		
Title:	EOD/ATOREQ	
As at/DTG:	<i>All timings Charlie</i>	
01	DTG unit discovered item(s):	
02	Reporting activity and location of UXO/IED: (8 Fig Grid & Grid Zone designator)	
03	Type of Ordnance (UXO/IED):	
04	Location of UXO/IRD: (* Fig Grid & Description)	
05	RV Location: (8 Fig Grid, Zone designator, safe route)	
06	POC: (Identity & method)	
07	Tactical Situation: (Include 4Cs, ICP location, safe route to ICP)	
08	Collateral Damage Assessment: (Threat to Life)	
09	Protective Measures Taken: (eg evacuation)	
10	Recommended priority:	

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**APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX E TO
CHAPTER 11**

SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT

To:		Report No: 005
From:		
Title:	SINCREP	
As at/DTG:	<i>All timings Charlie</i>	
1	Type of incident	
2	DTG of incident	
3	Location of Incident	
4	Description of incident	
5	Description of incident	
6	Friendly Forces involved	
7	Cas / Detainees / Evacuees	
8	Civilians involved	
9	Military Hardware	
10	En Forces Involved	
11	En unit or service pers involved	
12	General comment/Additional info	
13	Civilian Involvement	
14	En Mil Hardware	
15	Allied Foreign Involvement	
16	CIVPOL / RMP Involvement	
17	Media Involvement / Informed	
18	Action to date	
19	Intentions	

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APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 11

SHOT REPORT

To:		Report No: 008
From:		
Title:	SHOTREP	
As at/DTG:	<i>All timings Charlie</i>	
A	Time of shot(s) (<i>DTG</i>)	
B	Location of shot(s) (<i>Grid</i>)	
C	Observed/heard from (<i>Grid</i>)	
D	Number of shots	
E	High/low velocity (<i>H(1)/L(2)</i>)	
F	Action taken	
G	Outcome	
Z	General comment/Additional info	

METHANE REPORT

To:		Report No: 023
From:		
Title:	<i>METHANE Assessment</i>	
As at/DTG:	<i>All timings Charlie</i>	
M	"My C/S" ie Callsign/contact no. and name of caller.	
E	Exact location of incident	
T	Type of incident eg RTA, med emergency, UXO, IED.	
H	Hazards at the scene eg mines, secondary devices, overhead pylons.	
A	Access, including location of veh RV, ICP, HLS.	
N	No. and type of cas.	
E	Emergency services required eg ambulance, fire, RMP, helo.	

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CHAPTER 12

THE IED THREAT AND COUNTER MEASURES

DEFINITION OF AN IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED)

1. IEDs are defined as those devices placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals which are designed to destroy, disfigure, destruct or harass. They may incorporate military stores but are normally devised from non military items. The majority of IEDs employed by the enemy on Op TELIC and Op HERRICK employ military ordnance as the main charge.
2. There are four main types of IEDs. See Annex A for detailed descriptions:
 - a. Time operated IEDs.
 - b. Command operated IEDs.
 - c. Victim operated IEDs.
 - d. Projected weapons.

TTPs for dealing with suicide IEDs (SIED) are given in Annex E.

IED COUNTER MEASURES

3. **Leadership.** Neither Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) nor technical solutions (such as ECM) and physical security measures (such as concrete barriers) can provide protection from IEDs in isolation from each other. A comprehensive approach is required, blending all these measures together. Fundamental to this is leadership at all levels. Commanders must make it their business to ensure that all elements of the Counter IED (C-IED) battle are understood by all troops and put into practice rigorously. There will also be a degree of luck required.
4. **The C-IED Approach.** Leadership will set the tone for the low level C-IED battle. TTPs should provide the basis for all tactical actions, backed by ECM and other technical solutions. This is best summed up as shown below:




Figure 12.1 – C-IED Approach

5. This Chapter provides detailed descriptions of TTPs to counter the IED threat and highlights the threats to vehicle and foot patrols especially from Passive Infra Red/Explosively Formed Projectiles (PIR/EFP) IEDs. Suicide bombers or attacks on base infrastructure are covered in detail in Chapter 3 – Guarding and Base Security.

6. Within the C-IED approach, IED Counter Measures can be divided into two categories:
- a. TTP Counter measures – See Annex B.
 - b. Technical Counter measures – See Annex C.

POST-ATTACK ACTIONS

7. Post attack actions are detailed at Annex D. See also Chapter 11 for details of reaction to incidents, especially the four Cs – Confirm, Clear, Cordon, Control.

TYPES OF IED

1. There are four main types of IEDs:
 - a. Time operated IEDs.
 - b. Command operated IEDs.
 - c. Victim operated IEDs.
 - d. Projected weapons.

TIME OPERATED IEDS

2. **General.** Time operated IEDs are designed to function after a pre-set delay, allowing the enemy to make his escape before the explosion occurs. They are commonly used in indirect fire attacks and the anti property role, but may be used in the anti-personnel role if the insurgent can predict that the target will be present at a known time. Time operated IEDs may vary in size from small incendiaries to Large Vehicle Borne IEDs (LVBIEDs). The delay offered from time operated IEDs may be from a few seconds to several months, depending on the device make-up and the insurgent's aims.

3. **Types of Time Operated IEDs.** There are four types of time operated IED:

- a. **Igniferous.** Very simple time IEDs may incorporate slow burning fuze onto a plain detonator or in the case of an LE filled IED, directly to the main charge. Joss sticks, cigarettes and other items with a controlled burning rate can also be used.
- b. **Chemical.** Very simple IEDs have been manufactured using a chemical reaction. These typically include a condom or balloon, containing a small amount of sulphuric acid, inserted into a chlorate/sugar main charge. The acid eats through the rubber and the chlorate/sugar mix spontaneously ignites on contact with the acid. The time delay can be altered by varying the number of condoms or balloons.
- c. **Mechanical.** Mechanical timers are the most common form of timer. Criminal and less sophisticated insurgent IEDs often use a modified watch or clock. These can give up to a 12 hour delay, but are often inaccurate and unreliable. More common are one or two hour mechanical or electro-mechanical timers designed as parking reminders or for use in domestic appliances. The actual time delays set on IEDs are frequently much less than the one or two hours available.
- d. **Electronic.** Electronic timers offer the insurgent longer and more accurate delays. They may be modified production timers, taken from digital watches, cookers and video cassette recorders, or custom timers made up from a series of micro-processor chips.

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COMMAND OPERATED IEDS

4. **General.** Command initiated devices allow the insurgent to choose the optimum moment of initiation. They are normally used against targets that are in transit, or where a routine pattern has been established. A constant technological battle surrounds command systems and all command incidents must be treated with extreme caution, as previously unseen device types may be encountered.

5. **Types of Command Operated IEDs.** Command systems can be broken down into two main groups:

a. **Command Linked.** Linked systems have some form of continuous physical link between the Firing Point (FP) and the Contact Point (CP). The link may be visible or very well hidden, but its existence means that it may be detected and used to identify the FP and CP. It may also be exploited to gain control of the device. Linked systems include:

- (1) Command wire (CW).
- (2) Command pull.
- (3) Explosive link.
- (4) Fibre optic (FO).

b. **Command Separated..** Separated systems have no physical link between the FP and CP. Separated systems offer the insurgent the advantages of being easier to deploy and conceal. The lack of a physical link also makes identifying and taking control of these devices more difficult. Separated systems include:

- (1) Radio control (RC).
- (2) Light command (LC).
- (3) Active infra red (AIR).
- (4) Projectile command (PC).

VICTIM OPERATED IEDS

6. **General.** A Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Device (VOIED) is an ideal way of attacking specific individuals or for use in a 'come-on' scenario to attack security forces reacting to a real or fabricated incident. When dealing with a suspect VOIED it will usually be necessary for the IEDD Operator to search thoroughly a safe route to a suspect device and the immediate area around it.

7. **Types of Victim Operated IEDs.** The range of VOIEDs that can be deployed is limited only by the insurgent's ability and imagination. Some of the more common methods are:

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- a. **Pull/Trip.** Pull and trip operated IEDs require the victim physically to change the balance of the device, normally through the use of a hidden line or cord. Clothes peg switches and micro switches are the most common type of pull/trip switch.
- b. **Pressure.** Pressure devices function by applying weight or pressure to the switch. Micro switches can be used but the most common method is the pressure mat.
- c. **Pressure Release.** Pressure release devices function when a depressed switch is allowed to reassert itself and are most often fitted to anti-lift and anti-open IEDs. Micro-switches are the most common types of switch.
- d. **Movement Sensitive.** Movement sensitive devices function when the switch experiences sufficient disturbance. These may be reed, trembler or mercury tilt switches. The most common use for these switches is in UVIEDs, but they can be used in any VOIED.
- e. **Light Sensitive.** Light sensitive IEDs function when exposed to sufficient illumination. Early examples used a light meter which moved a contact piece into circuit. Light Sensitive Diodes (LSDs) that allow current to flow when exposed to increased light conditions are more common.
- f. **Other Electronic.** The range of electronic switches that can be used is almost limitless. Relays and Silicon Controlled Rectifiers (SCRs) can be used as collapsing circuits, causing the IED to function if wires are cut. They have also been used to start secondary timers after a first explosion or EOD action. Electronic switches have been used that react to SF radio signals and ECM equipment. Passive Infra Red (PIR) systems have been adapted, as have Active Infra Red (AIR) systems used in the 'break beam' or 'make beam' modes.

PROJECTED WEAPONS

8. **General.** Projected weapons offer the insurgent the ability to deliver an explosive charge to a target with a stand off between the FP and the CP. The flight of a projected weapon is initiated by mechanical, chemical or electronic means at the FP. The projectiles are initiated by their fusing system; time, impact or proximity.
9. **Types of Projected Weapons.** Examples of projected weapons include:
 - a. Indirect fire mortars.
 - b. Direct fire mortars.
 - c. Rockets and rocket propelled grenades.
 - d. Projected, dropped and thrown grenades.
 - e. Guided weapons.

TTP COUNTER MEASURES

1. **IPB.** Detailed IPB will help identify likely areas of attack. The ideal IED attack location will have some of the following characteristics:
 - a. **Vulnerable Points/Choke Points.** Obvious contact points or choke points must be identified and briefed to troops.
 - b. **Selection of PIR Vulnerable Areas¹.** Selection of PIR VAs is to be conducted in conjunction with the Royal Engineer Search Advisor (RESA) and ATO, facilitated by products from GEO, OA, Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC) and Reconnaissance Imagery and Geographic Centre (RIGC). After identification these are to be confirmed by ground recce. As insurgents gain familiarity with the PIR/EFP or any new weapons system they will tailor its use to more varied locations. PIR attacks have occurred on straight and curved roads, at locations with either abundant roadside debris (to conceal a device) or areas of hard standing where the device has been concealed among roadside debris.
 - c. **Prior Successful Attack.** Location maps of prior successful attacks must be kept updated and handed on roulement of units. Spot maps of ICPs used should also be maintained.
 - d. **Good Over Watch Location and Escape Routes.** Local knowledge and Geo will assist in the identification of likely firing points and escape routes by means of terrain studies demonstrating lines of sight, dead ground and obstacles to follow up.
2. **Increasing the Element of Risk to the Insurgent.** Increasing the risk, or simply creating an environment in which insurgents at least perceive there to be an increased element of risk, is a key pre-attack counter measure. This can be achieved by:
 - a. **Domination of AOR.** As with any form of insurgent attack, maintaining a robust and comprehensive footprint throughout all vulnerable areas (VAs) will significantly increase the element of risk to any potential attacker. This may be achieved through a combination of patrols, ISTAR, SF, aviation and air assets to put doubt in the mind of the insurgent.
 - b. **Domination of Routes.** Counter IED studies indicate that insurgent groups will identify a number of ideal attack locations and, where possible, utilise them again. Identification of suitable and previously used locations can be used to focus IPB and target route search operations.

¹ Traditional VPs alone are inappropriate in relation to the threat from PIR initiated IEDs as they indicate defined points on routes. The term Vulnerable Areas (VA) is defined as an area identified as being suspect following IPB. A VA can be of any length and a comprehensive search should be conducted within this envelope. VPs, however, should still be considered in relation to other IED types.

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c. **Depth.** Patrolling in depth will increase the element of uncertainty for insurgents who will be reluctant to take on a patrol where they are unable to establish the whereabouts of all of its manoeuvre assets operating within a three-dimensional framework. No isolated patrol should deploy into an environment where the threat of IEDs is high. All patrols into such an area must be considered as part of a framework, including satellite patrols and, where possible, aviation top cover.

d. **Increase in Patrol Manoeuvre Elements.** A minimum of three vehicles is required to provide sufficient manoeuvre elements to respond both offensively and defensively to IED contact. This allows the patrol to conduct simultaneous IA drills (including dealing with casualties), 4Cs action and rapid movement into depth in order to apprehend insurgents and locate the firing point.

e. **Aggressive Fighting Spirit.** A fast and rapid aggressive follow up by the security forces to kill or capture the insurgent is essential. Such action will increase the perceived risk to the insurgent and may deter him. Without an aggressive response the insurgent will be able to operate at will and attacks are likely to increase.

5. **Defensive Search.** Search is to be used defensively to provide freedom of manoeuvre and enhance force protection. Targeting of vulnerable areas should be random and unpredictable, with sites revisited to enhance the unpredictability. Route search is to be coordinated such that all available assets are tasked to maintain as large a search footprint as possible in a manner that is sustainable. The widespread use of low level search assets, such as Patrol Search Aware personnel, is to be used.

6. **Advanced Search Assets.** Should intelligence indicators suggest that a route will be subject to an IED attack, a Royal Engineer Search Team (REST) may be tasked in support of any clearance operation. RESTs provide a high degree of assurance that there are no devices or secondary devices present and will deploy in support of EOD assets (primarily ATO).

7. **Bund Removal/Clearance of Roadside Debris.** Attacks have utilised existing earth banks, bunds and street furniture both at the side of the road and concealed in the central reservation in order to emplace the IEDs at a suitable elevation for optimum attack. Clearing out to a distance of at least 10m from the road edge will diminish the enemy's ability to conceal IEDs. Due to plant availability this process must to be prioritised in relation to the threat. Familiarity with specific routes will also assist in the identification of out of place or new objects that may be concealing a freshly laid device.

8. **Movement Control.** Vehicle movements should only occur when necessary and should utilise all available force protection assets. Specific movement control operations should be considered for the coordination of administrative movement throughout high threat areas. Consideration must be given to variation of routes and timings, lead vehicle profile, use of search assets, air/avn and armoured assets and operations in depth in order to optimise force protection.

9. **Deception.** Deception will place an element of doubt in the mind of the insurgent and so persuade him not to carry out an attack. Deception can range from simple acts, which break up the predictable nature of a patrol to elaborate plans designed to confuse the

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would-be attacker and place him at a disadvantage. The degree of deception practised is limited only by the imagination of the soldier. Remember to think like an insurgent at all times and so thwart his intentions.

10. **Combat Indicators.** To counter any threat, patrols must maintain a high state of situational awareness and be able to identify combat indicators. Units and soldiers able to establish detailed knowledge of the pattern of life in their AOR are at an advantage, as often there are tell-tale signs that an incident is about to take place. These indicators may be spotted by alert soldiers:

- a. During the enemy’s preliminary reconnaissance.
- b. Whilst enemy sets up an attack.
- c. In the period immediately prior to initiation.

11. Even if patrolling in an unfamiliar environment, these combat indicators can be recognised as:

- a. **THE ABSENCE OF THE NORMAL;** or
- b. **THE PRESENCE OF THE ABNORMAL.**

Examples are shown in the table below:

Ser	Absence of the Normal	Presence of the Abnormal	Implications
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Lack of indigenous security forces at PVCs.		Indigenous security forces are potentially aware of an imminent attack and will not man their usual locations.
2		Hanging bricks from lampposts, cairns at the side of the road or other unusual markers/signs.	Insurgents will use markers as a warning along the side of the road.
3	Less traffic on the roads.	Civilian vehicles being diverted off main roads onto tracks and security force patrols and convoy being waved through at VCPs.	Civilians may be diverted off a route where an attack is planned. The indigenous security forces may sometimes be involved and could direct traffic at VCPs away from a planned attack.
4		Heavy ‘dicking’ of patrols.	Dickers are used to provide early warning to the bombers of CF approach.
5		Vehicles unusually low on the suspension. Vehicles approaching VCPs / SF base locations erratically. Unusual	Potential VBIED or suicide VBIED. Suicide VBIED are frequently fitted with a secondary initiation system (RCIED).

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Ser	Absence of the Normal	Presence of the Abnormal	Implications
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
		behaviour by driver.	
6	Misplaced objects/fresh rubbish/piles of earth/dead animals.		Possible IED hiding places.
7		Personnel videoing security forces.	It is common for insurgent groups to record attacks for propaganda purposes.

12. **Combat Indicators for Vehicle Borne IEDs.** VBIEDs offer numerous advantages and require little in the way of technical modification in order to be useable. In addition to the extra fragmentation offered by the vehicle body itself, they can carry a wide variety of charges capable of inflicting significant damage². The payload is usually located on either the rear seat, boot area or a combination of the two and linked to the RC switch by means of a battery pack, electric detonator and detonating cord. The enemy will strive to select a vehicle that blends in with the local environment and will not look out of place at the contact point. Combat indicators will be sparse, however there are some key features of the VBIED that may aid detection:

- a. Sagging or bottomed-out suspension may be countered by chocking the suspension.
- b. New tyres to prevent a blow out or flat on the way to the contact point.
- c. Screened or obscured load carrying areas (mainly rear seat and boot areas).
- d. Unusual or additional antennas.
- e. Presence of visible wires that may be used as ad-hoc antennas.

13. **Action on Combat Indicators.** Too often soldiers will have seen evidence of an attack unfolding, but will have failed to act on the information. It is essential that all combat indicators are:

- a. **Recorded.** If a patrol is not the immediate target another may be in the near future. All details are to be reported in the patrol report.
- b. **Reported.** Patrol members must have the confidence to report concerns to the team/patrol commander and ops room. Everyone must be alerted; attacks may be thwarted by a change in profile.
- c. **Acted On.** Reaction to perceived threats may startle the insurgent into exposing his position and so gain the initiative. Patrols should consider the effect of the enemy's actions on the original patrol plan and adapt this as required.

² In Iraq military UXO is most commonly used as the main charge in the VBIED. Large calibre artillery shells (eg 155mm HE) are favoured as they provide best effect for their size/weight. Attacks have also featured additional charges (such as 12 kg LPG cylinders) to enhance the effects of the explosion

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14. **Avoid Pattern Setting.** The most basic of C-IED TTPs is to not set patterns. Pattern setting considerably aids the enemy in targeting security forces:

- a. **Timings.** Routine activities such as resupply convoys, regular meetings and daily details must endeavour to change timings sufficiently so as not to be predictable.
- b. **Routes.** There are very few locations affording just one single route of entry and exit. C/S must avoid utilising the same routes to transit to and from specific locations.
- c. **En Route Variations.** Vehicles should create maximum confusion by adding as much variation into route moves as possible. Doubling back, short halts, diversions and other such seemingly impromptu diversions will, if planned effectively, leave any observer with no discernable trace of a targetable pattern.

15. **Avoid the 'Come On'.** The enemy may attempt to lure a target into a killing zone by means of a 'come on'. Scope for these traps is limited only by the imagination of the insurgent. Examples are:

- a. Walk in/telephone call warning of bomb attack/movement of weapons attack follows on security forces patrols reacting to investigate.
- b. Minor aggro to draw patrols into a set Killing Area (KA).
- c. Cowboy shoot with proper snipe/IED against follow up troops.
- d. 'Ordinary' crime with shoot or IED attack against troops investigating.
- e. Secondary RC/timed IED in ICP/cordon locations.

Patrol comds must assess the situation and conduct a threat assessment based on information available regarding the initial incident. Where a 'come on' is suspected care must be taken to ensure that the area is dominated before being entered, including adequate ECM coverage and 5/20m checks upon stopping. If a come on is suspected any aggressive follow up must avoid exploiting onto obvious FP locations or choke points. Patrol should move in depth to a position where they can cover the area by fire and cut off any movement by possible insurgents.

16. **Instinct.** Gut feeling has a part to play in identifying an impending attack. Experienced troops operating in a familiar AOR will have an excellent feel for the daily pattern of life in a particular neighborhood and have a good chance of picking up tell-tale signs that everything is not as it should be. C/S should be encouraged to positively act upon such gut feelings and rapidly evacuate perceived KA accordingly. If a situation does not feel right, there is probably good reason to assume that it isn't.

TECHNICAL COUNTER MEASURES

- 1. Use of Air / Avn / ISTAR for Route Reconnaissance.** The use of air, avn and ISTAR assets is invaluable in identifying recently disturbed earth and suspicious anomalies and acts as a deterrent to those planting IEDs. These activities should be coordinated with convoy movements as a matter of routine. Vulnerable routes should be targeted at times of day associated with insurgent activity. WIS, RESA and RIGC should assist JHF in provision of training to improve awareness of aircrew.
- 2. Assessment of Photographic Imagery.** Aerial photography image analysis is an extremely effective tool in the C-IED battle. RIGC interpreters should be utilised to maximum effect, making full use of the product from aerial imagery to identify possible VAs, conduct detailed analysis and steer ground patrols conducting route checks.
- 3. Effective ECM Procedures.** ECM has a huge part to play in countering the RC and PIR IED threat and is the first line of defence during the attack sequence¹. Although excellent by design and effect, ECM equipment does not reduce the requirement to adopt the full range of conventional Force Protection measures and, even when operating effectively, does not remove the IED from being a threat to others. Gaps in a patrol's overall ECM coverage (or bubble) will allow the insurgents to initiate devices by RC. It is therefore imperative that units conduct detailed planning to ensure ECM is put to best use to optimise ECM coverage of all patrol vehicles/personnel and that patrols maintain correct drills to ensure the coverage remains comprehensive.
- 4. IED Identification Training.** IED identification training must be an ongoing process, tailored to the most current IED designs employed by the enemy. Identification of IEDs is possible and has proved to be highly successful. All patrol personnel must be alert to the latest and most popular array of IED designs employed and the specific measures to be adopted if detected. Further information can be obtained from G2 cells or specialist assets such as ATO or WIS. While production of training aids is encouraged, they must co-ordinated by ATO to ensure correct lessons are being taught.

¹ There are many recent examples from Iraq of MNF C/S surviving very close contact with up and running RC IEDs due to the effectiveness of ECM equipment. Current in service ECM are inhibitors which seek to interfere with the initiation of an IED by RC.

POST ATTACK ACTIONS

1. **IA Drills.** IED attacks must be treated as urgently as any other form of contact. The **FEAR** acronym is as relevant for IEDs as it is for reacting to a shoot. Its application may be summed up as follows:

a. **Find.** Cock weapons, take cover (if possible) and try to identify any possible firing point. This may not be possible since insurgents will often be hidden.

b. **Extract.** Get out of the killing area. The following points should be noted:

(1) Avoid standard patterns of reaction. Vary cordon and evacuation distances outside of the minimum recommended distances. Try not to use obvious cordon locations.

(2) Insurgents will incorporate secondary devices on likely ICPs, cordon locations etc.

(3) 5 and 20m checks must precede all subsequent follow up action and should be conducted simultaneous with the administering of first-aid as required.

(4) Troops must be alert to the secondary/come on threat.

c. **Assess and Act.** There is potential for security forces to kill or capture the enemy in the period immediate following contact. This will require quick thinking and effective prioritisation of tasks at the scene to ensure that all requirements are met. The requirement to conduct an aggressive, immediate follow up must not be ignored. Clearly any follow up must be robust (possessing its own depth and mutual support) and wary of the potential for secondary devices/attack on or near the perceived FP, however it is imperative that aggressive intent is displayed to, at the minimum, sow fear in the mind of the insurgent.

d. **Report and React.**

(1) Send contact report.

(2) React to situation on the ground as it develops. Where practical commanders should always seek to instigate a 4Cs operation after the immediate follow up has been conducted unless the situation absolutely precludes this being achieved.

2. **Collection of Forensic Evidence.** The preservation and collection of forensic evidence must be afforded a high priority following any IED attack. Civilians and Indigenous Security Forces (ISF) may need to be kept away from the scene of the incident to avoid loss or contamination of forensic evidence from the scene. After most attacks ATO and WIS will facilitate the detailed examination of an incident scene requiring the securing

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of the CP and other areas of interest. Commanders will have to make a judgement on the time available, if any, for the considered follow up based on the threat and situation.

3. **After-Attack Review/Collation of Lessons Learned.** A comprehensive post-attack review must be conducted as the earliest opportunity IOT draw all relevant C-IED lessons from each subsequent attack. This information will be vital to the formulation of C-IED TTPs, production of lessons learned and to the development of pre-deployment training.

DETAILED DRILLS FOR REACTING TO THE THREAT OF A SUICIDE BOMBER

INTRODUCTION

1. The threat from suicide bombers has become increasingly common. At the tactical level, the suicide bomber seeks to create fear and vulnerability. Selective attacks against high profile and symbolic targets can demonstrate the enemy's ability to strike, reinforce his profile within the local community and attract media attention. The threat of suicide bombers might influence the profile and conduct of security forces to the point that the mitigation measures necessary could undermine their ability to interact with the local population.

2. A suicide attack is a technique which requires the initiation of a device that causes the death of the attacker. The suicide attacker should be considered as a weapon system that can identify, select and engage a target of choice; it is therefore precise, smart and guided. Suicide tactics are designed to achieve maximum effect for the sacrifice of the individual bomber. Whether that be the assassination of a high value target (politicians or soldiers), disruption of events through terror (such as elections) or attempted destruction of physical objects (security force bases).

3. Suicide bombers will seek primarily to kill people rather than achieve material damage. Concentrations of troops and international community members will be preferred in order to maximise casualties, but this does not preclude attacks against a single person, patrol team, sangar or vehicle. Attacks have occurred that demonstrate the inability of security forces to defend the public.

SUICIDE BOMBER TECHNIQUES AND ACTIONS

4. Suicide bombers may deploy in vehicles (including trucks, cars, motorbikes, bicycles, boats or even donkey carts) or on foot. They may conduct simultaneous and/or sequential multiple attacks in close proximity, to increase the shock effect. In most cases they will detonate if challenged, or if they perceive the mission compromised – it is unlikely that the suicide bomber will surrender.

a. **Vehicle Borne.** Vehicle borne explosive devices are likely to have the same characteristics and initiation methods as any other vehicle borne IED. Potential characteristics for the Suicide Vehicle Borne IED (SVBIED) are:

Construction and Concealment	
Ordnance	Vehicles are armed with explosives ranging from Home Made Explosives (HME) to Commercial Explosives to readily available and highly effective military munitions (arty/mor shells, mines etc). Military ordnance will have the added hazard of fragmentation.
Wiring	A wiring circuit will be present in the car to allow the driver to arm and/or detonate the device. The detonation of the explosives will normally be achieved by linking the firing

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	mechanism to the car battery or an independent power source.
Concealment	Ordnance has been discovered concealed within the panels and the seats of the car. It will therefore be difficult to detect. To achieve maximum effect a large amount is required and the vehicle could appear heavily laden.
Initiation	
Driver	The device is armed and detonated by the driver as he approaches or reaches his intended target. The driver is trusted to select the correct target and self initiate at the moment likely to achieve greatest effect. This method has the benefit that it is not countered by ECM. Based on recent evidence this is the most likely form of initiation.
Remote	The driver is directed to approach the target. The device is initiated remotely by another individual responsible to the organisation conducting the attack.
Pressure	A plunger mechanism is placed in the front bumper of the car so that the device will function as the car impacts on its intended target. This may be combined with either Driver or Remote initiation.
Timed	Should our procedures and ECM not permit effective detonation it is possible that timed devices could be incorporated, possibly as a fail safe system.

b. **Foot Borne.** Suicide bombers on foot can carry devices of up to around 25 kg of explosives including ball bearings or shrapnel. Potential characteristics of manportable devices are outlined in the table below

Carriage/Concealment	
Body harness worn beneath clothing	Usually at the front of the upper body, but could be on the back.
Bag or package	Including back pack, carrier bag
Everyday object	eg TV camera (Afghanistan 2001)
Crutches or prosthetic limb	
Initiation	
Trigger/toggle switch	Normally located in pocket or hand. If held in a hand, the trigger could operate on pressure release, increasing the risk of the device functioning when the bomber is neutralised.
Tilt switch	There have been incidents where the suicide bomber had fixed a tilt switch to the arm in order to operate when ordered to raise arms
Pressure pad	Located anywhere on the body.
Timer	Before reaching the target, the bomber operates the switch to initiate the timer, giving automatic countdown to detonation.
Remote Controlled (RCIED)	Bomb is initiated by remote control (eg cordless phone), by another terrorist over watching the bomber.

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5. **Combat Indicators.** Recent attacks have shown that suicide bombers are attempting to blend in with the local surroundings and therefore make themselves very difficult to detect. Listed below are some potential combat indicators:

Combat Indicator	Remarks
Dry runs and activity to test security forces reactions.	May precede a suicide attack. Recognition and reporting of suspicious activity may alert security forces to a potential threat.
Unusually low level of local activity for the time of day and area.	Terrorists may want to avoid or minimise collateral casualties (although see "Targets" above). It is possible that locals will be prevented or warned off from entering a target area (this is believed to have occurred in a suicide bombing in Afghanistan).
Religious events, public holidays, night time.	Terrorists may choose to attack at these times due to much reduced civilian activity levels in this theatre.
Lone vehicle occupant.	The driver of a SVBIED is likely to be the only occupant of the vehicle.
Record.	The event may well be recorded by someone for transmission on satellite television – possible tail vehicle or individual standing off from the target.
Fixing.	The suicide bomb teams may well attempt to fix the target. Methods include Remote Control (RC)/Command Wire (CW) IED, mortar or small arms fire attack or come on.
Suspicious vehicle movement.	Vehicle acting erratically, waiting at a road-side, shadowing military vehicle.
Scouting/dicking.	Other terrorists may be involved in surveillance and triggering activity against the suicide bomber's target, in the case of both foot and vehicle borne devices.

6. **Profile.** There is no typical profile for a suicide bomber. Men, women and children could all be used, from any ethnic group, including Westerners (possibly disguised as international forces, NGOs etc, perhaps using their vehicles). Disabled (eg limbless) persons have been used. Analysis from Iraq has identified that some 80% of all SVBIED have been directed against opportunity rather than predesignated targets.

7. **Recognition Factors.** One or more of the recognition factors in the table below could apply. There are no hard and fast rules, therefore many will appear contradictory. Recent attacks have been remarkable for the calm and collected manner in which the attackers have undertaken the task, giving the target virtually no indications as to their intent.

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a. Vehicle Borne.

Recognition Factor	Remarks
Heavily laden vehicle	Vehicles unusually low on the suspension. Vehicles approaching VCPs / SF base locations erratically. Unusual behaviour by driver.
Extra wiring	The vehicle will have extra wiring to allow for arming and initiation by the driver.
Recce	Depending upon the confidence of the bomber, he may well drive past a target prior to identifying the point of greatest effect.

b. Foot Borne.

Recognition Factor	Remarks
Calm and deliberate	
Friendly and approachable	
Abnormal appearance for the area	
Wearing bulky clothing, jacket, coat etc in hot weather	Local clothing, including burkas, may be adequate to conceal a harness device.
Wearing sunglasses	To hide the eyes and give the bomber confidence.
Sweating	Showing fear, apprehension.
Agitated	
Walking strangely	Like a robot.
Staring ahead/fixed vision	As though in a trance. Unaware of surroundings.
Elated	Smiling, happy.
Mumbling	Possibly praying.
Protecting genitals	
Newly shaved, with short hair	Islamic extremists preparing themselves for "martyrdom" often shave all body hair.
Altered appearance eg dyed hair	To look like a Westerner.
Marking on arms	Perhaps passages from the Koran.
Holding something in the hand, clenched fist	Bomb trigger in hand.
Wire or toggle protruding from sleeve or bag/package	Leading from trigger to device.
Cuts in clothing or bags	Intended to allow blast out.

8. **TTPs for Countering the Suicide Bomber.** The suicide bomber has been selected for his ability to carry out his mission and has been trained for it. Some experts believe that suicide bombers consider themselves already dead when setting out on an attack. Dealing with the suicide bomber is one of the toughest situations a soldier is likely to face. He must identify the bomber, judge the situation and take decisive action in a split second. In most situations there will be limited time for consideration to be given before action must be taken or for orders to be given. **Immediate incapacitation of the suicide bomber, using lethal force, is likely to be the only means of stopping him. Challenging the bomber may**

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trigger immediate detonation. Commanders must continue to assess the situation and consider the requirement to either escalate and or de-escalate the security profile in the light of the prevailing threat.

9. **Principles.** The TTPs adopted in response to the suicide bomb threat will have to depend upon the gravity of the threat balanced against the need to maintain contact with the local population. **Any procedures adopted to counter the threat will need to be accompanied by a proactive media and info ops campaign in order to reassure the local population and advise them on the security procedures that troops will employ.** It will never be possible to create a completely secure area in which to operate however these principles are designed to reduce the risk of a successful suicide attack. The principles are:

Factor	Remarks
Create stand off	Create stand off by placing the maximum possible distance and defences between soldiers and potential suicide bombers. Any distance, no matter how small, will lessen the effect of a device.
Reduce the target	Where possible avoid presenting a target to the suicide bomber. Maximise protection and increase dispersion.
Positively Identify the suicide bomber	Under UK ROE (JSP 398A), before he can open fire, a soldier must have an honest and reasonably held belief that he can positively identify his target as a suicide bomber. The bomber should be placed in a situation where he is forced to demonstrate his intent. An honest and reasonably held belief may be inferred if the bomber positively disregards instructions which are accompanied with the threat of lethal force.
Preserve the ECM umbrella	Always ensure that ECM cover is correctly applied to areas of highest threat.
Intelligence	Intelligence is critical to countering any terrorist attack. The nature of suicide bombs places added emphasis on gaining and exploiting intelligence on suicide attack plans and techniques. Immediate dissemination of the threat is vital to allow soldiers to make informed judgements on the use of lethal force.
Avoid becoming fixed	Keep static operations to a minimum. Remain in situ for no more than 20 – 25 minutes. Question the need to be on the ground in the first place. Be particularly alert during and after the conduct of deliberate operations (route clearance; cordon and search etc).

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS - IF YOU BELIEVE A SUSPECT TO BE A SUICIDE BOMBER

<p>If you believe a suspect to be suicide bomber and is about to commit an act which is likely to endanger human life and there is no other way to prevent the danger, then you may use lethal force in order to protect life.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Challenging</p> <p>If you encounter a suspected suicide bomber, a challenge MAY increase the risk of death or grave injury to you or persons other than the suspected bomber. However, in accordance with most ROE, a challenge must still be given before opening fire <u>unless</u> you believe that to do so would increase the risk of detonation and thereby the risk of death or grave injury to you or any persons other than the suspected suicide bomber.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Engaging</p> <p>Take cover before opening fire whenever possible. Remember that by engaging you may initiate the bomb. Only you are in a position to judge the relative risks. Shoot at the centre of the body mass or vehicle and fire no more rounds than are necessary until the bomber or vehicle is completely incapacitated.</p> <p>Give a warning to others. You might do this first in order that they can take cover, this may alert the bomber. As with the decision to take cover, only you can assess the relative risk involved.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Be Aware That</p> <p>A pressure release switch may detonate the device when the bomber is shot.</p> <p>A device could be operated by remote control or timer even after the bomber has been incapacitated.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Other Action</p> <p>Be alert for other suicide bombers, working as a team. All other soldiers take cover and scan for further suicide bombers.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Further Action</p> <p>Clear area in accordance with normal IED procedures (4Cs), whether or not device has detonated. Commander task EOD and Weapons Intelligence Section (WIS).</p> <p>Do not approach the bomber until EOD clearance complete.</p>

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS - IF YOU ARE NOT SURE WHETHER A SUSPECT IS A SUICIDE BOMBER

If at any stage during the actions set out below you come to believe that the suspect is a suicide bomber, revert to the guidelines in A above

Give the following instructions using an interpreter or language card if available

Order the suspect to show palms of hands and roll up long sleeves.

Order the suspect to place any bags etc on the ground and order the suspect to remove and show the contents of any bags. Once complete instruct the suspect to move away from them.

Order the suspect to lie face down on the ground with arms extended, palms up, showing open hands.

Continuing to aim your weapon at the suspect, order him/her to remove clothing.

If the suspect is wearing a harness, but you do not believe it contains a bomb, order him/her to remove it.

Once satisfied that the suspect is 'clean', order him/her to move to a position where he/she can be properly controlled, and arrested if required.

If in a vehicle, ensure that the driver and occupants leave the vehicle having opened the doors, bonnet, boot and disconnected the battery and continue with the above guidance.

Remember that a device could be operated by remote control or timer even after the bomber has detached himself/herself from it.


Other action

Order anyone else in the area to clear away/take cover. Other soldiers may do this if possible.

Be alert for other suicide bombers, working as a team.

All other soldiers take cover and scan for further suicide bombers.

HIGH RISK VCP



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CHAPTER 13

MINE AWARENESS

INTRODUCTION

1. **General.** During pre-deployment training and throughout operations in mine affected areas, the need for effective mine awareness training cannot be understated. The aim of training is to consider the severity of the threat and plan countermeasures in order to reduce the likelihood of a mine encounter or be prepared to react in a manner that minimises the risk of further casualties.

GENERAL INFORMATION

2. **Definition of a Mine.** An explosive munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be actuated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person, land vehicle, aircraft, or boat including landing craft.

3. **Definition of UXO.** Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use or used. It could have been fired, dropped, launched or projected yet remains unexploded either through malfunction or design or for any other cause.

4. **Definition of a Booby Trap.** A device designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure, that functions when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.

5. **Awareness.** Mines, UXO and booby traps are all designed to kill or injure and will not differentiate between their victims. Therefore, no distinction is to be made between them in awareness and avoidance.

PLANNING PROCESS

6. **Royal Engineer / EOD Advice.** It is essential that RE advice is sought as early as possible during the IPB. The Battlegroup Engineer (BGE) can provide access to more detailed intelligence products.

7. **IPB.** The following sources of information should be exploited through the BGE:

a. **Civilian Demining Organisations.** If commercial demining organisations have been operating in the country then the national Mine Action Centre (MAC) will have information on the mines found in country.

b. **Mine Mapping.** Mine maps must not be considered exhaustive as they only show approximate areas where mines are known to exist. It should never be assumed that those are the only mined areas.

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c. **Military Intelligence.**

(1) **Jt EOD Group.** The Jt EOD Group will have the most up to date information about mines, UXO and booby traps to be found in theatre.

(2) **Engineer Reconnaissance Teams.** The use of an engr recce team to ascertain the type and extent of the threat should be considered.

(3) **Other.** Defence Intelligence, PJHQ or the RE Mine Information and Training Centre may have more detailed information regarding the threat found in theatre.

(4) **Local Population.** The local population may have been living alongside or amongst the threat for many years and should be used as a valuable information source where possible. Former combatants and medical personnel may be particularly useful. They may have emplaced mines in the first instance or treated mine victims.

8. **Patrol Conduct.** Prior to deployment it is essential that a decision is taken as to whether or not the area of operations is 'mine free' or 'mine contaminated'. Where ground is suspected as being mine contaminated but it is not possible to confirm, planning must continue as though mines are present.

a. **Mine Free.** Despite IPB declaring an area mine free, remember that mines can be localised. It is therefore important continually to reassess the ground. Threat assessment must become routine throughout the entire duration of a patrol to counter any recent use of mines.

b. **Mine Contaminated.** Is it essential to conduct operations in and around this area?

(1) No: use alternative routes.

(2) Yes: follow the preventative measures detailed below.

PREVENTATIVE MEASURES

9. **Where Minefields are Found.** The following areas are at a greater risk of having mines or UXO present:

a. **Confrontation Lines.** Former confrontation lines can be expected to be littered with mines, UXO, and booby traps. Where confrontation lines were static for a period of time extensive mine field obstacles can be expected to be in place.

b. **Borders.** Countries borders will naturally be defended by some means and where cross border conflict has occurred, mines to deter or channel an enemy may be found.

c. **Old Military Positions.** Old military positions such as patrol harbours, hill tops, defended positions, etc may have mines or large quantities of UXO present.

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d. **Strategic Military Sites.** Strategically important military sites such as airports, docks, road junctions, tank parks, comms installations, HQs, etc were often heavily defended and mine fields can be expected at these locations.

e. **Unmade Roads and Tracks.** It is far easier to conceal a mine in a non-metalled roads and tracks than hard surfaces.

f. **Disused Buildings.** The local population will normally utilise every resource including buildings. Where a building is not being used the local population will have had good reason not to so it should be treated with extreme caution. It is very easy to emplace booby traps in buildings.

10. **Minefield Marking.**

a. **Military.** Most armies mark conventionally laid mines in areas likely to be entered by their own troops. This is primarily to prevent casualties to their own troops so marking on the home side may be more obvious. Perimeter marking will normally consist of fencing with suitable warning signs attached.

b. **Civilian.** There is a clear difference between military mine marking practices and those employed during humanitarian demining operations. As a general rule, no mine fence or tape should be crossed or stepped over.

c. **Local Marking.** Local populations at risk in mine affected areas may use the following methods to mark known minefields:

- (1) Cairns of rock/rubble.
- (2) Circles of rocks with the hazard lying centrally.
- (3) Lines of rocks. (May be painted, often red and white. Red denoting the dangerous side and white denoting safe.)
- (4) Crossed sticks.
- (5) Bottles and cans on top of sticks.
- (6) Animal bones placed in prominent places.

11. **Combat Indicators.** If no markings are immediately visible in an area suspected to be mined, it is important that basic tracking skills are used with extra vigilance and common sense. Signs to look out for include:

a. **Local Behaviour.** Locals avoiding certain routes, buildings, fields and areas are a good indication. If appropriate, they should be questioned about their actions.

b. **Ground Sign.** To place an object in the ground without leaving any trace is difficult. Once an object is placed in the ground it will either be slightly proud, sunken or discoloured. Footprints around the disturbed ground and flattening of the immediate area are good signs of recent activity. Earth mounds at regular intervals

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should also be regarded as a warning (Chapter 13 Annex A gives more detail on the use of observation and the interpretation of ground sign).

c. **Blast Signature.** Previously detonated mines or ordnance will be seen by charred, scorched ground, craters or earth discoloration.

d. **Mine Debris.** Unprofessional armies and civilians may leave mine packaging and surplus mine parts lying around rather than dispose of them.

12. **Mine Awareness Basics.** The six mine awareness basic rules provide a guide to avoiding the threat of mines. They cannot always be applied due to the operational situation but as far as is practicably possible, personnel should remember:

a. **Do Not Leave the Hard Standing.** Where applicable, a hard standing (or 'made' surface) offers protection as it is harder for mines to be deployed without detection.

b. **Do Not Park or Drive on Verges.** The verges can conceal hidden dangers such as the start of a mine field, discarded mines, and unexploded ordnance so vehicle halts, etc should be conducted on the safety of the hard standing only.

c. **Do Not Become a Military Tourist.** Remember that where previous conflict has taken place, the chances of mines, UXO and booby-traps being present will be high. Stepping into the area to have a photo taken could initiate unseen ordnance.

d. **Do Not Pick Up Souvenirs.** By entering an area to collect attractive items you significantly increase the risk of initiating a victim-operated device. Any items which are attractive and are in an unusual place should be regarded with extreme caution.

e. **Do Not Enter Uncleared Buildings.** Entering buildings which have not been cleared increase the risk of initiating devices. By not entering them you significantly reduce the risk of triggering a mine or booby trap.

f. **Do Not Use Uncleared Routes.** Any un-cleared routes could be hazardous and must be treated with caution, even if safe passage has been made previously. Plan routes in advance and stick to SOPs.

REACTIVE MEASURES

13. **Encounter Drill.** One drill is to be adopted for all situations regardless of whether the hazard is a mine, UXO and / or booby trap. It is described below and summarised at Annex B.

14. **Warning Process.** After a mine encounter, this drill should always be used:

a. **Stop.** Although perhaps counterintuitive, it is essential that all movement of all personnel stops immediately. This will prevent any further minestrikes.

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- b. **Warn.** Issue a clear and unambiguous warning to others in the locality to ensure they are made aware of the threat. "Stop, mines", is the simple warning that should be issued.
- c. **Report.** Send an immediate report by radio, "Mines / minestrike, wait, out"
- d. **Assess.** The following factors should be assessed:
 - (1) Is RE / EOD assistance available?
 - (2) Is Immediate CASEVAC available?
 - (3) Casualties?
 - (4) Nearest hard standing / known mine free RV?
 - (5) Plan for extraction?
 - (6) What other mines or indicators can be seen?
- e. **Report.** As a minimum, the following information should be given. Further theatre specific information may be required.
 - (7) Grid reference.
 - (8) Extraction Intentions.
 - (9) Number of casualties.
 - (10) Other agency's required.
 - (11) RV Grid reference.
- f. **Act.** There are only ever two options available:
 - (1) Help Available: remain still and await assistance.
 - (2) No help available: self extraction following the drill below.

15. **Look – Feel – Prod.** The location of mines using manual techniques requires inspection of the ground by observation, touch, trip wire feelers and prodders. Although the process of look-feel-prod is extremely slow and tedious, it ensures the only method of safe extraction. The level of risk taken by local commanders to speed up the process, if under fire or trying to reach an injured person, cannot be prescribed. The aim of this drill is to clear and mark a safe lane 0.6m in width to allow safe movement.

- a. **Look.** Experience has shown that most mines can be found by visual search. Although some indications of mine laying gradually disappear, traces often remain and a systematic and detailed inspection of the ground often reveals either parts of the mine or signs of digging which would not be apparent at first.

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b. **Feel.** The sense of touch takes the place of the sense of sight at night. The person systematically searches a strip of ground across his front, gently feeling for parts of the mine or indications that the ground has been disturbed. On the completion of a strip, he edges forward and repeats the process.

(1) **Trip Wire Feelers.** Trip wires are difficult to see so use of a trip wire feeler is a simple method of enhancing the sense of touch. It should be 1m of 14 gauge wire, which is straightened out and held lightly between the thumb and forefinger. It should be gently lifted from ground level to above head height in a horizontal position before advancing down a clearance lane.

c. **Prod.** Prodding is a method of locating buried mines by systematically prodding the ground to a depth of 75mm to detect solid objects. Prodding should be carried out using the service mine prodder, but a knife or bayonet may be used. The prodder is pushed gently but firmly into the ground at an angle of 30 degrees to the horizontal. To ensure that no ground is missed, 25mm spacing should be used across the 0.6m lane, before advancing forward 25mm. Knuckles of the hand provide a guide for 25mm. The drill is to be conducted in the prone position with legs remaining crossed.

d. **Identified Mines.** Absolutely no attempt should be made to disturb, render safe or further investigate any mine, UXO or booby trap. The following 'mark – avoid – move around' drill must be followed upon identifying a mine or suspected hazard:

- (1) Place a red / orange marker 300mm short of hazard.
- (2) Do not touch or disturb in any way.
- (3) Move around the hazard.
- (4) Under no circumstances tie tape around trip wires.

16. **Mine Extraction Kit.** All personnel deploying to a mine affected theatre should be in possession of a mine extraction kit and know how to use it. The contents should be housed in a waterproofed container and include:

a. Mine encounter card: an A5 waterproof aide memoir that summarises the preventative and reactive measures described in this chapter. Copies are available from the Mine Information and Training Centre and should be carried by all personnel.

b. Trip wire feeler.

c. Prodder.

d. Markers. Any system (mine tape, spray paint, cyalumes, pegs, plant markers, etc) that will enable you to identify:

- (1) Mines / UXO / booby traps / hazards in red or orange.

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(2) Safe areas in white.

17. **Vehicle Mine Extraction Kit.** A larger, more comprehensive kit should be carried centrally when in a vehicle.

Annex:

A. Mine Encounter Aide Memoire Card.

Mine Encounter Drill

- STOP** – Stop moving immediately
- WARN** – Issue warning to others nearby “**Stop, mines**”
- REPORT** – Report by radio “**Mines / minestrike, wait out**”
- ASSESS** – Plan of action: stay put or self extract

What other mines or indicators can be seen
Location of the nearest hard standing
EOD or Engr assistance available
CASEVAC available / required
Are other agencies required
Enemy action
Casualties

- REPORT** – Your exact location (6 fig GR)
Details of incident
Details of casualties
Assistance required
RV details (6 fig GR)
Future intentions

- ACT** – Stay still and await assistance
OR

If extraction from mined area is essential then ‘**LOOK – FEEL – PROD**’ to safety



How to Look – Feel – Prod

Look For any visible signs of mine action or combat indicators and blow away any sand.



Feel For any protruding fuses or mine components.

Prod Every **25mm** across a **0.6m** lane at a **30° angle** to the horizontal and, if ground conditions permit, to a **depth of 75mm**.

Do not ‘stab’ the ground or use excessive force but prod **slowly and firmly**.

Adopt the **prone position** with **legs crossed**. Remove webbing and secure weapon.

Prodding Matrix



If You Find a Mine

Mark and avoid Use orange mine tape 300mm to the front.

Move around Do not step over or touch.

Do not uncover to identify mine type.

Do not cut or tie tape to tripwires.



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Mine Awareness Basics

- DO NOT leave the hard standing
- DO NOT park or drive on verges
- DO NOT enter uncleared buildings
- DO NOT use uncleared routes
- DO NOT become a military tourist
- DO NOT pick up souvenirs

Where minefields are found

- Confrontation lines
- Borders
- Old military positions
- Strategic areas
- Unmade roads and tracks
- Disused buildings

Remember minefield marking signs and local markings:



Painted rocks, red pointing to danger and white to safe areas.



Look out for anything unusual that may indicate danger.



Cairns of stones marking dangerous areas.



Less obvious mines or UXO may be well marked.

Always stay alert for other combat indicators:

Local Behaviour

- Not using fields
- Not using routes
- Injured animals

Ground Sign

- Flattening
- Regularity
- Discolouration

Blast Signature

- Scorching
- Craters
- Strike marks

Mine Debris

- Parts of mines
- Packaging
- Tripwires

Contents of Personal Mine Extraction Kit

- Tripwire feeler - 14 gauge wire
- Prodder - Issued or improvised (bayonet, 6" nail)
- Safe lane markers (white mine tape)
- Mine markers (orange mine tape)
- A copy of this card

Contents of Vehicle Extraction Kit

- Add rolls of mine marking tape, extra prodders and cyalumes to enhance your personal kit.



ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES (ECM)

Due to the classified nature of UK ECM equipment this document only provides generic guidance and principles on the use of ECM equipment. For detailed guidance on the use of UK ECM equipment currently employed on specific operations please refer to the relevant theatre ECM Handbook.

GENERAL

1. **Introduction.** The Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device (RCIED) is a weapon that is being used extensively by the enemy. To reduce the risk to UK military and UK crown service personnel in operational theatres, UK forces deploy force protection Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) to thwart such attacks. ECM only has an effect against RC IEDs. It has no effect against IEDs initiated by other methods.

2. **The Purpose of ECM.** The purpose of UK ECM is to provide protection to UK military and UK crown service personnel against death or injury. Its purpose is not to provide protection for vehicles, equipment, infrastructure or personnel from other coalition partners.

3. **The C-IED Approach.** ECM equipment is only part of the protection against RCIEDs. Whilst ECM equipment is extremely effective at reducing the risk posed by known threats, it cannot provide protection against threats that fall outside its design parameters. The most effective defence against all IEDs, irrespective of type, is summed up by the diagram below:




Figure 14.1 – The C_IED Approach

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4. **Unit Responsibilities.** Units have a collective responsibility for maintaining the overall capability of their ECM assets. Commanding officers are personally responsible for ensuring the following:

a. **Security of ECM Equipment.** All necessary actions must be taken to prevent the loss or compromise of ECM equipment and its capabilities.

b. **Accounting of ECM Equipment.** Commanders are to ensure that all personnel comply with the accounting procedures.

c. **Correct use of ECM.** All personnel must have a thorough and accurate understanding of the RCIED threat, ECM tactics and equipment handling procedures. These must be correctly applied without exception. This includes submitting faulty equipment for repair at the earliest possible opportunity.

d. **Discouragement of Breakages to ECM Equipment.** There is only a finite quantity of ECM equipment available in theatre. Any breakages limit the availability of ECM assets, potentially putting UK forces at greater risk. Units are liable for the cost of replacement items that are damaged through negligence or non-conformity to the rules contained in this publication.

5. **Daily Management of ECM Equipment.** Within units daily management of these tasks may be delegated to a suitable nominated person. This is normally the RSO. He should be assisted by a storeman whose primary responsibility is the management of the ECM fleet.

SECURITY OF ECM EQUIPMENT

6. ECM equipment plays a vital role in protecting UK forces and it has been successful in reducing the threat posed by RCIEDs thus far encountered. The consequences of UK ECM equipment or information on the workings of such equipment falling into enemy hands are extremely serious. **ECM equipment is the responsibility of the person to whom it is issued, and must be treated as a weapon. Under no circumstances is it to be left unattended or handed to non UK-military personnel.**

7. UK ECM capability is classified **CONFIDENTIAL – UK EYES ONLY**. Physical equipments are classified **SECRET – UK EYES ONLY** and must be screened from view at all times. Under no circumstances is UK ECM equipment to be operated by personnel from other nations, or UK civilians. Equipment codenames are **RESTRICTED** when totally divorced from the specific capability; this does not include the term ECM. Although the equipment codenames do not carry a national caveat, they must not appear in any documentation which does not bear a **UK EYES ONLY** caveat, nor must they be conveyed with any personnel from other nations or UK civilians. Equipment generic titles are unclassified, however when linked to the codeword, they are **CONFIDENTIAL – UK EYES ONLY**. Under no circumstances is ECM to be discussed on insecure means, including PRR and mobile telephones. This specifically applies to the equipment codenames.

OPERATION OF ECM EQUIPMENT

8. **Alarms.** All users must recognise the equipment alarm tones, and know what actions are to be taken on hearing them. Actions on alarm tones are covered at Annex A.

9. Carriage of ECM Equipment.

a. **Handling of Equipment.** A number of equipments have external cables on the equipment. Under no circumstances are these to be used to carry the equipment, as it is likely to damage both the cable and the equipment.

b. **Bergen.** Only the ECM Bergen is to be used for the carriage of ECM equipment in the manpack role, as this allows airflow around the equipment that will prevent the equipment overheating. No personal equipment is to be stored in the main compartment of the Bergen, as this will restrict the airflow. All personal equipment is to be stored in the side pouches.

c. **Antenna.** The equipment performs best when the antenna is vertical. ECM equipment should not be operated from the ground as this substantially reduces its effective range. It should always be operated in the vehicle role or carried on a soldier's back. (Those equipments which can be used in both the vehicle and Manpack roles are to have the correct antenna fitted for each specific role).

10. **Batteries.** The battery system will become permanently damaged if it is either left on the equipment or in a discharged state when not in use. Batteries must therefore be recharged immediately after each patrol. Units will be liable for the cost of batteries broken due to mismanagement (approx £500 each).

11. Vehicle Installation Kits (VIK)

a. **General.** VIKs for White Fleet, SNATCH and LR TUL/TUM (GS) used in the Force Protection (FP) role have been designed, others are still in development. Where the correct VIKs are fitted in vehicles, they must be used to prevent damage to equipment and allow the equipment to function at full capability.

b. **Temporary Installations.** Where VIKs have yet to be installed, many temporary solutions on a best endeavour basis are currently in use. Advice and guidance on best practice for temporary installations on all vehicles can be sought from ECM Support Troop.

c. **Antenna Positioning.** This is critical to providing effective inhibition against RCIEDs. Figures 14.2 and 14.3 below show examples of the correct VIK antenna positions for SNATCH and Land Rover. Figure 14.4 shows an example of the White Fleet VIK antenna mounting system.



Figure 14.2



Figure 14.3



Figure 14.4

d. **Other Fits.** Where VIKs are not fitted, the following rules must be observed; otherwise the effective inhibition range may be reduced:

- (1) Antennae for each type of ECM equipment must be sited at least one metre apart.
- (2) All antennae must be mounted vertically.
- (3) The base of the antenna must either be sited at the front of the bonnet or elevated to the height of the vehicle roof.
- (4) The antenna should not be sited through the top cover hatch on SNATCH vehicles as this seriously reduces the effective range of the equipment.
- (5) The sides of the antennae must not be touching vehicle parts or metal structures.

12. **Equipment Positioning.** It is essential that equipment is secured correctly to vehicles. Failure to do so could risk significant injury to vehicle occupants in the event of an RTA. Under no circumstances is equipment (other than the antennae) to be secured to the outside of a vehicle. This places the equipment at risk of overheating due to the direct sunlight. It is also at risk of compromise, as it is a target for the enemy should they wish to acquire the equipment for analysis.

13. **Routine Procedures for Patrols and Base Protection.** Routine procedures for patrols and base protection are show at Annex B.

ECM 'ACTIONS ON' WHEN PATROLLING

1. **Alarm IA Drill.** In the event of a fault alarm commencing during a patrol, the following IA Drill should be carried out:
 - a. **Go Firm. Conduct 5 and 20m Checks.** Note that if mounted in vehicles the commander must make the decision as to whether to go firm or to conduct the IA drill on the move.
 - b. **Check Antenna.** Check that it is mounted correctly and that the bracket is not broken. In the vehicle role, check that the coax lead is correctly tightened.
 - c. **Check Battery.** Check the battery status via the LED. If it shows amber or red, then replace with a green status battery.
 - d. **Alarm still Sounding?** If the alarm is still sounding, the equipment is faulty and may need to be replaced. The commander then has four options:
 - (1) Switch off that item of eqpt for three mins and turn back on to confirm that it is not an overheating problem.
 - (2) Continue with the patrol, with a gap in his ECM coverage.
 - (3) Rearrange the patrol formation to maintain ECM coverage with the remaining equipment.
 - (4) Extract back to his base location.
2. **RTA with Casualties.** In the event of an RTA with casualties, a capable individual is to be given the responsibility of ensuring the security of all ECM equipment. Personnel may be nominated prior to deployment as part of unit Patrol Orders.
3. **Media.** If media are travelling with UK forces, they are not to travel in the same vehicle as ECM, and ECM is not to be discussed openly, either by name or capability, even if they already appear to have knowledge about it.
4. **ECM Fratricide.** ECM will have an adverse impact on comms systems. Commanders must take this impact into account when planning their C2 arrangements. Post operation reports regularly highlight the issue of ECM fratricide as an area that units had not focussed on during their training.
5. **Lost Communications.** If communications are unobtainable, ECM is only one possible explanation. As a guide to whether or not ECM is the cause of the interference, ECM can interfere with both the comms transmit and receive frequencies, but will often only interfere with the receive frequency. If ECM is assessed to be the cause, one of the following procedures is to be carried out. It is the responsibility of the patrol commander to

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conduct a risk assessment and determine which option poses the least threat in the given situation:

- a. **Increase Distance between Communications and ECM.** This should be the first option, whilst keeping all assets within the ECM protection. If this does not rectify the problem, either use a different comms system or ECM equipment may be switched off as detailed below.
- b. **Switch Off ECM.** The patrol should go firm and perform 5 and 20m checks. When content, switch off ECM. ECM is to be switched back on as soon as communications traffic is finished.
- c. **Use A Different Comms System.** Patrols must try all different comms systems.

5. **Abandoned ECM Vehicle.** Abandoning an ECM vehicle must only be done as a **last resort**. In the event that an ECM vehicle must be abandoned, either due to breakdown, RTA or ambush, attempts **must** be made to remove the ECM equipment from the vehicle and to extract it with the patrol. The **only** exception to this is if an attempt to remove the equipment would put the lives of the team members at risk. If equipment extraction is not possible, the following **last resort** is to be attempted:

- a. Try to extract at least some of the equipment.
- b. An attempt is to be made to destroy any equipment that is not extracted. Pending trials, the following possible methods are recommended:
 - (1) Phosphorous grenade into the rear of the vehicle.
 - (2) Multiple small arms rounds into the body of the ECM equipment.
- c. Equipment loss is to be reported immediately.
- d. Destroyed equipment is to be extracted at a later time if the security situation permits. This is to enable an investigation to confirm that the equipment has been destroyed and not compromised. All equipment is to be returned to the theatre ECM store, regardless of the condition.
- e. Replacement equipment **may** be issued **if sufficient stocks of equipment exist**. There are a finite number of assets in theatre. It is therefore stressed again that the destruction of equipment is a **last resort**.

6. **Damage to Equipment Casing.** In the event of such damage, the equipment is to be returned to the theatre ECM store. This will be inspected to ensure that no internal parts are damaged.

ROUTINE PROCEDURES FOR PATROLS AND BASE PROTECTION

Ser	Action	Activity		
		Vehicle Patrol	Foot Patrol	Base Installation ¹
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1.	Prior to equipment issue	ECM Storeman ensures all ECM equipment is serviceable.		
2.	Issue of ECM equipment	ECM user signs for ECM equipment on booking out sheet.		
3.		ECM user checks that antennae, coax, batteries and mounting frames are in serviceable condition.	ECM user checks that antennae, batteries and Bergen are in a serviceable condition.	ECM user checks that antennae, coax, batteries and mounting frames are in a serviceable condition.
4.		ECM user checks that all battery levels are green on the Press to Test (PTT). If green, attach battery. If red or amber, exchange for a fully charged battery.		
5.		Attach equipment to mounting frame, ensure extender (Smarty tube) is fitted where appropriate, connect antenna coax cables as per colour code system.	Attach manpack antenna.	Attach equipment to mounting frame, connect antenna coax cables and attach vehicle antenna to roof of base installation.
6.		Switch on all ECM equipment and await self tests to complete. If the equipment alarms after the self test has completed apply the IA Drill. If the equipment is faulty, it is to be replaced ASAP.		
7.			Secure ECM equipment correctly in ECM Bergen, ensuring the vertical straps pass between the equipment and battery. Load any personal equipment into the side pouches, not in the main compartment.	
9.		Pre deployment orders	Nominate individual(s) in patrol responsible for general use and / recovery/ destruction of FP ECM in the event of an RTA/ hostile enemy action/ veh abandonment.	

¹ Note that on taking over as a sangar sentry, the new soldier must switch off and turn back on all ECM eqpt as a confidence check.

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Ser	Action	Activity		
		Vehicle Patrol	Foot Patrol	Base Installation ¹
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
10.	During patrol	Switch on ECM equipment prior to leaving base location. Note:		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comd to issue order "ECM On". • One type of eqpt at a time. • Allow sufficient time. 		
11.			Make every effort to keep the antenna vertical at all times. Be aware of the effect of adopting different fire positions.	
12.		Ensure that all non-ECM vehicles remain within the protective range of ECM vehicles.	Ensure, where practicable, that the whole team remains inside the ECM protection.	
14.			Switch off all ECM and remove antennae before entering aircraft.	
15.	Observe 'Actions On'.			
16.	During base protection task			At every shift change, the new sentry is to account for all ECM equipment by serial number. He is then to switch off all equipment then immediately back on again to see if a fault warning is given at the equipment start-up.
17.				In the event of equipment failure, the ECM storeman is to replace faulty ECM equipment. All problems are to be reported to ECM storeman ASAP.
18.	On completion of task	Switch off on entering base locations.		
19.		Detach ECM equipment and antennae from VIK. Remove TNC extender (Smarty Tube) from equipment.	Remove ECM equipment from Bergen and disassemble.	Detach ECM equipment from BIK.
20.		Remove battery and recharge all batteries that are amber or red.		
21.		Check all ECM equipment and ancillaries and report faults and damage.		
22.		Sign all ECM equipment back into the ECM store.		
23.	Post task	ECM Storeman to test all batteries and recharge as required.		
24.		Submit all faulty equipment for repair as soon as possible. This should be within 24 hours in all circumstances. Equipment Failure Reports should accompany all equipment.		

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CHAPTER 15

VCP OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. Vehicle Check Points (VCPs) are a means of controlling movement on roads and tracks. They are used to block or close a route to vehicles and may also be used to restrict or monitor the movement of pedestrians. A VCP may have one or more of the following aims:

- a. To maintain a broad check on road movement in order to provide reassurance to the local population.
- b. To frustrate the movement of arms, ammunition and explosives.
- c. To assist in the enforcement of controls of movement of both people and materiel.
- d. To gather information and data on suspected persons and vehicles.

THREAT PROFILE

2. The exact deployment of any VCP will depend on the threat. When there is a high threat from suicide VBIEDs different procedures will need to be in place. In particular, the VCP will need to have a stand-off area, where drivers must be forced to stop prior to entering the VCP location. Drivers can then be instructed to get out of the vehicles and show that they are not suicide bombers prior to being brought into the VCP area.

LEGAL ISSUES

3. In addition to the extant ROE, troops manning a VCP must be well acquainted with their powers of search, arrest and use of force.

TYPES OF VCP

4. **Permanent.** Permanent VCPs are in effect small bases or outstations set up to monitor traffic on a daily and permanent basis. They will typically be set up on a main road coming into or out of a city or on the edge of a controlled area. By their nature these installations are the equivalent of any other SF base or permanent OP and the procedures for their manning, occupation and protection are similar.

5. **Deliberate.** Deliberate VCPs are typically used in support of another operation such as a cordon.

6. **Snap.** Snap VCPs may be deployed by troops already on patrol or by troops deployed by helicopter (eagle VCP). Unpredictability is essential to avoid pattern setting and maintaining the initiative. They may be further sub divided into:

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a. **Ground.** Ground snap VCPs are used to carry out spot checks frequently acting on intelligence. Initially they can achieve surprise but once their position is known their usefulness decreases rapidly and the potential for hostile reaction increases. They will seldom last longer than 15 minutes.

b. **Helicopter.** Primarily used in rural areas, helicopter deployed 'eagle' VCPs (EVCP) may be used to dominate an area for a limited period of time. They can take the initiative away from hostile groups and help to suppress activity on the ground. Eagle VCPs have the advantages of maintaining the initiative, flexibility of deployment and wide area of coverage. The opportunities for capturing, interdicting or disrupting hostile activity are high.

c. **Dolphin VCPs.** Boats may be used to deploy snap VCPs in close proximity to waterways.

7. **Triggered.** The triggered VCP is a variation on the snap VCP that is planned and triggered by a specific event or piece of intelligence. They are particularly useful in the defeat of hostile operations involving scout cars. Such vehicles can be allowed to pass through unhindered having triggered subsequent arrest of the target vehicle. They are usually extremely short in duration.

8. **Reactive.** The reactive VCP is another variant of the snap VCP but set up specifically as a reaction to an incident or attack in another area. It may be ground or helicopter deployed and is positioned to interdict hostile activity following the incident.

DELIBERATE VCPs

9. The tactical guidelines for setting up a deliberate VCP are as follows:

a. **Concealment.** Where the ground permits, the VCP should be sited where it cannot be seen from more than a short distance away. Sharp bends or dips in the road provide good positions provided that the requirements of road safety are met. Ideally there should be no room for an approaching vehicle to take avoiding action by turning, leaving the road or reversing.

b. **Security.** There must be enough troops to protect the VCP, particularly during the initial occupation. Sentries should be sited as cut offs on both sides well clear of the search area to watch approaching traffic and prevent evasion. All but the shortest duration VCPs should have a reserve force available to it. The use of a QRF from the nearest SF base should also be considered. The site of a VCP must always be checked for booby traps and ambushes before occupation and a pattern of use should be avoided.

c. **Construction and Layout.** A simple construction is two parallel lines of knife rests, each with a gap, across the road approximately 50 metres apart. The enclosure formed can then be used as a search and administrative area. Within the search area there could be:

- (1) Separate male and female search areas.

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- (2) Vehicle waiting area.
- (3) Vehicle search area.
- (4) A cage for detaining people prior to being passed on to other agencies.
- (5) VCP HQ.
- (6) Administrative area.
- (7) Signs in the local language and, in theatres where there is a high level of illiteracy, recorded loudspeaker broadcasts giving the instructions/information that is on the signs.

d. **Manning.** The number of troops required will depend on the number of roads to be covered and the expected volume of traffic. If people are going to be searched then female searchers must be available and special accommodation should be provided. Whenever possible or practical there should be a police presence at the VCP and interpreters will be required.

e. **Search Equipment.** Specialist search equipment may be required particularly for heavy vehicles and certain types of load.

f. **Communications.** External communications are essential so that revised instructions may be given, information about wanted persons passed quickly and incidents at the VCP reported. Internal communications can be achieved with PRR.




Figure 15.1 - Possible Layout for a VCP in a Rural Area.




Figure 15.2 - Possible Layout for a VCP in a Rural Area.

SNAP VCPs

10. The snap VCP is by nature simple since it must be set up and dismantled quickly. It may consist of two vehicles which are placed diagonally across a road with a search area between them; the effectiveness of the VCP can be improved with rolls of barbed wire. A snap VCP may also be deployed by helicopter or on foot; in both cases an obstacle such as a narrow bridge, cutting or level crossing may be used. A back up force should be readily available.




Figure 15.3 - Possible Layout for a Snap VCP.

ACTIONS IN A VCP

11. **Search.** One of the principal activities within a VCP is the searching of vehicles and people. Search is an activity which requires specialist training.

12. **Checking Identity Documents.** An identity document may be an ID Card, a driving licence or some other official document issued by a government department or a company. When several documents have been offered they should all be checked against each other and against any list of wanted persons. Questions should be asked about details contained in the documents (eg address, occupation etc). The following points may be helpful when checking documents:

- a. **Photograph.** Compare the photo on the document to the individual. When making a comparison try to recreate the conditions under which the photo was originally taken (eg if the photo was taken hatless then ask the person to remove their hat). The subject's hair style and colour may have changed so it may help to

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cover the hair in the photo so as to compare only the facial features. A check of age will also assist in making a comparison.

b. **Stamp.** Careful examination of the stamp across the corner of the photo will show whether the original photo has been removed and another substituted. The authenticity of the stamp should also be checked.

Annexes:

- A. Establishing a VCP.
- B. Basic Equipment and Stores.

ESTABLISHING A VCP

SITING CRITERIA

1. Experience has highlighted the following siting criteria:
 - a. The road party should be in a position where a vehicle has sufficient time to stop (avoid bends, brows of hills etc).
 - b. Cut offs should be sited at a point where vehicles pass them before sighting the road party but still have time to give early warning and sufficient time, if necessary, to deploy blocking equipment.
 - c. The patrol should be mutually supported.
 - d. The area of the VCP and immediate surrounds should be checked before occupation.

INSERTION DRILL

2. Assuming that the patrol is of at least 12 men (3 x four man teams) insertion could be as follows:
 - a. The patrol goes firm and the commander visually sites the road party and cut offs. Having carried out a visual appreciation the commander decides whether to put all the teams on the road or to have one in an overwatch location or conducting satellite patrol activity.
 - b. The patrol commander's team, which will be the road party, remains in overwatch while the cut offs insert.
 - c. Cut offs approach their locations, go firm and carry out 5 and 20m checks on their positions. The team commander and lead man occupy a position by the road, also conducting 5 and 20m checks. The remainder cover from an overwatch position about 50 - 100m away. The lead man positions vehicle immobilising equipment which is concealed but ready for deployment.
 - d. The road party carries out a check of its position. Detailed tasks include:
 - (1) **Patrol Commander.** The patrol commander remains off the road and uses the radio to run a check of Vehicle Registration Numbers (VRNs) (if such a database exists in that theatre), selects vehicles to be searched and must have an alternate signal to trigger the cut offs eg whistle blasts.
 - (2) **Chatter.** The chatter stops vehicles, chats up the occupants (in conjunction with an interpreter if necessary) and completes any forms as required. Note that in some theatres there may be strict guidelines detailing

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the exact requirement for telling occupants of the intention to search the vehicle.

(3) **Searcher.** The searcher removes weapon and webbing leaving it with a coverman and conducts a search of the vehicle and its occupants as required. It is good practise for the searcher to wear forensic gloves. Where items have been confiscated, theatre SOIs will give guidance on the procedures for giving receipts for those goods. Such SOIs must be followed rigorously.

(4) **Coverman.** The coverman covers the vehicle occupants from a concealed position and protects the searcher's equipment.

Note: The road party should not close in to a small space but stay spread out in case a problem should arise.

EXTRACTION DRILL

3. A normal extraction drill could be as follows:
 - a. The road party moves off to an overwatch position.
 - b. The cut offs regroup, collect any road block equipment and extract from their positions.
 - c. The patrol commander should consider deception when moving off as hostile forces may have identified the VCP and be considering an attack against it.
 - d. Where practical a basic search should be conducted along the roadside in both directions to the limit of visibility. This may reveal arms, explosives or other items which may have been discarded as a vehicle approached the VCP.

BASIC EQUIPMENT AND STORES

OPERATIONAL STORES

1. **Barrier Equipment.**
 - a. Knife rests.
 - b. Dannert wire.
 - c. Wiring gloves.
 - d. Wire cutters.
 - e. Caltrops or other tyre puncturing device.
2. **Signs and Lights.**
 - a. 'Stop and Dip Headlights' signs (reflective paint) in local language. One for each barrier.
 - b. Warning signs and recorded loudspeaker broadcast equipment.
 - c. Flashing warning lights or red hurricane-lamps.
 - d. Torches.
 - e. Portable searchlights.
3. **Communication Equipment.**
 - a. Radios. For internal and external use.
 - b. Telephones.
4. **Miscellaneous.**
 - a. Night surveillance equipment.
 - b. Portable tape recorder.
 - c. Camera.
 - d. Megaphone and whistles (one for each sentry).
 - e. Evidence handling kits for finds.

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- f. Chalk and labels (for identification purposes).
- g. Sandbags.
- h. Handcuffs.
- i. Probes.
- j. Mine tape. To delineate search area.
- k. Spring balance. For weighing suspicious packages.
- l. Tape measure. For searching for hidden compartments.
- m. Under car mirrors.
- n. Explosives detection devices.
- o. Lists of wanted persons and vehicles (to be kept in protective covers).
- p. Photographs of wanted persons (to be kept in protective covers).
- q. Hand-held metal detectors (especially for searching women, when female searchers are not available).
- r. Patrol Search Records.

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CHAPTER 16

CORDON OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. Cordon operations are usually mounted against a point or small area target. They involve isolating the target with troops and physical barriers to ensure that there can be no outside interference and that persons and objects inside are contained. This provides a sanitised area within which other agencies can operate. Resources permitting it is usual to mount two cordons around the target, the outer cordon to prevent interference from outside, and an inner cordon to seal off the target and prevent movement out of the area.

AIM

2. Cordon operations may be mounted to support the following activities:
- a. In response to an incident such as a shooting, explosion or find.
 - b. IED Clearances.
 - c. Searches (area and route).
 - d. Engineer tasks such as demolitions and building work.
 - e. Public events such as public meetings, funerals and demonstrations.
 - f. Arrest, confiscation and seizure operations.
 - g. Reactive operations.

CORDON COMPONENTS

3. Cordons normally comprise the following elements:
- a. The Inner Cordon. Usually static, with arcs normally facing inwards to prevent any escape by suspect persons.
 - b. The Outer Cordon. Usually mobile in depth, with arcs normally facing outwards to prevent any attack on the inner cordon locations.
 - c. The Incident Control Point (ICP). The ICP commands all cordon troops.

PRINCIPLES

4. **General.** The principles of cordon operations are identical to the principles of defence:
- a. Mutual support.

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- b. All round defence.
- c. Depth.
- d. Reserves.
- e. Offensive spirit.
- f. Deception and concealment.
- g. Communication.

5. **Depth.** Adequate depth is achieved by the use of a ring of static inner cordon positions and satellite patrols of the outer cordon. The inner cordon provides intimate protection to the agencies working within it and provides the framework against which satellite patrols can operate. The satellite patrols of the outer cordon provide early warning and protection to the static positions. Additional depth can be achieved by the use of mobile and/or static VCPs within the area of the cordon operation but outside the range of the satellite patrols.

6. **Mutual Support.**

- a. Individual positions must never be isolated. They must have an appropriate level of combat power to combat the threat.
- b. Coordination between the inner cordon positions and the satellite patrols must be rigorously tied down.
- c. The Incident Control Point (ICP) must be protected; it should be within the ring of static inner cordon positions.
- d. All static elements of the cordon should have overlapping and interlocking arcs of observation and fire. They must also all have communications with each other.

7. **All Round Defence.** The cordon must extend completely around the target and prevent any movement into or out of the target area. Every element of the cordon, but particularly the static elements, must maintain 360° situational awareness both visually and through maintaining a listening watch to the communications means.

8. **Offensive Spirit.** The maintenance of an offensive spirit forces the enemy to keep a low profile, adds a significant level of protection to the cordon operation and is good for the morale of the troops involved in the cordon. Depending on the resources available, the duration and size of the cordon, the following activities should be considered:

- a. Surge activity by patrols at different times throughout the operation. As well as being conducted randomly, the 'surge' may also be coordinated with specific activities by other agencies operating in the cordon eg the arrival of a helicopter.
- b. Use of armed or attack helicopters to provide top cover during the operation or for specific phases.

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- c. VCP operations either by satellite patrols in the area of the cordon and/or by other troops operating in the general vicinity.
 - d. Standing patrols at night.
 - e. Deployment of specialist teams such as snipers, if available.
 - f. Active patrolling by satellites to blur the edges of the cordon, cover potential firing points (FPs) for rockets, mortars and small arms and disrupt hostile activity.
9. **Reserves.** A reserve must be readily available to deploy without compromising the integrity of the cordon. Consideration should also be given to holding a larger reserve/QRF away from the cordon (ie at the nearest SF base) which has been specifically briefed in support of the cordon operation (ie they know the cordon set up, location, frequencies, callsigns etc.)
10. **Deception and Concealment.**
- a. **Concealment.** Once a cordon has been put in place there is little that can be achieved in terms of concealment. In rural areas, best use can still be made of the ground to provide cover from fire and sight. In urban areas, there should be maximum use of rooftops, buildings and elevated positions in order to give cordon troops greater protection and to deny the enemy the ability to dominate the ground.
 - b. **Deception.** It is difficult to disguise the nature of the cordon once it has been established but steps can be taken to deceive observers as to the area of the cordon and its overall strength by using satellite patrols and surge patrol activity to blur the edge of the cordon.
11. **Communications.** All elements of the cordon must have a reliable means of communicating with the ICP. Ideally all should be equipped with radio to also allow for direct communication with any satellite patrols operating in their area on an all informed net.

LIMITATIONS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

12. The conduct of cordon operations in the urban environment will be extremely difficult and will limit the ability to fully adhere to all principles. Middle and Far Eastern countries, in particular, are characterised by densely populated urban areas with many alleyways that will make it extremely difficult to seal off an area. The ability of cordon locations to support each other mutually will be especially difficult and maximum use of satellite patrols will be required to provide depth protection. Cordons must be particularly aware of the 360 degree threat associated with any urban operation.

Annexes:

- A. Deployment.
- B. Action Post Deployment.
- C. Satellite Patrolling.

DEPLOYMENT

1. **Order of Insertion.** The order of insertion will often depend upon the terrain, the threat, the nature of the target, the method of insertion and many other factors. For example, vehicles (particularly armour) should not move too close to the target location if surprise is to be achieved. With the exception of the overwatch OP, ideally all elements of the cordon should deploy as simultaneously as possible so that the cordon is effective before the target or any other hostile forces are able to react. The normal method is to deploy the outer elements first, and the inner elements last. The most suitable order for insertion is generally as follows:

a. **Overwatch OP Deploys.** This provides information on any activity at the target and in the immediate vicinity. It may be deployed specifically in support of the cordon operation or may have been deployed previously and has since been used to cue the cordon operation. The OP might even be from a different unit to that deploying the cordon.

b. **Outer Cordon Satellite Patrols Deploy.** Satellite patrols will deploy to dominate the ground around the target area by conducting VCPs, standing patrols and route checks. They may be used to clear and secure an HLS and/or routes for the deployment of cordon troops and other agencies. They also help blur the edge of the cordon thus contribute to the deception plan.

c. **Inner Cordon Troops Deploy.** The troops in the static cordon should deploy as simultaneously and swiftly as possible so that the cordon is created quickly. The ICP party will usually deploy with the main body of the cordon.

d. **Reserve Deploys.** If the reserve has not been able to deploy with the main body of the cordon they will deploy next and typically establish at, or close to, the ICP.

e. **Other Agencies Deploy.** Once the cordon is established, other agencies (eg RESA and ATO) can deploy to operate within the sanitised area.

2. **Method of Insertion.** Insertion may be by foot, vehicle, helicopter, boat or any combination. The exact method will be dictated by the nature of the ground (eg limited access by vehicle), whether time is a factor (eg the target may only be present for a short time), whether a covert approach is required (eg covert infiltration at night on foot in order to surprise the target, preserving forensic evidence and minimising the chances of hostile interference from outside the cordon) and the threat.

3. **Aviation.** As well as assisting with the deployment of the cordon and other agencies aviation assets can be deployed to cover a number of tasks, including:

a. Screen or guard troops on the ground.

b. Monitor traffic approaching the cordon.

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- c. Immediate reaction to any incidents.
- d. Monitor crowd levels and potential trouble spots.
- e. Disrupt hostile activity by use of eagle VCPs.
- f. Provide an aerial reserve/QRF.
- g. Assist with deception.
- h. Provide an alternate comms platform.
- i. Enhance the commander's situational awareness.
- j. Track moving/escaping suspects.

4. **Cordon VCP.** Where the cordon intersects a road or track, it may be necessary to insert a Vehicle Check Point (VCP). The establishment of a VCP is covered in Chapter 10. There are two additional points to note when a VCP is used as part of a cordon operation.

a. **Limited Access.** If there is no threat to life within the cordon, vehicles may be let through the VCP after being searched. Their passage through the cordon must be monitored to ensure that neither the vehicle nor any of its occupants are able to interfere with the cordon operation.

b. **Denial of Access.** Where there is a danger to life within the cordon (eg IED, explosives find etc) or the situation is such that allowing vehicles to pass would compromise the operation, access through the VCP must be denied.

5. **Multiple and/or Large Cordons.** Where an inner and outer cordon have been deployed, each cordon will have its own commander (possibly a platoon commander or platoon sergeant) with the company commander operating the ICP. Where the cordon is particularly large or the ground makes command and control difficult, the cordon may be divided into two sectors (eg cordon west and cordon east) with a platoon commander and platoon sergeant each commanding a sector.

ACTION POST DEPLOYMENT

1. **General Points.** The following are activities which, depending on the situation, should be considered once the cordon has been inserted.
 - a. **Checking the Cordon.** The cordon commander must make an immediate check of the area to ensure that the perimeter is complete, all arcs interlock and conduct a communications check.
 - b. **Instructions to the Public.** Instructions may need to be issued to members of the public who may be affected by the operation. If available, this function is best carried out by local police or Indigenous Security Forces (ISF). Interpreters will be required. Consideration should be given to producing signs in the local language to be used at static cordon locations.
 - c. **Guarded Areas.** It may be necessary to create a separate, guarded area for suspects, weapons or other non-IED finds. The QRF/reserve should not be used to guard as they may be needed elsewhere.
2. **Duration.** All troops should be aware of the expected duration of the cordon and should carry sufficient equipment and supplies. The possibility of having to resupply troops who are deployed for longer than anticipated should also be considered. If a cordon duration is extended significantly then consideration should be given to rotating troops through static and mobile tasks and also how to supply equipment which, originally, may not have been required (eg bivvy/sleeping bags).
3. **Extraction.** All troops must be aware of the extraction plan and warned in sufficient time for equipment to be packed and to be prepared to move.
 - a. **Extracting.** Extraction is done in reverse order to insertion, with the inner elements leaving first:
 - (1) Agencies.
 - (2) Civil police/ ISF (if present).
 - (3) Inner cordon teams.
 - (4) ICP and reserve.
 - (5) Outer cordon satellite patrols.
 - b. **Stay Behind Parties.** An overwatch patrol, to stay behind and observe subsequent activities in the target area, may be considered.

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4. **Actions On.**

a. **Shooting at the Cordon.**

(1) Identify FP and return fire within the ROE. Flanking elements should also engage as well if the FP can be identified. The use of other weapon systems (eg chain gun, GPMG, 30mm) may also be permitted subject to the current ROE and the appropriateness of their use given the situation.

(2) Follow up action should be taken by satellite patrols or the cordon reserve as directed by the ICP commander. Close control must be exercised to prevent fratricide.

(3) Static cordon elements should remain in their location to avoid the prospect of a 'come-on' or causing a gap in the cordon.

(4) Appropriate R2 must be sent as directed.

b. **Indirect Fire Attack.**

(1) Any individual can 'stand-to' the cordon for any suspicious activity.

(2) On sighting or hearing Mortar Base Plate (MBP) or other indirect fire explosions, take cover, count the number of detonations from the MBP and also the subsequent number of explosions on the ground - this will give an indication of any blinds.

(3) Stay in cover and check for casualties. If there are no casualties remain in cover until further orders are received.

(4) Depending on the severity of their wounds, casualties should be moved into cover (if possible), given first aid and prepared for evacuation, following a CASEVAC request.

(5) Appropriate R2 must be sent as directed.

(6) Follow up action should include:

(a) Use of reserve or satellite patrols to secure MBP which may well become the target of another cordon operation in its own right.

(b) Use of satellite patrols, helicopters or other troops to establish VCPs in the region of the cordon in order to intercept any hostile forces attempting to get away.

(c) Identifying and securing blinds for subsequent disposal by ATO.

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c. **IED/ Blast Bomb.**

- (1) If such a device is found, treat it as a contact, take cover, extract from killing area, and observe arcs.
- (2) Stay in cover and check for casualties. If there are no casualties, remain in cover and await further direction.
- (3) Depending on the severity of their wounds, casualties should be moved into cover (if possible), given first aid and prepared for evacuation, following a CASEVAC request.
- (4) Appropriate R2 must be sent in accordance with theatre SOIs.
- (5) Follow up action should include:
 - (a) Confirmation of device, including location and size.
 - (b) Use of satellite patrols to provide depth to what could be developing into a major operation.

d. **Public Disorder.**

- (1) If a cordon location should encounter a minor aggro or public order situation and it must maintain the integrity of the cordon, it will require immediate reinforcement by the reserve or satellite patrols.
- (2) If PO equipment is available consideration should be given to issuing such equipment prior to cordon troops deploying onto the ground.
- (3) Maximum use of vehicles should be made to minimise the risk to troops.
- (4) Helicopters and satellite patrols may be used to monitor the crowd and to operate in depth in order to improve situational awareness.
- (5) The posture and attitude of the cordon troops will be critical. If troops are too heavy handed they risk inflaming the situation. They must remain sufficiently robust to maintain the integrity of the cordon.

SATELLITE PATROLLING

1. **Role.** Satellite patrols assist in the overall defence of the cordon and provide depth, deception and aggressive activity.
2. **Composition.** A satellite patrol should not consist of less than two teams and should be commanded by an experienced patrol commander.
3. **Tasking.** A satellite patrol should be given detailed tasks and not left to patrol aimlessly within a given sector of the cordon. Tasks may include:
 - a. Rummage searches.
 - b. VCPs.
 - c. House checks.
 - d. Standing patrols.
 - e. Route checks.
 - f. Denying FP locations.
4. **Deployment.** Satellite patrols:
 - a. Deploy before static positions are taken up.
 - b. Dominate the area, securing landing sites and or routes prior to the arrival of the main body of the cordon.
 - c. Do not plug gaps but compliment other cordon activities.
 - d. Liaise with static cordon locations.
5. **Control.** For effective control the commander must ensure that:
 - a. All static positions are aware of their location.
 - b. The patrol rest and lie up activity is staggered between patrols.
 - c. Control is exercised by the ICP unless specifically delegated.
6. **Movement.** Satellite patrols should use unpredictable routes, cover dead ground and likely FPs onto static positions.

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CHAPTER 17

CONVOY OPERATIONS

GENERAL

1. There is no such thing as an administrative move on operations. The planning, resourcing and conduct of convoys are operations in their own right. Convoys on current operation often comprise between 30 and 80 vehicles, stretching for well over a mile in length.

AIM

2. This chapter provides direction on the planning and conduct of operational convoys at unit level, and the training required to operate them successfully in a complex environment against an enemy employing effective countermeasures

CONTENTS

3. Although primarily aimed at unit level, all officers and SNCOs should understand the mechanics of tactical road movement so that they can control their own group of vehicles. The following areas are covered:

	Section	Subject
(a)	(b)	(c)
1.	Principles.	The principles required for the safe conduct of convoys.
2.	Convoy Planning Factors.	Protection and security. Command and control. Composition of the main body and escorts. Formation and unit op orders. Unit SOPs.
3.	Battle Procedure.	The sequence of events.
4.	Responsibilities.	Formation HQ staff. Unit operations staff. Convoy commander. Escort commander. Junior commanders.
5.	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).	Driving considerations and convoy discipline. Employment of escorts. Use of top cover sentries. Vulnerable points and vulnerable areas. Traversing likely ambush sites. Actions on contact.
6.	Unit Training Requirements.	

PRINCIPLES

4. Convoy operations should adhere to the following principles:

a. **Mutual Support.** Convoys should not act in isolation from other operations. They should, wherever possible, be integrated into other framework operations in order to increase the protection available to them. Similarly, elements within the

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convoy must be mutually supporting and be able to assist each other throughout the operation.

b. **All Round Defence.** Convoys must maintain situational awareness. Convoys must not be drawn into the trap of worrying purely about problems to their front or rear.

c. **Depth.** Convoys should seek to maintain a depth capability, with the ability to react from the front, rear and flanks.

d. **Reserves.** Maintenance of reserves is key. Reserve groupings may contain strike assets as well as assets such as medics or recovery vehicles.

e. **Offensive Spirit.** Convoys must maintain an offensive mindset and remain focussed on their task.

f. **Deception.** Regular convoy routes may become well known to the enemy. Convoys should seek to change routes regularly, change formation and take any action that may sow doubt in the enemy's mind.

g. **Communications.** A key principle is the ability to maintain communications both within the convoy and with the unit responsible for the ground through which the convoy is moving. Detailed coordination will be required in the planning stages.

CONVOY PLANNING FACTORS

5. **The Threat.** Convoy commanders must conduct a thorough analysis of the threat along the proposed route. This should include areas such as the identification of previous attack sites, the locations of Vulnerable Points (VPs) and Vulnerable Areas (VAs), and an up to date G2 brief.

6. **Protection and Security.** Commanders must ensure that all convoys are afforded protection appropriate to the threat and in accordance with formation direction. Soldiers must be fully trained in the use of all weapons systems. Top cover sentries should be used as necessary. High priority or particularly large moves will usually warrant suitable reinforcement from assets such as helicopter top cover to give enhanced situational awareness. Convoys must always have their own integral force protection assets. Where appropriate, consideration should be given to the use of an external escort force to provide the convoy with additional depth, mutual support and additional firepower to combat an enemy threat.

a. **Integral Force Protection.** Convoys should have intimate protection from troops integral to the unit conducting the convoy. The precise role of these troops will depend upon the availability of other protection assets but their main role is to ensure that, in the event of attack, the convoy is able to extract from the killing area to an area of safety as quickly as possible. Integral force protection assets should normally remain in the immediate area of the main body.

b. **External Escort Forces.** A convoy escort force is any security element/augmentation which has an independent TASKORG in order to support the convoy.

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It must have sufficient firepower to deal with any attack whilst the remainder of the convoy extracts from the killing area. The composition of the escort is likely to be directed by the formation HQ, based on the size of the convoy and the threat. It may include an advance guard and a Reserve Strike Group (RSG). Consideration should be given to the use of arm'd inf or arm'd recce due to their enhanced protection, mobility and firepower. The mission of the escort is to provide in depth protection to the convoy. Additional tasks may include route checks, VP/ VA checks a tactical bound ahead of the convoy, the picqueting of key junctions and domination of ground in depth. Such activities will enhance situational awareness.

c. **Top Cover Sentries.** Top Cover Sentries (TCS) do not necessarily have to be used in every circumstance. Dynamic TCS should be deployed using the 'jack in the box' concept. Convoy commanders must balance the risk to TCS from attack and vehicle accidents with the benefit of the enhanced protection, surveillance and situational awareness they provide. TCS are most effective at deterring short range attacks (eg grenade, petrol bombs, RPGs). They are not effective when travelling at speed.

d. **ECM (FP).** All convoys must deploy with sufficient force protection ECM equipment and a thorough understanding of its tactical deployment. There should be enough ECM to enable all elements of the convoy to be protected.

7. **Command Control and Communications.** Effective C3 is the product of thorough training, effective SOPs and good coordination at all levels. The convoy commander must specify the responsibilities of all other commanders in his orders, particularly in the event of an attack. While on task the convoy commander has command of all elements of the convoy including escort forces. In the event of an attack, the convoy commander will usually retain control of the internal force protection troops and delegate responsibility for reacting to the attack to the escort force, maintaining the main effort of getting the convoy main body out of the killing area. Communications within the convoy and with flanking forces, particularly battle groups through whose AO the convoy is travelling, must be well understood by all commanders. PRR will usually be the prime means of comms within the convoy. Theatre specific commercial communication systems, VHF and HF comms may be required for external communication depending upon the terrain. Key to good C3 will be clear orders. Notes on orders are at Annex A.

8. **Composition of the Convoy Main Body.** The convoy main body, including internal force protection, should be formed so that it can readily react to the threat. The convoy commander should be positioned near the front of the main body from where he can best exercise control over the convoy. If the main body is divided into packets, each packet must have its own commander. Spare prime movers, REME fitters, recovery vehicles and CASEVAC vehicles should be positioned at the rear of the main body.




Figure 17.1 - Possible Deployment of Convoy

9. **Composition of Escorts.** The escorting force should consist of three tactical groups:

a. **Advance Patrol (AP).** If possible, sufficient security forces should be made available to allow an advance element to be deployed. Its purpose is to prove the route, provide the convoy commander with information on the enemy, enable situational awareness and to deter the enemy. It should work one tactical bound ahead of the convoy main body (2 — 3 km in open country but very much closer in built up areas) and maintain communications with the convoy commander.

b. **Close Protection Group (CPG).** The CPG provides immediate protection to the convoy. The escort commander is located in this group which could be located anywhere throughout the convoy and should be used as a reaction force. It should be able to respond immediately to any requirement for suppressive fire or counter attack.

c. **Reserve Strike Group (RSG).** This element provides the reserves and a counter attack element.

10. **OPSEC.** As with all operations denial of information to the enemy is paramount. Maintenance of OPSEC becomes more challenging where Host Nation (HN) or civilian contractors are employed. The following points should be considered during planning and execution:

a. Night move instead of day.

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- b. Correct voice procedure.
- c. Deception plan (eg route selection, timings, convoy composition).
- d. Guarding of vehicles.
- e. Denial plan – SOP (cargo, prime movers and trailers, communications equipment, ECM, frequencies).

10. **Communications.** Efficient communications are vital to the successful execution of convoy operations. It is the convoy commander's responsibility to ensure that appropriate levels of communications to meet the threat are provided. The following points should be considered:

- a. **Radio.** The primary means of communications should be by radio. All vehicles should be able to communicate within packets using PRR (insecure). Secure comms with sufficient range will be required between packets and the escort force. All packet commanders and above should be able to communicate with local units and formations, having a full knowledge of frequencies and all callsigns. A radio check must be carried out before deployment. In some circumstances HF radio and TACSAT may provide the primary means of communication.
- b. **Alternate Means.** In his orders the convoy commander should specify all alternate means of communication. These may include flares, hand signals, vehicle signals and mobile phone. The convoy commander must never use the term "as per SOPs" in his orders, since commanders within the convoy may be from external units.
- c. **Situational Awareness.** Keeping a high level of situational awareness throughout the convoy is essential. Escort forces should constantly be talking to one another, informing relevant callsigns of traffic movement, the progress of the convoy and potential threats. Within the convoy main body, TCS will aid situational awareness. Use of PRR to give a running commentary of activity and progress will also assist those in the back of armoured vehicles.

11. **Unit SOPs.** Thoroughly developed and well practised SOPs are essential. They must remain relevant and must be adhered to by planning staff and those involved in the execution of the mission. Care must be taken to ensure that all elements of the convoy from external units are fully aware of the relevant SOPs. A suggested list of SOP headings is at Annex B.

BATTLE PROCEDURE

12. **General.** Preparation for each convoy should follow a set procedure. Any temptation to cut battle procedure should be resisted, although well developed SOPs will assist in speeding it up. Full integration of any escort force and civilian drivers plus comprehensive briefing at all levels must take place prior to departure. A suggested planning sequence is at Annex C.

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13. Planning Sequence.

a. **Formation HQ.** Formation HQ G3 and G4 planning staff will conduct the initial planning and decide if the operation is necessary. They will also begin liaison with flanking formations/ other coalition nations through which the convoy will have to pass¹. They will then produce a formation op order or FRAGO to the units concerned.

b. **Unit Ops Staff.** Unit ops staff must also consider whether the convoy is necessary in light of the local threat level. Once the decision has been made an estimate will be conducted and a plan made. An op order or FRAGO (which includes cargo lists and transport requirements) will then be issued to the convoy commander, via sub unit ops staff as necessary. If time and the situation allow a route recce should be conducted. If not, a detailed map/imagery recce, engineer intelligence and RMP information should be used.

c. **Convoy Commander.** The convoy commander, with assistance from unit and sub unit Ops staff, is responsible for the detailed planning of the convoy. He must consider the following areas as part of his planning process:

- (1) Conduct estimate.
- (2) Identify clarification points and request answers from sub unit/unit ops staff.
- (3) Issue warning order.
- (4) Liaise with:
 - i. Internal FP elements.
 - ii. Escort force if allocated.
 - iii. Flanking units.
 - iv. Sigs/ECM staff.
 - v. G4 staff.
- (5) Prepare orders

RESPONSIBILITIES

14. Command and organisational responsibilities are at Annex D.

¹ Suggested drills for the planning of a Formation move by Formation HQ staff can be found in AC 71268A, *Military Road Movement (All Arms)*. They will not fit all circumstances and staffs should develop their own TTPs.

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

15. **General.** Generic TTPs should be adjusted to suit the operational environment, the threat and the equipment in use. Guidance on general convoy discipline, driving considerations and the deployment of the convoy commander, the escort and the use of TCS is at Annex E.

16. **Likely Ambush Locations.** Generic TTPs for traversing potential ambush sites are at Annex F. These include:

- a. Halts.
- b. Defiles.
- c. Villages, towns and built up areas.
- d. Bridges.
- e. Crowds.
- f. VBIEDs.

17. **Anti Ambush Drills.** Every ambush will differ and all eventualities cannot be trained for. Reactions to ambushes will also depend on the forces available and the composition of the convoy. Only thorough training will ensure an effective response in all situations. The key is to ensure that all elements of the convoy, including the escort force (if deployed) are aware of their responsibilities. General anti ambush drills are described at Annex G and must be known by all. These include:

- a. Progress not held up.
- b. Progress held up.
- c. Convoy partially held up.

TRAINING

18. Proficiency in the execution of operational convoys can only be achieved by repeated efficient individual and collective training. It is imperative that operational convoy drills are exercised whenever and wherever possible and that unit commanders, their operational staff and convoy commanders are well practised in the planning and execution of convoy operations. Only total familiarity will enable swift accommodation of any change in the tactical environment. A suggested outline for training is at Annex H.

CONCLUSION

19. The following conclusions can be drawn from recent operations:

- a. All convoy operations must be seen as operations in their own right and must attract the appropriate levels of resources and planning effort.

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b. Commanders must take every opportunity during collective training to treat the environment as hostile and any movement as tactical. In this way units will already have levels of expertise which PDT can then exploit and direct towards the specific threat.

References:

- A. AC No 71268A *Military Road Movement (All Arms)* 2001.
- B. LWC Doctrinal Note 05/03.
- C. 12 CS Sqn RLC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.
- D. OPTAG Convoy Drills Lessons, updated 2006.

FORMATION AND UNIT OPERATION ORDERS FOR MOVEMENT

1. **Warning Order.** Points listed below should be included in the warning order. Any items that are covered by standing orders or SOPs only need a reference. As much information as possible should be shown in the movement table, or by means of an overlay, rather than in the body of the order. Unit orders are to include only items that concern them.

- a. Threat.
- b. Friendly forces.
- c. Routes.
- d. Order of march.
- e. Methods of movement.
- f. Layout and outline traffic plan in new area.
- g. Average speed.
- h. Density.
- i. Details of harbour/ muster areas.
- j. Halts.
- k. RV for escort force.
- l. RV for guide parties.
- m. Traffic control.
- n. Advance and rear parties.
- o. **Protection.** Internal force protection only, or will there be an escort force?
- p. Refugee control.
- q. **Communications.** Including those for traffic control and with external/flanking units.
- r. ECM (FP).
- s. Lighting policy.

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- t. **Route Intelligence.** Detours options, route capability (MLC), VPs/ VAs, crossing, bridges. Previous incidents/ ICPs etc.
- u. Road state.
- v. **Administrative Arrangements.** To include:
 - (1) Issue and holdings of rations, fuel, lubricants and ammunition.
 - (2) Repair and recovery.
 - (3) Allocation of medical, supply and RMP resources.
 - (4) Life support (staging, halts along the route).
- w. Emergency RVs.
- x. Lost/ separated drills.
- y. ROE.
- z. Vehicle loading.
- aa. Medical.

2. **Operation Orders and FRAGOs.** Operation orders and FRAGOs should be issued for all tactical convoys. A suggested outline is shown at Appendix 1.

Appendix:

- 1. Example Unit Convoy Operation Order.

EXAMPLE UNIT CONVOY OPERATION ORDER

(PROTECTIVE MARKING)

Copy No . . . of . . .Copies
Issuing HQ
Place of Issue
Date/Time/Group of Signature
Message Reference Number

Convoy Movement Order No

References:

- A. Maps.
- B. Tables.
- C. Relevant Documents.

Time Zone used throughout the Order:

SITUATION

- 1. General.
- 2. Threat.

MISISON

- 3.

EXECUTION

- 4. Concept of Ops.
 - a. Intent.
 - b. Scheme of Manoeuvre.
 - (1) Convoy.
 - (2) Security elements.
 - (3) Air/ Avn.
 - (4) ISTAR.

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- c. ME.
- 5. Tasks.
- 6. Coord Instrs.
 - a. Timings.
 - b. Route.
 - (1) Outbound.
 - (2) Inbound.
 - c. RVs and ERVs.
 - d. Depth protection/ force protection and escorts.
 - e. ECM allocation.
 - f. Booking out procedure.
 - g. Convoy marshalling area and procedure.
 - h. Med.
 - i. Recovery.
 - j. Packet sy.
 - k. Air/ avn.
 - l. ISTAR.
 - m. O group.
 - n. Order of march.
 - o. Convoy discipline.

SERVICE SUPPORT

7.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- 8. Command/ command states.
- 9. Liaison.

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10. Comms (incl emergency nets).
11. Frequencies.
12. POCs.

CONVOY DRILLS UNIT SOPs

1. Unit Convoy Drills SOPs should include the following points. They are for guidance only and their relevance to the environment, the threat and the specific theatre should be examined carefully.
 - a. Command, control and organisation of convoys, packets and composition of tactical groups.
 - b. Vehicle preparation and loading lists, including personnel (personal equipment lists, grab bags) and CES. First parades, halt parades, suppression of reflective parts (windows, headlights). Serviceable spare tyres, water and fuel jerry cans filled, rigid tow bars distributed evenly along the convoy. Fitting of wire cutters if TCS are to be employed.
 - c. Normal speeds and densities by day and night.
 - d. Communications – standard formats of contact reports, situation reports, casualty (METHANE) reports. Alternate communications – flares, signals.
 - e. Marking of heads and tails of organised elements of columns by day and by night.
 - f. Duties of motorcyclists controlling columns and escorts, if employed.
 - g. Protection on the move and during halts including camouflage of vehicles.
 - h. Procedure at stoppages and halts.
 - i. Action on in the event of attack/ ambush (anti-ambush drills, EID/ VBIED drills).
 - j. Methods of marking routes by day and by night if required.
 - k. Vehicle markings and lighting.
 - l. Duties of vehicle commanders and orders for drivers.
 - m. Employment night viewing aides.
 - n. Composition and duties of advance parties, harbour parties, escort forces and attachments.
 - o. Battle damage repair and denial of vehicles, cargo and equipment policies.
 - p. Embussing, debussing and deployment procedures.

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- q. Inspection/ sanitisation of vacated sites for security purposes.
- r. Normal administrative arrangements; rations, F&L, medical (location of team medics), repair, recovery and towing (like to like, allowable fixing times, route sweeping, spare prime movers), allocation of RMP resources, transport operating record, accident reports.
- s. Signposting and traffic control, if required.
- t. Composition and duties of regulating HQ.
- u. Responsibility for manning start and release points, sector controls and traffic posts.
- v. Duties of unit personnel trained in traffic control, including officers in charge of traffic posts.
- w. Communications for traffic control purposes.
- x. Movement through and around obstacles, defiles, VPs/ VAs, bridges, villages.
- y. Detour drills.
- z. Harbour drills.
- aa. Employment of Escorts – coordination, RVs, limit of exploitation, target acquisition.
- ab. CASEVAC/ medic procedures.
- ac. TCS responsibilities.
- ad. Dress (CBA, helmets, goggles etc).

CONVOY OPERATIONS - EXAMPLE BATTLE PROCEDURE

H -	Fmn Ops	Unit Ops	Sub Unit Ops	Convoy Comd	Log Comd	Log 2IC	CMA Comd	
48	Issue OpO	Receive OpO: Estimate. Issue Wng O						
24		Issue FRAGO	Receives FRAGO: -Estimate. -Clarification pts to Bn Ops. -Issue WngO		Receives WngO.			
23								
22			Planning Meeting: -Cfm Loads. -Cfm Timeline -Cfm ORBAT					
21								
20			Book: -ECM. -O Gp.	Liaise with: -G4 elms. -BG Ops (all transit AOs). -FP Comds. -Sigs Det.	- Book Rations.			
19			Prep Route Cards.	Prep Orders.	-Supervise Veh Loading.		-Assist Log Comd.	
18								
17							-BPT supervise loading of civ vehs.	
16								
15			Receive/ issue Civ Flap sheets.		-Visit contractors to cfm civ loads.			
14								
13								
12			Firefight anomalies.	MANDATORY REST (8 HRS)				
11								
10								
9								
8								
7								
6								
5			Prep O Gp					
4			H - 5: Orders Group, incl Rehearsals & ROCC drills				Veh Security Pty during O Gp	
3		Final Atts Confirm/ Report Time H - 4	Collect & issue: -ECM (H-4) -Ammo. -Rations. Veh markers	Kit Check.	Receive Civ Dvr Flap Sheets		H-4: Assist collection & issue of ECM.	
2		Issue Civ Driver Flap Sheets		H-80 min: Line Up in OOM				Place vehs in OOM/ Escort Vehs to CMA.
1			H-60: Cfm Load Plan as per FRAGO on CMA					
			Firefight probs at CMA	H-30: RV with FP & Civ vehs	H-30: Load			
			Book out Bn Ops	H-15Final comms check & RTM				
H			H-Hr: Convoy Departs					

**CONVOY OPERATIONS – RESPONSIBILITIES OF
HEADQUARTERS AND COMMANDERS**

1. **Regulating HQ.** The Formation HQ responsible for tasking the unit with the convoy and monitoring its conduct is known as the Regulating HQ. Operations staff in the Regulating HQ will be responsible for:

- a. The recce of the proposed route and the selection and confirmation of Traffic Posts (TPs) and waiting areas as required.
- b. Command of the Traffic Control (TC) operation, if required.
- c. Medical and recovery facilities at TPs if deployed.
- d. The manning of TPs and waiting areas as required.
- e. Route maintenance.
- f. Maintenance of a QRF.
- g. Engineer intelligence including going, obstacles etc.

2. **Unit HQ Operations Staffs.** Much of the planning for a convoy will be conducted at unit level, with input from the convoy commander and with assistance from assets tasked by the unit through the regulating HQ. Much of the IPB, threat analysis and tasking of ISTAR assets to either recce routes or provide air support during the convoy will be co-ordinated by the unit HQ. Specific unit responsibilities include:

- a. Provision of the following information for the convoy commander:
 - (1) Go – No Go decision (usually following a formal Go/No Go brief).
 - (2) Convoy composition and order of march.
 - (3) Route details, incl marking and critical points. Route card and mapping.
 - (4) Timings and average speeds.
 - (5) Halts, TC, light, recovery, harbour areas, CASEVAC.
 - (6) G2 threat brief.
 - (7) Friendly forces – including one up, flanking formations, units/formations operating in traversed areas, known movement of other forces.
 - (8) Communications details.

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- b. Controlling convoy movement.
- c. Liaison with controlling HQs to ensure that flanking formations and other units are aware of convoy movement, routes, timings and in order to remain updated with the enemy and friendly force situation.
- d. Conduct estimate, plan and issue Op O/ FRAGO to convoy commander.

3. **Convoy Commander.**

- a. Command the convoy. Overall responsibility for conduct of the convoy.
- b. Approve TASKORG and delegate personnel and vehicle responsibilities.
- c. Conduct estimate, plan the convoy, issue OpO/ verbal Os, conduct the debrief. Conduct rehearsals prior to deployment.
- d. Responsible for maintenance of internal and external communications.

4. **Logistic Commander/ Deputy Convoy Comd.**

- a. Be prepared to assume convoy comd duties.
- b. Monitor security at rear of convoy.
- c. Responsible for G4 aspects of the operation – incl rations, vehicle load plan, ECM, ammo.
- d. Coordination with civilian contractors.

5. **Packet Commander.**

- a. Navigation.
- b. Maintenance of packet speed and packet interval.
- c. Command of all vehicles in packet.

6. **Internal Force Protection Commander.**

- a. Command of Internal FP vehicles.
- b. Responsible to convoy commander for intimate protection on convoy main body vehicles.
- c. Reaction to attacks in accordance with convoy comd's orders.
- d. In absence of escort force:
 - (1) Route recce and clearance.
 - (2) VP/VA checks ahead of convoy main body.

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7. **Escort Force Commander.**

- a. Route recce and clearance especially VP/VA checks.
- b. Provision of depth security to convoy.
- c. Immediate protection/intimate support to convoy.
- d. Overwatch/static security (picqueting of routes).
- e. Halt recces.
- f. Reaction to attack in order to main freedom of action for convoy.

8. **Vehicle Commander.**

- a. Obey all convoy signals and orders.
- b. Maintain correct distance from surrounding vehicles.
- c. Dispersal of personnel and camouflage of vehicles (if required) at halts.
- d. Maintenance of situational awareness for all passengers.
- e. Supervision of driver.
- f. Traffic control at halts.

Appendix:

1. Commanders' Responsibilities Check Sheet.

COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES CHECK SHEET

CONVOY COMMANDER

Receipt of Orders	
Receive FRAGO:	
Estimate: Time Appreciation. Staff Check Reqts. Clarification Points to Ops. Issue WngO/ FRAGO and Manifest to Log Comd.	} With Sqn Ops
Attend Planning Meeting: Confirm Loads. Confirm ORBAT. Confirm Addtl Pax.	} With Sqn Ops and Log Comd.
Liaise With: Bn Ops (and flanking units). LSD Comd. IO. FP Comd. Sigs/ ECM staff.	
Prepare Orders.	
Delivery of Orders	
Deliver Orders.	
Prior to Convoy Departing Convoy Marshalling Area (CMA)	
Book Out at Sqn Ops – hand in Flap Sheet. Book out at Bn Ops – hand in Flap Sheet. Comms check – all means. Final Confirmation of Veh loads with Bn Ops. RV with FP vehs. Physical inspection of Comms Antennae height.	Ensure 5 x copies of Flap Sheet: 1. Sqn Ops. 2. Bn Ops. 3. Convoy Comd. 4. Exit Gate. 5. Receiving Unit Ops.
Convoy on Task	
Navigate to Destination. Control FP. SITREPs to 0. C2 of Convoy. Pass on any key Int from Route.	
On Arrival at Destination	
Confirm Arrival with 0. Liaise LSD Comd. Book in BG Ops – book G2 brief and FP RV. Conduct Convoy Debrief and gather all Int fm Convoy. Liaise with Bn G2 Cell.	
Prior to Return to Own Location Confirm Collected Loads with FRAGO and LSD. Confirm all vehs, pax, wpns, ammo, ECM and eqpt present. Deliver CfmOs. Liaise with FP.	Following Return to Own Location Collect all Int. Conduct Debrief. Complete Patrol Report within 3 hrs – 2 x copies. Check Weapon cleanliness.

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LOGISTIC COMMANDER

Receipt of Orders	
<p>Liaise with the following: Convoy Commander. Sqn Ops (check correct vehs for loads). Admin for Dvrs, Top Cover and Co-dvrs. Attached Units. Stores Depts. Civilian Tpt Manger. Brief CMA Party.</p> <p>Complete/ Collect the following: Collect Loads. Flap Sheets. Check Kit, eqpt and wpn cards. Check sufficient breakdown eqpt carried. Ensure First Parade of vehs.</p>	<p>Book the following Eqpt: ECM. Manpack and Veh Radios. Number of Vehs Reqd. Enhanced Vehicle Protection Kits (EVPK) (if reqd). Support Wpns, Pyro and Illum. Early/ late meals and packed lunches/ rations.</p>
Delivery of Orders	
<p>Deliver OOM and Service Support paragraphs. Collect all Flap Sheets from FP and att elms. Collate all Flap Sheets and issue to Convoy Comd.</p>	
Prior to Convoy Departing Convoy Marshalling Area (CMA)	
<p>Place vehicles into OOM. (Including Allocation of Vehicle Recovery and Team Medics). Check security of Loads and coupling of trls. Confirm civ dvr names and destination. Final check of loads against manifest. Final check of all convoy marker boards. Account for all vehicles as they cross the start-line. Check manpack radio mount in Log Comd veh – Rear DROPS or Permanent Rear FP veh.</p>	
Convoy on Task	
<p>Account for vehicles at regular intervals. Control rear of convoy. Give regular comms checks to Ø over the back-up comms – HF manpack (Force Safety Net). BE PREPARED TO ASSUME COMD OF THE CONVOY AND CONDUCT IAs.</p>	
On Arrival at Destination	
<p>Account for wpns, ammo, Pyro and ECM. Ensure refuel vehicles. Ensure last parade has taken place.</p>	<p>Once briefed by the LSD Comd on security and Load Distribution: Brief all dvrs on distribution of loads and timings.</p>
Prior to Return to Location	
<p>Ensure first parade of vehicles. Supervise loading and securing of stores being returned. Check security of loads. Collect 1033s and consignment notes. Update flap sheets Tasks as per Convoy Departing CMA above</p>	
Actions on Return to Home Location	
<p>Ensure returned stores returned to receiving dept. Return all Consignment Notes. Ensure vehs refuelled. Ensure all wpns are returned to the armoury. Oversee last parades and report any faults on 1005 to TMA (and Artificer if mission critical eqpt).</p>	

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LOGISTIC SECOND IN COMMAND

<p style="text-align: right;">Receipt of Orders</p> <p>Collection and distr of: Vehs. EVPK. Sect wpns, reserve ammo and pyro. ECM. PRR. Veh Marker Boards. Escort Civ Vehs to CMA.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Delivery of Orders</p> <p>Do not attend O Gp. Remain with CMA party and fire fight any problems with collection of civ vehs. Get brief from CC at earliest opportunity.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Prior to Convoy Departing Convoy Marshalling Area (CMA)</p> <p>Supervise the Load of all wpns.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Convoy on Task</p> <p>Prepare to take command of Log Sect. <i>BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT IAs</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">On Arrival at Destination</p> <p>Supervise unloading of all wpns. Collect and secure all Log Sect ECM, wpns, pyro and ammo. Refuel vehicles. Supervise last parade. Check dvrs Eat and Sleep cards.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Prior to Return to Location</p> <p>Supervise first parading of vehicles. Check Eat/Sleep cards. Issue and supervise fitting of all ECM and Wpns. Supervise the load of all wpns. Distribute packed meals.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Actions on Return to Base Location</p> <p>Supervise unloading of all wpns. Collect all ECM, pyro, illum and PRRs. Return all ECM to ECM Store. Refuel Vehicles. Supervise last parade. Report all eqpt faults.</p>

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CONVOY MARSHALLING AREA PARTY COMMANDER

<p style="text-align: center;">Receipt of Orders</p> <p>Book and first parade LR to be used by CMA until convoy departs. Assist the collection and issue of ECM prior to O's. Ensure there is 1 x Prime mover on standby at CMA 1 in case of breakdowns.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Delivery of Orders</p> <p>Give CMA brief 2IC CMA party to all convoy vehs during O's.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Prior to Convoy Departing Convoy Marshalling Area (CMA)</p> <p>Dir vehs into the OOM as dir by Log Comd. Distribute and fit Convoy Marker Panels as dir by Log 2IC. Assist last min collection of civ vehs to CMA.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Prior to Return to Location</p> <p>Be on 20 mins NTM ready to deploy to CMA to receive convoy back into location.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Actions on Return to Base Location</p> <p>Meet convoy in the CMA. Assist the collection and accounting of all ECM, Convoy Marker Boards and individual veh pyro. Ensure no civ vehs depart CMA until Log Comd dir.</p>

FORCE PROTECTION COMMANDER

<p style="text-align: center;">Receipt of Orders</p> <p>Conduct own battle procedure. Liaise with Convoy Comd re tasks / actions on / posture.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Delivery of Orders</p> <p>Deliver Actions On during Coord Instr. Bring 4 x flap sheets to O Gp</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Prior to Convoy Departing Convoy Marshalling Area (CMA)</p> <p>Load weapons. Obtain Control Number. Test ECM and radios.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Convoy on Task</p> <p>Maint comms with Convoy Comd. Prov intimate FP to Main Body. Liaise with external FP elms. Account for all vehicles at regular intervals and inform Log Comd. Be prepared for Veh Comds and respective Top Covers to conduct low hanging cable actions on – have signals for dvrs and comds to follow as per orders. BE PREPARED TO ASSUME COMD OF THE CONVOY AND CONDUCT IAS</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">On Arrival at Destination</p> <p>Update Convoy Comd on incidents on route. Unload FP weapons. Control all FP Tps in location.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Prior to Return to Location</p> <p>Cfm Os: Deliver actions on in coord instrs.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Actions on Return to Base Location</p> <p>Unload all FP wpns. Update Convoy Comd on any incidents on route.</p>

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VEHICLE COMMANDER

Receipt of Orders	
Extract info on timings, routes, freq & C/S.	
Prior to Convoy Departing Convoy Marshalling Area (CMA)	
Sign for mini-flares, 2 x red phos, illum and smk. Ensure minimum of 2 x cyalumes carried per veh. Check load is correctly restrained. Supervise veh first parade. Obtain Control Number from Convoy Comd. Fit and check ECM – Ensure spare battery easily accessible. Fit convoy marker board.	
Convoy on Task	
Ensure driver stays awake. Relay comms msgs. Guide vehicle whilst reversing at all times.	Rectify any ECM faults on route. Provide Top Cover as dir by Convoy Comd. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT IAs!
On Arrival at Destination	
Assist in loading/unloading of vehicle. Fill in Eat and Sleep card. Assist hand in of ECM, ammo and pyro. Supervise first/last parades.	
Prior to Return to Location	
Check load. Check/Assist fitting of ECM. Assist first parade of veh.	
Actions on Return to Base Location	
Assist return of all ECM, pyro, illum and PRRs. Ensure refuel vehicles. Assist last parade of veh. Return wpn to armoury.	

DRIVERS' RESPONSIBILITIES

Receipt of Orders	
Extract info on timings, routes, freq & C/S.	
Prior to Convoy Departing Convoy Marshalling Area (CMA)	
Check load. First parade veh. Obtain Control Number from Convoy Comd. Sign for veh ECM, fit and check serviceability. Ensure convoy marker board is correctly fitted.	
Convoy on Task	
Stay awake and alert. Drive safely and defensively. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT IAs!	
On Arrival at Destination	
Fill in Eat and Sleep card. Last parade veh. Hand in ECM, ammo and pyro.	
Actions on Return to Base Location	
Return all ECM, pyro, illum and PRRs to Log 2IC. Refuel/ Last parade veh. Return wpn to armoury.	

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DRESS AND EQUIPMENT

In Secure Location	
On the Person	Carried
ID discs (around neck – NOT in pocket). ID card (MOD 90) Med Tags (If issued) F Med 965 F Ident 189 JSP 398 Card A (issue 04) FMT 600 Eat and Sleep card Driving license photocopy - no address Morphine 2 x FFD White light	ICBA Helmet Mk6 CARRIAGE OF PERSONAL WEAPON Ensure: Sling fitted, with knot The weapon stays slung to the body when outside of the veh. If having difficulty climbing in to the veh, place weapon in the footrest, then climb in. DO NOT LAY WEAPONS ON ANY OTHER PART OF THE VEHICLE DO NOT LAY WEAPONS ON THE GROUND.
On Detail	
Worn on Detail	Belt Kit/Asslt Vest
As above ICBA/EPPE (cfm'd at Os) Helmet Mk6 Eye protection: Blast goggles Issued sunglasses Visor (depending on threat)	Ammunition (min 120 rds in mags) Red phos (if issued) FFD x 2 (1 x left map pocket) Morphine (left map pocket) 2 x water bottles Wpn cleaning kit Individ mine marking kit Individ med kit PRR (if issued) Compass (if issued) Spare batteries 2 x Cyalumes
Comds	
GPS Compass Map pack Spare ammo Night vision device Mob / Satphone / PMR	
Details	
In Veh	Bergan/Holdall
Veh CES 1 x box water ECM Spare ECM batteries Mine marking kit	Rations (if issued) Water Change of clothing/underwear Wash kit and towel Refuse sack (black bag) Sleeping system

CONVOY DISCIPLINE, THE USE OF ESCORT FORCES, TOP COVER SENTRIES AND DRIVING CONSIDERATIONS

1. The convoy should form up in order of march in the Convoy Marshalling Area (CMA) with internal FP assets leading. The escort force, if required, may join the convoy either at the CMA or at a given point along the route. The convoy comd should place himself either at or near the front of the main body. Exact placing of the convoy comd should vary – never set a pattern. Internal FP vehicles should be spread throughout the convoy. Basic convoy discipline drills are shown at Appendix 1 to this Annex.

2. Vehicles should maintain spacing as per their orders. In some environments this may be as much as 100m or more, although ECM equipment may require different spacing if in such a threat environment. In close terrain vehicles should close up. Convoy speeds should be determined in kms in the hr. Weather conditions, terrain, local speed limits, the threat, vehicle and driver abilities will all dictate what speed is correct. Sectors of observation and fire which will achieve mutual support are shown below.




Figure 11E.1 - Convoy Sectors of Observation and Fire

3. **Reaction to Attack.** Detailed actions on the reaction to any attack will have been given in the convoy orders and will depend upon the nature of the attack and the make up of the convoy. In all cases, though, personnel within vehicles must maintain an offensive mindset and be prepared to suppress any enemy using all weapons at their disposal, within their allocated arcs. If an escort force is deployed, it will be the escort that takes substantive action against the enemy. Internal FP assets will also take action, the priority to be getting the convoy main body out of the killing area. This does not, however, absolve the occupants of all vehicles from the requirement to suppress the enemy.

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4. **Recovery.** Recovery assets, spare prime movers and convoy life support vehicles should be positioned at the rear of the convoy, but in front of the rearmost FP vehicle. In the event of a breakdown recovery assets should move to the scene as quickly as possible in order to minimise any time spent at the halt. The recovery packet commander must ascertain the following, much of which will depend upon the threat:

- a. Can the vehicle be fixed within xx mins (time given in O Gp)?
- b. If not, can the vehicle be towed by another vehicle?
- c. If not is the spare prime mover available, or is recovery required?
- d. If none of these then the vehicle and cargo must be denied to the enemy. All round defence must be in place while any assessment and action is being made/taken.

5. **Internal Force Protection Vehicles.** Internal FP assets are to provide intimate support to the convoy. They must be able to:

- a. Keep up with convoy maximum speeds.
- b. Provide all round observation and fire.
- c. Have sufficient firepower to suppress target and manoeuvre within unprotected convoy areas.
- d. Physically block the road in order to prevent traffic from feeder roads, junctions and roundabouts intermingling with the convoy.

6. **Escort Forces.** Escort forces are intended to provide depth protection and added firepower to a convoy. They must be able to:

- a. Keep up with convoy maximum speeds.
- b. Have the ability to manoeuvre around a convoy across country.
- c. Have sufficient firepower to deal with any attack independently of the remainder of the convoy.
- d. Block feeder roads and/or piquet key junctions in order to maintain the integrity of the convoy.

7. **Use of Escort Forces.** Detailed techniques are at Annex F. The following points must be considered when escorts are provided:

- a. Blocking techniques require extensive rehearsals and thorough training.
- b. Route recce/ analysis will be required prior to deployment to determine where these techniques will have to be used.
- c. Blocking vehicles should be identified prior to deployment.

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8. **Civilian Contractors.** Civilian contractors may well be included in tactical convoys. When planning the convoy, the convoy comd must remember that drivers will not be trained or armed, may speak little or no English and may well have cultural differences. Civilian vehicles are unlikely to have the same terrain capabilities as military vehicles. Military vehicles will usually need to be spread throughout the convoy in order to afford civilian vehicles the necessary protection. Manpower will be required to control and protect the drivers in the event of an incident and the procedures and personnel responsible should be nominated during the O Group. Drivers must be fully briefed on breakdown procedure and the likelihood that if their vehicle cannot be fixed or hooked up for towing within the allotted period then it will be abandoned and may be destroyed. Convoy comds must bear OPSEC in mind at all stages and must be careful about the amount of information that civilian contractors are given, both prior to and during the convoy.

9. **Top Cover Sentries.** Key points to note are:

- a. Be alert to overhead wires; wire cutters should be mounted to vehicles.
- b. Employment of an unpredictable 'jack in the box' technique is often the best way to deter the threat whilst minimising the risk.
- c. TCS should not be left up if unneeded since whilst up they are vulnerable.
- d. TCS have little effect when moving at speeds. If TCS are up, vehicle speeds should be such that the TCS have a good opportunity to identify combat indicators.
- e. Use of TCS at night should be coordinated with the use of white light or IR when NVGs are available.
- f. Correct dress and equipment. Body armour, weapons, first field dressings, webbing, grab bags. Ballistic eye protection and gloves must be worn at all times by TCS.

10. **Driving Considerations.**

- a. Be unpredictable; vary times, routes, speeds and formations.
- b. Attach signs to convoy vehicles in the indigenous language to warn civilians to stay clear of the convoy.
- c. Configure vehicles to eliminate blind spots (move mirrors etc).
- d. Use all available optical devices for scanning (binos, all weapons sights, handheld forward looking infrared devices etc).
- e. Wear helmets, body armour, seat belts and eye protection.
- f. Maintain a safe driving speed at all times.
- g. Drive defensively except what in contact.
- h. Maintain the correct vehicle interval. Avoid concertina effects.

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- i. Watch for combat Indicators at all times. This may be visible ordnance on the road, or any type of suspicious activity. Be aware of being drawn in to killing areas.
- j. Follow the tracks of preceding vehicles on unpaved roads.
- k. If conditions permit, travel down the middle of the road or off-road to maximise the distance from IEDs on the hard shoulder.
- l. If the convoy stops, all occupants must dismount, conduct 5 and 20m checks and establish all round protection.
- m. Exercise caution at choke points; watch for vehicle breakdowns, bridges, one-way roads, traffic jams and sharp turns.

Appendix:

- 1. Convoy Discipline Drills.

BASIC CONVOY DISCIPLINE DRILLS

Veh Comd: You are responsible for you vehicle, the driver and all occupants. Ensure that you maintain good convoy discipline at all times.

- Be alert to Combat Indicators. **Absence of the Normal – Presence of the Abnormal.**
- Order Top Cover up and down in response to the threat and the terrain.
- Drive in the centre of the road to maximise your distance from roadside devices.
- Keep your speed down. You will not outrun an IED.
- Give yourself time to move to your destination tactically. If you are late, speak to the Ops Room. Better late than never.
- Know and understand all theatre-specific TTPs.
- Know your route.
- Maintain good communications.
- Be alert to the threat.
- Maintain an offensive mindset. Do not be afraid to take action against any enemy forces.

TTPS FOR TRAVERSING POTENTIAL AMBUSH SITES

1. **Halts.** Do not set patterns. Making halts in the same locations on commonly used routes must be avoided. Identify halt areas during the convoy planning phase and specify them in orders. Halt areas must be secured prior to use by either the escort force or internal FP assets. If possible, escorts and FP vehicles should provide overwatch from depth locations whilst the site is in use. Irrespective of whether the site has been secured, all personnel must conduct 5 & 20m checks on dismounting.

2. **Defiles.** In several theatres, insurgents make good use of defiles as killing areas and convoys are therefore vulnerable within them. Defiles can be defined as either short or long. A short defile is one where the end can be seen from the start. A long defile is one where the end cannot be seen from the start. Defiles can be cleared either dismounted or mounted, this being a command decision based upon time, the threat and resources available. Without an escort force it is unlikely that sufficient troops will be available to conduct a dismounted clearance. It is worth noting that defiles can be created using obstacles such as parked vehicles etc to channel convoys into killing areas. The following techniques should be used for mounted clearance:

a. **Short Defile.** FP vehicles or escort should recce the area prior to the defile. Once satisfied that the area is secure they should move through the defile tactically, conducting VP/ VA checks as required. They should then advance one tactical bound forward, or move into overwatch and wait for the convoy to pass through.

b. **Long Defile.** Traversing long defiles should be done as quickly as possible. The convoy is vulnerable if halted and must be stationary for the shortest possible time.

(1) Escort forces or Internal FP vehicles should recce the area short of the defile. Once satisfied that the area is secure they should move into the defile up to a point where they can see the next leg, but still maintain line of sight with the start of the defile.

(2) FP vehicles with the main body should by this time have moved into the start of the defile. These vehicles should then move up to the escort forces securing that part of the defile, which will then move forward a further tactical bound.

(3) This procedure is then repeated until all forces are through the defile.

(4) Whilst the defile is being cleared, any static convoys should adopt a 50% stand-to posture, with dismounted forces always conducting 5 and 20m checks.

(5) If sufficient escort forces are available, consideration should be given to picqueting the defile, preferably from high ground overwatch positions and maximum use should be made of mobile depth satellite protection.

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(6) Consideration should be given to moving the main body through in smaller packets. Each packet will require its own protection.

(7) Once all elements are through the defile, the convoy should reform at a subsequent halt location.

3. **Villages.** Convoys and FP assets must be aware of likely combat indicators as they approach villages. If a village appears abandoned then it should immediately be considered as suspect and the convoy should be halted well short of the approaches. Any small village that may be considered suspicious should be entered and exited with extreme caution.

- a. FP vehicles should conduct a recce to see if anything is out of place.
- b. FP assets should then move through the village tactically in bounds.
- c. Maximum use of depth satellite callsigns is to be encouraged in order to sow doubt in the mind of potential attackers.
- d. The village should be treated as a defile, with FP callsigns establishing overwatch and providing security as the main body moves through.

4. **Towns and Built Up Areas.** If there is a threat, towns and built up areas should be bypassed if possible. The close proximity of buildings to the road and lack of clear escape routes coupled with possible large numbers of civilians and heavy traffic makes any reaction to attack extremely difficult. If a town cannot be avoided, additional forces may well be required in order to allow the convoy to move through it without interference from traffic, whilst enabling the convoy to remain alert to the threat. The use of an escort force in addition to internal FP assets should normally be considered as obligatory.

- a. The escort force should deploy well before the arrival of the convoy.
- b. The escort force should conduct a route check of the proposed route, carrying out VP and VA drills as required.
- c. The escort force should consider picqueting key junctions and VPs in order to provide a secure route through the built up area.
- d. Mobile overwatch and an ability to react must be maintained, this most likely being found by the Escort Force.
- e. It is essential that any escorts have communications with the convoy main body while the convoy is moving through.
- f. **Blocking.** Where escorts are not blocking junctions, internal FP assets may be used. Blocking vehicles must be in place at junctions prior to arrival of the main body. Once the convoy passes, the blocking vehicles should move forward and resume their positions in the order of march. The following figures illustrate various techniques. Numbers on vehicles indicate which adopts position first:




Figure 17F.1 - Blocking a Cross Roads




Figure 17F.2 - Blocking a Staggered Junction




Figure 17F.3 - Blocking a Roundabout

g. **Clearing Overpasses.** Overpasses present a unique hazard in that there is dead ground on top. Deliberate techniques should be employed wherever possible. The preferred method is to clear them from the top.

(1) **Deliberate Clearance from the Top (Figure 17F.4).**

- (a) Clearance vehicles accelerate to the overpass. This needs to be done in enough time to conduct the clearance prior to the arrival of the convoy.
- (b) Lead vehicle stops short and covers the overpass. Troops should dismount and conduct VP/ VA checks under the overpass.
- (c) The second vehicle moves up the slip road onto the top of the overpass and maintains observation down onto the road whilst the first maintains cover. Vehicles must remain within ECM coverage.
- (d) Once the convoy moves through the second vehicle comes back down onto the road while the first maintains cover.
- (e) Once the manoeuvre is complete both vehicles rejoin the convoy.




Figure 17F.4 - Clearing of Overpass from Above

(2) Clearance of Overpasses from Below (Figure 17F.5).

- (a) Clearance vehicles accelerate to the overpass. This needs to be done in enough time to conduct the clearance prior to the arrival of the convoy.
- (b) The lead vehicle stops on the near side and covers the overpass. Troops dismount and conduct VP/ VA checks under the overpass prior to second vehicle moving through.
- (c) The second vehicle passes under the overpass and takes up a position to cover it from the other side.
- (d) Once the convoy has passed the near side vehicle moves through whilst the far side vehicle maintains cover.
- (e) Both vehicles then rejoin the convoy.




Figure 17F.5 - Clearance of Overpass from Below

(3) **Hasty Clearance (Figure 17F.6).** This technique should only be used when the situation does not permit deliberate clearance or when the threat level is deemed low enough.

- (a) Top cover sentries are deployed.
- (b) As each vehicle approaches the overpass, the TCS observes the overpass with the weapon in the shoulder.
- (c) As each vehicle passes under the overpass, the TCS turns to the rear and continues to cover the overpass from the far side.




Figure 17F.6 - Hasty Clearance of Overpass

5. **Bridges.** Bridges are key choke points and are prime locations for IEDs. Long bridges should be approached in the same manner as long defiles, if necessary walking lead vehicles through. The areas 200 – 300m to either end of the bridge are also prime ambush locations and should be treated with extreme caution.

- a. Escort forces should receive the area immediately prior to the bridge and conduct VP checks. Once satisfied that the approach is clear, troops should conduct dismounted VA checks along the bridge before vehicles move across.
- b. Once across the bridge, the escort force should establish an overwatch area to cover the main body as they cross the bridge.
- c. The escort force will also be required to move a tactical bound ahead of the bridge in order to clear the area beyond the bridge and to enable the main body to get clear of the bridge once they have crossed.

6. **Crowds.** Crowds may be aggressive. If they are, the escort force or FP assets must inform the convoy comd in sufficient time for an alternative route to be taken. If this is not possible then vehicles should close up. Drivers should ensure that all necessary security measures have been taken (lock doors, close windows) and continue to push forward at a walking pace. If conditions worsen, the convoy comd should raise the force profile on a graduated scale, beginning with the more overt carriage of weapons, escalating to the employment of FP assets in a more threatening overwatch position. A loudhailer should be used to give verbal warnings to the crowd. The use of baton guns may also be considered as part of the escalation of force. Warning shots should only be used if there is sufficient threat to warrant the use of lethal force. All personnel should remain alert for

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combat indicators throughout. The most likely threat in a crowd situation is that of a shoot rather than IEDs and TCS must be alert to this.

7. **Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs (SVBIEDs).** Convoys are vulnerable and attractive targets. The use of SVBIEDs as an effective means of ambush against convoys is common in some areas of operation, but is highly dependant upon the *modus operandi* of particular insurgent groups. All in the convoy must be aware of the likelihood of SVBIEDs on the route. This awareness will drive the action to be taken in the event of a suspicious vehicle. The following points should be observed during the planning and conduct of all convoys:

- a. Routes and timings of convoys must not follow a pattern.
- b. The threat from SVBIEDs must be identified during the planning phase and reiterated in Orders.
- c. Commanders and TCS must maintain continuous vigilance.
- d. All vehicles approaching the convoy, especially those with a driver and no passenger, should be observed closely. Vehicles containing substantial amounts of military ordnance will be heavily weighted down (although if commercial explosive such as C4/ Semtex is being used this will be less so). The main load bearing areas may be covered using blankets. Driving may be erratic.
- e. If in a high threat SVBIED area, rear vehicles should carry signs in the local language telling vehicles to maintain at least a 50m gap from the rear vehicle. TCS should reinforce this with hand signals and be prepared to fire warning shots, escalating to shots into the engine block and up to lethal force, if vehicles approach closer.

8. **Static VBIEDs.** Static roadside VBIEDs represent the same threat to convoys as other static IEDs. All convoy elements must be alert to the threat. They should be identified either by observation from convoy or escort vehicles, or as a result of VP checks. The drills in the event of identification of static VBIEDs are the same as for any other IED.

9. **Suicide Bomber (on Foot).** The pedestrian suicide bomber is more likely to be a threat in urban areas where convoy speeds are slow and vehicles are confined. All personnel should be briefed on the threat, what the typical recognition factors are and what actions should be taken on identification:

- a. **Actions On.**
 - (1) TCS shouts "Suicide Bomber" to commander. Commander relays to remainder of convoy immediately.
 - (2) Convoy drives out of killing area.
 - (3) Convoy comd sends SITREP and continues with mission.
 - (4) If it is too late to get out of the killing area and the suicide bomber appears to be about to initiate it, or starts to rush towards the convoy, the TCS should act within the ROE, opening fire with lethal force. The convoy comd

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will then need to make an assessment on whether to get out of the area, or cordon the area depending upon the tactical situation and any casualties that may have been caused.

ANTI-AMBUSH DRILLS

1. **General.** Initial assessment of the situation is critical. Commanders must distinguish quickly between what might be a single IED or what might be the commencement of a complex ambush. Commanders must ensure that anti-ambush drills for likely scenarios are known, practised and published in SOPs. It is not possible to cover every eventuality and therefore commanders must respond in a timely, robust and effective manner. Escorts and vehicle crews must remain vigilant and aware at all times.
2. **Immediate Action.** The mnemonic **FEAR** remains as pertinent to convoys as it is to other forms of contact. In essence, it is as follows:
 - a. **Find and Fire.** Identify the enemy and return fire within the ROE.
 - b. **Extract.** Get out of the killing area as quickly as possible. This may mean the convoy moving forwards, rearwards or to the flanks.
 - c. **Assess and Act.** The commander needs to conduct a quick estimate, identify his plan, communicate it through the convoy and initiate action as quickly as possible.
 - d. **Report and React.** Send a full contact report, task any additional assets required and be prepared to react to the situation as it develops.
3. **General Outcomes.** There are three general outcomes of an ambush:
 - a. **Progress Not Held Up.** Any vehicle which comes under harassing fire (possibly from a lone gunman) in areas where the road is more open should keep going and accelerate. The vehicle crew should attempt to ascertain where the fire is coming from and return fire in accordance with the ROE. If communications are available in the vehicle (which there should be), a contact report should be sent to the convoy comd, thus alerting the remainder of the convoy. The convoy comd should then direct any FP or escort assets to engage the enemy if possible, whilst the remainder of the convoy gets out of the killing area. The convoy commander should then brief his controlling HQ. In the event of casualties, or if reorganisation is required, the necessary action should take place out of the contact zone.
 - b. **Progress Held Up.** If any vehicles are disabled or the route ahead is blocked in any way, swift action is crucial. The composition of the convoy and the availability of firepower will dictate the response and commanders must be prepared to act quickly. In general the following action should be taken:
 - (1) Vehicles crews in the contact zone return fire and send a contact report.
 - (2) If the convoy comd and any internal FP vehicles or escort forces are not in contact they should get to the scene as quickly as possible.

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Commanders of any vehicle that is held up dismount their troops and engage the insurgents within the ROE if possible.

- (3) Any supporting elements called in (eg avn).
- (4) Escort and FP vehicles move into position from which they can engage the enemy, while vehicles and crews caught in the contact zone extricate themselves.
- (5) If vehicles have been disabled the options are:
 - i. Recovery vehicle moves forward and hooks up disabled vehicle.
 - ii. Disabled vehicle is destroyed by friendly forces, the most favoured technique being the use of a red phosphorous grenade followed by the firing of small arms into the ECM equipment. Friendly forces must not enable enemy troops to get access to our vehicles, communications equipment or ECM.

c. **Some Elements Held Up.** As with above, the action taken will be dependant on the construction of the convoy. In these circumstances it is likely that the lead elements of the convoy will already have gone through the ambush site.

- (1) A contact report should be sent immediately to the convoy commander.
- (2) Lead elements halt and regroup once out of the killing zone, ensuring that their own protection is assured by conducting 5 & 20m checks.
- (3) The convoy commander should marshall escorts and gun truck depending on location and move as quickly as possible to the ambush site in order to take command of the counter attack. At the same time any supporting elements such as artillery and helicopters should be alerted and, where appropriate, employed.
- (4) The remainder of the convoy extracts, either forwards or rearwards while FP and escort forces deal with the enemy.

Appendix:

1. Actions On Check List.

ACTIONS ON CHECK LIST

Shooting	
<p style="text-align: center;">Firer Seen</p> <p>Top cover return fire (within ROE). Lead FP puts on 4 way flashing lights. Send target indication via packet. Drive through. Suppress enemy. Send contact report. RV/reorganise at a safe distance 5/20 m check. Triage (if casualties taken) Send METHANE report if required.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Firer Not Seen</p> <p>Lead FP puts on 4 ways. Drive through. Send contact report. RV/Re-Org at a safe distance 5/20 m check. Triage (if casualties taken) Send METHANE report if required.</p>
Seen IED	
<p>Stop. Stay out of line of sight. Dismount and conduct 5/20m checks. Retreat up to 400m. Secure flanks and establish all round defence. Carry out 4 C's: Identify and secure ICP. Recce alternative ICP. Inform O of any changes. Be aware of secondary devices, shootings etc Brief EOD as required</p>	
IED Initiated	
<p style="text-align: center;">No Casualties</p> <p>Send immediate contact report. Clear contact area. ERV 400m + Cover arcs If safe, stop conduct 5/20m checks, then conduct 4C's. Maintain visual on blast area if poss Clear and set up ICP. Await tasked agencies If not safe, clear contact area.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Vehicle Casualty</p> <p>Send immediate contact report. Clear contact area. ERV 400m + Cover arcs FP move to evacuate personnel from veh If safe, stop conduct 5/20m checks, then conduct 4C's. Maintain visual on blast area if poss Clear and set up ICP. Await tasked agencies If not safe, clear contact area. Send METHANE report</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Personnel Casualty</p> <p>Send immediate contact report. Clear contact area. ERV 400m + Cover arcs FP move to evacuate personnel from veh If safe, stop conduct 5/20m checks, then conduct 4C's. Maintain visual on blast area if poss Clear and set up ICP. Await tasked agencies If not safe, clear contact area. Send METHANE report</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Road Blocked</p> <p>Send immediate contact report. Dismount and secure area covering arcs. Secure flanks and establish all round defence. Carry out 4 C's: Identify and secure ICP. Recce alternative ICP. Inform O of any changes. Be aware of secondary devices, shootings etc. Send METHANE report if nec</p>

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<p style="text-align: center;">Road Blocked Front</p> <p>Top cover engage (within ROE) if not possible to detour. Smk Contact Report Indicators FP suppress en and evac cas Push obstacle clear with veh U turn or reverse out of contact (unmoveable obstacle front) Move out of contact area. ERV 5/20 m check. Send full contact report Extract to nearest Coalition Force Base</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Road Blocked Front and Rear</p> <p>Top cover engage (within ROE) Smk Contact Report Indicators FP suppress en and evac cas Push obstacle/Reverse If not possible extract Dismount - form all round defence. As per QBOs: FP defeat en Log Sect prep to: Prov covering fire Asslt en</p>
Halts	
<p style="text-align: center;">Short Halt(<5 minutes)</p> <p>Lights out (night) Keep engine running. Co driver dismount. Conduct 5m & 20m checks. Wait for orders. FP veh push front/rear 20m. VCP if required.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Long Halt (>5 minutes)</p> <p>Lights out (night) Keep engine running. All dismount (less top cover) Conduct 5/20m checks. All round defence. Dvr remains close to veh. Wait for orders. FP veh push front/rear 20m. VCP if required.</p>
Aggressive Crowds	
Road Blocked	
<p>Front veh (IM / SNATCH / any immed veh facing the obs):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Nudge or force obstacle off road <p>If obstacle still in place:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Fire red miniflare through cupola to warn FP of blocked route 	
Road Blocked - Aggressive Crowd Forms	
<p>Send SITREP to BG & Regt Ops Rm Convoy closes up PO FP establish buffer zone: Use SNATCH to push crowd back If appropriate BPT dismount team to maint buffer zone – Select break clean point and inform isolated veh crew Once buffer zone estb: Isolated veh manoeuvres to break clean point PO FP team manoeuvres to break clean point (remain faced up and under control - comd directing baton gunner) REMAIN IN VEHICLE UNLESS VEH IS ON FIRE OR YOU ARE TAKING EFFECTIVE EN FIRE</p>	
Road Blocked - Life Endangered	
<p>Recovery priority: Personnel, ECM, Veh / load Deter crowd Deter players, baton rds, warning shots, lethal force.</p>	
Life Endangered - Crew Need Recovery	
<i>(At any time - poss if veh subject to petrol bomb attack)</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● DOUBLE RECOVERY METHOD: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Drive to blocked vehicle - force a buffer zone ▪ Remove threat ▪ Disable ECM (Red phos then fire through ECM) ▪ Disable vehicle (fire through gearbox and engine block) if possible ▪ Enter FP vehicle through top hatch / rear door ● PO FP BPT dismount and assist vehicle crew 	

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Vehicle Recovery					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Push and Shove: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Rec veh pushes veh clear of obstacle • Hook Up: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Rec veh drags veh out of the situation using tow bars or strops 					
Contractor Vehicle Threatened					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist if possible 					
OTHERS					
RTA	Lost / Separated				
<p>Halt pkt. Conduct 5/20 checks. Top cover remains up. Adopt all round defence carrying out 5/20 checks. In event of casualties: Triage. Send METHANE. Secure area for QRF. If situation deteriorates (contacted/hostile crowd) evac casualties to nearest CF base. Incapacitate vehicle. Carry out FMT 3 procedures on return to camp.</p>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: center;">No Nav Aids</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Nav Aids</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: top;"> <p>Halt veh. Dismount, adopt fire posn, go firm. Transmit frequently on all comms means aval Fire red mini flare every 5 min. Fire 1.5 inch rkt para illum after last red mini flare. Await QRF</p> </td> <td style="vertical-align: top;"> <p>If issued assess loc from map/GPS. Retrace route to last know MNF base. If unsuccessful, follow known nav aids</p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	No Nav Aids	Nav Aids	<p>Halt veh. Dismount, adopt fire posn, go firm. Transmit frequently on all comms means aval Fire red mini flare every 5 min. Fire 1.5 inch rkt para illum after last red mini flare. Await QRF</p>	<p>If issued assess loc from map/GPS. Retrace route to last know MNF base. If unsuccessful, follow known nav aids</p>
No Nav Aids	Nav Aids				
<p>Halt veh. Dismount, adopt fire posn, go firm. Transmit frequently on all comms means aval Fire red mini flare every 5 min. Fire 1.5 inch rkt para illum after last red mini flare. Await QRF</p>	<p>If issued assess loc from map/GPS. Retrace route to last know MNF base. If unsuccessful, follow known nav aids</p>				
VPs					
<p>Short halt FP Carry out VP procedure Remainder 5/20 checks carried out along route using white light where nec. Top cover remains up. On discovery of anything suspicious use IED pre-seen drills.</p>					
LOSS OF ECM					
<p>Carry out IA drill: Inform nearest FF C/S of problem over PRR/PMR. Close up to front veh within their bubble. Veh comd to turn off/on the set. If problem persists check antenna att and fittings. Change battery. If problem persists inform Convoy Comd. Convoy Comd will call short halt (sit dependant). Radio Op will attempt to rectify problem.</p>					
LOW HANGING POWER CABLES					
<p>Lead FP vehicles are to identify any low hanging power cables or phone cables and carry out the following actions: FP Comd to inform Convoy Comd. FP to take up a suitable position to observe the obstacle. Observe all vehicles with high mounted antennae (particularly FFR on DROPS) transiting beneath cables. If necessary, stop and remove antennae.</p>					
On Arrival of EOD					
<p>On arrival of EOD, be prepared to provide (using maps/ diagrams where possible):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What it is. Where it is. When was it first seen? Why was it suspicious? Who was seen acting suspiciously? 					

AN OUTLINE FOR TRAINING

1. Training for convoy operations must be based on a set of generic skills. These skills range from proficiency in individual soldiering via both individual and collective training through to the ability of commanders and their staff to plan and execute convoys effectively. Units should aim to have reached proficiency in all the areas listed below before attending PDT.

- a. Individual skills: dress, equipment, first aid, CBA, team medics, weapon handling (including crew served weapons), firing from moving vehicles.
- b. Vehicle preparation: tow bars and their distribution, CES, water, fuel, spare tyres.
- c. Running repairs (for all troops) and Battle Damage Repair (BDR). All troops must be able to change tyres quickly and hook vehicles up for towing, which may have to be done whilst under fire.
- d. Communications training.
- e. ECM (FP) training.
- f. Convoy discipline.
- g. Anti-ambush drills.
- h. Casualty handling and evacuation.
- i. Study periods (for commanders): the planning sequence, estimate process, orders, capability and employment of escorts.
- j. Collective FTX training, with escorts.

2. Ideally a theatre specific training package will be given to units prior to deployment. This must include:

- a. ROE.
- b. G2.
- c. Live training (which if possible should continue in theatre).

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CHAPTER 18

PUBLIC ORDER OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. This chapter provides guidance on TTPs for troops in Public Order (PO) operations. The main body of the chapter covers the nature, aims, principles and roles for the military in PO operations.

2. Annex A provides guidance on dress and equipment. Annex B provides guidance on the use of PO equipment and weapons. Annex C describes the principles and techniques for crowd management. Annex D describes the ORBATS and deployment postures for platoon and companies engaged in PO operations. Annex E describes the integration of vehicles into PO operations, including specific considerations and formations.

3. The guidance is not prescriptive and should be supplemented by individual experience, the threat, level of training and unit SOPs.

NATURE OF PO OPERATIONS

4. PO operations are confusing, demanding and extremely difficult to control. Responses to incidents of public disorder vary from tolerance escalating through riot control to the use of lethal force.

AIM OF PO OPERATIONS

5. The aim of any PO operation must be to achieve a designated mission whilst preserving the peace. Minor breaches of law and order may have to be tolerated in order to prevent an escalation of disorder.

6. Where crowd violence occurs, commanders should adopt a riot control posture and use riot control tactics in order to restore the situation to a point where the mission can be completed. The use of riot control tactics provides opportunities for the security forces to be photographed and seen in an aggressive posture that can lead to negative propaganda. Riot control techniques should therefore only be adopted when necessary and only once other attempts to de-escalate a violent situation have failed.

PRINCIPLES OF PO OPERATIONS

7. The principles of PO operations are:

a. **Preventative Approach.** A de-escalatory attitude should be adopted to prevent incidents of disorder.

b. **Mission Focused.** Troops should resist becoming embroiled in civil disorder that does not relate to the mission.

c. **Balance.** Commanders must deploy with the means to restore a situation should violence break out. In PO operations, it is numbers that carry the significant

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advantage. To this end, PO operations are manpower and equipment intensive. Anticipation is crucial if adequate resources are to be made available.

- d. **Flexibility.** The force posture should be changed according to the situation.
- e. **Communication.** PO operations are about dealing with people. To this end commanders must be prepared to negotiate with those community representatives who may be able positively to influence the crowd's behaviour and perception.
- f. **Control.** Command and control in PO ops is inherently difficult. Commanders must establish robust SOPs in order to maintain control and coordination.

DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN PO OPERATIONS

8. Military forces can be deployed on PO operations in support of the police or when the police presence is either unavailable or incapable of primacy.

a. **In Support of the Civil Police.** The deployment of military forces on PO operations in support of the police assumes police primacy.

- (1) Planning will be joint. The police will state the resource requirement and overall intent of the operation.
- (2) The police will place themselves at the point where confrontation is most likely.
- (3) The police will have responsibility for the maintenance, preservation and, where necessary, rebuilding of relationships with the community.
- (4) The police will lead with the management of, and interaction with, members of the crowd, including appointed marshals and community representatives.
- (5) The ROE and legal constraints on the application of force by soldiers will be broadly similar to those for the police force.

b. **In the Absence of Effective Policing.** The deployment of military forces on PO operations in the absence of an effective police force may arise when the civil police have lost control of disorder, or when operating in a state where law enforcement institutions do not exist, are discredited, or have collapsed. Such deployments carry with them the following implications:

- (1) Military forces are likely to be responsible for relationships with the local community, its representatives, and for crowd management. This requirement is likely to have to be met against a background of poor intelligence and language difficulties.
- (2) Military forces will be constrained by international law, and the need to apply reasonable and proportionate force.

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(3) Military forces may be able to resort to equipment and tactics that would be considered politically unacceptable under normal circumstances (such as the employment of armoured vehicles).

(4) A breakdown of law and order will require military forces to be able to withstand a far higher intensity of violence (including a substantial lethal threat) than would be expected of a civil police force.

(5) The level of force necessary will be governed by the need to preserve life and prevent serious injury. This may require the application of lethal force against rioters in appropriate circumstances.

SPECTRUM OF PUBLIC DISORDER

9. Public disorder ranges from increased tension in the civil community through to rioting resulting in the loss of life. Public disorder can escalate and de-escalate rapidly but will generally follow a number of identifiable steps as represented in Figure 18-1. Any number of escalatory and de-escalatory changes may take place during a public disorder incident and the violence threshold may be crossed a number of times during a particular incident. Alternatively the violence threshold may never be crossed or be crossed very rapidly after an incident arises.




Figure 18.1 - The Spectrum of Public Disorder

USE OF FORCE

10. Soldiers have an inherent right to self defence when conducting PO operations and may use lethal force during a situation when required. The application of minimum force in accordance with the ROE must always be the guiding principle. PO control equipment (batons, baton guns etc) must only be used when there is no less forceful alternative available to prevent violent disorder. When guarding property, lethal force must not be used other than for the protection of human life.

PUBLIC ORDER DRESS AND EQUIPMENT

DRESS

1. **Underlayer.** The underlayer is worn to provide extra protection against burning petrol or against acid that may soak into the outer layer of clothing. It consists of:
 - a. Issued socks.
 - b. Issued extremely cold weather underwear (or underlayer of natural fibre material such as a second set of C95).
 - c. Leg protectors.
 - d. Combat body armour.
2. **Overlayer.** The overlayer is worn as the primary protection against burns and injuries to the head. It consists of:
 - a. Issued leather boots. (No boots with canvas or plastic materials that may melt or absorb petrol.)
 - b. Combat 95 trousers. (Other types have a low cotton content providing reduced protection against petrol & acid bombs.)
 - c. Combat 95 jacket or para smock. (Other types have low cotton content providing reduced protection against petrol or acid bombs.) The collar should be turned upwards to protect the neck. No belts or webbing should be worn as they can be used to pull soldiers into the crowd.
 - d. Issued leather gloves. Jacket cuffs should go over the top of the gloves preventing liquid from running down into the glove.
 - e. PO balaclavas. (Under no circumstances are troops to wear the issued headover as these melt when exposed to heat causing facial injuries.)
 - f. Helmet, visor pulled fully downwards. Nape protectors must be fitted correctly. Petrol and other liquids will not drain off the helmet if the nape protector is folded up.
 - g. Personal weapon. Can be carried in the ski position or slung to the side. A knot should be tied into the end of the sling to prevent it being pulled through. Carrying the weapon in the ski position makes it easier to use the baton and shield. Weapons can be brought to bear more easily from the slung position but may get in the way when using the baton and shield.

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EQUIPMENT

3. Specific equipment considerations include:
 - a. **Fire Extinguishers.** Foam and CO₂ extinguishers are the only types acceptable for PO operations. Water and dry powder extinguishers must not be used; water causes petrol to spread and dry powder has a very limited effect against petrol.
 - b. **Ballistic Blanket.** The ballistic blanket is used to protect troops against unexploded ordnance, eg pipe bomb. The blanket must be marked with cyalumes at night so troops know its location.
 - c. **Loud Hailer.** A loud hailer should be carried by the PO commander and used to give warnings to the crowd.

CHANGES TO FORCE POSTURE

4. The posture of the security force on PO operations should change in direct proportion to the level of crowd violence. The crowd should always be seen to be the aggressor.
5. The response of troops to any given situation is the responsibility of the commander who will order changes to force posture as required. Changes in force posture may result in changes to PO equipment carried and used.

USE OF PUBLIC ORDER EQUIPMENT

USE OF PUBLIC ORDER EQUIPMENT

1. PO control equipment may only be used on the command of the designated local commander or upon the direct order of COMBRITFOR in situations of potential or actual violent disorder. PO control equipment may only be used when there is no other less forceful alternative to prevent the violent disorder. When used, every effort must be made to minimise the risk of injury. Lethal force may be used during PO operations in accordance with the ROE.

PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIFE

2. It is possible to use a baton and/or shield in such a way as to cause fatal injuries. A shield and baton may only be used to strike a person with lethal force if he/she is committing or about to commit an act likely to endanger human life and there is no other way to prevent the danger.

WARNING OF USE

3. The commander of the security force at the scene or his representative should issue a warning to the crowd prior to the use of public order equipment unless:

a. To do so would increase the risk of death or serious injury to members of the security force or any other person other than the persons committing violent disorder;

OR

b. The security force personnel in the immediate vicinity are under armed attack.

USE OF PO EQUIPMENT

4. **Baton.** The baton is to be secured by wrapping the strap around the hand. The strap is not to be hooked around the thumb and wrapped round the wrist as this method makes it difficult for the soldier to release the baton if dragged into the crowd. A challenge must be given before batons are used unless to do so would increase the risk of death and/or injury to security force personnel. Baton strikes should be aimed at the lower limbs in order to incapacitate the rioter with minimum risk of permanent serious injury. Other preferred target areas include the arm, thigh and elbow and knee joints. Strikes to the head should be avoided.

5. **Shield.** The shield may be used to defend against thrown objects and physical attacks by the crowd. The shield should be angled such that attackers injure themselves during an attack. Placing the shield at an angle which presents the base of the shield forward is an effective defence against kicks.

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6. **Baton Rounds.** Baton rounds may be fired in line with the ROE for that theatre if the use of baton rounds is the minimum force necessary to protect security forces, or those under their protection, from physical violence. Baton rounds must be fired at selected individuals and aimed so that the round strikes the lower part of the body directly (ie without bouncing). Care should be taken not to fire baton rounds below their minimum safe distance (which differs depending upon the type of round being used), unless there is an immediate and serious threat to life, which cannot otherwise be avoided.

CROWD MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. **General.** The incidence of crowd violence does not imply that the situation is irreversible. Careful management, situational awareness and communication may allow de-escalation below the violence threshold which may enable the restoration of order.

2. **Intelligence.** Understanding the local area, its geography and demographic make up and the wider political situation will assist commanders in identifying potential flashpoints for public disorder. Local intelligence, including combat indicators from patrols, can often provide early warning of crowd events. Commanders must be prepared to listen to community concerns and should establish liaison with community and tribal leaders whenever possible. The following process can be used to assist in identifying who will be of most use in influencing the community:

a. **Identify Stakeholders.** Identify those who may have a stake in a forthcoming crowd event. Stakeholders may include:

- (1) Religious leaders.
- (2) Tribal leaders.
- (3) Civic leaders.
- (4) Local police service.
- (5) Shopkeepers.
- (6) Business representatives.
- (7) Street vendors.

b. **Identify Suitable Representatives.** Once stakeholders have been identified a filtering process must be conducted to identify those stakeholders that are appropriate to act as intermediaries between the security forces and the crowd.

3. **Facilitation.** Security forces must consider whether a gathering is legal or illegal as it will influence the force posture and method of interaction with the crowd.

a. **Illegal Crowd Events.** Security forces should refrain from adopting a black or white approach to an illegal crowd event as to do so will often result in confrontation. The riot that follows a robust attempt to uphold law and order by the security forces will cause damage and distrust that may far outweigh and outlast the often transient impact of the law-breaking activity. In some circumstances, it may be better to allow illegal crowd activity (particularly noisy, but non violent demonstrations or protests) to continue unchecked in anticipation of the crowd dispersing.

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Commanders will have to weigh up the risks inherent with the deployment of public order troops against allowing minor criminal activities, such as looting, to continue. (Looting may not be as damaging as the wholesale destruction of the street during a riot.) Credibility of the security force must also be considered and illegal activity can not be allowed to escalate unchecked. Commanders must use common sense when responding to illegal crowd activity.

b. **Legal Crowd Events.** Where crowd events are legal, the security forces must do all they can to assist the members of the crowd and their nominated representatives. The community, and thus the crowd, must assume responsibility for its own policing whenever it can be achieved. Where relationships have been established with effective community representatives prior to the event, steps should be taken to ensure the appointment of stewards or marshals from within the community. In the absence of established relationships with community representatives it may be necessary to enlist the assistance of those, as they are identified, who have influence over the crowd. Throughout legal crowd events, the security forces should adopt the softest possible posture towards the crowd. The attitude of the security forces should be one of facilitation, rather than confrontation.

4. **Communication.** Poor communication and associated misunderstandings can enflame grievances and result in confrontation. Interaction with the crowd and with community representatives will identify issues that need clarification. Commanders must try to identify and manage false expectations and facilitate the passage of information to the crowd via its representatives

5. **Legitimacy.** The security forces will gain legitimacy in the eyes of the crowd if they can be seen to be acting reasonably. As far as possible, people in the crowd must be treated and addressed as individuals. If security force actions are not lawful, proportionate and disciplined, then credibility will be lost along with any ability to influence it other than through the threat of force.

6. **Balance.** Hostile elements may have a vested interest in provoking a riot. Crowd violence may be inevitable, regardless of the security force posture adopted. Commanders must retain tactical balance throughout a crowd event. Specific considerations include:

a. Preventing the isolation or separation of elements of the security forces by the crowd.

b. Having a robust extraction plan for the security force elements in soft posture whose task was interaction with the crowd.

c. Having Public Order trained and equipped reserves poised to stabilise a violent situation and enable the extraction of troops insufficiently robustly equipped for the situation. The reserve should be a minimum of a sub unit, which should be kept out of sight of the crowd but in a location where they can be employed at short notice.

CROWD MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES

7. Some crowd management techniques which can be used by the security forces include:

a. **Reducing the Size of the Crowd.** A crowd will be easier to manage and is less likely to become violent if it is smaller and does not perceive that it carries a substantial numerical advantage over the security forces. The crowd around a specific point event should be minimised. Two techniques can assist with this process:

(1) **Timing.** Where the timing and structure of an event is within the control of the security forces, consideration should be given to staging a number of small events consecutively over time, rather than one mass event that may draw a large crowd. Examples include the distribution of food to specific areas over a week, rather than running a single district food point. In such cases it is vital that the prospect of later distribution is credible, and liaison with community representatives will be critical to maintaining credibility.

(2) **Filtering and Screening.** The crowd should not be allowed access or view of the focal point of a crowd event where possible. Filtering and the careful positioning of screens will assist with this process. The filtering process must be seen to be fair and impartial. Credible community representatives can assist with this process. In addition to denying the crowd the opportunity to rush the focal point, filtering and screening will serve to discourage the viewer groups who make up the majority of any crowd. The crowd will thus be substantially smaller.

b. **Queuing and Waiting.** A crowd will naturally wait around if they perceive that there is a benefit in doing so. Organising the waiting crowd into a queue can be a challenge and is an activity that should be conducted with the minimum of confrontation. Of critical importance to the members of any waiting crowd is an understanding that, by conforming (ie queuing), their turn will come. Tensions will rise quickly (and understandably) if the reward is denied to those who have waited several hours in anticipation. Techniques associated with queuing and waiting are as follows:

(1) **Communication.** Members of a waiting/queuing crowd must be regularly updated on progress. Convergences arriving at the back of the queue should be given a realistic appraisal of the chances of success and the waiting time involved.

(2) **Anticipation.** The security forces must be alert to individuals in a queue who appear to become agitated and move quickly to seek an explanation. It may be that there is a genuine grievance that can be addressed. Community representatives and appointed marshals from within that community should be instrumental in any rectifying action, particularly if the issue causing concern is contentious.

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(3) **Routeing.** The route of the queue and the use of lightweight barriers will provide those in the queue with a perception of progress. A winding queue pattern, as used in most airports, will reduce the perception of distance to the filter point, and will give the perception of increased progress.

(4) **Exploitation.** People waiting in a crowd may present a captive audience for the distribution of information operations literature. Good humoured interaction by individuals moving amongst members of the crowd can also decrease tension.

c. **Negotiation.** Commanders must be prepared to negotiate with identified community representatives. The start of crowd violence should not bring negotiation to a halt. Negotiation is best conducted on a one to one basis and commanders should not negotiate with a group of people. Cultural issues will dictate the approach to be taken, but adherence to some key principles has proved to work:

(1) **Appearance.** Eye contact is vital for successful negotiation. Commanders should not negotiate wearing sunglasses or other headgear which hides the face and eyes. Negotiators should adopt as soft a posture as possible and wear the minimum of protective equipment as the threat allows during negotiations.

(2) **De-escalatory.** The aim of robust negotiation is to de-escalate the situation and to keep or restore the peace. Negotiations must therefore be de-escalatory in nature. Commanders must continue to stress their objective as a 'peacemaker' and stress that progress cannot be made until peace is restored. This should be portrayed as a 'common goal' for both parties.

Authority should not be negotiated. Concessions may be made as part of the negotiation process but commanders must be clear on what can be conceded and what can not. The right of the security forces to be present and engaged in public order operations should not be negotiated.

d. **Clarity.** Commanders should make clear what they want the crowd to do, in particular stipulating the boundaries and limits for forward movement of the crowd. Commanders should make clear the consequences and security force responses to cooperation and non-compliance with security force requests. Commanders should avoid pleading with community representatives and issue deliberate, direct warnings of impending retaliatory action to community representatives in situations where unacceptable crowd behaviour exists.

e. **Relevance.** The local commander can only influence the immediate and local situation. Local commanders should not engage in discussions about operational and strategic issues and associated grievances as they can lead to inappropriate expressions of empathy by security forces.

f. **Retain the Initiative.** Commanders may find themselves taking tactical risks in order to de-escalate a situation and retain the initiative. Junior commanders must understand what actions they can take on their own initiative. Public disorder situations change rapidly and commanders must remain flexible in order to adapt

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their plan to changes in crowd behaviour. Commanders who stick to a plan regardless of the changes in situation are inviting failure.

g. **Remain Polite, Calm and Firm.** Commanders must remain professional and reasonable throughout negotiations. They must listen to the grievances of the community and attempt to find a solution that de-escalates the situation in accordance with the commander's intent and without compromising the position of the security forces. Negotiations can often be frustrating and commanders must remain calm and focused. Commanders should not make promises but can give assurances that particular grievances will receive appropriate attention.

PUBLIC ORDER ORBAT – PLATOON AND COMPANY LEVEL

PLATOON ORBAT

1. **ORBAT.** Three teams of four, each commanded by a JNCO represent the fighting element of the Public Order (PO) platoon.
2. **Baton Gunners.** Baton gunners can be located in one of two places:
 - a. At either end of the lead team. The advantage of this position is the baton gunners can identify any threats at an earlier stage and carry out any actions required.
 - b. Behind the three fighting teams colocated with either the PO commander or 2i/c.
3. **Firemen.** Firemen are key to the protection of the public order platoon. They must be soldiers who can use their initiative in order to position themselves where they can be of use and move to deal with incidents as required and without orders. It is recommended that robust and experienced troops are allocated to the task. Firemen can be located in one of two places:
 - a. At either end of the centre team. From these locations the firemen can see the whole platoon and are able to move rapidly to where they are required.
 - b. Behind the three fighting teams colocated with either the PO commander or 2i/c.
4. **Platoon Commander.** The PO platoon commander is normally located behind the centre team. He is equipped with a loud hailer to give warnings to the crowd as necessary.
5. **Platoon 2i/c.** The PO platoon 2i/c is normally located approximately 15 metres behind the PO platoon commander. He controls the movement of the vehicles, must be prepared to relieve the commander if he is injured and is responsible for ensuring spare visors/shields & equipment are carried in the vehicles.
6. **Countering a Lethal Threat.** Counter terrorist (CT) men are normally located on either flank at the rear of the PO platoon. They should attempt to reach an elevated position (ie rooftops) in order to dominate the area, but may still require protection. CT men have the following tasks:
 - a. Dominate the lethal threat.
 - b. Report on events in depth of the crowd.
 - c. Where necessary, engage targets within the ROE.

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7. **Helmet Markings.** To aid command and control during PO operations, the back of helmets should be marked as follows:


- a. Team commanders - one stripe.
- b. Platoon commander / 2i/c - two stripes.
- c. Company commander - three stripes.
- d. Baton gunner - A cross.
- e. CSM – triangle.

PO COMPANY ORBAT

8. The PO company consists of three PO platoons, each PO platoon as already described, and two additional groupings as follows:

- a. The company commander's command group comprising:
 - (1) Company commander.
 - (2) Company commander's protection man (often a company clerk).
 - (3) Signaller.
 - (4) Vehicle driver.
- b. An arrest cell comprising:
 - (1) Company sergeant major.
 - (2) CSM's protection man (often a company clerk). He may require further protection, depending on the risk of being isolated and kidnapped.
 - (3) Signaller.
 - (4) Vehicle driver.

**PLATOON CONFIGURED FOR PUBLIC ORDER OPERATIONS
(THIS DIAGRAM DOES NOT SHOW A FORMATION)**



Notes:


1. The platoon commander commands the platoon, and in particular the shield line. The platoon sergeant controls the vehicles (and thus decides the baseline location), acts as rear link with the sub unit commander and provides a trouble shooting service at the rear (including casualty evacuation).

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2. The ORBAT is based around vehicle crews. Crews always work with, and embark in, the same vehicle. In this way, the absence of a crew member will be quickly spotted during a withdrawal.

3. The shield team commander can be in, or to the rear of, the shield line. If he is in the shield line, he will be better able to lead an inexperienced or intimidated shield team. If positioned to the rear he will be better able to control, the shield line, particularly during rearward movement. The commander can also direct the baton gunner from this position.

**SUB-UNIT CONFIGURED FOR PUBLIC ORDER OPERATIONS
(THIS DIAGRAM DOES NOT SHOW A FORMATION)**



Notes:


1. Additional manpower can be used to create a second reserve under the command of the CSM.
2. The Coy 2IC's principal role is as a rear link to ease reporting to the ops rm. He is a useful trouble shooter, liaison officer and link man, and should deploy and not remain in a vehicle CP. Where the company splits, the 2IC will usually remain in command of the main body.

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3. The CSM's principal role is as traffic controller. He will also be required as a key trouble shooter and link man.
4. Specialist agencies (such as evidence gathering teams, RMPs or dog team) should move with the Saxon group.

ARMoured INFANTRY - PUBLIC ORDER ORBATS

The Public Order Platoon




Notes:

1. The armd inf platoon is sometimes reorganised to provide two WR crews, two Snatch crews and 21 dismounted troops, although the decision may be taken to retain a four WR structure. Using Snatch vehicles can free up more men.
2. Key elements of the platoon are:
 - a. Three shield teams consisting of a commander, baton gunner and three shieldmen.
 - b. Two sniper teams.
 - c. Command group consisting of the pl comd, pl sgt, and fireman.
 - d. Vehicle crews.

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The Public Order Company



Notes:

1. The reduction in the number of WR will provide the additional dismounts required.
2. Spare manpower should be deployed as overwatch teams, sniper teams or firemen.

VEHICLE TACTICS IN PUBLIC ORDER OPERATIONS

1. The use of vehicles can give the security forces an advantage over a crowd in a PO operation. Vehicles can be used as barriers to filter, block and channel crowds, screen activity and provide vantage points for security force personnel.

VEHICLE CONSIDERATIONS

2. Experience of using vehicles in PO operations has led to a number of detailed lessons being learned, a selection of which are reproduced here.

a. Landrovers and other light vehicles can be pushed over onto their sides by as few as six men. Care should be taken not to present the side of a light vehicle to a violent crowd without a second vehicle being positioned closely alongside to prevent tipping over. When moving through a crowd vehicles should creep forward so that the crowd has difficulty getting a purchase on the vehicle. Care should be taken to nudge individuals away from the front of the vehicle without running them over.

b. The last soldier to dismount from a vehicle should ensure the doors and top cover hatch are locked to prevent the crowd gaining access to the inside of the vehicle. Drivers should ensure the driver and passenger doors are locked. If the vehicle is not fitted with dead locks the driver should consider using the seat belt wrapped around the door handle to stop the door from being opened.

c. Security forces must be well rehearsed in embussing and debussing drills for all vehicle types used in the operation. All soldiers should be familiar with the vehicle stowage plan which should be included in unit SOPs.

d. Prior to deploying, drivers should align the vehicle wheels to point forward and mark the top of the steering wheel with tape. The direction in which the driving wheels are pointing will thus be easily ascertainable, even when the vehicle is static. This is essential when vehicles are required to operate at speed in close proximity to dismounted troops.

e. A jerry can of drinking water should be placed just inside the rear doors of each vehicle. Water can be used for dousing burning clothing and equipment, drinking or for treating burns.

f. Soldiers must be practised in the opening and closing of protective side wings where fitted to vehicles. Experience has shown that it takes four men to operate a side wing efficiently.

g. Drivers have limited vision and cannot see all around the vehicle. Horn blasts must be sounded to warn dismounted troops prior to moving vehicles. A vehicle commander must remain with the vehicle at all times to assist the driver in manoeuvring.

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- h. Vehicle drivers **MUST** be equipped with radio comms.

VEHICLE FORMATIONS

3. Various formations may be used for the organisation of vehicles in PO operations. They are used as part of a drill so that vehicle drivers and dismounted soldiers understand the way the vehicle is integrated into the security force activity.

4. **Box Formation.** This formation adopts a soft posture, allowing the street to remain open for use but with vehicles positioned so they can rapidly react to an increase in tension or an outbreak of violence. Where a local commander decides it is necessary to close a street, dismounted soldiers move into the area between the vehicles to a position where they are level with the front doors of their vehicle. From this position dismounted troops have the option of reverting to their previous posture, remaining where they are, or advancing towards the crowd, either in open order allowing the use of batons, or in close order to provide defence against missile attack.




Figure 18-E-1 - Box Formation

5. **Staggered Line.** This formation is effective at closing a road. To adopt the formation the lead vehicle, normally the platoon commander's, pulls over to the side of the road and at an angle to it. The wheels of the vehicle should remain aligned with the road to enable the driver to move forward rapidly if required. The second vehicle lines up with the outermost rear edge of the first vehicle and stops leaving a 6 foot gap between the two vehicles; this gap will assist with troop deployment through the staggered line if it is required. Additional vehicles line up in a similar fashion but do not leave a gap between them. This formation provides the dismounted platoon with significant protection from which they can deploy as required.




Figure 18-E-2 - Staggered Line Formation

6. **Hard Line.** The hard line formation should be adopted when the level of crowd violence increases to the point that the dismounted troops require significant levels of protection. The formation provides a very effective mobile block for street closure operations. The crowd may move forward but must be prevented from climbing onto or over the vehicles or damaging them. Where the commander feels the vehicles risk being damaged by the crowd, a Close Quarter Response (CQR) should be conducted.




Figure 18-E-3 - Hard Line

7. **CQR.** CQR drills enable dismounted troops to move forward of the protection of the vehicles in a well rehearsed manoeuvre. For the drill to be effective it must be conducted rapidly. There are three variations of the CQR drill which allow the commander flexibility in selecting the most appropriate response for the situation.

- a. **Delayed CQR.** The vehicles withdraw to the rear of the dismounted troops who “punch” into the crowd on orders.
- b. **False CQR.** The vehicles move to the rear of the dismounted troops who maintain a baseline formation.
- c. **CQR Punch.** The PO Commander will order “Punch” - an executive order for the baseline to advance rapidly in order to drive the crowd back.

8. **CQR Considerations.** CQR drills are aggressive manoeuvres and consideration should be given to the following:

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- a. **Timing.** The timing of the CQR is critical. If conducted too early the effect on the crowd is minimised. If conducted too late the crowd may have reached the vehicles.
- b. **Exposure.** A rapid advance into an open area by dismounted troops can lead to the baseline having to fight on three fronts as their flanks are unprotected. The time that dismounted troops spend in front of vehicles should be minimised when vehicles are in the hard line formation.
- c. **Support.** Baton gunners and firemen must deploy forward to provide support to the baseline.
- d. **Protection.** Troops positioned in front of vehicles are vulnerable to missile attack. When in front of vehicles, troops should be moving to present a moving target that is more difficult to hit. Troops should then withdraw behind the vehicles as soon as possible.
- e. **Aggression.** CQRs must be sufficiently aggressive to turn the crowd and force the crowd to withdraw. They must go far enough forward to enable vehicles to move forward prior to the troops withdrawing. If CQRs are poorly executed they will have little effect on the crowd.

WARRIOR IN PUBLIC ORDER OPERATIONS

9. Warrior (WR) equipped platoons, like other vehicle equipped platoons, are vulnerable to encirclement and care must be exercised so that platoons are not overextended which may lead to vehicles being surrounded. The lack of numbers of vehicles and limited reaction options available to WR commanders may encourage the crowd to escalate the level of violence unless WR AFVs are integrated with dismounted troops. The deployment of WR will place a physical barrier between the troops and the crowd and may have a psychological effect on insurgents and crowds. WR provides a useful platform from which a PO commander can observe the crowd and make changes to his tactics. Snipers should be deployed to positions of overwatch to cover the dismounting of troops from WR and the establishment of a baseline.

10. WR is likely to be deployed into PO situations where there is a high risk of attack by small arms, grenades or heavy weapons. In such situations WR should be pushed forward of dismounted troops wherever possible and should lead advances in line abreast where the terrain allows. Drivers need to be well rehearsed in the drills associated with manoeuvring in close proximity to dismounted troops and civilians. Commanders may decide to use WR to disperse a crowd without support from dismounted troops. Where such an action has not been successful WR should either push on through the crowd or withdraw to a safe area where troops can be dismounted. Troops should not be dismounted in close proximity to the crowd.

11. Where WR is used in conjunction with shield teams, the WR should be pushed to the flanks, thus providing a central area that can either be filled by the more manoeuvrable vehicles (eg SNATCH Land Rover) or kept clear for shield teams to conduct rapid advances and arrests.

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CHAPTER 19

BASIC OBSERVATION SKILLS

1. **Aim.** The aim of this chapter is to define the basic observation skills which need to be acquired by all soldiers and to describe how they are applied to gain and improve situational awareness.
2. **Situational Awareness.** To display effective Situational Awareness (SA) troops need to combine:
 - a. A background understanding of the environment and the indigenous population.
 - b. Current knowledge of the threat and what friendly and neutral forces are doing.

Effective SA is all about being proactive: troops must pay continual attention to their surroundings. They must be able to anticipate and identify potential dangers and ignore distractions. Achieving this is not difficult if the approach is rigorous and background briefings and training are comprehensive and effective.

3. **Danger Areas/Situations.** It is important to understand that some areas and situations pose more of a threat than others. Identifying these in advance will allow troops to adopt the appropriate posture. In order to reduce their alert state troops must be aware of the bigger picture and remember that the threat may alter. Where an area may be safe for a period of time, it could quickly change.
4. **Combat Indicators.** Combat Indicators are subtle clues that something is not right. Anything that is inappropriate or out of place requires a closer look. Much will be down to instinct: troops may be suspicious, apprehensive or even afraid. Whilst these feelings cannot be allowed to affect the mission they may, if used prudently, lead to a successful outcome. It is better to be cautious than careless. Avoid thinking about the past; focus on the present. Doing so will allow successful identification of subtle clues.
5. **Action.** After identifying something out of the ordinary it is important to decide what to do about it (eg look for cover, concealment or escape routes). It is crucial that an initial reaction is appropriate and timely, and that in taking it troops do not forget what triggered it in the first place.
6. **Training and Briefing.** Only through consistent and thorough application of skills and tools (training), coupled with a comprehensive understanding of the environment and the threat (briefing), can one build up appropriate levels of situational awareness to cope in a complex military environment.¹ In a military context SA can be defined as:

¹ AFM Vol 1 Pt 1 *Formation Tactics*.

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“An individual’s understanding of the operational environment including friendly and enemy forces and their intent, the physical environment and other factors in the context of his role and mission.”²

7. Command.

a. **Understand.** Commanders at all levels must ensure that their soldiers possess a full understanding of who (including local “personalities”) and what they will be up against and the environment in which they will be operating. This will involve engendering:

(1) **Cultural Awareness.** All soldiers must be aware of differences in the culture of the enemy and of the indigenous population and (to a lesser extent) of coalition partners. It will enable the soldier to understand their behaviour patterns and what can be expected in different situations. He will thus be better able to anticipate the enemy’s actions and will be able to communicate more effectively where the situation demands.

(2) **Environmental Awareness.** Commanders and soldiers must be fully aware of the terrain and weather in theatre and must be fully prepared (trained and equipped) to operate effectively once deployed. Observation and sign interpretation drills are given at Annex A.

(3) **Threat Awareness.** The threat must be fully understood by all. Commanders at all levels must ensure that their soldiers are completely aware of what the enemy’s capabilities are and how and when he is likely to employ them. Detailed knowledge of the threat, maintenance of vigilance and an understanding of the combat indicators will enhance the chance of preventing a successful enemy attack (eg. Guidance on Suicide Bombers³). The threat is limited only by the imagination and technical capability of the enemy. A list of possible threats (which is not comprehensive) is given at Annex B.

(4) **Combat Indicators.** Units and soldiers able to establish detailed knowledge of the pattern of life in their AOR are at an advantage as there are often tell tale signs that an incident is about to take place. These may be spotted by alert soldiers:

- (a) During the terrorists’ preliminary reconnaissance.
- (b) Whilst terrorists set up an incident.
- (c) In the period immediately prior to its initiation.

(5) Examples of Combat Indicators are at Figure 19.1. Even if patrolling in an unfamiliar environment, these combat indicators can be recognised as:

² AFM Vol 1 Pt 8 *Command and Staff Procedures*.

³ AFM Vol 1 Pt 11 *Battlegroup Tactics*.

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<p>THE ABSENCE OF THE NORMAL</p> <p>OR</p> <p>THE PRESENCE OF THE ABNORMAL</p>

ABSENCE OF THE NORMAL	PRESENCE OF THE ABNORMAL	IMPLICATIONS
	Dicking of patrols Dicking by known terrorists from likely firing positions	Terrorists need exact information as to a patrol's location, strength, disposition and attitude before they will engage it. Are dickers providing the final confirmation that an attack should proceed? Do they show apprehension, tension and excitement or just nonchalance?
Women, children and other passers-by suddenly vacate a street or are absent from a normally busy area	An aggressive crowd suddenly disappears	Clearing the way for a shoot or detonation of a device and avoiding collateral damage?
	Curtains either open or drawn at the "wrong" time of day	Another sign of a house takeover or simply a signal that your patrol is in the area. Does interior light flood out to illuminate a soldier passing by the window?
	Known terrorists making themselves obviously seen on foot or in vehicles	A distraction?
Routine traffic fails to show or is late. Lack of cars on a normally busy road	Cars or vans unusually low on the suspension	Have they been hijacked for use as proxy bombs or mortar baseplates? Have locals been warned to avoid an attack zone?
	Footprints, disturbed vegetation at potential ambush sites	May indicate presence of potential attackers at FP or CP
	Recent digging. Sudden flocking of birds	Dug in CW or device? Rural activity may indicate presence of potential attackers
	Posts, flags, bags, cones or other conspicuous objects placed at the roadside or above head height	Potential markers for command wire IED, IAAG, PRIG, horizontal mortar or similar attacks, especially against mobile patrols

Figure 19.1 - Examples of Combat Indicators

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(6) **Actions.** Too often soldiers will have seen evidence of an attack unfolding but fail to act on the information. It is imperative that all combat indicators are:

(a) **Recorded.** If not the immediate target someone else may be in the near future. Record all details in the patrol report.

(b) **Reported.** Have the confidence to voice concerns to the team/patrol commander and ops room. Make sure everyone is alerted. The attack may be thwarted by a change of profile.

(c) **Acted On.** If soldiers react as if they have seen something, they may startle the terrorist into exposing his position and so gain the initiative. Do not continue with the original patrol plan; the “enemy” factor has changed – so must the estimation of the threat.

(7) **Enemy SOPs.** Enemy attacks seldom follow identical patterns, however if an attack has been successful it is likely to be repeated if the opportunity presents itself. This is why information must be disseminated ASAP. An enemy attack will normally follow a certain sequence of events - illustrated at Annex C.

8. **Surveillance.** Surveillance describes the operational tasks of protective overwatch and information gathering. It provides the ability to defeat terrorism through proactive operations based upon a good intelligence picture with real time imagery allowing the military to disrupt terrorist operations. Surveillance may be considered as a refinement of basic reconnaissance skills and while training is required to conduct observation effectively, overt surveillance is really a matter of following basic procedures. Surveillance is assisted by state of the art optical equipment, radar, thermal and infra-red imaging (TI and II) devices but still relies on the skills of close observation, logging and reporting of activity. Covert surveillance tends to focus on the monitoring of a specific point target (person or place) based on current threat. Overt surveillance takes in a specific area within visual range of the OP (known as its footprint) providing protection, deterrence and information on terrorist and terrorist related activity.

9. **Surveillance Skills.** Although surveillance has become a specialist operation, it is one that any soldier may be required to undertake, for example while observing from a security sangar. While soldiers are often rotated through operational cycles to keep interest and motivation high, surveillance skills must be maintained at a high level by practising the individual and collective skills whenever possible. The skills required for conducting surveillance from a sangar, OP or monitoring suite are primarily:

- a. Observing, logging and reporting skills
- b. Communications and administration
- c. Equipment familiarity

10. **Core Skills.** Core observing skills, which must be mastered before deployment and practised regularly, are:

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A – H (Describing Persons)	SCRIM (Describing Vehicles)
A – Age B – Build C – Clothes D – Distinguishing marks E – Elevation F – Face G – Gait H – Hair	S – Shape C – Colour R – Registration I – Identifying features M – Make/Model

Note: Full descriptions of **A – H** and **SCRIM** are at Annexes D and E respectively.

11. **Continuity of Evidence.** One of the primary roles of overt surveillance is to provide detailed information for others to use in their attempts to cause attrition. This information could also potentially be used as evidence in a court of law to secure convictions. Soldiers must therefore be “evidence aware” to ensure that opportunities from which convictions could arise are not missed because of errors in evidence continuity or information handling.

12. **Preservation of Forensic Evidence.** Evidence awareness extends to the preservation of evidence at the scene of an incident. It is recognised that full and effective preservation of forensic evidence is a skill which requires a significant amount of training and scientific equipment. Under most circumstances it will therefore be appropriate to involve RMP/SOCO but there will be times when this is impracticable. When this is the case it will be necessary for the patrol leader or incident commander to ensure that the scene is appropriately photographed and relevant evidence is bagged and tagged with as little contamination as possible. Details on how evidence should be handled are contained in at Annex F.

OBSERVATION AND SIGN INTERPRETATION DRILL

OBSERVATION

1. Enemy activity will leave its mark on the environment. The ability to interpret such signs leads to enhanced situational awareness, including the location of threats (mines, UXO and booby traps) or the direction of enemy movement (a withdrawal route from a firing point). The importance of effective observation should not be underestimated. It is essential to look, see, interpret and deduce from an object or sign that has drawn attention. The use of sight is the primary means by which the individual accumulates information, while the ability patiently to reflect and employ common sense is essential for effective interpretation.

2. **Why Objects are Seen.** Objects are seen for the following reasons:

- a. Shape.
- b. Surface/Shine.
- c. Shadow.
- d. Silhouette.
- e. Spacing.

3. **Observation Techniques.** Observation techniques are broken down into two areas:

a. **Scanning.** Scanning is a general and systematic examination of a specific area of interest, to detect any unusual disturbance or interference. Scanning is as a visual search and should not, at this stage, progress to a physical search. The scan area is broken down into:

- (1) Foreground.
- (2) Middle distance.
- (3) Far distance.

The optimal technique is to scan each area horizontally, starting with the foreground. Maximum efficiency is gained by moving the head in short overlapping movements in a figure of eight motion. Move the head rather than the eyes to reduce eye fatigue. The speed at which the scanning process is carried out will depend on the type of terrain being observed. Look through the vegetation/terrain and not directly at it to prevent the detail fading out. The maximum range for the eye to be most effective is five metres; beyond this distance detailed analysis will be obscured by the elements, ground and human error.

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b. **Searching.** Searching can take place during any stage of the scanning phase once an area of interest has been identified. The ground is broken up into segments/'cheeses' and numbered in a logical sequence (see the Sign Interpretation Drill below).

(1) **Initial Search.** Any suspected disturbance or sign will require a detailed and immediate initial study. At this stage a visual rather than physical search is carried out as follows:

- (a) Visually assess the immediate area of interest up to two metres out to the front and sides.
- (b) Assess from the standing, kneeling and prone positions.
- (c) Determine a safe avenue of ingress and egress.
- (d) This process can take up to 30 minutes. If no detail is obvious, conduct an initial probe.

(2) **Initial Probe.**⁴

- (a) From present position probe forward to the left front and right in the direction of the area of interest. Return to the start point along the chosen axis. This can be confirmed by magnetic bearing.
- (b) This must only be carried out up to and one metre beyond the area of interest. If no confirmation is made, then carry out an initial cast.

(3) **Initial Cast.**

- (a) Move back along your direction of travel 15-20 metres. Using the original start point at which you conducted the initial search, walk in a circle 15-20 metres in diameter, using the start point as the centre of the circle.
- (b) The aim here is to cut any sign, information or indicators that might suggest human activity.
- (c) On confirmation, the circle must be complete prior to any additional scan/search techniques being conducted. Information may be logged and recorded for further investigation.

4. **Terrain Analysis.** An intimate knowledge of the ground is the key to understanding how the aggressor will chose to use that ground to his own advantage. Every fold, kink, and relief must be interpreted correctly and every possibility uncovered.

⁴ Where the suspected threat is from mines, no movement towards the suspect area should be made. The scanning and searching technique should be used to identify safe areas. If in a mined area the usual extraction drill (Look-Feel-Prod) should be used.

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SIGN INTERPRETATION DRILL

5. **Introduction.** The Sign Interpretation Drill is a guide for a sequence of activities which the individual can employ with confidence in the pursuit of the tell tale signs left by human interference with the natural state of the environment. The drill is intended as a thought provoking process and if followed correctly will offer the best chance of sign identification.

6. **Seven Step Overview.** There are seven steps to the cycle. For a sign to become obvious the individual must first be able to interpret what he has observed. The following must be applied throughout the process:

- a. Study the sign intimately.
- b. Distinguish the sign from others.
- c. Assess the condition or state of the sign.
- d. Note any idiosyncrasies or traits.
- e. Investigate any slight change, no matter how small or insignificant.
- f. Anticipate any human activity, movement, direction of travel and, most importantly, any deception measures.
- g. Make deductions based on fact alone.
- h. Monitor the ground state and lay of the land.

7. **The Steps.** The continuous cycle is a seven step process applied as a systematic drill. Do not be tempted to overlook any step as each will answer the questions raised for the next. The process is as follows:


- a. **Assessment of the General Direction.** Assess the general direction of threat out to the maximum visibility (15-20m) and trace back to your position. Be sure to observe every detail as you close into your position.
- b. **Eliminate all Openings and Finalise the General Direction.** Prioritise the threat area in small chunks to finalise the exact location of the threat. Mentally and visually close off any areas of no concern.
- c. **Look to the Furthest Sign and Connect it Back to your Position.** This is to ensure that no other deception process has been applied.
- d. **Look Through the Vegetation.** Even in sparse and open ground pay attention to every detail. Every nook and cranny may hold a clue. Look to side of any area that arouses suspicion as the detail will become clearer.

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
- e. **Check Immediate Threat/Area for Deception Tactics.** Start from the threat and work back to your position. Pay particular attention to within two metres of the threat.
- f. **Plan and Memorise your Next Footsteps.** Work out the best avenue of approach or exit. Make a mental note of the ground as you move. Look ahead and not at the ground. Be aware that it is natural to desensitise while on the move.
- g. **Approach/Withdraw with Stealth and Caution.** Move to an area you perceive to be safe. The cycle can then be repeated.

THE THREAT

1. All soldiers are encouraged to “think enemy” and attempt to undermine his opportunities by presenting a difficult target.

T H R E A T	WEAPON	CHARACTERISTICS	R A N G E	DEPLOYMENT	EFFECT
	Petrol Bomb	Bottle filled with petrol, possibly mixed with paint, acid etc. Wick protrudes from neck. Lit immediately before throwing	15–20 m	Mostly during minor aggro or riot using crowd as cover. Thrower may expose himself to view	Normally can be avoided but potentially lethal if thrown at close range against unprotected skin
	Grenades RDG-5	Commercial anti-personnel fragmentation grenade	15–20m	As above	Shrapnel effect increases with confined space
	Mk 15 “Coffee Jar”	Commercial explosive and detonator, initiates on glass shattering and releasing spring	10–15m	As above plus dropped from high points, bridges, flats etc	Considerable anti-personnel effect, limited anti-vehicle effect
	IAAG	Shaped charge, “drogue” bomb. Destroyed on impact	5–10m	As above, thrower may expose himself to view if used horizontally	Modern vehicle armour lessens impact

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T H R E A T	WEAPON	CHARACTERISTICS	R A N G E	DEPLOYMENT	EFFECT
	Shoot CQA	Handgun, shotgun or rifle used at close range	0–2m	Victim is shot at close range, usually several times	Usually fatal
	“Cowboy”	Random, unplanned shoot and run, using high or low velocity weapon	15–50m	Usually used to “blood” young terrorist. Lacks determination, escape uppermost intent	Lucky to achieve a significant hit
	Automatic multi-weapon	Well planned attack from prepared firing positions with mutually supporting mix of AK47, Armalite, HMG etc	20–300m	Determined ASU, especially in rural setting, with vehicular escape arranged	Can destroy lightly armoured vehicles and troops in the open
	Snipe	Single, well aimed shot from HV weapon, including commercial sniper rifles with optic sights such as Barrett .50	30–100+m	Zeroed weapon used by dedicated terrorist with good dicking and escape systems in place	Usually fatal
	Shoulder-launched devices RPG 7/RPG 22	Commercial light anti-armour weapons. RPG 7 reloadable, RPG 22 disposable tube			Will defeat armour

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T H R E A T	WEAPON	CHARACTERISTICS	R A N G E	DEPLOYMENT	EFFECT
	Explosion CWIED	Various-sized explosive pack housed in metal or plastic container (milk churn, fertiliser bag, plastic barrel), usually home made mix with commercial booster and detonator, initiated by command wire which may be dug in	5–700m (7m shortest urban CW)	Urban CW tends to be shorter and may be surface laid at short notice. Rural can be longer and spit-locked into ground a considerable distance. Targets are predicted and dicked – markers may be used to confirm target in killing zone	Considerable collateral damage over a widespread area. Depending on the amount of explosive used and direction of blast it may defeat armoured vehicles.
	RCIED	As above, except device initiated by remote means, whether light, laser, radio, telephone or other	15–300m	Certain types can be inhibited therefore terrorist looks to exploit slack drills.	As above
	VOIED	As above, except device initiated by pressure pad, trip-wire, light-sensitive switch, mercury tilt switch or similar	Immediate area	Terrorist need not remain in situ once device primed. Favoured at derelicts, attractive items, predicted harbour areas, under vehicles etc	As above

ENEMY SOPS

1. Enemy attacks seldom follow identical patterns, but if an attack has been successful it is likely to be repeated. Attacks will normally follow a certain sequence of events.

Event	Remarks
Recce	The gunman or bomber may well recce the target area and his potential escape routes, looking for markers, good line-of-sight, suitable firing positions etc
Dicking/Lookout screen	Confirmatory information on target location, timings and disposition will be provided by a screen of dickers. Dickers will try to identify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • unit boundaries • routes used • cover positions and locations adopted • timings • attitude/alertness • strength and composition Lookouts, including youngsters, will provide a warning system to cover the movement of weapons, approach of the gunman/bomber, approach of the target, appearance of threats to the escape route (such as an unforeseen patrol). Mobile phones, CB radios and walkie-talkies may be used if a simple hand-signal system cannot cope.
Provision of weapons and explosives	The plan will normally be for weapons and explosives to be moved into the attack zone immediately before the incident and removed from the scene immediately afterwards. In urban areas this may be achieved by a supply chain of activists, while in rural areas the gunman/bomber may carry the munitions in and out of position himself. Temporary transit hides may be used both before and after an attack to safeguard the weapons pending re-location to a deep hide.
Firing Points/House takeovers	A safe and unsuspected FP for shoots and IED initiation may take the form of a nearby building. If these are occupied, the enemy may take over the house and hold the occupants captive until after the attack. Such FP may be adapted to suit the weapon being used, for example, roof slates, air vents or window glass may be moved to accommodate a long-barrelled weapon. The family car may be stolen for use as an escape vehicle. Neither the house nor the car will attract attention as they are inevitably “untraced”.
The attack	Timings, range and method of attack will vary enormously depending on the type of attack, the environment, the calibre of the enemy and even the weather.

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Event	Remarks
Post attack/escape	The enemy will wish to distance himself from the scene by escaping on foot, bike or other vehicle. His immediate concern is to escape capture and avoid being linked to the scene. If escape routes are blocked, he may try to blend into the community, possibly by entering other occupied buildings. The enemy will always want to place some kind of barrier between himself and pursuing SF. Obvious examples are walls and fences, however he may also use inter unit boundaries, open ground (clear field of fire) or groups of civilians, including children. Inevitably the enemy will attempt to leave behind an observer to note SF reaction and tactics as well as the result of the attack.

DESCRIBING INDIVIDUALS – THE ‘A TO H’ METHOD

1. **Introduction.** The recognised method of describing individuals is the A to H method. An accurate A to H can enable an individual whose identity is unknown to the observer to be identified by someone else. Where possible photo or video coverage should accompany an A - H. The subject’s sex should also be recorded where known. This is usually done at the beginning of the text in the log entry by using the following abbreviations: Unknown Male/Female (UKM/UKF).

2. A - H stands for the following:

- A: Age**
- B: Build**
- C: Clothes**
- D: Distinguishing Marks**
- E: Elevation**
- F: Face**
- G: Gait**
- H: Hair**

3. **Age.** The most reliable method of ageing a person is to bracket them. Allow a three year bracket around the age you believe them to be. For example a man aged 27 would be bracketed 26 to 28. Another method is to place the subject in a general category eg ‘late teens’ or ‘early 20s’. Whichever method is adopted it will only give an approximate age. Remember that women, in particular, can be difficult to age correctly.

4. **Build.** Build refers to the size and shape of the individual. This should be kept simple, for example: Slim/thin, pot bellied, stout, stocky, fat or plump. Avoid using the terms small/medium/large build which people interpret from their own perspective.

5. **Clothing.** Clothing can be used to disguise an individual’s build. When describing clothes work from the top to bottom and include anything that the subject may be carrying. The sun can affect the perceived colour when using viewing devices. Use dark or light coloured if in doubt. Avoid brand names. Be accurate and only record what you can see. Remember clothing is an unreliable recognition feature as it can be changed easily.

6. **Distinguishing Marks.** When describing distinguishing marks it can be useful to ask the question; What makes the subject stand out from others? Examples of distinguishing marks can be scars, burns, tattoos, acne or moles. The greater the accuracy and detail included in the description of the distinguishing mark the more helpful the description is to others. Try to add details of the type, colour and exact location of the distinguishing mark.

7. **Elevation.** Judging elevation or height is made more difficult when looking down on a subject from an OP position. Use the bracketing system, ie 4cm (about 1½ inches) either

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side of estimated height. For example, if a subject appears to be 175 cm, bracket it to 171 – 179 cm. Common yardsticks for estimating height are:

- a. The average car height is 140 cm.
- b. A standard door is about 195 cm.

8. **Face.** Facial appearances can be easily changed by using wigs, glasses, growing beards and moustaches or gaining/losing weight. Work from the top to bottom. Mention the outline of the face if observed, eg round, thin, broad or pointed.

9. **Gait.** The way a subject walks can be an important recognition feature, especially at night when using night viewing devices (NVDs). The things to look for include:

- a. Length of stride.
- b. Speed of movement.
- c. Deportment. Slouched or upright?
- d. Anything unique eg a limp, shuffle, or characteristic arm swing.
- e. Method of standing eg legs apart, one leg bent etc.

10. **Hair.** Hair is easily changed by the use of wigs, dyeing, cutting and styling. It is therefore not a particularly reliable long term recognition feature. Things to look for include:

- a. Length.
- b. Colour If in doubt use the terms dark, light, fair or blond.
- c. Style - military, crew-cut, permed etc.

11. In some cases you will not have only a fleeting observation. Regular practise of this skill ensures that when required it is second nature and detail will not be missed.

DESCRIBING VEHICLES – THE ‘SCRIM’ METHOD

1. **Introduction.** The recognised method of describing vehicles is commonly known by the mnemonic SCRIM. This provides a structured description of the identifying features of a vehicle.
2. **SCRIM.** The mnemonic SCRIM stands for:
 - S:** Shape
 - C:** Colour
 - R:** Registration
 - I:** Identifying features
 - M:** Make/Model
3. **Shape.** Describe the shape by recording the type of car and the number of doors. Examples of the type of car include the following: saloon, hatchback, estate, pick-up or coupé. A full description of the shape of a car could be *‘4-door saloon’*.
4. **Colour.** It can be difficult to give an accurate description of colour and so if in doubt use light/dark as the description.
5. **Registration.** A vehicle’s registration number (VRN) is its most easily recognisable feature and it is therefore extremely important to be accurate. If in doubt record the details as a partial VRN and attempt to confirm the VRN with others or video playback.
6. **Identifying Marks.** Identifying marks are distinguishing features that separate a vehicle from other similar vehicles.
7. **Make/Model.** It is becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate between different make/models as modern car styling becomes increasingly similar. Knowledge of the manufacturer’s logo design and its position on the vehicle can be an aid to identification but experience is required to be able to identify the model of car.
8. You may only have a short period of time in which to record this information. Thus practice and thorough knowledge of the sequence are essential. The most important details to achieve are colour, VRN and model.

CONTINUITY OF EVIDENCE

1. **Types of Evidence.** Evidence may consist of physical objects or information. Information may be recorded in a variety of formats such as:

a. **Written.** There are a number of types of written evidence that could be produced, the main ones being:

- (1) AFB 58 Log Sheet
- (2) Patrol Note Book

b. **Photographic.** If photographic evidence of an incident has been captured it is important that the frames used should be correlated with the sightings entered in the log. The digital memory should be handled as evidence.

c. **Video.** Video evidence can be extremely useful provided that the tape has been correctly accounted for. There are a number of considerations which should be taken into account:

(1) The DTG display on the VCR/ Camcorder must be correctly set and visible on any tape recording. The time on the video monitor is the time to be used on all log entries. The VCR tape position counter should be zeroed at this time and also used as a reference in the log. These procedures ensure that any video evidence is co-ordinated with written evidence.

(2) For full continuity of evidence any sequence of video footage should be supported by complete coverage of that day, up to and including the event. This may be achieved by using 24 hr time lapse VCRs, so that a complete 24 hr period is recorded onto one tape. OPs should ensure that when recording an event of interest the VCR is switched to three hr mode to improve the quality of the recording.

(3) These continuity tapes should be continuously recording whilst the OP is operational. They should be changed over at midnight, logged and stored. The time period of storage and method of handling will be directed by Bn HQ.

2. **Treatment of Evidence.** If potential evidence is captured (either physically, on film or on video) then it must be dealt with it in the correct manner in order for it to have any value in a court of law. This involves the use of a simple evidence handling kit and procedures.

a. **Evidence Handling Kit.** A suggested evidence handling kit to be kept in OPs or carried by patrols is:

- (a) Army Form 38/29 (A).

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- (b) Sturdy, opaque bags or envelopes.
- (c) Self-adhesive labels.
- (d) Sellotape.
- (e) Camera (digital/disposable).

4. **Handling Procedure.** Anything more than basic preservation of forensic evidence can only be achieved by SOCO/RMP with specialist equipment. If the security situation precludes the calling of SOCO the incident commander must coordinate the collection of as much relevant evidence as possible by soldiers.

a. **Photographs.** Where possible, photographs should be taken of the evidence in situ. Those photographs must then be treated as evidence and the digital memory/film/camera bagged and tagged as detailed below.

b. **Identification.** Form 38/29 (A) should be completed with full details of the evidence including where and when found, by whom found, how treated and what associated photographs. All markings on memory/film/tape, whether operational serial numbers or those applied by the manufacturer, should be recorded.

c. **Bagging and Tagging.** Evidence should be bagged and tagged using the kit outlined above. It should be handled with as much care as possible, put into a bag or envelope and all edges sealed with tape. The Form 38/29 (A) should then be sellotaped to the evidence package. Note: The statement section on the form should only be signed when the evidence is handed over to the police or other agencies as authorised by G2.

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CHAPTER 20

OPERATIONS ROOM STAFF AND PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION

1. Command, Control and Communications (C3) will be exercised either through the commander on the ground, the operations room/centre or a combination of both. This chapter deals with procedures to be followed by all staff working in an ops room.

2. The main business of the ops room staff is to control forces placed under command. The commander is likely to spend much of his time on the ground giving orders and direction. It is the role of the ops room staff to convert that direction into tangible effects on the ground. An effective ops room gives soldiers on the ground confidence that they will be looked after in the event of an incident. An ineffective ops room can result in lives being put at risk.

PRINCIPLES FOR OPS ROOM PROCEDURES

4. Those working in an ops room should adhere to five key principles:

a. **Situational Awareness.** Ops room staff must be aware of all activity in their Area of Operations (AO) in detail, as well as being aware of the operations of flanking forces. They should also have a good understanding of the wider context in which they are operating (ie their higher commander's intent).

b. **Support to Deployed Forces.** Ops room staff are there to support deployed troops. The threat faced by those deployed troops and the risk to soldiers' lives must be foremost in the mind of all ops room staff. The staff should deploy whenever possible in order to understand the operating environment.

c. **Anticipation.** A good ops room will anticipate. It will cue assets before they are requested and will take pressure off deployed troops.

d. **Accuracy.** Ops room staff must be accurate in their work. They should also always check information for accuracy, since it will often be sent to them by troops in contact who are under great pressure.

e. **Coordination.** A good ops room will coordinate troops effectively in order to achieve the relevant intent. All troops should be made aware of other operations in the vicinity in order to ensure that all activity is co-ordinated effectively.

LIAISON

5. Liaison is defined as the communication and contact between groups. It has to be both horizontal (internal within the unit and external to other units/organisations) and vertical (up and down the chain of command). As well as being able to pass current information, frequent liaison also engenders a sense of trust, confidence and understanding in other organisations. The tendency for organisations and departments to become introspective must be avoided.

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a. **Horizontal Liaison.**

(1) **Internal.** Passage of information between ops room and int cells so that both develop an accurate picture of what is happening on the ground.

(2) **External.** Links to the local police and other agencies must be encouraged and nurtured. Links to flanking military units should also be encouraged particularly in a multinational setting.

b. **Vertical Liaison.** Feedback to and from sub units is essential to maintain situational awareness and to ensure that information is reported, analysed and acted on in a timely manner. Reporting to a superior HQ must be clear and factual, ensuring that opinion is not reported and that the meaning of messages does not change during transmission.

6. **Information.** In order to be effective an ops room must hold and evaluate information:

a. **Background Information.**

(1) **Maps.** Covering a variety of scales. Typical examples are:

(a) **Own AO in Detail/ Master Ops Map.** This should be prominently displayed and in a position where it can be written on. It must be kept up to date and location of all troops should be shown.

(b) **Next Level Up AO Map.** This should also be visible and should have flanking units, boundaries, other operations etc all marked up.

(c) **Tribal/ Religious/ Demographic Maps.** Other maps may show tribal areas, religious zones etc.

(d) **Detailed Town/ Village Maps.** There may be large scale maps of prominent towns or villages.

(e) **Base Security Map.** There should be a map (or aerial photograph) showing the layout of the SF base in which the ops room is located. This may be gridded, or split into zones to enable effective clearance in case of base attack.

(2) **Photographs.** Both aerial and ground based showing key route junctions, incident black spots, known flashpoints, SF bases etc.

(3) **Contact Details.** As well as the contact details of key personalities (including details of their off duty location) it is useful to have the number of other agencies, civic personalities etc. The int cell may also keep wider records on key characters in the local population eg frequent complainers/ tribal leaders/local police etc.

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(4) **Agency Tasking Procedures.** Contact details and the SOP tasking procedures for all agencies who may be required to support an operation.

(5) **Actions On Boards.** A number of boards which provide a one side aide memoire for the immediate actions in the event of an incident.

(6) **Historical Knowledge.** Previous incident locations and routes including ICP/VCP locations. Base attack histories. Weapon capability aide memoires. Transit route usage data.

(7) **Local Knowledge.** Forthcoming events eg football matches, parades. Awareness of dates of cultural and/or historical significance. Holidays.

b. **Current Information.** Cover the immediate past (24 hours to several days) and projected activity for the next week or longer. Watchkeeper logs. Reports and returns.

c. **Peripheral Information.** Include information gleaned from less formal liaison with other organisations, units or agencies, from media reports, local knowledge and considered speculation. It forms part of the ops room lore and may be considered when planning or reacting to an incident.

7. **Practical Considerations.** An efficient ops room will pre-empt the requirements of commanders on the ground and aim off for agency tasking, thus reducing reaction time. A balance must be struck between coaxing information from deployed troops and interfering in their operation.

a. **Informal Action.** In the event of an incident, callsigns not involved can be minimised. Superior HQs and key agencies can be given preliminary warning of tasking and given regular SITREPs. Routine administration is minimised and key posts within the ops room are manned by the most effective personnel (the "A Team").

b. **Formal Action.** A number of anticipatory actions which can be taken by the Ops Room prior to firm requests being made by the commander(s) on the ground.

(1) Warning can be given to superior HQs that air assets may be required and confirmation of their availability. Aircraft in transit could be diverted to provide top cover, deception or troop movement.

(2) Reinforcement troops can be considered and NTM reduced accordingly.

(3) Agencies can be given formal warning of likely involvement and specialist equipment prepared for use.

(4) Logistic preparation can be started eg for provision of defence stores, public order equipment, additional feeding, accommodation.

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8. **Tasking Procedure.** Tasking procedures are well established in Theatre, giving the agency involved sufficient information to prepare for the forthcoming task. The exact nature of tasking procedures may be modified by superior HQs in order better to meet the prevailing situation and no attempt is made to reproduce them in this chapter. All troops or agencies who are deploying in reaction to an incident must be given a thorough brief and a defined mission. This is especially true of the QRF, who are often tasked without a specific purpose.

9. **Communications Systems.** HF or VHF radio command nets form the basis for the passage of information. Radios should be used for incident control wherever possible in order to maximise awareness across the unit. A sub unit ops room will normally have the following comms systems:

- a. **Sub Unit Comd Net.** Usually VHF but occasionally HF.
- b. **BG Comd Net.** VHF or HF. TACSAT may be available in some theatres.
- c. **TACSAT.** When operating over long distances TACSAT may be regularly used.
- d. **Portable Mobile Radios (PMR).** A commercial system which may be on wide issue. It is generally **insecure**.
- e. **Telephones.** Telephone systems will vary in terms of classification and security. During incidents care should be taken during their use since they provide one to one comms rather than all informed.
- f. **IT.** Most Ops Rooms will be equipped with some IT, which may or may not be linked to an intranet. Intranet-enabled systems can provide a useful means of executing control, although operators must be proficient in their use and ensure that they remain up to date.

PERSONALITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

10. **Operations Officer.** The ops offr runs the ops room. He must exert his personality and influence on all who work there. He must also have credibility with those on the ground and a detailed understanding of the ground, the threat and the operating environment. He must understand his commander's intent in detail and be capable of taking independent decisive action with little or no direction. He must not, however, be arrogant or overbearing. Like other ops room staff, his is a support role to those who execute operations.

- a. **Duties.** Duties may include some or all of the following:
 - (1) Routine planning of the patrol programme.
 - (2) Support to the commander for planning specific operations.
 - (3) Command of all ops room staff.
 - (4) Coordination of troops and incident management.

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- (5) Support to the incident commander.
- (6) Tasking of agencies.
- (7) Compilation of post operational reports and learning accounts.

b. **Common Ops Offr Mistakes:**

- (1) Not understanding the situation on the ground.
- (2) Over control of the watchkeeper or signaller.
- (3) Not maintaining a broad view.
- (4) Getting too involved in logging and reporting.
- (5) Over control of callsigns on the ground.
- (6) Failing to task agencies and supporting callsigns effectively.

11. **Watchkeeper.** The watchkeeper must be a SNCO or above. He must also be capable of managing an incident with little direction, must understand the operations on the ground and must be capable of understanding the wider context. At sub unit level he will normally man the BG comd net and be responsible for passing information upwards.

a. **Duties.** At sub unit level, his duties may include:

- (1) Remain aware of all activity in the sub unit AO.
- (2) Man the BG comd net.
- (3) Monitor the signaller.
- (4) Maintain the watchkeeper's log.
- (5) Tasking and coordination of agencies and flanking forces (once directed by the ops offr).

b. **Common Watchkeeper Mistakes:**

- (1) Lack of situational awareness.
- (2) Over control of signaller.
- (3) Over use of telephones rather than comd net.
- (4) Not checking info for accuracy.

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(5) Over reliance on check lists; watchkeepers must maintain a broad view, using their experience and intelligence to effectively task agencies and support deployed troops.

12. **Signaller.** The signaller will normally be a signals specialist. His role includes:
- a. Ensuring that all comms eqpt is in working order (incl radios, faxes and IT).
 - b. Manning the sub unit comd net.
 - c. Logging and reporting in the radio operator's log.
 - d. Maintaining the ops map, ensuring that troops locations are up to date.

SUMMARY

13. All staff must maintain their situational awareness. Control of incidents is a delicate balancing act between allowing the commander on the ground the freedom to act and manoeuvre, yet pressing him for information where necessary.

14. A good ops room and its staff:
- a. Facilitate.
 - b. Support.
 - c. Maintain a broad perspective.
 - d. Remain calm.
 - e. Engender confidence.

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CHAPTER 21

USE OF INTERPRETERS

INTRODUCTION

1. Language difficulties can arise at any stage in the conduct of operations in a theatre where English is not widely spoken. This can also be a problem on combined operations, exacerbated by differences in doctrine, training, military culture and capability. Such problems can be overcome by employing interpreters who may be UK military or civilian personnel or Locally Employed Civilians (LECs). The latter may be employed direct or provided as part of the Host Nation Support (HNS).

MILITARY INTERPRETERS

2. Military interpreters will be required from the earliest stages of military planning, through any deployment into, and eventual withdrawal from, a theatre of operations. The scale of provision will depend on the requirement to interpret between the military force and other parties, on whether the environment is friendly or hostile, on the language of allied and coalition partners and on the nature of the operational theatre.

3. The extent to which local nationals can be used will depend upon the nature of the operations, but it does not remove the requirement for some servicemen to speak the language(s) concerned. The deployed force should have a number of military interpreters on strength who can:

- a. Assess the abilities, employ, deploy and monitor the performance of any local interpreters.
- b. Replace local staff when security, military or political considerations require interpretation of sensitive information.
- c. Deal with a military vocabulary beyond the scope of the local interpreters.

4. In certain situations and environments the rank of the military interpreter may be important if he or she is to have credibility in the eyes of the local political/military leaders.

USE OF LOCAL INTERPRETERS

5. Before employing LECs as interpreters it will be necessary to assess their capabilities and possibly their political affiliation. Employing local people as interpreters has security implications both for information and for the physical security of the persons involved. The use of LECs in policy making staff areas will generally be inappropriate. In any operation, knowledge of the political/cultural/religious affiliation of individual local interpreters could be of vital importance in certain situations.

6. Consideration has to be given to the basis on which interpreters will be employed as it will be rare for their services to be required on a permanent basis. They may also have to be employed in other secondary roles which will require them to demonstrate wider military skills and possibly some flexibility.

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GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF LEC INTERPRETERS

7. These guidelines¹ provide commanders and others using or managing LEC interpreters with guidance to assist them in getting the best service from their interpreters. The guidelines focus on how interpreters should be used in practical work situations, and some related administrative issues.

8. The function of the interpreter is to facilitate communication and understanding. He/she is the filter through which much, if not most, of the local information you receive will pass. How you use this filter is mainly up to you. As the user, you will achieve better communication and understanding through interpreters if you are aware of their strengths and limitations.

9. Interpreters are either allocated to support an individual or small group of personnel, or are placed in a pool from which all can demand support. The assumption in these guidelines is that you will develop some familiarity with the interpreter you use, even if he/she is drawn from the pool.

10. The three main tasks performed by interpreters are assisting in speaking to groups (such as trainees or crowds), informal contact with locals (such as on patrol), and planned meetings (often with single individuals, at their request). The guidance here is most relevant to interpreting for planned meetings, but can be easily adapted to the other circumstances.

11. Some useful terms in dealing with Interpreters are:

a. Linguists are those who have command of two or more languages. Some linguists are required to act as interpreters. Although it is recognised that interpreting is a specialist skill that requires training, note that such training is not yet available to most linguists (both UK and LEC) who are tasked to perform as interpreters.

b. Translating – rendering the written word in another language.

c. Written translation – a written translation of a written document.

d. Sight translation – a verbal translation of a written document.

e. Interpreting – rendering the spoken word in another language:

(1) Simultaneous interpreting – listening in one language and speaking in the other at the same time, probably a sentence or so behind. Used when speech cannot be interrupted – in formal conferences (where the interpreter is in a booth and you hear your language through headphones) or when listening to speeches or announcements (where the interpreter can whisper to you as the speech progresses). Simultaneous interpreting is very demanding and is unlikely to be either available or much needed on operations.

¹ These guidelines are not rules. It is expected that those using LEC interpreters will find some parts of these Guidelines more useful and informative than others. In order to develop and improve these Guidelines, it would be helpful if any feedback is passed to: SO2 Languages; HQ DETS(A); Trenchard Lines; Upavon; Wiltshire SN9 6BP.

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(2) Consecutive interpreting – you speak in English, then your interpreter renders this in the foreign language, your interlocutor replies, the interpreter renders this into English, and so on. This is a less demanding skill and far more appropriate to most operational situations. These guidelines will focus on consecutive interpreting.

12. Properly used, LEC interpreters can be the best means to understand the local population. Improperly used, the least bad thing that could happen is that a valuable potential resource is squandered. Some commanders will have a natural flair for working with LEC interpreters and will quickly establish an excellent relationship with them.² For such fortunates, these guidelines will probably be most useful at the start of the tour and then as an occasional reference. Others will find it difficult, for whatever reason, to establish a good relationship with their interpreters.³ The least that must be expected in these circumstances is that the relationship is professional and functional, based on the advice in these guidelines.

13. Many of the LEC interpreters will be members of the local elite, often respected professionals who – in local comparative terms – believe themselves to be better educated and of higher social status than many of the UK military personnel they encounter. This can be a source of great interest, but is also potentially a problem. Do not expect such interpreters to understand the entire range of their own society. They will know their social strata well, but may be less familiar with others. This may be particularly marked when dealing with rural or tribal leaders. They will certainly have great difficulty understanding many of the UK military personnel with whom they work.

14. They may have military experience of some sort. Some may be ex-soldiers and will view our restraint and concern for the rule of law as a sign of weakness. This subject is best dealt with openly in discussion and the outcome reported, if appropriate and necessary.

15. Interpreters change as they become more experienced and comfortable in their role. From an initial position of wary uncertainty and diffidence (often approaching fear), by their third or fourth rotation of troops they will often understand the mission and SOPs as well as many incoming troops. Care must be exercised in exploiting this experience, but without in any way becoming subordinate to it, or too dependent. The risks are greatest in specialist areas, where the interpreter is dealing with the same group of local interlocutors on a regular basis. The options are to either rotate the interpreter to other tasks, or seek to employ him in a different capacity that recognises and controls his role (as an LEC staff officer or civil servant equivalent).

16. Interpreters will be viewed differently because of their employment by the UK military. There will be some envy, some contempt, some suspicion, but they will always be regarded as a knowledgeable source of information about British troops, SOPs, etc.

² All will be aware of the range of potential risks if the relationship becomes too close. While this is a subject in its own right, two risks of over reliance on a single source are worth noting here – those of distortion and dependency.

³ In a small minority of cases, the problem will be prejudice. While it is impossible to legislate against attitudes, commanders should be in no doubt that bigoted behaviour will not be acceptable. However, in most cases the problem will be a clash of personalities. In these cases, there should be no difficulty arranging the re-assignment of LEC Interpreters. Should such re-assignment prove impossible, the next best option is to move to a pool system.

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17. Interpreters live in the local community. Despite any vetting they may have received, there is a high risk that the detail of your conversations will be passed on. Indeed since you cannot protect them and their family at home, you should assume that they will pass everything on, if under any pressure to do so. In establishing your relationship, you may wish to tell them that the safety and security of their family must come first, as it would for you in similar circumstances. If this may cause a problem, do not use a LEC interpreter.

18. It is impossible not to form some sort of human relationship with your interpreter. Since this is inevitable, it might as well occur on your terms and in a manner that is comfortable to you. Some will be happy to exchange life stories and develop friendships. Others will prefer a more reserved relationship. Learn to do the small talk appropriate to the level of relationship you seek. It is always worthwhile chatting about what is being covered on the local and international media, local problems and issues, and the general reaction of the local community to the British military presence and activity.

19. If you cannot discuss religion with knowledge, sensitivity and genuine interest – avoid talking about it at all. Differences of faith create ample opportunity for misunderstanding and unintentional slights, greatly exacerbated by any historic tensions. Therefore, particularly if you are secular or atheist/agnostic, you will need to be exceptionally careful about discussing religion.

20. Finally, be aware that LEC interpreters will almost certainly NOT be a trained professional interpreter, but a local who has reasonable English. Their effectiveness is therefore critically dependent on the guidance and support received from you.

21. Working with LEC Interpreters.

a. **General Points.**

(1) There is no substitute for experience. You should expect to get better at using interpreters and should therefore start with modest expectations. Try and avoid the trap of seeking consistency from the start – at the price of learning and adapting.

(2) Pick the right interpreter for the meeting. If you are not sure if he/she is the right person for the task, ask – if necessary by outlining the task in general terms. For example, your interpreter will normally be male. There may be cases where a female interpreter would be more appropriate – a rape investigation for example, or a house search where the only occupants are female. If in doubt, seek advice from a trusted local.

(3) Have a clear idea of what it is you wish to achieve from the meeting, but develop a healthy unease if you achieve your aim too easily. Always seek corroboration.

(4) Plan how you are going to achieve your aim. A direct question is unlikely to elicit the answer you need, in all but the most exceptional circumstances. It is best to have two or more planned approaches, from which to choose depending on the early exchanges.

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(5) Be alert to the possibility of gathering useful information beyond the immediate requirements/interests.

b. **Before Meetings.**

(1) As far as possible, get to know your interpreter and his/her abilities.

(2) Give the interpreter as much advance warning as possible. If possible, give an outline of the subject matter, so that he/she can prepare any specific terminology. This applies to military language, concepts and abbreviations (how much would your British civilian friends understand of a typical military conversation?)

(3) Brief the interpreter to repeat what is being said during the meeting, not to give you a summary or evaluation.

(4) Brief the interpreter not to analyse, judge or edit what is being said.⁴

(5) An interpreter will not understand everything you say in English, but will probably not want to say so in front of others (potential loss of face). Make sure he/she knows that he should ask if he is not sure – you will be far more irritated if he/she guesses and gets it wrong.

(6) If possible and appropriate, let him/her know that you will make overt use of audio recording. Not only will this encourage interpreters to be more accurate in their work, it will also provide you with a record of the interaction that could be translated into a written record. MP3 players now allow, cheap, reliable and extended digital recording.

(7) Take part in interpreter training if possible – this will help you to understand the interpreter's task better, and practise your own skills in using an interpreter. If formal training is not available, there is nothing to stop you arranging role playing scenarios with two interpreters and yourself.

c. **During Meetings.**

(1) Complete appropriate formalities. Your status will be either that of a host or guest. It is necessary for you to understand the difference between these roles and the implications it should have on your behaviour. In some circumstances you will wish to dispense with all formalities to make a point, but this should be done deliberately and knowledgeably – not out of ignorance. As the interpreter's boss, it is for you to do this.

(2) At your direction and if appropriate, the interpreter should introduce himself/herself and explain his/her role – to give an impartial and complete rendition of all that is said.

⁴ What the interpreter can do is to explain the culture or context to you, but as an aside and by making a clear distinction between interpretation and the wider explanation.

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- (3) If you consider it necessary, you should direct the interpreter to briefly explain that he will only intervene in the following types of situation:
- (a) To ask for clarification.
 - (b) If one party may not have fully understood something.
 - (c) If there has been a missed cultural inference – knowledge of a piece of information has been wrongly assumed.
 - (d) If the speech is too quiet or too fast.
- (4) Establish how your interlocutor's name should be recorded, and how he/she wishes to be addressed.
- (5) If appropriate, ask the interlocutor if he/she is content to use your interpreter or would prefer to provide one of his/her own. If your interpreter is to be used, make a point of ordering him – politely but firmly - to the position you prefer. Where possible, set the meeting up in a quiet room where you are facing your interlocutor. For example, you could face each other across a table, with the interpreter at the end of the table so that he/she is not physically perceived as being on one side or the other.
- (6) If this is a follow up meeting with the same interlocutor, much of the preliminary detail above can be dispensed with. On the other hand, you may wish to remind him/her of your previous discussion and any actions that have followed in the interim.
- (7) Speak slowly.
- (8) Speak directly to your interlocutor, and look at him/her – not the interpreter.
- (9) Use simple, clear, unambiguous language.
- (10) If you make an error or use language clumsily, do not hesitate to tell the interpreter to ignore your last sentence. Try again.
- (11) Listen carefully and pay particular attention to body language. With experience, it is possible to gain a good understanding of what your interlocutor is saying, even without understanding his words. This gives you additional thinking time, while the interpreter is confirming your initial impressions. If the interpretation differs from your initial impression, then either you are not very good at reading body language or your interpreter is not being accurate.
- (12) Expect misunderstandings. Remember you will probably be far more experienced in the use of interpreters than your interlocutor whose struggle to communicate effectively may be even harder than yours. Additionally, the interlocutor will probably have far more to gain or lose from the meeting than

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do you. He will also be uncertain about the allegiances of the interpreter. He is therefore likely to be under greater stress than you and you should expect him to make mistakes in expressing himself. If aware of this, it will not take you long to learn how to exploit this to your advantage.

(13) Stop for interpreting every sentence or two (10-20 words). Complete a sentence or thought before pausing, so that the interpreter can understand the whole idea. Foreign language word order can differ from English word order – this is another reason for completing your sentence first.

(14) Be aware that some languages (eg Arabic) can take 20-30% more words to express the same idea. This will increase if a phrase is needed to explain an unfamiliar word or concept.

(15) Allow your interpreter to take notes – especially for names, numbers, times, dates, etc – so that these are correctly rendered.

(16) Your interpreter should use the same person and tense as you do. Almost always, you should speak in the first person and so should he. For example, speak directly to your interlocutor as if he can understand what you are saying. You should not say “Tell him that ...” and the interpreter should not say back to you, “He said that...”

(17) Allow at least twice the normal time for meetings. Obviously, everything will need to be said twice, and explanations may be needed to accommodate different cultural perceptions and backgrounds.

(18) If you are not sure about background information, ask your interlocutor - not the interpreter. It is not your interpreter’s job to act as an adviser or negotiator. If he adopts one of these roles, he is controlling the meeting – not you. The interpreter’s pattern of speech will then change, and your interlocutor will no longer be clear about who is in charge.

(19) Ensure that you have some basic cultural awareness, so that you do not inadvertently give offence and can begin to sense your interlocutor’s meaning. For example body language varies between cultures,. Over 50% of communication is non-verbal – what is meant by gestures, eye contact, lack of eye contact or other body language?

(20) Avoid private discussions with your interpreter, unless you wish to do so for deliberate effect – your interlocutor may feel uncomfortable, marginalised, excluded or offended.

(21) Humour – your idea of what is funny may not be the same as others. Avoid the risk of giving offence. Jokes may be impossible to interpret.

(22) At the end of a meeting it may be useful to summarise what has been discussed, to ensure that there has been no confusion and all parties are agreed on the key points and any agreements that may have been reached.

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d. **After Meetings.**

(1) Invite feedback from the interpreter. Offer feedback if appropriate. The best time to do this is immediately after the meeting. The emphasis must be on improving the working relationship between you. Be candid and frank, but avoid unnecessary or unhelpful criticism.

(2) The interpreter may be able to shed light on aspects of the meeting by explaining cultural background or context of which you were unaware.

(3) If you consider it appropriate, get the interpreter to provide a written summary of the key points of the meeting – especially if there were other parallel discussions going on in the background that were not interpreted for you at the time. You may also ask the interpreter to provide a list of the people you met or who were present during the meeting. Local SOPs will probably require you to complete a meeting report in a standard format, but at the very least you should record the main players involved, DTG and location details, a summary of the discussion and any agreed outcomes. You must take care not to compromise your interpreter by exposing him to any sensitive information, including over-directed questions that make your specific interest obvious.

22. **Administration.** Your interpreter works for you. You have a duty of care for him/her, as you would to any other subordinate.

a. Specify clearly time, date, where to report and to whom. If appropriate provide a contact telephone number, and make sure you have theirs.

b. Include your interpreter in transport arrangements.

c. Provide life support as appropriate. Your interpreter also needs to eat, drink, use the ablutions, rest and sleep.

d. Provide protection as appropriate. Does your interpreter need body armour or helmet? Are you exposing him/her to an acceptable level of risk?

e. Telephone interpreting – if you expect to receive phone calls in a foreign language, it is preferable if you, as well as your interpreter, can hear the caller. Ideally use a phone with a loudspeaker or two phones on the same line. Rehearse before going live.

f. If you have a large meeting, a microphone and public address system may be appropriate. If you are dealing with a crowd situation, you may need a loud hailer or vehicle-mounted public address system. Do give your interpreter a chance to familiarise himself with any such equipment. Also, you should consider whether both of you will speak through the equipment in turn (preferable), or only he/she will do so.

23. **Training.** Military interpreters cannot be trained from scratch for operations at short notice. AGC (ETS) Branch has an operational commitment to provide a limited number of interpreters. Additionally, the AGC (ETS) Pool of Linguists (TA), and officers teaching

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Arabic, Russian, French, Italian and Spanish at the Defence School of Languages form another potentially deployable asset. A list of qualified persons is also maintained by ETS for the Army pool of language qualified personnel. This does not guarantee, however, that individual linguists can or will be available to deploy at short notice as military interpreters.

24. **OPSEC.** LEC interpreters come from the local community and their first loyalty will be to it, not the Coalition Forces. Assume they are passing information on and do not discuss operational matters in front of them. All LECs, including interpreters, must be thoroughly searched on entering any SF base. Units must ensure that all LECs and contractors are denied access to all sensitive areas and classified information (including Restricted) within the location. This includes:

- a. Ops Rooms.
- b. G2/Int cells.
- c. Conference facilities unless accompanied by authorised personnel.
- d. Arms, ammunition and explosive storage areas.
- e. Classified equipment storage areas.
- f. All office accommodation housing official information.
- g. Personal details, specifically home addresses or telephone numbers.

Rotate interpreters between tasks on a regular basis (this avoids individual interpreters becoming overly acquainted with specific aspects of operations). Avoid compromising timings by booking interpreters for unusual working hours (better to warn them off to, say, stay on base for the next three nights than book for 2130 the day after tomorrow). Finally, it is vital **never** to let an interpreter use their mobile phone when on task.

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CHAPTER 22

CULTURAL AWARENESS

INTRODUCTION

1. The importance of cultural awareness in any operation (particularly COIN) has been graphically brought home in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the lessons can be applied to any theatre of operations. The sensitivity of the local population has the potential to escalate a perhaps unintended slight or mistake into a major incident, often with strategic implications. Respect for the culture and norms of any theatre also assists in the battle for hearts and minds, improves our ability to influence opinion and helps with the generation of HUMINT. It is therefore essential that those deploying to any theatre are aware of some of the basics of the local, indigenous culture and that of other nations and organisations with whom they may be operating.

MULTINATIONAL ALLIES

2. Many future operations will continue to involve working as part of a coalition with, and possibly under command of, Multinational (MN) allies as part of a MN brigade or division. An awareness of the culture and capabilities of MN allies is therefore an essential prerequisite to the successful conduct of MN operations which may necessitate combined training before deployment.

FCO AND NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

3. The military aspect of national power will be employed in concert with economic and diplomatic means. Members of armed forces can therefore expect to have contact with a number of different agencies including FCO, Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) and the Department for International Development (DfID). Understanding the responsibilities and limitations of Other Government Department (OGD) and recognising the links between respective Lines of Operation (likely to include security, governance and development) is essential.

INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES

4. Multinational forces are likely to work alongside and develop the capability and capacity of Indigenous Security Forces (eg army, police, customs and border police) as part of a SSR programme. An understanding of the security environment (the role of various agencies, how they are regarded by the general population, their capabilities and histories) along with an understanding of specific military/police culture is essential if this process is to be successful.

PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES

6. Private Military and Security Companies (PMC and PSC) employ thousands of international personnel working as bodyguards across all operational theatres. Most are heavily armed and normally travel in civilian 4 x 4 vehicles. They vary in quality with some having high standards and abiding by detailed rules of engagement, but many do not. Most

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will be concerned solely with extracting their principal and themselves from a situation and will have little regard for the repercussions of their actions.

7. Soldiers will not routinely expect to have contact with PMCs and PSCs, but they should be aware of their presence, especially as many employ locals who may wear uniforms that can make them difficult to discriminate from government organisations such as the police.

SACRED SITES

1. **Background.** Sacred sites, be they of religious or cultural significance, are areas where inappropriate behaviour can cause bad feeling or lead to outbreaks of violence. They often have religious and political significance and offer 'spoilers' opportunities to escalate violence. Enemy forces may use them as firing points, bases or depots in the belief that they will not be targeted or in an attempt to prompt inappropriate action by security forces and provide opportunities for their own Info Ops campaign. The dilemma posed in such circumstances is the need to avoid the alienation of the population whilst confronting the enemy.

2. **Understanding.** It is essential that the location and reasons for significance of sacred sites within an AO are understood. Where appropriate, sacred sites should be considered in the IPB process. As a guideline the following should be considered:

- a. Location. In addition to the location of the site the importance of the site as a whole should be understood. Are some areas more significant than others?
- b. Reason for significance. There is a need to understand the unique aspects of sites. Are they significant at a local/national/global scale?
- c. Rules and practices regulating entry and behaviour (for example carrying weapons, using force and shedding blood are strictly prohibited within a mosque).
- d. The impact of desecration. Would, for example, desecration remove the sanctity of the site and prompt the use of force to defend it or avenge desecration?
- e. Calendar. Are there particular religious festivals, times of the month etc which would impact on military activity in the vicinity of the site (eg large numbers of pilgrims present or auspicious dates).

3. **Consultation with Religious Leaders.** Religious leaders may not be willing collaborators with security forces but they are likely to help with providing information that will avoid damage to sacred sites. They should be consulted in order to gain a detailed understanding of the significance of the site and the implications of military operations in and around it. They will understand rules of behaviour and may be able to determine acceptable compromises. Religious leaders will have an influence on public opinion and if not consulted/involved may hamper the efforts of the security forces.

4. **Conduct of Operations.** The following guidelines may assist with planning and conducting operations in and around sacred sites:

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- a. Avoid significant religious festivals.
- b. Time operations to avoid unnecessary offence to religious sensitivities (prayer times, holy periods etc).
- c. Balance the anticipated gains of kinetic operations against the wider effect on public opinion.
- d. Consider the use ISF to enter sacred sites with foreign troops providing secure entry, cordons etc.
- e. Involve local religious leaders as far as practicable.
- f. Conduct remedial action. Restoration work (most likely by contractors) or some means of compensation for damage may be required.
- g. Consider cordon ops and negotiation to facilitate a peaceful solution when the enemy is known to be in a sacred/religious site.
- h. Support all activity concerning sacred sites with a rigorous Info Ops campaign to shape perceptions prior to, during and subsequent to operations.

THEATRE SPECIFIC INFORMATION

8. This Chapter is supported by a number of theatre-specific Annexes. Annex A covers examples of generic Arab/Muslim customs and behaviour. Annex B is an Aide Memoire of do's and don'ts specific to Iraq. Annex C deals with Iraqi Security Forces rank. Annex D gives details about Afghanistan-specific cultural issues. Annex E covers do's and don'ts specific to Afghanistan. Annex F provides Afghanistan specific cultural notes for military operations. Annex G explores the Afghan National Army.

GENERIC ARAB / MUSLIM CUSTOMS AND BEHAVIOUR

DRESS

1. Public appearance and personal conduct is intimately connected with status in the Middle East and as a result Arabs will tend to dress and behave much more formally than we do. Many Arabs, even those in blue collar jobs, dress formally to go to work, and feel that we dress much too casually. While many Arabs may wear western clothes traditional Arab costume is equally common, including:

- a. **Men.** Men will usually wear the following:
 - (1) Dishdasha - Ankle length robe.
 - (2) Ghutra (Hatata or Shamkh) – Headdress.
 - (3) Ogal - Head band.
 - (4) Ghafiya - Scull cap.
- b. **Women.** Women will usually wear the following:
 - (1) Abayah - Head-to-toe silky black cloak.
 - (2) Burqa - Short black veil that leaves the eyes and forehead exposed.
 - (3) Boushiya - Semi-transparent veil that covers the entire face.
 - (4) Hijab - Headscarf that conceals the hair but leaves the face unveiled.

GREETINGS

2. An Arab man shakes hands gently and pulls those he knows very well towards him and kisses them on either cheek in greeting. Arabs may also hold hands whilst walking. If an Arab does not touch someone he greets it is because he perceives the person is unaccustomed to being touched. After shaking hands, the gesture of placing the right hand to the heart is a greeting with respect or sincerity. (For women, placing the right hand over the heart after serving food is a sign of offering with sincerity). Shake hands with the right hand only. The left hand is preferably used for cleaning oneself in the toilet using water. Failure to shake hands when meeting someone or saying good-bye is considered rude. When a Western man is introduced to an Arab woman it is the woman's choice whether to shake hands or not; she must initiate the handshake. Usually women shake hands only using their fingertips. If so, do not touch their palm and do not kiss their hand.

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PUBLIC SPACE AND PHYSICAL CLOSENESS

3. The British like to keep their distance from one another (about one arm's distance) and maintain their personal space. Arabs do not have the same need for space and may not realise when they are violating your personal space; even though an area may be completely empty, an Arab may sit or stand right beside you. The distance apart that a conversation is held at is based on the greeting distance; for British men it would be handshake distance for Arab men it is closer (about 12 inches is considered normal), since they kiss each other on the cheek upon greeting. While the same applies for two Arab women, for two people of the opposite sex, the distance would be an arm's length away. Men and women cannot touch each other in public, but there is a lot of touching between individuals of the same sex and Arab men (including soldiers) may be seen walking hand-in-hand or taking your hand to show you something.

USE OF THE ARABIC LANGUAGE

4. Arabic is considered to be the language of Allah and the Qur'an is written in it. It is the official language of most Arab states (though English, as well as other tribal languages specific to some countries, may, also be used) and is spoken by over 250 million people worldwide. Locals will appreciate attempts to learn and use their language. Do not be afraid to try out some Arabic words and phrases as any effort to speak the language will go a long way towards establishing good relationships.

CONVERSATION

5. Conversations with Arabs should be governed by some strict conventions. It is important to realise what subjects are off limits (for instance detailed personal questions about female members of their family) and what should be avoided (political issues, religion, alcohol, women's liberation, abortion etc). In addition it is important not to: put the Arab into a position in which he can lose face by criticising him directly, publicly lose your temper or make promises that may not be kept.

GESTURES

6. There are gestures used in the Arab world that convey different meanings from those used in Britain:

- a. An Arab may signify "yes" with a downward nod.
- b. "No" can be signalled in several ways: tilting one's head slightly back and raising the eyebrows; moving one's head back and chin upward; moving one's head back and making a clicking sound with the tongue; or using the open palm moved from right to left toward the person, or moving the index finger right to left.

7. Other gestures to be aware of are:

- a. "That's enough, thank you," may be indicated by patting the heart a few times.
- b. The "A-OK" (forming a circle with the index finger and thumb of one hand) gesture is considered obscene by Arabs.

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- c. The “thumbs-up” is considered obscene by the older, more traditional Arabs.
- d. The younger generation has taken on the Western idiom of saying hello. It is recommended that soldiers wave in return.
- e. The left hand is considered unclean; the right hand should be used when gesturing. To beckon another person, all fingers wave with the palm facing downward.
- f. Hitting the right fist into the open palm of the left hand indicates obscenity or contempt.
- g. Do not allow the exposed sole of your foot/shoe to face a person, it is interpreted as a grievous insult, and considered extremely bad manners.
- h. It is important to sit properly without slouching. Do not slide down or fidget around excessively, it is considered very rude.
- i. Do not lean against walls or have hands in your pocket when talking.
- j. Do not point to or beckon someone with the index finger as it shows contempt for the person being pointed at, as if they were an animal.
- k. Men stand when a woman enters the room; everyone stands when new guests arrive at a social gathering and when an elderly or high-ranking person arrives or departs.
- l. The ‘thumbs up’ gesture is considered extremely rude, particularly in Afghanistan.

BEHAVIOUR BETWEEN SEXES

8. Relationships between men and women in Arab society are much more formal than in Britain. Soldiers must ensure that they respect the privacy of Arab women and be alert to the potential problems caused by touching women, staring at or talking to them openly – this can lead to the honour of her family being slighted with attendant repercussions. Whilst the use of female soldiers and interpreters to talk to women can get around many of these problems female soldiers should also be aware of the obligations on them to dress and behave appropriately.

HOSPITALITY

9. **General.** Arabs are generous and value generosity in others while hospitality is essential for a good reputation. Refreshments must always be offered to guests and a visitor should accept what is offered, but only after refusing once. Soldiers can expect to be offered drinks and sometimes meals while going about their duties. The following guidelines should be adhered to:

- a. **Drinks.** Guests should accept at least a small drink as an expression of friendship or esteem and no matter how much coffee or tea has been drunk

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elsewhere it is never declined on the second offer. The cup should be accepted and held with the right hand. If coffee is served, drink only the liquid portion and not the sludge on the bottom.

b. **Eating.** When eating with Arabs, especially when taking food from communal dishes, the left hand is not used as it is considered unclean (however, it is used to cut bread). Not eating everything on one's plate is considered a compliment as it is a sign of wealth when an Arab can afford to leave food behind. If invited to an Arab home, take your leave promptly after the second or third round of coffee or tea after a meal which marks the end of the occasion.

BUSINESS

10. Arabs will not normally get straight down to business, but will instead start the meeting with small talk and serve refreshments. An initial business meeting may be used to demonstrate the ideal conceptions of Islamic and Arab civilisation and is not necessarily a time for objective analysis, pragmatic application, and problem-solving; the real business may occur at a later meeting, or at a more informal setting such as a dinner. Arabs are reluctant to accept personal and total responsibility (if something goes wrong and they are blamed then they are dishonoured), but will accept shared responsibility. Arabs view time differently from Westerners. Britain's fast pace will not work with Arabs and if an attempt is made to rush them, they will take it as an insult.

AIDE MEMOIRE OF DOs AND DON'Ts FOR BEHAVIOUR IN IRAQ

GREETINGS

Do:

- Shake hands whenever you meet or bid farewell to an Iraqi. Always offer your right hand; the left hand symbolises uncleanness and is used for personal hygiene. Also shake hands with everyone in a room when you enter or depart. Greet the oldest and most important person first.
- Rise to show respect whenever an important person enters the room.
- Feel free to return a hug or kiss on the cheek, initiated by an Iraqi man. It this is a sign of friendship, not homosexuality.

Do Not:

- Use Arabic greeting unless you are sure how to pronounce it.
- Hug or kiss an Iraqi man unless he takes the initiative or is a close friend, but feel free to return hug or kiss if Iraqi initiates.
- Shake hands with an Arab woman unless she offers her hand first, or if you are a woman yourself.

CONVERSATION

Do:

- Open conversation with small talk and pleasantries.
- Talk to an Iraqi as an equal.
- Maintain eye contact, but don't stare down your host.
- Follow the Arab's conversational lead and discuss what he brings up.
- Place your feet flat on the floor if you are sitting on a chair, or fold them under you if you are sitting on the floor.
- Attempt to use any Arabic language skills you may learn.
- Avoid arguments.
- Avoid discussions on political issues (national and international), religion, alcohol, total women's liberation, abortion, and male-female relationships.
- Bring photographs of your children (not wife) during conversations.
- Look for subtle or double meanings in what an Arab says. Arabs often answer indirectly.

Do Not:

- Show impatience or undue haste, for example, looking at your watch when participating in discussion.
- Ask direct or personal questions, especially about female family members.
- Criticise an Iraqi directly. This will cause him to lose face and respect for you.
- Patronise or talk down to an Iraqi, even if he does not speak English well.
- Say "no" when an Iraqi asks a favour of you, or admit you do not know the answer to a question. Instead, respond with a "maybe", eg you'll look into it, or you need to talk it over with your superiors.

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- Move away from an Iraqi who stands close to you during conversation. It is customary for an Arab person to stand about one foot away.
- Lose your temper and publicly embarrass anyone.
- Be offended when an Arab shows great interest in your social, personal, professional, and academic background. Arabs do not enter personal or business relationships casually or lightly.

RELATIONS BETWEEN SEXES

As a Male,

Do:

- Respect the privacy and protected role of Iraqi women.

Do Not:

- Flirt, hit-on, touch, hug, talk in private with an Iraqi woman, it will endanger their safety. Family members and others may threaten a woman if they witness any casual relationship occurring with a foreign soldier.
- Try to engage an Iraqi woman in conversation unless you have been formally introduced.
- Stare at an Iraqi woman or maintain eye contact with them.
- Talk in public to professional women, even non-Iraqi women, except on business.
- Kiss, touch or show affection toward any woman in public, including a non-Iraqi woman.
- Ask an Iraqi direct questions about his wife or other female members of his family.
- Expect an Iraqi to introduce you to a veiled woman.

As a Female

Do:

- Dress in a manner acceptable to Iraqis. UK Armed Forces uniforms are fine, and in civilians, western clothing is acceptable if it is loose and covers the neck, arms and legs. Western women are not expected to wear veils.

Do Not:

- Wear tight or revealing clothing in public. This is considered immodest and undignified in Arab culture. It may be inappropriate to wear a T-shirt in front of locally employed civilians.
- Kiss, touch or show affection toward any man in public.

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HOSPITALITY

Do:

- If you are given a gift accept it, do not open it in front of the person, and give a gift in return at a later date.
- Thank your host profusely for his hospitality and good conversation. Plan to return the hospitality.
- Accompany your guest outside the door or gate when he leaves.
- Use your right hand in eating, drinking, and offering, passing or receiving anything.
- Try all different foods offered to you. You may ask about a dish that is unfamiliar to you.
- Eat heartily. Take seconds, even if only a small amount. It's a compliment to your host.
- Compliment your host on the food and wish him always a full table.
- Take your leave promptly after the second or third round of coffee or tea after a meal. Arabs usually socialise and converse before the meal, not after.

Do Not:

- Feel obligated to bring a gift. If you do bring a gift, make it a gift for the children, such as sweets.
- Praise too much any possession of your host; he may give it to you. If he does, you are expected to give something in return.
- Appear anxious to end a visit.
- Expect an Iraqi to be as time conscious as you are. An agreed upon time is an approximate guideline, not a rigid requirement.

RELIGION

Do:

- Understand and respect the devoutness of Muslims.
- Respect the requirement for Muslims to fast from sunrise to sunset during the holy month of Ramadan. Following Ramadan is the festival known as Eid Al Fitr, which is celebrated for three days.

Do Not:

- During the holy month of Ramadan eat, smoke or drink in public from sunrise to sunset or offer food, beverages, or tobacco products to Muslims. NOTE: This prohibition does not apply to the sick or needy.
- Enter a mosque during prayer times or pass in front of a prayer rug while Muslims are praying.
- Stare at Muslims praying or take photographs of them praying.
- Eat publicly in the daytime during Ramadan when Muslims will be fasting.

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MEETINGS & MILITARY PLANNING

Do:

- Arrive on time, not early.
- Shake hands with everyone on entering and leaving the room.
- Drink at least one cup of drinks offered.
- Start the meeting with small talk.
- Maintain eye contact but do not stare.
- Be positive in critiques.
- Plan training that is likely to produce a positive outcome.
- Deal with commissioned officers rather than NCOs.
- Subtly encourage greater use of NCOs.
- Win the trust of the commander before consulting with his subordinates.
- Remember that they are risking the lives of themselves and their families for an indeterminate period.



Do Not:

- Be totally business oriented.
- Expose someone to criticism in front of his subordinates.
- Ask yes/no questions.
- Expect contingency plans, risk analysis or an appreciation of the value of rehearsal and practise (*Insh'Allah* determines all outcomes).
- Rely on maps - Iraqis have a greater appreciation of models and aerial photos.
- Insist on formal battle procedure – concurrent activity is achieved through efficient cooperation and anticipation.
- Separate soldiers from their own officers – discipline and order are prone to lapse.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES RANK STRUCTURES




ENGLISH	PRONUNCIATION
Private First Class	JUUN-dee ow-wal
Corporal	a'-REEF
Sergeant	ra-QEEB
Sergeant Major	ra-QEEB ow-wal
Second Lieutenant	moo-LA-zim
First Lieutenant	moo-LA zim ow-wal
Captain	na-QEEB
Major	RA-i'd
Lieutenant Colonel	moo-KUD-dam
Colonel	a'-QEED
Brigadier	a'-MEED
Major General	lee-wa'


Commissioned Officers

Iraqi Army, Air Force, and Navy	Mulazim	Mulazim Awwal	Naqib	Raid	Muqaddam
					
U.S. Equivalent	2d Lieutenant	1st Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel

Aqid	Amid	Lhwa	Fariq	Gariq Awwal	Mushir
					
Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General	General	General of the Army

Enlisted Personnel & Warrant Officers


	Jundi	Jundi Awwal	Naib Arif	Arif	Rais Urufa
					
	U.S. Army Equivalent	Private	Private 1st Class	Corporal	Sergeant
U.S. Air Force Equivalent	Airman	Airman 1st Class	Sergeant	Staff Sergeant	Technical Sergeant

Rais Urufa			Naib Arif		
	NA	NA		NA	NA
Sergeant 1st Class	Master Sergeant	Sergeant Major	Warrant Officer (WO)	Chief Warrant Officer (CWO-2)	Chief Warrant Officer (CWO-3)
Master Sergeant	Senior Master Sergeant	Chief Master Sergeant	Warrant Officer (WO)	Chief Warrant Officer (CWO-2)	Chief Warrant Officer (CWO-3)

Iraqi Police Service Rank




CHIEF
INSPECTOR




SUPERINTENDENT




CHIEF
SUPERINTENDENT



CHIEF OF
POLICE




PATROLMAN




SERGEANT



LIEUTENANT



CAPTAIN



INSPECTOR

AFGHAN CULTURAL GUIDANCE

GENERAL

1. Afghanistan is made up of several ethnic groups, each of which are tribal in nature. Fundamental to all Afghans is a desire to keep Afghanistan free from foreign occupation. They are generally accepting of foreigners who are giving them assistance, and from which they can derive benefit, but would not wish Afghanistan to be governed or occupied by foreigners in the long term.

QUAM

2. Quam is the term by which Afghans understand their loyalties, allegiances and priorities. It is crucial to understanding the Afghan people. Afghans will owe loyalty to the nation, their tribe, their clan or to Islam, amongst other things. Two Afghans from neighbouring tribes may fight against each other, but in the face of foreigners they may feel that they have a duty to protect one another.

3. Afghans care about power and influence, and this will often be at odds with their ethnic grouping. Many Afghans have fought for different sides in conflicts throughout their lives. Some may have been part of the Taleban movement in the 1990s, and then switched their 'allegiance' to the current Government when the Taleban were ousted from power in 2001. The same may occur at local levels, with farmers, for example, expressing support for the local Governor until they perceive the local Taleban to be stronger and more effective. Troops can expect to be assured of a tribe's support, only to discover that the tribe's loyalty in fact rests elsewhere.

ETHNICITY

3. **Overview.** Afghanistan is made up of five key ethnic groups (although there are other smaller groups), all of whom are Muslim. They have traditionally not fought against each other and have peacefully co-existed for the majority of the time. All Afghans, however, will believe that they must remain loyal to their ethnic groups.

4. **The Pashtuns.** The Pashtuns make up approximately 40% of the population. They are officially the largest tribe in the World, but in reality the Pashtuns are made up of many hundreds of different sub-tribes. These sub-tribes can broadly be divided into Durrani and Gilzai. They are predominantly from the south of the country. The Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, is a Pashtun. Their language is Pashtu (an official language of Afghanistan), although some educated Pashtuns will speak Dari, the other official language. Whilst Hamid Karzai is a Pashtun, the majority of the Taleban are also Pashtuns. The majority of the Helmand Province population are Pashtun. They have their own code of conduct known as the **Pashtunwali**. This broadly covers the following areas:

- a. Devotion and loyalty to families, the tribe and religious/ political leaders.
- b. An obligation to exact revenge for actual or perceived offences against the family/ tribe.

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c. Hospitality is regarded as a social obligation and must always be extended to visitors. It is impolite to refuse such hospitality.

d. Loyalty to the homeland and a willingness to defend their territory and family.

e. Bravery is highly prized. Defensive actions or security roles in warfare are regarded as insulting, whilst what may be perceived by us as reckless charges against superior forces will be highly regarded.

5. **The Tajiks.** The Tajiks come predominantly from the north east of the country. They formed the backbone of the Northern Alliance, which spent the late 1990s trying to defeat the Taleban. They have traditionally been politically marginalised by the Pashtuns and relations with the Pashtuns have traditionally been tense. Since the fall of the Taleban they have increased their share of power.

6. **The Uzbeks.** The Uzbeks come from the north west of the country around Mazar-e Sharif. They are generally isolationist and have little nationwide influence.

7. **The Hazaras.** The Hazaras come from the central highlands to the West of Kabul. Historically, they have often been sidelined and have a perception that this is intentional. They tend to look Chinese since many of them are descended from Genghis Khan and members of his Army. The Hazara are primarily Shia Muslims.

8. **The Baloch.** The Baloch, or Baluchi are from the far south of the country on the southern border with Pakistan.

RELIGION


9. The vast majority of Afghans are Muslims. They are not, however, Arabs. The vast majority of Afghans are Sunni Muslims (as opposed to neighbouring Shia Iran), with the exception of the Shia Hazara.

LANGUAGE

10. Afghanistan has two official languages; Dari and Pashtu. Both are derived from the Persian Farsi. The Mission Support Group website contains language cards, and language cards will also be issued during PDT.

DRESS

11. **Men.** Most common is a knee length shirt worn over baggy trousers. This is often covered by a sleeveless waistcoat, jacket or dress coat. There is a variety of headgear. Large turbans are most common but knitted woollen and sheepskin hats are also worn.



12. **Women.** All women cover their hair and many cover their face in public. The colour of headscarf reflects the ethnic group. The most common form of clothing is a two piece outfit consisting of long trousers and a long sleeved high neck tunic. Other women wear a full length cloak fastened under the chin. The *burqa*, compulsory under the Taleban, covers the face



and has slits for the eyes and is often worn in rural Pashtu communities.

The Position of Women

13. In common with most Islamic societies, the position of women is not a significant one, although their menfolk will be fiercely protective of them. There is strict gender segregation (*Purdah*) and an offence by an individual against a woman will have implications throughout the family. All troops must be particularly sensitive if women are in the vicinity.

GENERAL DO'S AND DON'TS FOR AFGHANISTAN

DO

- Use basic greetings.
- Accept hospitality where appropriate.
- Stand up when someone enters the room.
- Make eye contact with men, smile and say hello "A-salaamu alaykum".
- Shake hands (with the right hand) with men.
- Respect locals in authority.
- Ensure men do not search women.
- Remove headdress and sunglasses when talking to someone in authority.
- Accept food when offered but do not eat too much. Eat with your right hand and always accept second helpings if offered.
- Remove footwear when entering a home or mosque.

DON'T

- Ask ethnic origin.
- Make eye contact with a woman when first meeting her.
- Shake hands or embrace a woman in public.
- Ask about female members of the family in conversation.
- Take offence if you see men holding hands or greeting each other with kisses.
- Admire personal belongings.
- Form a circle with thumb and index finger – ie the ok sign – this is very rude.
- Use the 'thumbs up' gesture, which is also extremely rude
- Use a dog when searching inside a mosque.
- Sit with soles of feet pointing at someone – ultimate insult.
- Offer to shake a woman's hand unless she offers.
- Eat with your left hand.
- Photograph someone unless you have asked their permission first.
- Accept invitations to private functions as this may imply favouritism – politely decline. If appropriate suggest meeting in a public place eg café.

AFGHAN CULTURAL NOTES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

LEADER ENGAGEMENT

1. **Identifying Influential Persons.** Ask for:
 - a. Elders/'white beards'.
 - b. Mullahs and other prominent local figures.
 - c. Tribal/village leaders.
2. **Approaching Elders/Influential Persons.**
 - a. Ideally get introduced to them by someone who knows them.
 - b. Greet by placing your left hand at the centre of your chest, dip your head slightly whilst shaking hands. Do not look directly into their eyes (this may be seen as intimidating) but do not look down.
 - c. When introducing yourself engage in small talk (health, agriculture etc) and get a positive response before introducing yourself. Build a rapport.
 - d. Read the mood of the situation.
 - e. Move on if the response is negative.
3. **Power and Influence.** This usually rests with the following:
 - a. Elderly.
 - b. Rich (eg land owners).
 - c. Educated people (often referred to as 'Engineer', 'Doctor' or 'Ustad' (teacher/mentor)).
 - d. Mullahs.

MEETINGS

4. **Identifying Influential Persons in a Meeting.** As a general rule the most influential figure at a meeting will be located furthest away from the door to the room. Next to him will be other influential figures and the order of precedence will decrease towards to door.

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5. Behaviour in Meetings.

- a. Shake hands with and greet everyone present ('Salaam'). Note that hugging may also be used in greeting.
- b. Accept offers of food and drink (avoid uncooked food if hygiene is questionable) – this is a good sign.
- c. Raise specific points that you want to address with the senior figure at the meeting. Be prepared for him to discuss this with other people present (note who these are as they will also have influence and are potential secondary points of contact) before he answers you.
- d. Do not expect answers to the points you raise immediately. It may be necessary to conduct follow-up meetings. Consider subsequent approaches to key persons in their place of work or in a social environment.
- e. Conduct detailed negotiations in private.
- f. Do not accept offers of alcohol.
- g. Do not wear helmets or sunglasses inside. Regimental headdress should be worn.
- h. Avoid taking long barrelled weapons into meetings. A discreetly carried pistol will likely be acceptable.
- i. There is no need for you to stay to the very end of a meeting. People will come and go. When you leave, shake hands with everyone. Do the same when others arrive or leave (take the lead on whether to stand or not from others present).

6. Organising a Meeting.

- a. Consider the seating plan and where you seat influential persons.
- b. Offer tea (black and green with sugar available in bowls for guests to help themselves), biscuits and sweets. Avoid extravagance.
- c. Demonstrate hierarchy – the senior military figure should not serve tea etc. Consider how elder/senior figures are treated in Afghan meetings.
- d. Make time for social chat before starting business.
- e. Use and explain an agenda.
- f. Defuse heated discussion and avoid contention.
- g. Listen.

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7. **Interpreters.**

- a. Brief interpreters to translate word for word.
- b. Remember that English translations of local dialect are likely to be shorter.
- c. Interpreters are not likely to understand the full complexity of the local tribal system. Local teachers or elders will be a good source of information on local relationships (genealogy) to provide an understanding of the local situation.

8. **Other Points to Consider.**

- a. Because of its geographical location Afghanistan has been subject to foreign influence for hundreds of years. There is scope for people to see this as a positive thing. Do not give the impression that we are invading or occupying their lands.
- b. Remember that Pashtun society places great store in status. Consider how your actions will be perceived by others. For example, engaging with a particular person may raise/legitimise his status and decrease that of others.
- c. Avoid compromising the position of people you wish to influence in the eyes of others (eg meeting privately too frequently, surrounding their home or workplace with troops when visiting).
- d. Pay attention to detail. Note relationships between people at meetings (where do they sit in relation to each other, who shakes hands with who, does someone ignore you when they leave a meeting? etc). All of this informs situational awareness.
- e. Always record and report the outcome of meetings. Do not limit this to the agenda. Note the interaction between people and how they react to you and your comments/issues.
- f. **NEVER PROMISE ANYTHING THAT YOU CANNOT DELIVER!**
- g. Never shake hands with women.
- h. Never inquire about female family members.
- i. Try to maintain continuity with contacts. The same person should deal with local contacts. Contact may be maintained by telephone and contacting people to wish them well at religious festivals. Use contacts at local level to pass messages, explanations of incidents etc.
- j. Understand local attitudes towards taking photographs.

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SEARCHING

9. **House Searches.** The points given here are to augment current search procedures by considering cultural factors relevant to AFG. The aim is to provide guidance that reduces the causing of unnecessary offence to the local population.

a. **Generic Compound.** A generic family compound is shown in Figure 16.F.1. A compound will usually contain the following:

- **Family Rooms:** Occupied by a section of the family (son, his wife and children).
- **Verandah:** Low step outside family rooms. May have cellar/shelter dug beneath.
- **Bathroom:** Open room with concrete floor and drainage to outside.
- **Kitchen:** Open fire and clay oven (traditional hiding place).
- **Toilet:** Raised platform with hole. Waste can be cleared through hole in outside wall.
- **Garden:** Yard area with livestock, vegetables, fruit trees etc.
- **Well:** If present may be covered at ground level to prevent children falling in.
- **Guest Room:** In homes of influential persons. This has separate access to the outside and to the compound (allows for male guests to visit).
- **Surrounding Wall:** Made from local materials to approx 8 feet in height. The entrance is through a single doorway in the compound wall, opposite the family rooms.




Figure 16.F.1 – Generic Family Compound

b. **Points to Note.** The following points about compounds should be noted:

- Roofs are flat.
- People sleep on the floor in all family rooms or on the roof in hot weather.
- Children sleep on the floor.
- Babies are slung in small hammocks in family rooms.
- There will be limited furniture (mattresses, cushions, carpets).
- Charcoal stoves may be used for heating.

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c. **Treatment of Women:**

- Before entering shout 'PARDAH' ('cover up') to warn women that men are entering the compound (this was accepted common practice with the Taleban and Mujaheddin).
- If separated from men, keep women in sight of a senior/elder male in the family. Keep elderly males with the women.
- Use female searchers to search women. Men must not touch them. Keep male guards at a discreet distance.
- Keep women, children and elderly family members in shelter – do not make them stand in the cold or rain.

d. **Other Considerations:**

- Consider covering boots before entering family rooms.
- Understand local attitudes/sensitivities towards dogs before using AES dogs.
- Use ANA/ANP on initial entry where possible.
- Expect to find weapons, most families will have these. Ask where they are and decide upon 'actions on' finding them.
- Be polite and professional.

e. **Searching Vehicles.** Treat persons and property as you would in house searches.

f. **Info Ops:**

- Enduring IO messages should inform the population of the reasons for and methods used in house searches and set the general conditions for their conduct.
- Engage with local leaders. Ideally have them present in the house as the search is conducted.
- Explain to elders and the local community what is happening and why. Do not allow an information vacuum to develop that can be exploited by the enemy.
- Use ANA/ANP and local leaders to engage with onlookers and crowds.
- Conduct a follow-up info campaign to explain the results of the search.
- Be as open and honest as you can be about what has happened and why.
- Use normal procedures for damage claims. Explain these to local leaders.

DEALING WITH RELIGIOUS SITES

10. **Religious Sites.** Mosques, shrines and graveyards have significance to the whole local society for a range of reasons. Consider the following:

- a. Know where these are on your patch. Understand their significance.
- b. Use ANA/ANP to go into them in the first instance.
- c. Avoid causing collateral damage to them as far as reasonably possible.

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d. Where possible engage with local leaders and mullahs if operations are to be conducted in/on religious areas. Explain your reasons and negotiate acceptable procedures with them.

d. Do not fire onto religious areas first. If you are perceived to attack them the enemy become defenders of the mosque/shrine. If they fire first then the situation is changed.

f. Consider the wider implications of your actions. It may be better to back off and lose the chance to capture one or two of the enemy than risk alienating yourself completely from the local population. Exploit IO opportunities in these cases.

THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

"Remember, it is the Afghans' country: the fastest way home is to make them self-capable. Do not sideline them but embrace them – it has to be an Afghan solution".

Member of the UK OMLT Feb 07.

AIM

1. The purpose of this Annex is to provide UK forces deploying to Afghanistan with a balanced perspective on the nature and standing of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Specifically it is designed to provide the context on which to prepare UK Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) for their role advising the ANA and developing its' capability.

"The insurgents held the high ground on three sides, pinning the unit and preventing withdrawal. The platoon sergeant realised it was time to fight and lead his men. He ran through a hailstorm of incoming enemy rocket propelled grenades and machinegun fire and boldly directed Mac's machinegun. The enemy's fire intensified, so he guided the grenadier and systematically helped destroy the remaining enemy positions. His actions bolstered the confidence of the unit, but he was struck down. He saved the lives of over 40 soldiers, the actions of a hero. Yet he was not awarded for gallantry or recorded in the annals of history. He was only remembered and revered by his US Marine advisors SSgt Cooper and SSgt McMillan, as the bravest man they ever knew. As an Afghan soldier, Abdullah displayed leadership qualities equal to that of history's finest warriors."

Capt Brian G. Cillessen USMC,

Embedded Trainer and Advisor to the ANA 1 Sep 04 to 7 Mar 05.

THE AFGHAN STATE AND ARMED FORCE

2. The nation state of Afghanistan is considered to have been formed in 1747, when the Afghan tribes elected Ahmed Shah Abdali as king through a Loya Jirga in order to resist Persian domination. Since then Afghan leaders, either royalty or politicians, have had to balance the resources required to maintain a standing army with the forces available to the numerous independent tribes.

3. Armed force has existed within three distinct military elements:

- a. **The Regular Army.** Directly sustained by the state and commanded by appointed officers.
- b. **Tribal Levies.** Part time soldiers provided by tribal leaders or chieftains under negotiated contracts (tax incentives, land concessions, direct payments).
- c. **Community Militia.** All able bodied members of the community, mobilised for common causes under community leaders.

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HISTORY OF REGENERATION

4. The civil war in Afghanistan from 1992 - 2001 led to the disintegration of effective government and governmental institutions including the Armed Forces. It was only in early 2002, that the Armed Forces were re-instigated. Western military forces began equipping, training and developing Afghanistan's armed forces so that they would eventually be able to meet both internal and external threats to the country.

5. Our current efforts are the fourth significant regeneration of the Afghan military over the last 150 years following its total disintegration:

a. In the 1870s Amir Sher Ali Khan recreated the Afghan Army that disintegrated during the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-80).

b. In the 1880's Amir Abdur Rahman had to re-establish the army to unify the fragmented country. The army was remodelled under King Amanullah following the third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), but met a fatal blow during the civil war of 1929.

c. A new military establishment was created by Nadeshah after his succession to power in 1929. The Soviet-sponsored reorganisation and modernisation of the Afghan army began in the 1960's and continued through the Moscow-backed communist rule.

6. At the December 2002 Bonn II Conference (Bonn II), the Afghan government and donor nations agreed that the new Afghan army should be ethnically balanced, voluntary, and consist of no more than 70,000 individuals (including all civilian and Ministry of Defence personnel). They also agreed that the Army's commands should be located in Kabul and other geographically strategic locations. The Afghan government and the donors did not set a deadline for the completion of the army. Following the Bonn II conference, US DoD planners, in conjunction with Afghan officials, developed a force structure for the ANA that includes:

a. 43,000 ground combat troops based in Kabul and four other cities,

b. 21,000 support staff organised in four sustaining commands (recruiting, education and training, acquisition and logistics, and communications and intelligence),

c. 3,000 Ministry of Defence and general staff personnel, and

d. 3,000 air staff to provide secure transportation for the President of Afghanistan.

7. The mission of the 'new' ANA will include providing security for Afghanistan's new central government and political process, replacing all other military forces in Afghanistan, and combating terrorists and other destructive elements in cooperation with coalition and peacekeeping forces. US efforts to establish the army are led by the DoD, with support from the State Department. The US DoD-staffed Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan (OMC-A) in Kabul oversees the development of the Afghan army's force structure, decision processes, and garrisons, and provides equipment. OMC-A works

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closely with Task Force PHOENIX, which is a joint coalition task force charged with training ANA battalions at the Kabul Military Training Center and elsewhere in the country. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Central Command provide planning and other support, and the US Army Corps of Engineers is constructing facilities for the Afghan army's central and regional commands. In Washington, DC, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency uses DoD and State Department funds to provide financial and administrative support for OMC-A. The agency purchases services and equipment requested by OMC-A through the US Army Security Assistance Command and transfers funds to OMC-A to allow it to procure services and equipment from local vendors.

HERITAGE OF ADVICE

“As a first step he (King Amanullah) began building a national army, bringing in Turkish military advisors, much to (General) Nadir Shah's (CinC Afghan Army and distant cousin to the King) irritation as their advice such as reducing pay only demoralised the troops.”¹

8. The concept of foreign military advice is not new to the Afghan military: In the 1920's King Amanullah's sought support from the Turkish leader A Ataturk, whom he much admired. US support was requested in the 1960's, but when it was refused Afghanistan turned to the USSR. The Mujahadeen resistance against the Communist government and the Russian Army over the period 1978 – 89 was supported by the CIA and UK SF². More recently Pakistan has supported armed groups within Afghanistan.

9. The current advice effort is coordinated within the overarching Task Force PHOENIX³. It comprises thirteen separate national components from the US and new NATO countries to Mongolia, with the following mission:

TF PHOENIX mentors ANA to conduct sustained independent COIN operations in Afghanistan to assist the ANA to defeat terrorism within its borders.

Comment: UK forces in HELMAND must recognise the possibility of advice 'fatigue' among elements of the ANA. In Feb 07 a UK mentor explained that when he had introduced a new idea his Afghan counterpart had politely said 'that the Russians had told them (the ANA) their way, the US had told them their way, now the UK was telling them their way...frankly they (the ANA) would do it their own way!'

ISLAM WITHIN THE ANA

10. Apart from a few very small minority groups (1%), Afghans are either Sunni (84%) or Shia Moslems (15%). The historical divide between Sunni and Shia Islam is deep-rooted and although it was a source of considerable tension under the extremist Sunni Taleban, the Sunni-Shia religious divide has been marked more by a traditional tolerance than violence or persecution. The Shias are predominantly (although not exclusively) found among the Hazaras, while most of the other ethnic groups of Afghanistan follow the Sunni faith. For many Afghans, particularly in the Pashtun south, the religious schools, or madrassas, usually attached to mosques, have been the primary means of education for

¹ Lamb pp125.

² JIHAD, Tim Carew.

³ Information on TF PHOENIX is available at www.taskforcephoenix.com

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boys. In many remote communities the Ulema (Muslim clerics or teachers) are the most important means of transmitting information on national and world events. Despite the attempts of the Taleban, the Islam practised by most Afghans, although conservative – particularly outside the major cities – is also traditionally tolerant and practical.⁴

“Although Islam is all pervasive culturally, it doesn't impinge on training or operations provided that the OMLT are aware of the requirements for eg prayer timings. On operations, it is seldom an issue. Those that want to pray just get on with it unobtrusively.”
UK Mentor Feb 07.

11. As Moslems, members of the ANA reflect the wider Afghan population in their attitude to their faith. Some soldiers will be extremely devout; others will be less so. Experience working closely with their counter parts will inform advisors of the level to which individual ANA soldiers observe the obligations of the Islamic 'way' and the Five Pillars of Islam, and its effect on training and operations. The following gives an indication of these practices:

- a. **Performance of Five Daily Prayers – 'Salah'**. In addition to the specific prayer time, there is a need to wash beforehand. Experience has shown that the 'breakfast' and 'early afternoon' (approx 1400hrs) prayer times have the most impact on the ANA working day.
- b. **Rammadan - 'Saum'**. This period of fasting will have an effect on the capabilities of the ANA, and their ability and willingness to undertake work and training.
- c. **Religious Holidays**. As Islamic religious days are based upon the cycle of the moon rather than strictly by the calendar as in the West, they can appear random to the western advisor. One UK advisor referred to the 'ambush holiday', and the expectation among the ANA that the OMLT would 'automatically' know when these religious holidays were due to occur.
- d. Friday is the Islamic day of rest, the equivalent of the Christian Sunday.

ANA units include a religious officer. Although the exact nature of his role is unclear, it is thought that he has more authority than our Chaplains. In addition to providing spiritual support to his unit, it is possible that he may have a part to play in ensuring the observance of Sharia Law within the unit.

12. It is natural that the ANA recruits from the large centres of population (including Kabul, Jellabad and Heart), and therefore that the majority of soldiers are perhaps less conservative than their Afghan counterparts in the more rural Helmand province. There are indications that the soldiers become less devout once deployed in the field, when away from the Afghan chain of command and practical considerations become more important. There remains a need for advisors at all times to be mindful of offending ANA religious sensitivities. Any possibility for western advisors to be seen as anti-Islamic would play into the hands of extremists, with the potential to mobilise support for '**Jihad**'.... "*To fight in*

⁴ Direct extract from DIS Afghansitan Background Brief dated May 2006.

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defence of religion and belief is a collective duty; there is no other duty after belief than fighting the enemy who is corrupting our life and our religion” Ibn Tamiyya C13th.

VOLUNTEER RECRUITING FOR THE ANA

13. Various systems of conscription, or draft, have been employed by the Afghan Army during its history. The 1941 draft system ensured ethnic diversity in formations. At that time in addition to its security role, the Army performed the role of a national educational institute where Afghan youth received literacy and civic education. There is no current intention to reintroduce a conscript force.⁵

14. The Coalition, in conjunction with the government of Afghanistan, is establishing recruiting stations in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. To help ensure that the army is ethnically balanced, new battalions are formed up for training with volunteers drawn from Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups. Reporting indicates that the army as a whole generally reflects Afghanistan’s balance of major ethnic groups. According to US figures, as of Jan 04, the ethnic composition of the Afghan population was 42 percent Pashtun, 27 percent Tajik, 9 percent Hazara, 9 percent Uzbek, and 13 percent “Other.” According to the OMC-A, as of Feb 05, the ethnic composition of the ANA was 49 percent Pashtun, 21 percent Tajik, 6 percent Hazara, 3 percent Uzbek, and 22 percent “Other” (the total of the individual percentages is greater than 100 percent due to rounding). Individual units vary in their ethnic balance. The OMC-A reports at least two battalions have no, or very few, Uzbek soldiers.

Comment: UK OMLT reports suggest that officers are predominantly drawn from the Pashtun or Tajik groups.

15. It is reported that volunteers are vetted through community elders. Whilst ex-militia fighters may enlist on an individual basis, United Nations reports indicate that less than 2 per cent had done so as of Feb 05.

RETENTION AND AWOL

16. While many of those initially recruited left the army before completing their terms of service, by late 2004 the army’s attrition rate had dropped to 1.1 percent per month. While attrition appears to have abated, it is reported that soldiers often leave their units without permission to take their pay home to their families. The lack of an Afghan national banking system is a significant contributing factor to these unauthorised absences, as is the lack of any significant penalty for AWOL within the volunteer ANA.

17. As many soldiers are stationed far from home and travel within the country is so difficult is far from unusual for soldiers to fail to report back from leave on time. In many cases soldiers will only be reported as AWOL after a month’s absence, in some cases it might be longer. However if they are over two months late they are automatically posted AWOL, discharged from the Army and removed from a unit’s books. Soldiers KIA are classed as martyrs, and remain on unit strength. It is not known if they are still paid, and if so what happens to that pay.

⁵ Ali A Jalali explains the difficulties in reintroducing conscription in “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National Army”, Parameters Autumn 2002 pp 80..

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ANA MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM

18. Violence is viewed differently in Afghanistan than in the West. Traditionally vendettas and criminal acts have been punished through physical means including death. This was particularly prevalent during Taleban rule when executions and amputations were commonplace.

19. Where punishment does exist within the ANA it is often physical, and brutal by Western standards. Anecdotal evidence from advisors exists of ANA soldiers being beaten, subjected to 'warning' shots, electrocuted or 'containerised' – locked in a metal ISO container for periods regardless of temperature.

20. Indiscipline can take many forms. The following has been reported:

- a. Arguments among soldiers, sometimes leading to directly pointing loaded weapons with threats to their colleagues or advisors.
- b. Drug use, including marijuana, opium and intravenous heroin.
- c. AWOL.

Comment: The ANA currently lacks a universal discipline system that is enforced throughout the chain of command. Advisors need to be mindful of the implications of reporting acts of indiscipline to their counterparts. Innovative ways of ensuring individual and team (both UK and ANA personnel) safety have been used, for example:

- a. Confining drug users to camp within the FOBs,
- b. Carriage of personal protection weapons, and
- c. Avoidance of ANA lines at periods when indiscipline is most likely to occur.

LANGUAGE

21. Of the many languages spoken across Afghanistan, the two official languages are:

- a. Dari (Afghan variant of Persian) spoken by 50%. This is the official language of the ANA.
- b. Pashto, spoken by 35%. Pashto is the spoken by the majority of the population in Regional Command (South) including Helmand Province.

22. Other languages are spoken in the regions where minority ethnic groups predominate. Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) are spoken by 11% and 30 other minor languages (including Baluchi and Pashai) by 4%. Most Afghans are bilingual and speak both Dari and Pashto.

23. Recruiting nationwide and the manning of ethnically diverse battalions, can lead to difficulties where Dari is not a soldier's first language. Likewise they may serve in an area where the local population speak a language unknown to the soldiers. In Feb 07, UK

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advisors reported that they had experienced instances where soldiers failed to attend for duties having been issued verbal orders in Dari. On investigation it was apparent that the soldiers had not understood their orders. This might be compounded by a perception of loss of face if orders are questioned, or clarified.

Comment: To be effective, advisors should be able to communicate in Dari to their ANA counterparts, and in the local language of their AO. For Helmand based UK forces there is thus a need for both Dari and Pashto language training.

“Use of interpreters is something of a skill in itself and many advisors will find themselves speaking “terp speak” where they slow their speech, use regular pauses and simple words. In Afghanistan be aware that some languages in remote areas may not have been exposed to the modern world concepts and constructs and it may not be possible for an interpreter to translate word for word. Also be aware that their position can cause friction, especially as they are invariably better paid than soldiers and careless use can make it seem as if they (the interpreter) are giving orders and instructions rather than the advisors who are using them. Try not to task the ‘terp to “fetch” “tell” etc. Rather, go with them and do everything in person with them as a mouthpiece only.”

UK OMLT Offr Feb 07.

24. The language assistance provided by interpreters is vital for working with the ANA. Interpreters are a coalition resource paid by the relevant national contingent. The UK view is that they are non-combatants and while they are issued with protective equipment (dark blue helmet and body armour) and personal equipment (bergen, sleeping bag etc), they do not wear UK uniforms or carry weapons.

Comment: The following should be noted by advisors:

- a. The best interpreters have a firm grasp of English, Dari and Pashto including the relevant military terminology, and the written languages; some do not.
- b. Many interpreters feel they should be allowed to wear military uniforms either UK or ANA, and some nations permit this to happen. Their key concern is that in the confusion of a contact they will be mistaken for the enemy and be engaged by the coalition or ANA.
- c. Whilst some have military experience and have been known to pick up a discarded AK-47 during a contact, others are less inclined to remain alongside their advisor when their language skills are needed for immediate command and control.
- d. Interpreter CSS must be provided by the advisors for the duration of the relevant task. Their kit should be inspected to ensure that they have the right equipment and enough rations (Halal as required).
- e. One UK mentor suggests “frustrations can be avoided by thorough preparation for meetings with the interpreter that will be used. 10 minutes covering vocabulary, what is to be discussed, likely arguments etc, prior to a meeting can save 30 minutes of incomprehension later. It is far too easy to blame the interpreter when meetings go badly. Invariably it is the advisor’s poor preparation that is at fault.”

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LITERACY

25. Nationwide the literacy rate is around 36%, although among females the figure is much lower. One ANA corps commander⁶ believed the problem

“Local Security Forces (LSF) (esp. Afghanistan) may have low literacy rates so an ability to use map and compass and grid systems is often beyond them. LSF will often cite GPS as a solution and advisors will need to demonstrate the advantages of Maps and compass to them (esp. for communicating locations, tgt indication etc) However, in areas familiar to them they may not need to be competent with navigation equipment to be able to lead the way to a know location. Allowing them to do this benefits their prestige both personal, and with attached advisors, and with local population. Again, hand signals can be used to steer or stop them if they are off course.”

UK OMLT Feb 07

to extend to a literacy rate of only 20% among his soldiers and 50% for his officers. Reports suggest that a key factor in the selection and promotion of NCOs is literacy, which is tested by exam during basic training.

Comment: Innovative approaches are required, based on an assumption that only one in five soldiers can read: demonstration, use of a white board to illustrate TTPs, use of models to discuss the ground for operations, comprehensive rehearsals and where ever possible the use of a ‘super’ recce group allowing every man to see the ground over which he will fight.

ANA DOCTRINE

26. ANA personnel draw their military expertise from a number of differing sources:

- a. Many senior officers attended Russian training academies to conduct conventional and COIN operations during the period 1979 – 89.
- b. Many learnt their trade as guerrillas fighting the Communist GoA and Russian army in Afghanistan.
- c. Most recently training delivered by the coalition at KMTTC, has been augmented by first hand experience fighting the Taleban throughout the country.

27. Simplistically, ANA written doctrine exists only as Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). The US PSC MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated) has produced and delivers low level tactical doctrine for the ANA on behalf of the US DoD. Basic training, and NCO leadership pamphlets are among the products MPRI has produced to support coalition and ANA training. Available in both Dari and English, while bearing a strong resemblance to the equivalent US Army training manuals, these are bespoke materials for the ANA. ANA weapon systems are covered, all photographs show ANA soldiers demonstrating fire positions and hand signals etc. MPRI has also been involved in

⁶ General Rahmuatullah Raufi, Kandahar Corps Commander, Feb 06 reported in the Christian Science Monitor.

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running courses for ANA offrs on the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), basing these on the US system.

Comment: Reports indicate:

- a. The ANA is good at low level drills such as VCPs, and some compound clearance work, particularly when they are given a discrete task either independently or as part of a wider operation. Indeed, rates of advance in some ANA clearance operations have far exceeded that expected of experienced coalition forces. They are less able to integrate closely on tasks with coalition forces when significant coordination and deconfliction is required.
- b. The best soldiers have a clear understanding of low level doctrine, and are very professional. Some reporting suggests that low level fire and manoeuvre drills are poor.
- c. ANA learn to undertake tasks by rote, rather than the application of principles to any situation. Predictably, this can lead to “All their section attacks are the same”.
- d. In comparison to their Iraqi Army counterparts the ANA soldiers are more willing to have a say in operations, training or improvements to their camp infrastructure. Sometimes this can lead to a ‘Chinese parliament’, or military Shura, where all soldiers regardless of rank enter into a discussion of the best way to conduct a task. In some cases ANA offrs and SNCOs do not have the experience or desire to impose a decision on their soldiers, and instead look to their advisors for direction.
- e. Advisor attempts to introduce the concept of concurrent activity to the ANA have been problematic. Whether this is because they are very sociable and wish to undertake activities as a collective group, or because they hold concerns that some elements will be left with a disproportionate amount of work is unclear.
- f. There is no systematic feedback, lessons learned or AAR process within the ANA.

ORGANISATION

28. The ANA is organised along conventional structural lines:

Squad – Platoon – Company – Kandak (Bn) – Bde – Corps

Within the 3rd Brigade of 205 (HERO) Corps ANA, there are three Infantry Kandaks, a CS Kandak (comprising an artillery company with nine D30, a recce company equipped with BMP and a 108-man engineer company) and a CSS Kandak.

29. **Squad.** The infantry are trained in squads of twelve men, but on the ground more generally operate as two four man fire teams, commanded by a Sgt who does not sit in either fire team.

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30. **Platoon.** Commanded by an officer - platoons range in size from 20 – 30 men depending on task and AWOL statistics.
31. **Company.** Approximately one hundred men.
32. **Kandak.** On paper Kandaks are around 600 men.
33. **Force Generation Cycle.** The three infantry Kandaks within the Brigade operate a Force Generation Cycle. At any given time one Kandak is on leave, another is training and available for surge operations, and the third committed to operations. Until recently the Brigade had not had the strength to be able to meet each of these commitments simultaneously with a detrimental effect on both leave and training time available.

LOW-LEVEL LEADERSHIP

34. In general, command is centralised within the ANA. Authority is held by very few individuals, and influence may follow tribal affiliations, rather than the formal chain of command. Responsibility across the staff disciplines is focused almost entirely with the Kandak commander, potentially leaving the Kandak level staff officers marginalised.
35. Some reporting suggests that some ANA officers at the lower tactical levels are loath to deploy onto the ground (FOBs) or patrol with their soldiers. It is unclear why this should be the case, but may be due to:
 - a. A lack of experience and a cultural unwillingness to be exposed as lacking in front of their men, especially when foreign advisors have shown a propensity to take command if the situation deteriorates, or
 - b. A desire for an easy life.

Comment: It is reported that some ANA soldiers have directly criticised their own officers' performance in comparison to the performance of coalition advisors. This has had the effect of driving a wedge between the advisor and his counterpart ANA officer, played upon by the ANA soldiers. Whilst the best way to promote professionalism with the ANA is through advisor example, "do as I do", rather than "do as I say", considerable effort is required to avoid unintended consequence and loss of face by the ANA hierarchy. Conversely, the ANA soldier has proved likely to side with his officer against advice when it suits.

ANA MATERIEL

36. While much of the ANA materiel is from the Soviet era, white fleet vehicles and uniforms are increasingly being supplied by the US. Equipment includes:
 - a. Small arms and support weapons:
 - AK-47
 - AK-74
 - Dragunov SVD sniper rifle
 - RPK

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PK series machine gun
RPG
SPG-9
Mortars 60mm and 82mm

b. Vehicles:

BMP-1
BTR 80
M 113
HMMVV
Various trucks and light vehicles

c. Heavy weapons:

D 30 – 152mm towed arty.
T 55
T 62

d. Engr equipment:

US demolition sets
US provided plant

Comment: In common with their British counterparts the ANA soldiers covet new, high tech and 'gucci' equipment – desert boots are viewed as a status symbol. Reports suggest that ANA soldiers cite our advanced equipment (NVG etc) as the source of coalition force competence. Cross training with counterpart equipment, and advisor prowess with ANA weaponry has sought to alleviate this jealousy. Uncorroborated reports of D 30 engagements have suggested an accuracy better than the UK 105mm light gun. It should be noted that the Russian equipment uses 6000 mils, rather than the NATO 6400 mils system.

37. The ANA attitude to equipment care and husbandry varies widely. At one extreme, advisors have reported ANA soldiers throwing away goretex jackets in the summer months or driving vehicles to destruction, ignoring preventative maintenance and warning lights. On the other hand, they can show innovation in repair and once instigated, zealous adherence to systems of care and maintenance.

Comment: There are skilled craftsmen who are able, in common with those of many developing countries, to fix equipment from first principles – adapting or cannibalising parts to make up for shortcomings in the supply chain. Explanations for the differing attitudes on equipment care vary:

- a. One reason cited is that because the AK47 invariably works despite neglect and dirt, there is an underlying assumption that all kit will react in the same way, or
- b. As some items are viewed as expendables, such as rifle magazines, broken items can just be thrown away and replaced (by the US taxpayer!).

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- c. As most items of equipment are not labelled, and may not be attributed to a designated individual through a serial number, there is little collective responsibility for equipment.
- d. A fatalistic attitude pervades, such that equipment will either break or not, and that an individuals' actions cannot effect this.

38. The ANA experiences systemic problems obtaining spares, and accounting for equipment issued through the joint ANA/coalition supply chain. ANA demands are submitted through the ANA chain of command and simultaneously must follow the TF PHOENIX chain. If either part becomes lost or delayed in the system, then spares or equipment will not be forthcoming. A lack of a reliable mail system means that ANA demands, are hand delivered when transport is available.

PHYSICAL FITNESS AND SPORT IN THE ANA

39. In comparison to his western counterpart the average ANA soldier has not been exposed to physical fitness training or the type of diet that would allow the routine carriage of heavy combat loads.

Comment: Careful groundwork is required to ensure that ANA counterparts fully understand the benefits of PT prior to the introduction of western style 'gym' sessions.⁷

40. Whilst **Buzkashi**⁸ – polo with a headless carcass of a calf - might be considered as Afghanistan's national game, it is more likely that the ANA soldiers will be more concerned with football or cricket! Advisors have used both these games to effect in their relationship with their counterparts.

Comment: The HERRICK 5 OMLT Battlegroup obtained two sets of cricket equipment that were given to the 3rd Bde, 205 Corps following a resounding defeat of the OMLT team by their ANA counterparts. The football practice undertaken by even the best premierships teams has been used as an analogy by at least one advisor to illustrate why the ANA need to keep practising military skills despite them being trained soldiers.

On Kandahar football stadium: "To start with (the Taliban) had banned football altogether. But football is our national game so eventually they allowed us to play matches, but only before 4pm. The players all had to be covered, arms and leg. You can imagine in the summer, what that was like for them, when it is a furnace here, more than 40°C. The Taliban used to come and catch players who had rolled up their sleeves or whose beards were too short. They would drag them from the pitch and beat them with the butts of their Kalashnikovs...in the past...we even used to follow foreign teams . My favourites were Brazil and Manchester United....I want a football federation where no beards are allowed."⁹
Mohammed Nasir, (former) head of Kandahar sports board.

⁷ 'UTUBE' offers an example of a less than effective ANA PT session.

⁸ It is understood that Buzkashi originated among the nomads of the Central Asian steppes and is therefore most closely associated with the Hazaras, Taiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen of Afghanistan.

⁹ Religious police dragged the Pakistan youth football team that went to play in Kandahar in summer 2000, off the pitch and the teams' heads were shaved for not wearing long trousers. Quoted by Christina Lamb in 'The Sewing Circles of Herat'.

THE ANA SOLDIER

41. The ANA soldiers encountered by UK advisors in Helmand Province have shown much humility, a sense of humour and fun and a genuine affection for their UK counterparts. Viewed against the backdrop of their casualty and morbidity rates, meagre wages (by UK standards), and the potential for a violent discipline system, poor equipment and low level leadership often lacking in experience, their morale is remarkable.

42. They will continue to be shaped by the society from which they are drawn, but in comparison to their advisors on six-month tours their competence at the COIN task in hand can only grow. Advising them will only become more challenging as their confidence grows and they demand more from their coalition counterparts.

“The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.”¹⁰

¹⁰ The Soldier and the State Huntington pp 2.

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CHAPTER 23

THE USE OF DOGS IN OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. Dogs can be trained to perform tasks which save manpower and time and increase the effectiveness of a search or follow up. Military dogs fall into two broad categories, protection and specialist dogs. The primary function of the protection dog is to help improve the security of installations guarded and to decrease the manpower required to provide an effective guard. Specialist dogs are those trained for a single role and are used to detect people or inanimate objects. A proper understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each type is essential if full value is to be obtained from them.

2. The performance of a dog depends to a great extent on the ability and enthusiasm of its handler who must therefore be chosen with care. Specialist dogs, who may work in very dangerous conditions and carry a burden of life and death, require particularly diligent handlers who should be selected accordingly.

3. The characteristics and capabilities of the various types of dog are described in outline in the following paragraphs. Commanders can judge the type of dog which may be useful to them, but not all of them will usually be instantly available. Protection dogs can generally be supplied on demand, but specialist dogs must be acquired and trained and consequently their need must be anticipated well in advance.

PROTECTION DOGS

4. **Characteristics.** Protection dogs rely on their sense of smell of air scent, acute hearing and visual detection of movement and aggression.

5. **Employment.** The dog patrols on a lead with the handler; it can detect at a distance, and when released and given the word of command will attack and bite. It will also protect the handler without a word of command. The dog can be used as a static sentry, and therefore can be taken on overt or covert patrols to give early warning of hostile activity, and to apprehend suspects. As these dogs are likely to bark, they must be carefully selected for operations where silence is required. The main uses of protection dogs are:

- a. Patrolling of enclosed areas where there is little movement of personnel or traffic.
- b. Aggressive/high visibility patrolling of open areas.
- c. Prisoner escort.
- d. Listening posts.
- e. OPs.
- f. Ambushes.

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- g. Crowd Control.
- h. VCPs.

ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES SEARCH DOGS

6. **Characteristics.** Arms and Explosive Search (AES) dogs are specialist animals trained for one specific role, that of searching for and indicating the presence of weapons, explosives and equipment. They can be used to search in both urban and rural environments. A dog should be deployed to every incident, even if there is no specific job for it as a result of the incident. It can be used to check cordon and ICP locations.

7. **Employment.** AES dogs and handlers may be held available on location or in a central pool for tasking on request. AES Dogs should never be deployed to confirm some already existing suspicion. However, in the event of a telephone warning being given that a device has been planted, consideration may be given to the deployment of AES dogs but due regard must be paid to soak times, the reliability of information etc. The principal tasks for AES dogs are:

- a. Searching for munitions, hides and ancillary equipment in:
 - (1) Buildings. Occupied, unoccupied or derelicts (unoccupied and derelicts after having been checked for booby traps before the dog enters).
 - (2) Vehicles. Cars, lorries, buses, trains, ships and aircraft.
 - (3) Open Areas. Fields, woods, hedgerows and embankments.
 - (4) Routes. Roads and railways.
- b. Providing negative information by checking buildings after completion of repairs or renovations, or prior to VIP visits etc, clearing areas of operation such as VCPs and helicopter landing sites.

8. **Tasking and Tactical Considerations.** Tasking is usually through the normal chain of command unless the dog has previously been deployed to a specific unit or search team. Except in conditions of high risk search, the AES dog should have access to the area to be searched before the other searchers move into it. Where IEDs or booby traps are expected, a check for devices must be made before the dog moves in, by searchers other than the dog handler.

9. **Advantages.** A dog is compact, mobile and easily transported. It can work in a variety of conditions including confined spaces and difficult terrain. It can search relatively quickly, allowing either the time for a search to be reduced or a larger area to be covered. It can indicate the presence of many separate explosive substances - a far greater range of substances than any single machine can detect. It is also an excellent overt deterrent in many circumstances. A dog is normally unaffected by CS gas, air fresheners or other aerosols.

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10. **Limitations.** Variations and limitations are to be expected when using AES dogs. For instance:

- a. They are of little use in detecting arms and explosives hidden on the person, as dogs expect these to be carried by humans, ie their handlers and other soldiers.
- b. Reduced ability to detect objects more than 1.2 metres above working height.
- c. There is a danger of AES dogs setting off booby traps.
- d. The dog should only work within the range/cover of the ECM equipment available on the ground.
- e. Dogs suffer from tiredness and may only give of their best for a limited time.

TRACKER DOGS

11. **Characteristics.** Tracker dogs also have a highly developed sense of smell but more especially for ground than air scent. The dog is only trained for the task of tracking.

12. **Employment.** The dog and its handler should be held in a central place and deployed to a task on request. They should have early access to a line before the scent has been confused by other troops. Possible tasks are:

- a. After Incidents. Pursuit of suspects fleeing on foot. Even if no arrest is made, intelligence can be obtained from the direction of flight and from witnesses on or at the end of track; also forensic evidence can often be obtained from footprints, tyre marks, items dropped or left behind etc.
- b. Routine. The routine usually adopted is:
 - (1) Stand-by at planned arrests and road blocks in case of escape on foot.
 - (2) Determining firing points, sniper posts, observation positions.
 - (3) Determining routes to and from sub-para (2) above, and freshly dumped, hidden hides or any clandestine operation.

13. **The Track.** A track is made up of a combination of scents, human, artificial (soap toiletries, polish etc) and crushed vegetation and insects. Everywhere a human goes, he leaves a track. If he runs his track will be more pronounced than if he walks away from the scene. As a dog cannot differentiate between friendly forces and enemy targets, it is vital that at the start of a tracking task it is confirmed that the dog is following the correct track, ie the enemy. Once on the track the dog can follow it to a successful conclusion despite diversionary tracks, which may be introduced either by humans or animals.

14. **Handler Information.** Before a tracker dog can start to work on a track, the handler requires certain information:

- a. He must know:

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- (1) Where the quarry was last seen.
- (2) In which direction it was moving.

b. He should know:

- (1) The amount and the limit of movement by friendly troops which has taken place in the area where the quarry was last seen.
- (2) At what time the quarry was last seen.
- (3) How many there were.
- (4) Whether it is thought that there has been movement by the quarry out of and back into the area where the track starts before final departure.
- (5) The state of weather after the quarry was seen.
- (6) The probable reaction of the quarry when encountered.

15. **Limitations.** The main limitations are that:

- a. The tracker dog should be deployed to the scene of an incident as soon as possible. Time is a major factor in its deployment.
- b. As with other dogs, tiredness is a factor.

INFANTRY PATROL DOGS (IP)

16. **Characteristics.** Infantry Patrol (IP) dogs use their sense of smell and hearing to give silent warning by pointing. The IP dog is used predominantly in a close country environment and is trained silently to indicate enemy presence, either moving, static or concealed, as in an ambush.

17. **Employment.** the following points should be noted if using patrol dogs:

a. A patrol dog differs from a tracker dog in that it does not follow a track, but it is alert to the scent and sound of human beings or animals conveyed to it on the air. The patrol dog is useful for giving silent warning of ambushes and attempts at infiltration, and will indicate any presence before it can be detected by a human. The distance at which warning is given depends upon the following factors:

- (1) Wind direction and velocity.
- (2) Prevailing weather conditions.
- (3) Density of vegetation.
- (4) Individual ability.

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- b. Depending on the environment Infantry patrol dogs are normally worked on a long lead both by day and at night.
- c. On patrol the handler and dog should lead. The normal procedure is:
 - (1) The patrol commander briefs the handler on the mission, disposition of own troops, the general direction of advance and any special instructions before moving out.
 - (2) The IP dog handler and escort precede the patrol at a distance close enough for immediate communication with the patrol commander. At night this would be at about an arm's length, in daylight the distance will be greater but still within visual signalling distance. The dog and handler should be allowed to take advantage of any wind or other conditions which help the dog's scenting powers.
 - (3) When the dog points, the handler indicates by silent hand signal and the patrol takes over.
 - (4) The patrol commander should then move quietly up to the handler and make his plan.

18. **Limitations.** The survival of a patrol may depend on its ability to locate an enemy without itself being detected; a trained IP dog will always detect a hidden enemy before the patrol. The dog can be worked by day or night in most kinds of weather and country and is not disturbed by the noise of battle. It must, however, be stressed that:

- a. The dog's performance usually deteriorates in heavy rain and when working upwind of the enemy.
- b. The dog is apt to become perplexed when a lot of activity is taking place within a small area.
- c. The dog cannot differentiate between the enemy and own forces. Full briefing of the patrol on the dispositions of our own troops is therefore essential.
- d. Although the dog will point at animals, the handler should normally recognise a false point of this kind.
- e. The dog will suffer from tiredness if over used.

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OTHER SPECIALIST DOGS

Type	Task
Drugs Detection Dog	To detect the presence of prohibited drugs or to act as a deterrent.
Casualty Detection Dog	To detect humans in open or enclosed spaces, including battle casualties.
Mine Detection Dog	To detect mines, in difficult and open terrain where deployment of sensitive equipment is not feasible.
Vehicle Search Dogs	To search vehicles, particularly when large numbers and quick searching is required etc.
Police Dogs	To protect and track (to a limited ability).

19. **Limitations.** The following limitations on the use of dogs should be noted:
- a. **Avoidable.**
 - (1) Lack of imagination.
 - (2) Lack of understanding of the dog's capabilities and limitations.
 - (3) Calling for the wrong type of dog.
 - (4) Excessive movement or disturbance in the dog's required area of operations.
 - b. **Unavoidable.**
 - (1) Tiredness of the dog or handler. This can be minimised by resting the dog at intervals during a task and ensuring that dog and handler are not kept waiting before and after tasking.
 - (2) Sickness or injury to the dog or handler.
 - (3) An inexplicable off day for the dog.
 - (4) Distractions: bitches, other dogs, other animals, food, people.
 - (5) Cultural objections. Some cultures regard dogs as unclean and unfit to enter human habitation.
 - (6) Weather: excessive wet, hot sun, and strong winds. The following limitations may apply to AES Dogs:

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- (a) In darkness and at night the handler's reduced ability to read his dog, even in artificial light, is reduced
- (b) Reduced ability to detect objects more than 1-2 metres above working height.

20. **Capabilities.** Despite the limitations, the following capabilities should be noted:
- a. Highly developed sense of smell and hearing.
 - b. Act as visual deterrent.
 - c. Protection dogs can be an Early Warning Device.
 - d. Protection dogs can positively affect an arrest.
 - e. Most intruders submit when challenged by a dog handler with a dog.
 - f. Easy transportation.
 - g. Dogs employed correctly can save much manpower.
 - h. A dog can be used for at least 16 hours in every 24 hrs (provided it gets 6 hrs undisturbed rest in each 24 hrs).
 - i. A dog can be recalled.

SUMMARY

21. All units should be aware of the value and variety of dogs used by the Army and where possible dogs should be involved in a unit's training programme. Advice and assistance regarding training with dogs can be given by the nearest appropriate RAVC unit.

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CHAPTER 24

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) AIDE MEMOIRE¹

INTRODUCTION

1. The Security Sector.

a. **Security Actors.** Armed forces; police and gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, government backed militias) and veterans groups.

b. **Security Management Oversight Bodies.** The executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial planning and audit units); civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

c. **Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions.** Judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.

d. **Non-Statutory Security Forces.** Liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security companies (PSC); political party militias.

2. SSR Principles.

a. **Indigenous participation/local ownership.**

b. **Application of a Strategic Reform Plan.**

c. **Operating within the law.**

d. **Optimum delivery.**

3. **Local Solutions.** Develop local solutions that are appropriate to the environment with input from Indigenous Security Forces (ISF). Do not template solutions or employ inappropriate equipment.

4. Situational Awareness.

a. **Stakeholders.** A number of other departments and agencies will conduct activity that directly or indirectly influences military activity in support of SSR. An understanding of respective roles and liaison will be required. Possible other agencies include:

¹ Details on Military Support to SSR are given in the Stability Ops Chapter of AFM Vol 1, Part 1, *Formation Tactics*.

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- (1) HN Government and Ministries.
- (2) ISF.
- (3) UN Agencies.
- (4) NGOs and the representatives of all groups in the civil society.
- (5) Bilateral Governments.
- (6) Coalition Military Forces.
- (7) PSC.

b. Obstacles to Change.

- (1) Persistence of an authoritarian, militarist approach to security.
- (2) Lack of institutional capacity to formulate and execute reform programmes.
- (3) Factions and individuals who view SSR as a threat.
- (4) Corruption.
- (5) Resource constraints.
- (6) Conflicting donor policies or lack of donor resilience.
- (7) Political instability and tension with neighbouring states.
- (8) Suspicion between ISF and the civilian population.
- (9) Insecurity resulting from insurgency, public disorder etc.
- (10) Lack of political will.

TRAINING TEAMS

5. Considerations.

- a. Role.
- b. Resources.
- c. Security.
- d. Medical support.
- e. Cultural awareness.
- f. Expectation management.

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- g. Continuity.
- h. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Rules of Engagement (ROE).
- i. Risk.
- j. Logistic support.
- k. Integration of military activity with other elms of security sector (eg police, judiciary)

6. **Reconnaissance and Planning.**

- a. **Recce Team Composition.** Team OC, G4 and G3/5 (minimum).
- b. **Tasks.**
 - (1) Determine the security situation in AO.
 - (2) Obtain brief from in country HMG reps.
 - (3) Confirm/identify training/operational aims.
 - (4) Confirm time, funding and equipment required.
 - (5) Examine availability and standard of ISF training infrastructure and equipment.
 - (6) Confirm CASEVAC and medical plan.
 - (7) Confirm comms requirements.
 - (8) Coordination and deconflict with the activities of allies and NGOs.
 - (9) Confirm G4 arrangements
 - (10) The ISF:
 - (a) Engage with ISF commanders and start to build relationship.
 - (b) Determine background and standard of trainees.
 - (c) Communicate task limitations and boundaries.
 - (d) Obtain information from the Defence Attache as.
 - (11) Gender issues. Confirm requirement for/appropriateness of female instructors.
 - (12) Confirm impact of any ethnic/tribal issues.
 - (13) Identify scope of comms/media strategy.

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(14) Determine availability of interpreters (cost and security vetting).

7. **Planning Training Programmes.**

- a. Training should be in line with the wider SSR programme.
- b. The standard of students will determine the time required to complete the training (if using interpreters, allow at least three times the length of time taken to train British soldiers).
- c. Training packages may be required for several years to deliver the training aim.
- d. Develop the range of G1-7 capabilities.
- e. ISF commanders may require separate training packages (integrated with their soldiers at a later stage).

8. **Pre Deployment Preparation.**

- a. **Selection of Personnel.** Experience, maturity, high personal standards, self discipline and a willingness to work with indigenous forces are essential. Native speakers within the Army should be sought. Teams will usually require a top heavy rank structure. Local/acting rank for some or all team members may be required.

9. **Team Training.** Should cover:

- a. Situational awareness.
- b. Cultural awareness.
- c. Personal military skills.
- d. Language.
- e. Training skills. Proficiency with foreign weapons, lesson plans, language cards.
- f. Liaison.
- g. Personal security skills.

10. **Conduct.**

- a. **Team Security.** The following points must be considered and adhered to when conducting Trg and OMLT tasks:

(1) **Trust.** Unless operating in a benign environment, never completely trust the ISF unit that is being trained. It is highly likely to have been infiltrated by hostile elements. The same applies to Locally Employed Civilians (LECs).

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- (2) **IA Drill.** Unless the environment is benign the team must have an IA drill to cover a situation where the ISF unit (or elements of it) it is training attacks it. This should never be communicated to the ISF.
 - (3) **Emergency Communications.** The team must have constant (24 hour) communications on an open line to deal with emergency situations.
 - (4) **Incident Response Team (IRT).** Wherever possible an IRT should be available to assist a team if required.
 - (5) **Vigilance.** At least one member of the team should always be awake and providing security for the team (in camp and particularly on training and operations).
 - (6) **IED and Terrorist Threat.** Pattern setting must be avoided and appropriate equipment and TTPs employed.
 - (7) **Indigenous Drivers and Vehicles.** Poorly trained ISF drivers and badly maintained vehicles pose a serious threat to safety. Driver training and assessment should be conducted at the outset of the task and a similar system to the UK FMT 600 (where driver training and competences are recorded) should be adopted.
 - (8) **Personal Security and OPSEC.** Team personnel should avoid exchanging e-mail addresses with and providing details of domestic residences etc to members of the ISF. Personal e-mails and mobile phone calls may not be appropriate in some locations due to the risk of compromise and personnel should be prepared to be out of direct contact with families and friends for extended periods when the risk of compromise dictates.
 - (9) **Self Reliance.** The team must have sufficient training (medical, communications, joint fires procedures etc) to ensure that it can operate in isolation from national or coalition forces.
- b. **Build Relationship with ISF.**
- c. **Recreation Facilities.** Avoid exposing the community and ISF to Western influences. Set up a separate tent/area. Do not take pornography of any sort (DVDs, magazines etc) to avoid causing irreconcilable offence with local leaders, communities and the ISF, thus providing opposition groups with invaluable Info Ops opportunities.
 - d. **Mentoring.** Develop capacity by encouraging ISF to take responsibility. Advise, steer and influence commanders.
 - e. **Training.** Where training to achieve the basic standard is required consider:
 - (1) **Ranges and Field Firing.** Seek appropriate support (SASC) when selecting/opening live firing ranges and developing field firing programmes. Adopt UK safety standards as far as practicable. Ensure that specialist tools (eg for zeroing AK series weapons) and relevant manuals are available.

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(2) **Timings.** Be aware of ISF normal daily routine and match training programmes to it. Take a firm line on lax attitudes to programme timings. Be clear that an 'Insh'allah' approach is not acceptable.

(3) **Pace of Training.** The pace of training will be much slower than that for UK troops. Be patient and realistic about what can be achieved in the time available.

(4) **Driver Training.** For ISF forces equipped with vehicles, driver assessment and training is essential. Mobility cadres are likely to be required. Driver records should be kept and routine maintenance and first parade checks carried out.

(5) **Develop G1 and G4 Capability.** This should be developed in parallel with its G3 capability. Pay, promotion, ES, infrastructure etc all contribute to the operational effectiveness of the ISF unit and the enduring effect of the task.

(6) **Trg Methods and Aids.** Trg should be conducted as practical, hands-on activity with realistic scenarios. Simple pictures and diagrams make effective trg aids. Avoid using high tech IT systems that ISF instructors will not be able to obtain.

f. **Discipline.** Use the ISF chain of command to enforce discipline.

g. **Use of Interpreters.**

(1) **Training.** Conduct detailed rehearsals. Brief to interpret word for word.

(2) **Security.** Consider the security implications of the knowledge that interpreters will gain from assisting with instruction. They could pass on skills and information to adversaries.

(3) **Duty of care.** Consider the security and safety of interpreters expected to deploy on ops. Confirm that this task is within their contract.

h. **Developing ISF.**

(1) Involve the ISF unit chain of command in:

(a) The design of the training programme.

(b) After Action Reviews (AAR) and assessment of their troops.

(c) The selection of soldiers to become instructors.

(2) Develop a strong SNCO and JNCO cadre where appropriate to local mil culture.

(3) Identify suitable candidates for training at RMAS, Brecon, UK police academies etc (as appropriate).

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TRANSITION FROM TRAINING TO OPERATIONS - OPERATIONAL MENTORING AND LIAISON TEAMS (OMLT)²

11. The considerations for and conduct of Training Teams apply to OMLT. The OMLT will be operating in a hostile environment and its focus will be the delivery of ISF capability on operations. The following points apply:

a. **OPSEC.** OPSEC is critical:

(1) Due to the likelihood of infiltration of the ISF unit by adversaries, it is usual for the OMLT only to brief the senior ISF commander in advance (compromised security can then quickly be traced).

(2) For the first operation conducted by the unit with the OMLT it may be appropriate to brief that the unit is deploying on a training task and inform them of the operation en route.

(3) Plan and rehearse a number of operations of which only one will be conducted.

(4) The OMLT should ensure that the ISF deal with breaches of security (highlight then check that action has been taken).

(5) Screening of ISF personnel, interpreters and LECs should be conducted as far as possible.

(6) Isolation of ISF personnel prior to an operation.

b. **ISF Involvement in Planning.** Involve ISF chain of command in planning for operations (when their capability is at a suitable level and OPSEC issues have been addressed). Use local knowledge. Keep plans simple.

c. **Manage Exposure to Tactical Risk.** Use operational experience to develop the ethos and capability of ISF. Manage exposure to risk and do not overface. Exploit operational success to build confidence and esteem (consider honour, perceptions of families, indigenous population etc).

d. **Weapon Handling and Safety.** Ensure that procedures for making ready are enforced.

e. **G4.** Ensure that both the ISF and OMLT have sufficient ammunition, rations, batteries, fuel etc for the duration of operations.

f. **CASEVAC.** A CASEVAC system must be established for the ISF and OMLT.

g. **Supporting Assets.** The OMLT must be conversant with the procedures required to coordinate MNF assets in support of ISF operations (eg CAS, AH, SH, CCA, CASEVAC). The OMLT must be able to conduct BM at the appropriate level.

² See Doctrine Note 06/12, *Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams*.

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h. **Liaison.** The OMLT is likely to be required to provide LOs to MNF and other ISF HQs during the conduct of operations. These should operate in parallel to LOs from their associated ISF unit to ensure that the necessary coordination takes place and that the capability of the ISF to fulfil this function is developed.

i. **Partnering.** Partnering arrangements between ISF and coalition units:

- (1) Provides continuity between ISF and coalition units.
- (2) Develops ISF capacity through use of TTPs and doctrine.
- (3) Provides OMLT with the required C2, BM, FP, OS and CSS support.
- (4) Joint/partnered operations add legitimacy to coalition operations.

12. **Handovers and Continuity.** Rotate team personnel 50% at a time or allow for long handover.

13. **Carriage of Weapons.** OMLT personnel should always be armed.

14. **Battlespace Management.** As OMLT may need to deliver capabilities to ISF units (CAS, SH, CASEVAC, CCA etc), it should be able to fulfil the Battlespace Management (BM) function for the ISF HQ.

DEVELOPING INDIGENOUS POLICE SERVICES (IPS)

15. **Introduction.** In the absence of other agencies the military may become involved in the development of IPS. HQ staff, training teams and OMLT may be required to operate in support of IPS. The following points apply to SSR activity concerning IPS.

16. **Planning Considerations.**

a. The separation of police and military powers.

- (1) The PS will routinely answer to ministries of home affairs or interior not the MOD.
- (2) Military personnel should not conduct policing activity.
- (3) The PS should have its own specialised education and training programmes.
- (4) Police and military powers should complement each other.

b. Strategic Planning.

- (1) Clearly delineate police and military responsibilities.
- (2) Formalise the boundaries, points of interface and responsibilities between police and military functions.

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- (3) Clearly define routine policing in relation to the activities of paramilitary units, special guards etc.
- (4) Identify spoilers (those with something to lose due to reform) and threats.
- (5) Develop HN institutional capacity.
- (6) Ensure that formal/institutional relations determine change, not personal relationships and allegiances.
- (7) Develop an appropriate legal framework for the basis for police action.
- (8) Analyse strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
- (9) Develop realistic timelines.
- (10) Chose and adhere to MOE and progress indicators.

17. **Building/Developing a Police Service.** Challenges:

- a. Ensuring that the PS operates within a wider system of governance.
- b. Establishing adequate managerial structures and systems.
- c. Establishing an accountable organisation that respects human rights.
- d. Equipping and training individual officers.
- e. Representation.
- f. Be aware of the benefits and challenges of some traditional non-state justice systems.

18. **Principles.**

- a. Set realistic aspirations and timescales for.
- b. Design and equip the PS to meet the requirements of its role.
- c. Local ownership is essential.

19. **Practical Steps.**

- a. Ensure that the PS is adequately paid in order to counter corruption and make service an attractive career.
- b. Create a framework of internal and external accountability.
- c. Punish inappropriate behaviour and reward good practice.

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- d. Build public confidence in the PS:
 - (1) Publicise the role and ethos.
 - (2) Engage leaders, civil society and the media to promote understanding.
- e. Develop the criminal justice and penal system in parallel.
- f. MNF AO boundaries should mirror those of the PS they are supporting.
- g. Design a HRM strategy with guidelines on recruitment, selection, training, promotion and retirement.

20. **Recruitment.**

- a. The aim is to produce an effective, capable and sustainable institution.
- b. An objective assessment of competency and performance should be the criteria for promotion and reward.
- c. A continual process of performance assessment should be established to remove or retrain officers who fail to meet the required standards and identify individuals for further training and promotion.
- d. Remedial training should be offered to make up for shortfalls in skills.
- e. The PS should reflect the demographic balance of the society that it serves. This should be achieved without diminishing the standards.

21. **Establishing Police Primacy.**

- a. Improve the status of the PS in the eyes of the public.
- b. Lessen corruption.
- c. Improve training.
- d. Adequately train and equip the PS to operate in dangerous situations to lessen reliance on mil sp.
- e. Ensure that the PS is accountable through internal and external organisations.
- f. Emphasise the service element of policing.
- g. Avoid the politicisation of the PS as far as possible.
- h. Quick win solutions include:
 - (1) Introducing distinct police uniforms.

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- (2) Targeted international study trips.
- (3) The abolition of military ranks and title

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CHAPTER 25

OPERATIONAL MENTORING AND LIAISON TEAMS

INTRODUCTION

1. **Role.** Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) are employed as a means of developing a Host Nation's (HN) Indigenous Security Forces (ISF)¹ usually as part of a Security Sector Reform² (SSR) programme. The functions of the OMLT include training, mentoring, liaising and enabling in support of ISF operational activities. OMLT activity may range from establishing and running training facilities to conducting operations with and providing additional capabilities to the ISF unit it has trained. The nature of the task calls for relatively small teams operating in close association with ISF, either in isolation or in partnership with UK or coalition units. It is a demanding task for the individuals who make up the OMLT and is a function that requires significant resources in terms of the quality of personnel involved, their training and the equipment and supporting infrastructure that they require once deployed.

2. **Scope.** This chapter is primarily aimed at OMLT deployed in support of a wider operation but contains information equally pertinent to one-off OMLT and other Training Team tasks. Methods of Instruction (MOI) and other training specific issues are not covered.

CONSIDERATIONS

3. The following factors should be considered when planning, preparing for and executing OMLT tasks:

a. **Role.** The specific role and objectives of the OMLT must be clearly defined and understood.

b. **Resources.** The resource requirement to support the OMLT (funding, equipment etc) should be clearly defined and met.

c. **Security.** The security of OMLT personnel must be considered throughout the planning and conduct of training tasks and operations.

d. **Medical Support.** A robust medical plan must be in place to support the OMLT.

e. **Cultural Awareness.** The OMLT must understand the cultural environment that it is operating in. This will enable it to pitch training at the correct level (understanding trainee background and experience) and avoid causing offence (through cultural mistakes) to those with whom a close bond and mutual trust needs to be established.

f. **Expectation Management.** The ISF is likely to expect the OMLT to deliver far more (in terms of capability and equipment) than resources, time or its mandate

¹ Usually Indigenous Armed Forces (IAF).

² See AFM Vol 1, Part 1, *Formation Tactics* Chapter 6 – Stability Operations and JDN – *The Military Contribution to SSR*.

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are likely to permit. ISF expectations should, therefore, be managed accordingly from the outset.

g. **Continuity.** For both short and long term OMLT tasks effort must be made to ensure continuity in personal relationships to assist mentoring and the conduct of training and operations.

h. **Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Rules of Engagement (ROE).** The MOU and ROE and their implications for all aspects of the OMLT activities must be understood (for example are OMLT personnel permitted to fight alongside ISF?).

i. **Risk.** The risks associated with small, isolated teams operating amongst ISF must be identified and managed.

RECONNAISSANCE AND PLANNING

4. **Recce Team Composition.** The recce team should be composed of those deploying as the OMLT to promote continuity at the outset. As a minimum the OMLT OC, G4 and G3/5 representatives should form part of the recce team. The rank structure within the team should be sufficient to enable it to engage with and influence the senior levels of the ISF unit with whom the OMLT is operating (acting or local rank may be required to give OMLT personnel the required status in the eyes of the ISF).

5. **Tasks.** The recce should consider the following issues:

a. The security situation in which the OMLT will operate.

b. The training/operational aims should be confirmed/identified.

c. The time, funding and equipment required for the task should be confirmed.

d. Availability and standard of ISF training infrastructure and equipment (SASC, MT and other specialist representatives may be required to assess the standard of ranges, vehicles, infrastructure etc).

e. CASEVAC and medical plan (including first line support, in-country resources and facilities, availability of SH (own, allied, HN and caveats), timelines etc).

f. A robust, secure communications network is required for the OMLT to conduct routine R2 activity, calls for fires (own and other nation), links to ISTAR platforms etc.

g. Coordination and deconfliction with the activities of allies and other organisations may be required.

h. Establish means of resupply for OMLT (rations, ammunition, equipment, ES etc).

i. The ISF:

(1) Engage with ISF commanders and start to build relationship.

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- (2) Ascertain background (tribal makeup, previous experience etc) and standard of trainees.
- (3) Clear communication of OMLT task limitations and boundaries.
- j. Obtain information from the Defence Attache if appropriate (to obtain country-specific information, the perspective of Other Government Departments (eg FCO) etc).
- k. Gender issues. The requirement for or appropriateness of female instructors should be confirmed.
- l. Availability of interpreters (consider cost and requirement for vetting).

6. **Planning the Training Programme.** Any training conducted by the OMLT should be in line with the wider SSR programme delivered to the HN and resources should be allocated to complete the task. The reconnaissance should highlight any shortfalls. The standard of students will determine the time required to complete the training³ and training packages may be required to run for several years to deliver the training aim. Consideration must be given to developing the G1-7 capabilities of the unit (including driver training) rather than focussing purely on G3 aspects to ensure that appropriate levels of self-sufficiency and sustainability are developed. Depending on cultural sensitivities and standards ISF commanders may require separate training packages that are integrated with those of their soldiers at a later stage.

PRE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION

7. **Selection of OMLT Personnel.** Selection of personnel for the OMLT is critical. Experience, maturity, high personal standards, self discipline and a willingness to work with indigenous forces are essential. Native speakers within the Army should be sought. In most Arab/eastern cultures rank is an issue and teams will usually require a top heavy rank structure. Local/acting rank for some or all OMLT members may be required.

8. **OMLT Training.** The OMLT will require extensive training, particularly where it will deploy in support of ISF operations. It should cover:

- a. **Situational Awareness.** Detailed information on the security situation and relevant factions, organisations etc must be understood by all. The J2 brief must include personal security.
- b. **Cultural Awareness.** The OMLT personnel must understand the military and civil culture in which they are operating (for example do families live in the camps with ISF personnel, how do prayer timings and religious festivals (eg Ramadan) impact on training?) TTPs should be developed to suit circumstances (eg method of instruction, meal times during Ramadan).
- c. **Self Preservation.** All members of the OMLT must have highly developed personal skills to enable them to fight for their survival in isolation. Weapons training, first aid training, communications training, actions-on, driver training, ability to call for and direct fires etc all need to be included in the OMLT training package.

³ As a general rule of thumb double the time required to train UK personnel plus 10%.

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OPSEC issues should also be addressed in training (security risks, procedures required, standard of training to be delivered to ISF etc).

d. **Language.** It is desirable for at least some members of the OMLT to speak the language of their students. Selection of languages should be based on the ethnic mix of the ISF unit. Colloquial or 'streetwise' (rather than classical) language should be used. Where interpreters are used the OMLT must rehearse delivering lessons via an interpreter (eg briefing interpreters to translate word for word etc).

e. **Training Skills.** The OMLT members are required to conduct the training of ISF units. They therefore need to be trained as trainers and be fully conversant with the subject matters taught (in particular foreign weapon systems, communication systems and vehicles). Lesson plans should be prepared, up to date and supported by relevant language cards for the trainers.

f. **Liaison.** OMLT personnel will be required to fulfil liaison functions with other elements of the ISF and MNF. They should be trained accordingly in procedures, communications systems and language (if required).

g. **Battlespace Management.** Where the OMLT is responsible for delivering additional capabilities to ISF units (CAS, SH, CASEVA, CCA etc) it should be able to fulfil the Battlespace Management (BM) function for the ISF HQ.

CONDUCT

9. **Introduction.** It is intended to cover considerations pertinent to the operation of OMLT in this section and not repeat existing doctrine and TTPs that cover the delivery of lessons and training.

10. **Team Security.** The following points must be considered and adhered to when conducting OMLT tasks:

a. **Trust.** The ISF unit that is being trained is highly likely to have been infiltrated by hostile elements and should never be trusted entirely. The same applies to Locally Employed Civilians (LECs).

b. **IA Drill.** The OMLT must have an IA drill to cover a situation where the ISF unit (or elements) it is training attacks it. This drill should never be communicated to the ISF.

c. **Emergency Communications.** The OMLT must have constant (24 hour) communications on an open line to deal with emergency situations.

d. **IRT.** Wherever possible an IRT should be available to assist an OMLT if required.

e. **Carriage of Weapons.** OMLT personnel should always be armed.

f. **Vigilance.** One member of the OMLT should always be awake and providing security for the team (in camp and particularly on training and operations).

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g. **IED and Terrorist Threat.** Pattern setting must be avoided and appropriate equipment and TTPs employed.

h. **Indigenous Drivers and Vehicles.** Poorly trained ISF drivers and badly maintained vehicles pose a serious threat to the safety of the OMLT (and ISF) both on routine training activity and operations. Driver training and assessment should be conducted at the outset of the task and a similar system to the UK FMT 600 (where driver training and competences are recorded) should be adopted⁴.

i. **Personal Security and OPSEC.** OMLT personnel should avoid exchanging e-mail addresses with and providing details of domestic residences etc to members of the ISF. Personal e-mails and mobile phone calls may not be appropriate in some locations due to the risk of compromise and OMLT personnel should be prepared to be out of direct contact with families and friends for extended periods when the risk of compromise dictates⁵.

j. **Self Reliance.** The OMLT must have sufficient training (medical, communications, joint fires procedures etc) to ensure that it can conduct operations with HN ISF in isolation from national or coalition forces.

11. **Relationship with ISF.** OMLT personnel should attempt to develop a strong professional relationship with the ISF personnel and get to know them more personally. Sharing food and tea, sporting and social events, living alongside them and taking an interest in their backgrounds and families goes a long way to establishing a good rapport as does developing language skills. However seemingly small cultural blunders (swearing, spitting, showing the soles of the feet when sitting, looking at wives who live on camp etc) can set back training programmes significantly and ruin interpersonal relationships in an instant.

12. **Recreation Facilities.** The OMLT is likely to be operating in remote locations where the local community and ISF are likely to be religious and extremely conservative. Care should be taken to avoid exposing the community and ISF to Western influences. A separate tent/area should be set aside for OMLT personnel to watch DVDs etc. The OMLT should not take pornography of any sort (DVDs, magazines etc) with them in order to avoid causing irreconcilable offence with local leaders, communities and the ISF, thus providing opposition groups with invaluable Info Ops opportunities (footnote 4 applies).

13. **Mentoring.** The mentoring function is best conducted through adherence to TE Lawrence's dictum "Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better (they) do it tolerably well than you do it perfectly. It is their war and you are to help them, not win it for them". The ability to advise, steer and influence personnel in a direction that will allow them to fulfil their operational tasks and simultaneously develop capacity is a step beyond that of actually training the ISF. It should encourage the ISF to take responsibility for its actions.

14. **Training.** Where training to achieve the required basic standard is required (likely in the early stages of the OMLT task) a number of issues should be considered:

⁴ It is common for unqualified ISF personnel who want the prestige (and comfort) of being a driver to take advantage of OMLT personnel changeovers to be employed as drivers.

⁵ If OMLT personnel cannot accept these restrictions then they are not suited to the task in the first place.

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- a. **Ranges and Field Firing.** SASC support should be sought when selecting/opening live firing ranges and developing field firing programmes. UK safety standards should be adopted as far as is practicable. The OMLT should ensure that specialist tools (such as those required for zeroing AK series weapons) and relevant manuals are available.
- b. **Timings.** Be aware of the normal daily routine of the ISF and produce training programmes that match the usual daily in-barracks rhythm in conjunction with them. Take a firm line on lax attitudes to programme timings. Be clear that an 'Insh'allah' approach is not acceptable.
- c. **Pace of Training.** The pace of training will be much slower than that for UK troops. Be patient and realistic about what can be achieved in the time available.
- d. **Driver Training.** For ISF forces equipped with vehicles driver assessment and training is essential. Mobility cadres are likely to be required at the outset of most OMLT tasks. Once trained, driver records should be kept and routine maintenance and first parade checks carried out.
- e. **Develop G1 and G4 Capability.** The G1 and G4 capacity of the ISF should be developed in parallel with its G3 capability. Pay, promotion, ES, infrastructure etc all contribute to the operational effectiveness of the ISF unit and the enduring effect of the OMLT task.
- f. **Training Methods and Aids.** Training should be conducted as practical, hands-on activity with realistic scenarios. Simple pictures and diagrams make effective training aids.

Throughout the training phase the emphasis should be on progressing to mentoring.

15. **Discipline.** The ISF chain of command should be used to discipline trainees. This will avoid compromising the OMLT relationship with their students and help to develop an enduring culture of discipline in the ISF. The OMLT should check and mentor the ISF unit on disciplinary procedures.

16. **Interpreters.**

- a. **Training.** Detailed rehearsals should be conducted with interpreters prior to the delivery of training. They should be briefed to interpret word for word.
- b. **Security.** Consider the wider security implications of the knowledge that interpreters will gain from assisting with instruction. After a number of training cycles they are likely to be proficient instructors themselves and could pass on skills and information to adversaries.
- c. **Duty of Care.** Consider the security and safety of interpreters who are expected to deploy on operations. Confirm that this task is actually within their contract.

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17. **Developing ISF.** Throughout the OMLT task effort should be taken to develop the ISF unit's enduring capacity and capability⁶. A number of methods should be considered:

- a. The ISF unit chain of command should be involved in the following activities from the outset of the task:
 - (1) The design of training programmes.
 - (2) After Action Reviews (AAR) and the assessment of the performance of their troops.
 - (3) The selection of soldiers to become instructors.
- b. Development of a strong cadre of SNCO and JNCO who are given adequate responsibilities.
- c. Where applicable the OMLT should identify suitable candidates for training at RMAS, Brecon, UK police academies etc. This will develop the capability of the ISF and create long term influence on likely future senior figures within the ISF.
- d. Involving the ISF chain of command in planning for operations (when their capability is at a suitable level and OPSEC issues have been addressed). Use local knowledge. Keep plans simple.
- e. Use operational experience to develop the ethos and capability of ISF. Manage exposure to risk and do not overface. Exploit operational success to build confidence and esteem (consider honour, perceptions of families, indigenous population etc).

18. **Constraints.** A number of issues need to be clearly understood when the OMLT conducts mentoring tasks:

- a. The extent to which the OMLT should become involved in ISF operations (for example do they assist with the planning of missions only or do they deploy on operations with the ISF and provide specific capabilities (eg fires)?)
- b. The constraints on any advice that can be given (for OPSEC reasons or due to limitations placed on UK forces by certain conventions, for example the use of AP mines and chemical agents).
- c. Legal issues regarding the use of UK ammunition on operations with the ISF (for example, UK ammunition provided by the OMLT for training is subsequently used by the ISF on operations which result in the death of a foreign national).

19. **Transition from Training to Operations.**

- a. **OPSEC.** OPSEC is critical and the following methods should be used:

⁶ See AFM Vol 1 Part 1, *Formation Tactics*, Chapter 5 for more detail on developing ISF.

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- (1) Due to the likelihood of infiltration of the ISF unit by adversaries it is usual for the OMLT to brief only the senior ISF commander in advance (compromised security can then quickly be traced).
- (2) For the first operation conducted by the unit with the OMLT it may be appropriate to brief that the unit is deploying on a training task and inform them of the operation en route.
- (3) Plan and rehearse a number of operations of which only one will be conducted.
- (4) The OMLT should ensure that the ISF deal with breaches of security (highlight then check that action has been taken).
- (5) Screening of ISF personnel, interpreters and LECs should be conducted as far as possible.
- (6) Isolation of ISF personnel prior to an operation.

b. **ISF Involvement in Planning.** Most ISF units will have soldiers from the areas in which the unit will be operating. They should be used in the planning process to provide detailed information on target areas (for example, where does the village headman live? Where do his relations live? Does he own a mobile phone? What are the best approaches? Location of minefields etc). ISF personnel returning from leave may be willing to provide the OMLT and their chain of command with background information (for example, the mood and opinions of villagers and family). (Note - this should not be considered as HUMINT activity). Keep plans simple.

c. **Weapon Handling and Safety.** In the initial transition to operations, particularly in contact, it is usual for ISF personnel to forget weapon handling drills and basic safety. The OMLT should ensure that procedures for making ready are enforced and be aware of the risks.

d. **G4.** Procedures and the required capability must be in place to ensure that both the ISF and OMLT have sufficient ammunition, rations, batteries, fuel etc for the duration of operations.

e. **CASEVAC.** A CASEVAC system must be established for the ISF and OMLT.

f. **Supporting Assets.** The OMLT must understand the procedures required to coordinate MNF assets in support of ISF operations (eg. CAS, AH, SH, CCA, CASEVAC). The OMLT must be able to conduct BM at the appropriate level.

g. **Liaison.** The OMLT is likely to be required to provide LOs to MNF and other ISF HQs during the conduct of operations. These should operate in parallel to LOs from their associated ISF unit to ensure that the necessary coordination takes place and that the capability of the ISF to fulfil this function is developed.

h. **Partnering.** Partnering is a defined relationship between ISF and CF force elements, facilitated by the OMLT, which allows coordinated and cooperative operational and training activity. Partnering, despite the potential constraints it may place on the CF, offers advantages to the ISF, the CF and the OMLT. For example,

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it will offer legitimacy to CF operations, aid the transition to ISF primacy and, through the CF's professional example, provide a role model to the ISF, thus developing their capability. The CF partnering unit's responsibilities will include (but are not limited to):

- (1) The identification of operational tasks, in conjunction with the OMLT, which will enable the development of ISF capability whilst simultaneously contributing to the operational plan.
- (2) The planning, execution and coordination of joint CF/ISF operations up to the point at which the ISF can assume the lead.
- (3) The provision of wider CF capabilities such as CAS, medical support, communications, air mobility and logistics.
- (4) Assistance to the OMLT in the training, mentoring and enabling of all ISF activity.

20. **Influence Activity.** The OMLT should consider its ability to contribute to other campaign lines of operation. For example, where trained medical staff are available running clinics for families of ISF soldiers and members of the local community could have a significant impact on local perceptions and attitudes. The OMLT could also identify possible CIMIC tasks to provide benefit to local communities and assist with the delivery of food supplies to locals in, say, the winter. Whilst these may be short term activities that are not linked to longer term development programmes their likely short term impact on the security situation will assist in setting the conditions for other agencies to operate, and for longer term projects to be implemented.

21. **Equipment Issue.** Where the OMLT is responsible for the issue of weapons and equipment to ISF units normal G4 procedures for issue and accounting must be introduced and the ISF given responsibility for these. Accountability should be enforced through the use of checks (both by the OMLT and the ISF chain of command) and disciplinary action (again through the ISF) where appropriate. Where possible a long term approach should be adopted to equipping the ISF. Some form of development programme should be developed and agreed in conjunction with them and the HN MOD/donors.

22. **Measures of Effectiveness.** The OMLT will be required to report on the progress and capability of the ISF unit it is working with. Usually this process will involve a combination of judgment (by OMLT personnel and ISF commanders) and objective data (numbers trained to certain standards, equipment issued etc). The OMLT should anticipate this requirement, and be clear of the requirement. The ISF chain of command should be involved in this process throughout.

23. **OMLT Handovers and Continuity.** In order to maintain continuity consideration should be given to rotating OMLT personnel 50% at a time. Where this is not possible time must be allocated for a comprehensive handover and for working relationships between the ISF and the incoming OMLT to be established.

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CHAPTER 26

LIAISON

INTRODUCTION

1. Stability operations will see UK Armed Forces working alongside coalition partners, Other Government Departments (OGD), International Organisations (IO) and Indigenous Security Forces (ISF). Liaison activity will be essential to achieve coordination at all levels and it will require significant additional manpower.

LIAISON WITH COALITION FORCES

2. The requirement for liaison with other friendly forces will be considerable. It will normally take one of the following forms:

a. **Cross Boundary Liaison.** Where units are conducting operations outside a framework of established AOs liaison with friendly forces will continue to be as conducted in a general war setting. However, most units involved in conducting operations will normally be allocated an AO. As such there will be a need for considerable cross boundary liaison with neighbouring units. This liaison will aim to:

- (1) Achieve transparency of intentions and conduct.
- (2) Ensure deconfliction of patrols and other operations.
- (3) Encourage cross boundary support and medical assistance, particularly where a remote site in one area is adjacent to a friendly location across the unit boundary. In such cases movement of CASEVAC will often be more effective via the bordering unit.
- (4) Assist commonality of force posture and military activity. A military force has to have the ability to be effective and consistent in all areas of operations.
- (5) Ensure that cross boundary operations such as escorts or convoys can be conducted effectively.

b. **Liaison Across the Chain of Command.** The multinational and multilingual nature of a military force will often give chain of command liaison a greater significance than in a general war setting. This is particularly so if a military contingent is not familiar with generic operating procedures used by the lead military force such as NATO. Chain of Command liaison will also assist with the two well known liaison difficulties:

- (1) **Language Barriers.** Where a contingent speaks a language not used by a superior HQ, the benefit to a commander who can brief or be briefed by an LO in person, who then relays orders to the unit in its own language, will be considerable.

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(2) **Passage of Information.** Communication over the long distances will be a challenge. Radio and satellite communications will often be unworkable and long distance travel over poor routes will take time. An LO will often be required at a superior HQ to brief, assist with planning or just to relay likely future intentions.

c. **Liaison with the Civil Authorities.** It is also essential, where appropriate, to effect good liaison with the Civil Authorities such as the local police, coastguards, air traffic controllers and any fire services and hospitals in the theatre of operations.

d. **Liaison with ISF.** AOs may be shared with ISF and UK Armed Forces are likely to be responsible for developing ISF capability and capacity as part of a Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme. Depending on the capability of the ISF the liaison function may be achieved through Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) or through the standard exchange of Liaison Officers (LO).

LIAISON WITH CIVILIAN ORGANISATIONS

3. A feature of the COE is the plethora of OGD, IOs and NGOs working in operational theatres. The military will usually find itself working alongside a range of civil actors working to disparate agendas. Military forces will often work in conjunction with organisations established, for example, to monitor the police which might not be part of the same chain of command, but working under the same mandate. The military line of operation cannot be pursued in isolation. Effort must therefore be made to understand where and how these organisations are operating and attempt to coordinate activity. There may be a commitment under a particular mandate for the military to provide security for IO. Liaison with IO, such as the UNHCR, ICRC, WHO and UN Civpol will generally allow a military commander to advise on:

a. **Security.** A military commander will often be responsible for the security situation (namely the provision of a secure environment). There may, therefore, be a requirement for daily security briefings to IO and the need to develop contingency plans for their evacuation in the event of a deterioration in the security situation. Information sharing may include advice on mine threats, areas of conflict, ceasefires and other related activity.

b. **Shared Initiatives.** Operations will often involve contributions from IO. For example, an attempt to return refugees to their previous homes may well require the military force to ensure the situation is secure, the UNHCR to oversee the refugees, an organisation to oversee the civil police and a number of others to assist with the rebuild of destroyed houses. Such operations will require a shared aim, with coordinated planning and negotiation to ensure success.

LIAISON WITH WARRING FACTIONS

4. Liaison with Warring Factions (WFs) and other host nation entities should normally be attempted by all levels of command within the military force. Depending on the military structure, there may well be a Div LO, Bde LO, unit LO, G9 LO and UNMOs. All will attempt to meet and provide liaison with key civil, military and police commanders. A liaison plan has to be adopted to ensure deconfliction of responsibilities between different

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LOs and to ensure the timely and accurate passage of information up the chain of command. In particular, responsibilities for liaison with specific WF commands/levels of command have to be established. For example, a unit LO may liaise with WF Bdes; a Bde LO may liaise with WF Div HQs and the Div LO liaise with WF Corps HQs. Foot patrols, if deployed, can be used for liaison with the civilian population and any local WF. Once confidence has improved, liaison between individual staff branches can be established.

5. Where such a framework is not established, then there is potential for different LOs to have meetings with the same WF commander several times in a short space of time: it is probably not necessary. In this case a Div LO wanting to verify information at a lower level, and in person, should get the unit LO (or whoever normally deals at that level) to arrange the meeting, accompany the Div LO and introduce him to the WF commander, thus retaining continuity. Probable liaison tasks with WFs are as follows:

- a. **Negotiations.** The need to negotiate will depend on the mandate, the force structure and its level of dependency on host nation support or on WF goodwill.
- b. **Ceasefire Violations.** The basing of LOs at WF HQ will assist in the resolution of any ceasefire violations. Not only will it allow a rapid assessment of which party is the aggressor, but it will assist the military commander in preventing an escalation of the violation, or reprisals. Coordinated and timely negotiations can be conducted concurrently with opposing military commanders to bring about a return to stability or a ceasefire.
- c. **Protests/Briefs.** The requirement for briefings to host nations/WF of future operations and the requirement to protest breaches of any ceasefire or peace agreement will depend entirely on the nature of the mandate.